


SOROTAN DARAT

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TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ENGINEER TRAINING



Mejar Tommy Pereira

The performances of the Regiment of Engineers in the GONZALES series according to the author have been, to a certain extent, unsatisfactory and that the Engineer training should be guided by a practical doctrine based on facing the enemy with what we have. The author further advocates that a positive attitude be adopted by personnel if effective training is to be achieved. Engineer training should be guided by a practical doctrine based on facing the enemy with what we have. A positive attitude by all personnel is vital to ensure effective training, and to add to this a training review board is necessary to serve as a watchdog.

THE PROBLEM

It is the duty of an army to be prepared for war at all times. However without the experience at first hand of the practical realities and requirements of war, it is at times difficult for armies such as ours to prepare correctly for war, especially conventional warfare.

Added to the lack of real experience in conventional warfare is the perpetual shortages of facilities, training areas, stores, time and of course personnel. This situation is aggravated in the case of the Engineers by the non existence of key stores and equipment.

There is no lack of explicit training directives, instructions, orders and the like. There also seems to be no problems in the submissions of voluminous training reports. It would be very interesting and probably alarming if an analysis was conducted as to the effectiveness of the training being carried out and the true preparedness of our army for war.

The reports on Engineer performances in the GONZALES Exercises¹ give an insight to some of the deficiencies. The constantly poor performances of officers in promotion examinations are also indications of training shortcomings.

REALISTIC APPROACH

A realistic approach to training is vital. Certain plans permanent or temporary, have to be identified, accepted and catered for. The enemy will not wait for us to be perfectly equipped, manned and trained before launching his onslaught.

While striving to overcome all existing shortcomings and deficiencies in our system we should act to ensure maximum preparedness within our current capabilities and limitations. Training should be based on preparing for battle with what we have, not what we should have or hope to have. However when what we should have or hope to have arrives training will automatically adjust as the same principle is applied.

THE TRAINING CYCLE

The training cycle can be divided into 3 main categories:

- * Basic training.
- * Specialisation and advanced training.
- * Continuous unit and on the job training.

Basic training can be subdivided into two further types:

- * Basic military training
- * Basic Engineer training.

The effectiveness of any further training will be determined to a large extent by the effectiveness of the basic training that a soldier has undergone. Correct basic training would have inculcated a keen sense of professionalism together with a sense of responsibility and eagerness to improve. Without interest and motivation elaborate training programmes will be of no avail. However with interest and motivation any individual can and will on his own accord, train himself to be a professional. He will also gain most from any form of training.

It is felt that both types of basic training today are not as effective as they should be. Some of the problems identified with basic training are:

- * Too large a number.
- * Lack of basic facilities.
- * Lack of stores.

Number of trainees should be determined by the number of good instructors and facilities available bearing in mind an effective student/instructor ratio. Mass production of poor trainees will only aggravate the situation in the long run as the accumulated deficiencies could result in a total breakdown of the system. Instructors should be selected on merit and not on welfare or career considerations. They should be made to prove themselves worthy of their appointments.

To derive optimum effectiveness from training the conditions that trainees live and work in should be conducive to allow it. Basic facilities such as accommodation, water and electricity should be catered for. While the aim should be to train tough, unpampered soldiers, due considerations should also be given to the provision of amenities to meet their basic needs.

A large volume of practical training appears to be based on imaginary, notional or improvised stores, especially in the Engineers. While improvisation appears to be the Engineer war cry it must be borne in mind that a soldier needs to know how

the original store or item is constructed and functions before he can improvise. Recruits on navigational exercises have known to share one compass among 40 recruits.

The everlasting maxim of learning to crawl before walking and running should be strictly adhered to in training. The nation has gone back to the 3 Rs; for recruit training we should adopt the 3 Ks – *Kesopanan, Kecergasan, Kemahuan*. Let us first aim at converting civilians to military personnel. The reminder should then be taught properly, efficiently and progressively. Finance should not be the criteria in deciding the length² of basic training. The duration allocated should be determined solely by the realistic time required to achieve the objectives.

SPECIALISATION AND ADVANCED TRAINING

To facilitate correct specialisation and advanced training there is a need to identify in practical terminology the roles and tasks of the Engineers. The adoption of foreign doctrines will not serve any purpose. There are still many areas of engineer responsibilities which have not been taken into consideration.

One of the main factors attributed to the fall of Singapore in the final stages of the Japanese assault was the misemployment of the Engineers³. General Percival was said to be foolishly deaf to good Engineer advice. Let us not allow history to repeat itself. The formulation of doctrine may take some time. However drawing up interim operational or technical instructions to cover all roles and tasks of the engineers will assist all those involved in any form of training to plan towards common objectives. This is especially important when we have personnel who are exposed, to further training in countries such as the USA, Indonesia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Britain, Australia, India, Phillipines and so on. The aim should be for personnel trained overseas to use their wider exposure to better fulfill our local objectives. A comparison of precis held in the Army Engineer School today will bear out this fact.

The correct selection of personnel is imperative towards achieving effective specialised train-

ing. Their academic, physical and mental qualifications should be taken into consideration. By and large compulsion should be avoided. However at times it may be genuinely necessary to compel especially in cases where individuals themselves are not aware of their full potential or are apprehensive of their failures.

Shortlisting of personnel for specialisation can commence during basic combat engineer training. This can then be confirmed during the new sapper's subsequent service in the unit. One of the effective methods tried out is the attachment of potential tradesmen to understudy trained tradesmen. By this method a soldier's potential and aptitude can be determined. This can be taken a step further by drawing up a loose schedule whereby all potential tradesmen are introduced to their prospective specialisation trades prior to their actual attendance of the basic trade courses. This will serve two purposes: the tradesman in charge will have an opportunity to confirm and put into practice his knowledge as well as his instructional capability while the trainee will be prevented from presenting himself at the Engineer School for a trade course without the faintest idea of what he is in for.

Selection for advanced training should, in addition to time qualifications, be based on merit. Entrance examinations should be conducted for those intending to attend advanced courses. These entrance examinations should be based on determining whether the potential student has practised his trade at the basic level at least. Those who do not make the grade should not be allowed to attend the advanced courses. The onus should be on the individual to prepare himself for the advance course from the time he has completed his basic course. Too often soldiers only open their precis or notes while at the Engineer School, at other times they, (the notes) collect dust. Any student who aspires to pass an advanced course should prove himself without any doubt.

CONTINUOUS AND ON THE JOB TRAINING

The most common excuse given by many in this respect is 'No personnel'. In addition the

following comments are also heard 'No time', 'no stores', 'no facilities'. Continuous training is a daily affair and can be carried out even if there is only one person left in the unit.

The field squadron⁴ has 327 personnel on establishment. However there will never be a time when any squadron can have more than 280 personnel (based on 10% on leave and 10% on course). For the immediate future a squadron commander will be very fortunate if he can parade 200 men everyday (on current situation 30% are on course at any one time). However these 200 men or less will have to perform the role of a squadron. This message will have to be driven home and accepted by all. The aim should be to train these smaller number to perform as a squadron. In war even if a squadron were to start out with a full complement of personnel, it will be fortunate to be able to operate with 90%⁵ of its strength after one week of intense activity.

Training time will have to be created. By this it is meant that training should be given a high priority. A certain number of personnel should be on some form of beneficial training at any one time. The ideal time for training is when a group is on standby.

Training programmes at Squadron level should be drawn up in detail by the implementers, and the troop commanders⁶. No troop commander can honestly say that he cannot set aside one day or 8 hours every week for his own training. This training time should be extracted from working hours in a week. Even a troop on operations can set aside an hour a day for some form of beneficial training. Examples of how this hour can be spent are:

- * Proficiency in planning tasks
 - * Delivering orders
 - * Administration training
 - * Hygiene training
 - * First aid training
 - * Casualty evacuation
 - * Training in taking over command, the tp or Sect Comd hands over command to his subordinate and observes him.
 - * Psychological training, discussing Rukun Kesopanan, Rukun Negara.
- It will be a shocking experience in most cases

if one was to lay out all the stores available in a Quartermaster's store and get the unit personnel to look at them. It has been found that many officers and Non-Commissioned officers were unaware of the variety and numbers of stores available within a unit. The answer to the problem of lack of stores is, "First be proficient in the employment of all the stores that you have in your unit, only then can you determine the additional stores you need". On an exercise⁷ recently there was a requirement to measure the gap of a river. The person responsible was planning to wade across to measure the gap, with a tape and string. When a gap measurer was shown to him, he admitted that he had never heard of it, let alone seen it or knowing how to use it. Yet gap measurers have been in field squadrons' holdings for many years.

There appears to be a constant cry for training areas. While it is granted that gazetted training areas are scarce, it is hard to accept that practical engineer training cannot be carried out in this vast natural terrain of ours. A little perseverance will result in the usage of terrain that will provide excellent challenges to engineer knowledge. Let us never forget that the Japanses advanced in a conventional warfare style from Kedah to Singapore in this unsuitable terrain for conventional style warfare (to quote some eminent warfare pundits prior to 1940)

Opportunity and informal training can play a very vital role towards effective training and the attainment of professionalism. Every activity if properly planned can be converted into a training exercise of some form. Even the driver on his school ferry⁸ rounds, if properly supervised, can be trained to be a disciplined, responsible and honest soldier. It is not unusual to come across a unit regimental policemen carrying a pistol he has never fired. It is also not unusual to come across a storeman who cannot use some of the stores or tools that are under his charge. Every engineer should be encouraged to be inquisitive and to learn on his own initiative. Constant informal methods of questioning and testing should be employed to inculcate a keen sense of opportunity training.

Training has to be realistic. While it is possible to train soldiers in tactics without real enemy, it

is not possible to teach soldiers to fill up craters without a hole in the ground. Far too often training is reduced to notional manoeuvres. For realistic engineer training the following are necessary:

- a. Suitable training area with minimum restrictions.
- b. Sufficient stores.
- c. Realistic scenario.
- d. Reasonable usage of explosives and stores.

Unit Commanders should be encouraged to conduct realistic training even though it may prove quite expensive. However the expenditure incurred should not be allowed to be excessive. Unit Commanders should be encouraged to be bold in their training. Genuine mistakes during training should be accepted within reason. It is better to flop in training than in war.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE TRAINING CYCLE

The Engineer School⁹ is the only formal Engineer training establishment. Every Engineer personnel will attend a minimum of two courses at the School. Some attend up to five or six courses. As such the School plays a vital role in the inculcation of basic and advanced engineer knowledge as well as general attitudes and behaviour into all engineer personnel. The degree of success of all other training will largely depend on the effectiveness of the training at the Engineer School. The School faces many problems and to an outsider it appears that effective support from higher echelons is not forthcoming.

The Regiment of Engineers is 29 years old and yet it lacks in facilities and stores. Most of its equipments¹⁰ need to be changed if training is to be effective. A good example is the machinery in the Trade Training Squadron.

The posting of personnel to the school should never be for convenience or on welfare ground. On the other hand there are many instructors who have been at the school far too long¹¹ that they have not kept pace with the current situation in the real engineer world. The Engineer School should aim to turn out professional engineers and not borderlined welfare passes. Strict standards should be set up and enforced.

The Engineer School should be the *Pride of the Regiment*. Every individual who is posted to the School should have a proven track record as an all rounder.

a. Postings. Stringent selection of personnel should be the norm. Disciplinary cases of any form should be kept away. Personnel should not be allowed to remain in the School for more than five years¹².

b. Stores. Action should be taken to ensure that the school possesses a complete range of all Regiment Engineer stores. In addition it should possess stores which will enable tradesmen to be trained to be at par if not better than their civilian counterparts. It should also possess other stores that will facilitate the passing on of information and knowledge pertaining to current development in the international scene in the respective fields of all tradesmen.

c. Standards. High standards should be decided upon, formalised and enforced. Standards should also be based on, where applicable, current national and international standards.

d. Support. The Regiment of Engineers as a whole should strive to ensure that the School is the best organization in the Regiment. All form of moral and material support that is needed should be unselfishly extended.

e. Publications. The School as the centre of Engineer learning should have a wide range of reference material. In addition it should also disseminate new items and training developments to the Regiment. The quality of precis in the School needs to be improved and all units should have free access to them.

There is a move to decentralise as many courses as possible. The Engineers do not appear to be too badly affected by this move. However the small numbers of courses that are decentralised such as cadre courses, JSPA¹³ courses and the like should be guided by central standards. The personnel who pass a cadre course organised by HQRE 1 Div¹⁴ may tomorrow serve in 3 Div. A pass in a cadre course is a prequalification for promotion. It has therefore to be standardised and assessed on similar standards. All decentralised

courses should be conducted based on standard syllabi and assessed based on predetermined common standards.

QUALITY OF THE ENGINEER SOLDIER

To quote a famous General "The key word to proper Military training is INTEREST, firstly on the part of the soldier being trained and secondly on the part of those who run the Army" — the Generals^{1,5}.

The Engineer soldier comes to the Regiment with very little Engineer involvement in his selection. The Engineer soldier, due to the nature of this roles and tasks, has to have qualities and capabilities in addition to those that are required of an ordinary soldier. It is almost impossible to cultivate interest in a soldier who is a half hearted soldier in the first place. In addition, to place the burden of mustering a trade and to learn mathematics and the like on a person whose only vision of soldiering is that in the fashion of 'Combat' and John Wayne's celluloid exploits is similar to the proverbial donkey and the water. Engineer soldiers can be exemplified as a special breed. Most of the time one mistake on the part of an engineer soldier can result in the loss of many lives and equipment. Few other soldiers need to shoulder similar responsibilities, yet apart from the marginally superior educational qualifications very little else differentiates the Engineer recruit from the others. Given that sort of basic material it is no wonder that the engineers are not moving forward.

A review has to be made of the entry standards. Today's SPM appears to be the equivalent of yesterdays SRP. We should make it attractive for the right type of SPM holders to become Engineer soldiers.

The engineers should play a direct role in the selection of engineer personnel both the other ranks and officers. Some form of engineer School cadet corp is not too far fetched an idea. We should also cash in on the schools under Armed Forces auspices such as the Trendak's MRSM^{1,6} as our sources for potential sappers^{1,7}. Effectives recruiting programmes are necessary to obtain the right talents.

Basic military and Engineer training should be based on the inculcation of motivation and dedication. With motivation and dedication, interest will be cultivated naturally. With interest any form of training will achieve higher degree of success.

At present it appears that everything has to be put down in reports. Visits to units consist of parades, briefings and walkarounds. While agreeing that the above will achieve a certain amount of training value it is felt that a large amount of time is wrongly utilised. In the absence of real warfare, units should be tested practically. There is nothing to stop a field squadron or troop being given realistic test tasks at short notice. Deployment procedures, battle procedures, planning and execution of engineer tasks and technical proficiency are some of the aspects that units should be proficient in and tested at as often as possible! This will put all units on their toes at all times.

Units should be motivated to achieve a high standard of proficiency at all times. This can be achieved by senior officers testing the units practically as often as possible. While insisting on good administration a review of the large number of reports being submitted should be conducted to ascertain their true value. How many of these reports are read with any degree of comprehension? The true value of training conducted can only be assessed by practical tests not reports.

Senior officers should encourage bold and practical training. They should also encourage realistic training. They should strive to ensure that their units are correctly equipped for practical training. Sound future planning will enable and encourage unit commanders to plan meaningful training.

BASIC EQUIPMENT AND STORES

Earlier in the article the question of some form of doctrine was discussed. It is imperative, in the absence of a formal doctrine, that an interim but detailed list of roles and tasks of the engineers be drawn up. In the absence of clear cut roles and tasks and concepts of execution it is impossible to train an engineer soldier completely. It is also impossible to determine the stores and equipment that an engineer unit or the Regiment

of Engineer will need to be able to discharge their responsibilities efficiently. If for some reason the relevant stores cannot be obtained then our concepts of execution of tasks need to be reviewed and adjusted. We should avoid the classic example of thousands of engineer soldiers being taught how to use the Anti-Tank mine (in the form of concrete blocks¹⁸) while the Regiment has never had a single live anti-tank mine since 1970, possible earlier. Many of engineer soldiers have retired without even seeing a live anti-tank mine yet they have laid thousands of anti-tank mines in training.

Based on the interim doctrine, a list of Engineer stores and equipment should be finalised to enable units to fulfill their roles and tasks. These stores should then be procured or manufactured based on the fact that without them the Engineers cannot fulfill their primary roles and tasks. Training can then be meaningfully planned and realistically enforced.

All forms of training should be constantly reviewed to ensure updating and keeping abreast of current developments. With the expansion of the Regiment, additional responsibilities and also the fast moving technological world engineer training needs formal reviews constantly. The review should be conducted jointly by the policy makers as well as the implementors. The reviewers can also play advisory and policy formulation roles.

It is proposed that an Engineer Training Review Board be established. This board should comprise of the Chief Engineers representative, all CRE's¹⁹ the Commandant of the Engineer School as well as other appointed members. An observer or advisor from Army Training may be necessary. The primary role of this Board should be to advise the Chief Engineer on all training matters. It can also be tasked to formulate training directives. It should ensure that Engineer Training while catering for today's requirement is also aware of tomorrow's possible developments in the Army, the Armed Forces, the country and the world.

CONCLUSION

Engineer Training has been formally existing for three decades. However it appears to be some-

what superficial. Very little real progress has been made towards the attainment of the professional engineer soldiers. The launching of the GONZALES series resulted in the Engineers being tested practically, in the open. Many shortcomings were repeatedly exposed.

There seems to be a lack of interest at most levels towards training. Some even consider training and exercises a waste of time. There are many contributory factors. The main ones being the poor quality of material that join the Engineers and their lack of dedication and motivation. The Engineers do not play an effective role in the selection of sappers.

Most commanders at all levels do not attach sufficient importance to continuous training. The Engineer School mainly imparts knowledge to individuals. It is the responsibilities of units to mould the individuals and their knowledge into cohesive and efficient engineer troops and squadrons.

Any form of training planned should be realistic. To achieve this, relevant stores and equipment are necessary. Limitations on expenditure in the form of usage of expendable training stores should not be too strict. Expenditure on training should be considered an investment.

The Engineer School plays a vital role towards the attainment of a well trained sapper. As such it should be manned and equipped accordingly. It should be the pride of all sappers. Sappers should feel proud to go to the school whether as an instructor or student.

In the absence of sufficient stores it is at times impossible to train completely and realistically. There is no indication as to what are the basic stores that the Regiment needs to carry out its primary roles and tasks.

All Engineer training needs to be constantly reviewed and updated. Engineer training policy making should not be left entirely to some individuals. The vital responsibilities related to the formulation of policies, guidelines and drawing up future training plans needs a greater involvement and proper representation of views and problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made with a view to achieving meaningful and efficient Engineer Training.

- a. **Basic Military and Engineer Training.** These two forms of training should be reviewed with the aim of setting out realistic objectives and going about achieving them.
- b. **Interim Doctrine.** Some form of interim doctrine and practice concepts need to be drawn up to provide a basis for all training.
- c. **Selection of Personnel for Advance Training.** The Regiment as a whole should play a positive role in ensuring that only the right personnel attend advanced training.
- d. **Continuous Training.** Commanders at all levels should play a meaningful role in the implementation of continuous training. Continuous training should be based on making respective units and sub units cohesive and efficient with what they have. Most of the so called problems will vanish if there is a genuine spirit to train.

- e. **The Engineer School.** The School should be given priority in all considerations. The School should be equipped and manned so as to play its rightful role in Engineer training.
- f. **Quality of the Sappers.** The Regiment should review its entry qualifications for Officers and other ranks. It should also embark on direct recruitment programmes.
- g. **Assessemment Emphasis.** When assessing units the emphasis should be towards testing its practical capabilities by setting test problems.
- h. **Basic Equipment and Stores.** The Basic equipment and stores required by the Regiment to discharge its responsibilities should be procured and distributed to enable correct and realistic training.
- i. **Review Board.** It is strongly recommended that an Engineer Training Review Board be established to advise the Chief Engineer on all training matters. This Board should also be responsible for the assessment of all training and formulation of training policies and guidelines.



Major Tommy Pereira was commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in December 1970, into the Regiment of Engineers. He has served in all levels of command in a field squadron. He has also served in Engineer Branch in the Department of Army, Headquarters Malaysian Engineers I Division and 2 Division and the Army Engineer School.


He currently commands 7 Engineer Squadron in Kluang. Prior to assuming this command in January 1980, he had successfully completed the Army Survey Course in the United Kingdom.

Footnotes:

- ¹ This is the name given to a series of exercises planned to train and test the Malaysian Army in Conventional Warfare tactics. A total of ten Brigade sized exercises were conducted between 1978 – 1981. They have now been scaled down the Battalion group sized exercises.
- ² Initially recruit training was conducted over six-months. It was then cut down to four months.
- ³ "The fall of Singapore" by Frank Owen.
- ⁴ The field squadron is the basic unit in the Regiment of Engineers, See Establishment No FED (M)/3017/8/71.
- ⁵ Based on logistics planning figures for casualties in the Armed Forces Staff College Handbook.
- ⁶ There are 3 field troops and one plant troop in a field squadron.
- ⁷ GONZALES X.
- ⁸ Military transport provided for transporting forces children to and from school.
- ⁹ The School is located in Kluang.
- ¹⁰ A good example is the machinery in the Trade Training Squadron.
- ¹¹ There have been cases of personnel serving their total term only in the School.
- ¹² This may not be possible in all cases, especially the specialised Warrant Officer Class 1.
- ¹³ Jerangkap Samar and Periuk Api. A course with the aim of training soldier to handle booby traps and mines.
- ¹⁴ Headquarters Regiment of Engineers 1 Division.
- ¹⁵ Lt Gen A.C. Collins in "COMMON SENSE TRAINING".
- ¹⁶ Maktab Sains Rendah Mara which is under construction at Terendak. This will cater for children of forces personnel.
- ¹⁷ Sapper – A private in the Regiment of Engineers. Also used to describe all ranks in the Regiment.
- ¹⁸ In the absence of live training mines concrete blocks were manufactured to depict them. The only similarities were in shape and weight.
- ¹⁹ CRE – Commander Regiment of Engineers, Commands divisional engineers.

SIMULASI TEMPUR

*Sebuah Panduan Latihan dan
Evaluasi Tentera Darat*



Lesternan Kolonel Hashim Karim

Usaha Tentera Darat untuk mengembangkan Simulasi Tempur sebagai panduan latihan bukannya satu contoh 'sensationalism' seperti yang dianggap oleh segelintir masyarakat tentera. Ia adalah penghayatan latihan yang realistik lagi menjimatkan untuk mendidik pegawai-pegawai pemerintah dan setaf di dalam pengendalian pertempuran. Simulasi Tempur juga akan merintis jalan untuk kita memulakan evaluasi rancangan pertahanan, struktur pasukan serta konsep logistik kita secara objektif.

pasti masalah, menganalisa dan seterusnya menghasilkan keputusan secara pantas. Di dalam pendidikan serta latihan mereka, tekanan harus diberi kepada pengendalian pertempuran (conduct of battles). Maksudnya, pendidikan dan latihan untuk pemerintah serta staf mereka hendaklah merangkumi teknik dan kaedah yang melibatkan pengendalian pertempuran hingga tamat; bukan berakhir dengan pengeluaran perintah operasi sahaja³ seperti mana yang lazim kita laksanakan sekarang.

Pernah dikatakan bahawa akademi ketenteraan terbaik ialah medan perang dan Jeneral Giap ditonjolkan sebagai contoh yang nyata.⁴ Malangnya, kita tidak dapat menggunakan falsafah ini di dalam pendidikan dan latihan pemerintah-pemerintah serta staf kita kerana pertempuran bukannya satu perkara yang boleh kita ada-adakan mengikut kehendak. Oleh yang demikian, kita perlu mencari cara dan kaedah lain yang bukan sahaja boleh mewujudkan secara realistik satu

Mengikut pengalaman dan pengamatan mendiang Fil Marsyal Sir William Slim, pertempuran (battles) jarang-jarang sekali berkembang mengikut rencana¹ dan pendapat lain pula menyatakan bahawa apabila krisis timbul semasa mengendalikan pertempuran, keputusan yang pantas oleh pemerintah lebih menjamin kejayaan; bukan masa yang dihabiskan untuk membuat kajian serta perencanaan yang panjang lebar walau bagaimana sempurna sekalipun.² Kedua-dua ini membayangkan bahawa pemerintah-pemerintah dan staf masing-masing perlu dibiasakan untuk mengenal-

medan tempur yang dinamik dalam mana kita dapat menghadapkan pemerintah-pemerintah serta staf mereka dengan ketegangan dan desakan per-tempuran tetapi yang lebih penting kaedah itu hendaklah membenarkan mereka membuat kesalahan tanpa mendatangkan akibat-akibat buruk kepada sesiapa pun. Setelah kerapkali menerima pendedahan kepada suasana demikian, besar kemungkinan pegawai-pegawai pemerintah kita serta staf mereka akan lebih memahami serta mengenali asas-asas pertempuran (the essentials of battles). Ini akan mempertingkatkan lagi kemampuan mereka untuk mengendalikan pertempuran apabila tiba masanya kelak.

Menyedari hakikat ini, Panglima Tentera Darat telah mengarahkan penggunaan teknik simulasi perang (war games) untuk memberi latihan medan perang yang realistik kepada pemerintah-pemerintah formasi dan unit serta staf-staf markas masing-masing mulai dari pertengahan tahun 1983.⁵ Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, suatu model permainan perang yang dinamakan TEMPUR PERTAMA⁶ telah direka dan dikenalkan secara rasminya kepada panglima-panglima di Kem Sungai Udang pada 18 Februari 1983 oleh Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat di bawah arahan Panglima Kor Tentera Darat.⁷

LATIHAN MELALUI SIMULASI TEMPUR

Ada terdapat ramai ahli-ahli dari profesyen ketenteraan yang tidak yakin tentang faedah (usefulness) apatah lagi kesahan (validity) simulasi perang sebagai alat untuk melatih pegawai-pegawai pemerintah serta staf mereka di dalam pengendalian per-tempuran. Ramai pengkritik-pengkritik sambilan memikirkan bahawa simulasi perang hanya sesuai untuk hiburan sahaja (seperti catur dsbnya) dan ia tidak mungkin akan memberi sumbangan terhadap perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan serta kecekapan yang diperlukan oleh profesyen tentera. Oleh sebab inilah maka hingga ke hari ini, selain dari Amerika Syarikat, tidak banyak angkatan-angkatan tentera negara lain yang menggunakan teknik *permainan* perang secara sungguh-sungguh sebagai alat latihan. Sebaliknya pula, mereka yang telah terlibat samada sebagai pelaku (players) atau daya penggerak di dalam perkembangan permainan perang berpendapat bahawa, ia bukannya suatu *permainan*, malah ia adalah latihan untuk peperangan.⁸

Memang tidak boleh dinafikan bahawa belum ada model simulasi perang yang telah dibentuk dengan begitu lengkap dan sempurna untuk mewujudkan realisma yang mutlak bagi seseorang



Tim Simulasi TD



mempelajari seni serta sains peperangan. Walau bagaimanapun, sekiranya permainan perang digunakan mengikut prosedur yang disarankan, ia akan mendatangkan manfaat yang dihajatkan. Misalnya, banyak 'penemuan' serta 'proses pembelajaran' telah berlaku di kalangan pelaku-pelaku permainan perang di Maktab Pemerintahan dan Staf Umum Tentera Darat Amerika Syarikat.⁹ Antara lain pelaku-pelaku telah mempelajari semula (relearn) sifat-sifat sistem senjata. Mereka juga menyedari bahawa menghafal jarak-jarak senjata sahaja tidak mencukupi untuk membolehkan seseorang itu menggunakan satu-satu sistem senjata dengan berkesan. Pelaku-pelaku di dalam pertahanan pula dapat memastikan pengelompokan yang wajar bagi tiap-tiap satu kedudukan platun, kandungan-kandungan yang sesuai untuk skvin, tugas serta utusan yang waras dan rasional untuk kumpulan simpanan dan pelbagai lagi aspek pertempuran yang begitu abstrak untuk dipelajari dengan cukupnya melalui kaedah latihan lain selain dari pertempuran sebenarnya.

Dengan pengalaman simulasi perang kita yang terhad ini pun, ramai ahli-ahli Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat di Markas Kor Tentera Darat telah menemui bahawa nisbah 3:1 yang kita anjurkan di dalam merancang serangan tidak boleh diterjemah-

kan untuk membawa makna menyerang sebuah platun musuh dengan sebuah kompeni kita yang mengandungi tiga platun! Apabila tanggapan mudah ini disimulasikan, ia menghasilkan kekalahan teruk kepada penyerang. Penemuan ini tidak jauh dari kebenaran jika kita bandingkan dengan bukti-buktii yang berdasarkan kepada penyelidikan, pengalaman dan pengamatan. Cuba kita ambil contoh ofensif-balas pihak Jerman di Ardennes dalam Bulan Disember, 1944. Pada keseluruhannya nisbah kekuatan antara pihak Jerman (Army Group B) dengan pihak Amerika Syarikat ialah 3:1. Tetapi dititik-titik konsentrasi keunggulan Jerman meningkat kepada 6:1.¹⁰ Namun, walaupun secara ketara pihak Jerman mempunyai keunggulan yang melimpah, ofensif mereka telah tersekat di sekitar St Vith selama 4 hari. Akhirnya ofensif-balas tersebut telah kecewa. Bagaimana pula halnya dengan serangan tentera Mesir ke atas Garisan Bar-Lev pada 6 Oktober, 1973? Mesir menumpukan 5 divisyen infantri terhadap Briged ke 14 (Yahudi) yang sedang mengendalikan antara 15 hingga 16 benteng-benteng pertahanan (strong points) di sekitar garisan tersebut. Perbandingan kekuatan di antara kedua-dua belah pihak pada permulaan pertempuran adalah seperti dinyatakan di dalam Jadual 1.

Elemen	Mesir	Yahudi	Nisbah
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Infantri	30,750	4,005	7.68:1
Kereta Kebal	30*	100	1.00:3.33
Meriam	960	44	21.82:1
Bantuan Udara Rapat (Sorti)	50	30	1:67:1

JADUAL 1 – PERBANDINGAN KE-KUATAN DI ANTARA TENTERA MESIR DAÑ YAHUDI PADA 6 OKTOBER 1973

* 200 buah lagi kereta kebal masih berada di tebing barat Suez.

Angka-angka di atas, terutamanya angka-angka tentang kekuatan infanteri dan meriam mendedahkan sifat sebenar prinsip konsentrasi kekuatan. Kita semua ketahui hasil serangan Tentera Mesir ke atas Garisan Bar-Lev pada 6 Oktober, 1973. Dalam masa 6 hingga ke 8 jam selepas permulaan serangan, pihak Mesir telah berjaya membina 50 buah feri dan mengatur gerak sepuluh briged di tebing timur untuk menguasai Garisan Bar-Lev.¹² Dengan itu berakhirlah imej kebal yang dikaitkan dengan *garisan* tersebut.

Banyak contoh-contoh lain yang boleh dipetik – Ofensif Montogemery di Alamein dan pemecahan keluar Tentera Bersekutu dari Normandy – untuk menunjukkan bahawa di dalam pertempuran sebenarnya, adalah menjadi matlamat tiap-tiap pemerintah untuk mengatur dan menggerakkan (maneuvre) pasukan mereka dengan cara yang dapat menjamin kejayaan. Di dalam usaha untuk mencapai matlamat ini, pemerintah sentiasa mengambil kira kesan mendalam yang dibawa oleh ubahan tempur (combat variables) terhadap elemen fizikal kekuatan tempur dan hasil atau kesudahan pertempuran.¹³

Sebenarnya, saranan asal yang hendak ditekankan di sini ialah bahwasanya konsentrasi kekuatan di dalam pertempuran bukannya tanggap an lurus atau mudah, “musuh satu pelatun, saya ada tiga platun; jadi saya punyai keunggulan 3:1 yang perlukan.” Sebenarnya, jumlah pasukan dan

kekuatan senjata sahaja tidak memberi apa-apa makna kepada kita melainkan kita mengetahui perihal serta keadaan dalam mana pasukan tersebut serta kekuatan senjatanya digunakan.¹⁴ Adalah dipercayai ramai lagi pelaku-pelaku simulasi perang akan menemui kenyataan ini di masa-masa akan datang apabila mengambil bahagian di dalam permainan perang. Kemudian mungkin kita ingin memikirkan semula tentang pengajaran keunggulan 3:1 di dalam serangan yang dirasai sudah merupakan ‘fallacy’ yang terasas. Mungkin Mao lebih realistik apabila beliau menyarankan nisbah 10:1 apabila melancarkan ofensif tektikal.

Ada di kalangan penentang-penentang simulasi perang yang berpendapat bahawa cara yang terbaik untuk berlatih mengendalikan pertempuran adalah melalui latihan-latihan medan dengan trup (field exercises with troops). Kita memang tidak meragukan dan tidak berhajat untuk memperkecilkan sumbangsih latihan-latihan medan dengan terup terhadap pendidikan dan latihan pemerintah dan staf di dalam pengendalian tempur. Latihan-latihan prosedur tempur, kemahiran tempur dan tembakan di medan, (field firing exercises) di peringkat seksyen dan platun bahkan di peringkat kompeni dan batalion seharusnya diteruskan jika tidak dipesatkan. Walau bagaimanapun, bagi mereka yang pernah terlibat di dalam perencanaan dan pelaksanaan latihan dengan trup secara besar bersetuju bahawa adalah amat sulit atau mungkin mustahil untuk mewujudkan situasi-situasi kritikal seperti yang dihadapi oleh pemerintah dan staf di ANZIO, ST VITH, KOHIMA, IMPHAL ataupun di JITRA, KAMPAR dan SLIM RIVER.

CPX

Mungkin diketika ini sudah ada yang bertanya apa pula kekurangannya dengan latihan pos pemerintahan atau yang lebih kita kenali dengan panggilan CPX? Situasi-situasi kritikal boleh direka dan dimasukkan kedalam Rangka Kejadian latihan tersebut. Memang tidak ada apa salahnya dengan latihan pos pemerintahan. Hanya kita jarang-jarang sekali berpeluang mengadakannya dan apabila diadakan, situasi yang diwujudkan adalah ‘artificial’ kerana segala kejadian ditentukan oleh perancang latihan di dalam bentuk *Rangka Kejadian* (Outline of Events). *Rangka Kejadian* ini diagih kepada *Pengendali Bawah* (Lower Controllers) dalam

bentuk 'control brief' untuk disampaikan kepada pos pemerintahan yang dilatih mengikut masa yang ditentukan.¹⁵ Walaupun cara begini amat perlu untuk menjamin tercapainya pengajaran yang diinginkan oleh pengarah latihan, realisma telah tidak begitu tercapai kerana 'musuh' di dalam latihan seperti ini tidak 'hidup'. Tidak ada berlaku interaksi bebas di antara dua pemerintah yang bertentangan matlamat dan lazimnya perkembangan operasi yang direka di dalam *Rangka Kejadian* disesuaikan dengan organisasi, pengelompokan dan kadangkala rencana *Pasukan Biru*. Menurut Mendiang Field Marsyal Lord Wavell, latihan (exercise) yang paling baik ialah latihan yang mempunyai dua pasukan yang bertentangan dan digerakkan mengikut skim yang mudah, dalam mana segala kejadian dibenarkan berkembang secara sendiri (*naturally*).¹⁶ Untuk ini, kita perlu mengadakan satu sistem untuk menstimulasikan medan perang, elemen-elemen kekuatan tempur dan interaksi di antara pasukan yang bertentangan serta hasil interaksi ini. Pendeknya kita perlu menggunakan teknik *permainan* perang untuk memandu latihan pos pemerintahan kita di masa-masa hadapan supaya latihan tersebut boleh dijadikan lebih dinamik dan realistik; latihan yang berbentuk bebas dan dikendali oleh dua-belah pihak.

KEPERLUAN ASAS

Ramai di kalangan penyelidik-penyelidik berpendapat bahawa permainan perang yang tidak terikat kepada bentuk catur telah pertama kali dicipta oleh Leftenan Von Reisswitz dari Prussia dalam tahun 1811.¹⁷ Permainan ini menggunakan peta untuk menggantikan medan tempur dan 'pieces' atau 'token' untuk menggantikan trup. Dua orang pelaku 'melagakkan' otak mereka di bawah pengendalian seorang pengendali yang berpandukan kepada peraturan-peraturan serta data yang disediakan. Inilah ciri-ciri penting *permainan* perang sebenarnya yang terulung. Sejak dari itu, beranika jenis alat telah direka bentuk untuk melaksana *permainan* perang. Ini meliputi bentuk yang mudah dan murah iaitu alat permainan papan rata seperti yang digunakan di dalam model Von Reisswitz hingga ke Simulator Taktikal Pasukan Tempur Gabungan (Combined Arms Tactical Simulator) iaitu satu simulator pos pemerintahan yang dibantu oleh komputer dan berjuta ringgit harganya. Walau apa pun sistem yang dipilih, beberapa keperluan asas harus diwujudkan untuk menjamin permainan yang berkesan. Setelah keperluan-keperluan ini difahami, maka suasana permainan yang seronok lagi bermakna akan wujud.



PERALATAN ASAS SIMULASI TEMPUR

Keperluan pertama ialah untuk menyediakan satu set peraturan dan data-data untuk mengatur (to regulate) permainan. Di dalam usaha untuk mencipta peraturan serta data-data ini kita akan menghadapi dua keperluan yang bercanggah; per-

berjuta 'dollar' untuk memperolehi permainan komputer atau permainan dibantu komputer.¹⁹ Bagi kita, faktor kewangan dan kemahiran teknikal yang diperlukan untuk mendukung sistem komputer tersebut sudah pasti akan membantutkan usaha untuk menggunakan permainan perang komputer sebagai alat latihan terutama di peringkat-peringkat rendah tanpa menidakkan kegunaannya di bidang penyelidikan dan evaluasi.



Latihan Kekar Malindo VII 1983

aturan serta data yang disediakan hendaklah tepat serta sah dan pada masa yang sama ia jangan merumitkan permainan. Banyak model permainan perang telah terkubur oleh kerana kegagalan penciptanya memuaskan dua keperluan yang bercanggah ini. Misalnya, sejak pengenalamnya di dalam tahun 1811, model yang dicipta oleh Von Reisswitz telah acapkali dipindah serta dibaiki demi untuk mencapai ketepatan, kesahan dan realisma. Akhirnya, peraturan-peraturan serta data-data yang dicipta menjadi begitu banyak dan kompleks sehingga orang-orang Prussia mendapati bahawa banyak tenaga telah digunakan untuk belajar bermain: bukan untuk bermain sebenarnya.¹⁸

Di dalam zaman kebanjiran teknologi ini, jalan keluar yang ketara dari masalah ini ialah dengan menggunakan komputer. Pada zahirnya opsyen ini sangat menarik. Tentera Darat Amerika Syarikat mendahului di dalam bidang ini dan sejak pertengahan tahun 50an, mereka telah melaburkan

Kita sangat beruntung kerana peraturan-peraturan yang terkandung di dalam risalah TEMPUR PERTAMA bukan sahaja telah dicipta dengan baik dari segi ketepatan dan kesahan bahkan ia juga secara relatif mudah dipelajari dan dimainkan kerana tidak melibatkan penggunaan formula-formula yang kompleks atau sefer-sefer yang rumit. Risalah TEMPUR PERTAMA juga tidak memestikan penggunaan atau interpretasi yang 'rigid'. Sebaliknya, peraturan yang disediakan hendaklah digunakan dengan bijaksana serta diiringi dengan imaginasi. Hakikat ini membawa kita kepada keperluan yang kedua.

Satu-satu latihan pos pemerintahan yang dipandu oleh risalah TEMPUR PERTAMA akan hilang nilai latihannya jika pengendali tidak mampu menguruskan konflik secara cepat, tepat, objektif dan realistik. Untuk mencapai kemampuan ini, pengendali hendaklah memahami sepenuhnya peraturan dan prosedur model ini. Mereka juga

hendaklah mengetahui secara mendalam sistem-sistem senjata dan teknik kedua-dua pihak di dalam permainan. Pengendali hendaklah mampu mewujudkan kepercayaan dari pihak pelaku supaya pertengkaran dan pertentangan pendapat dielakkan dan permainan perang dapat berjalan dengan licin.

DOKTRIN

Ketiga, pelaku-pelaku meja permainan juga boleh memberi sumbangan terhadap peningkatan keberkesanan permainan perang. Pelaku-pelaku yang menjalankan peranan musuh hendaklah benar-benar berfikir seperti musuh. Mereka hendaklah merancang serta melaksanakan operasi dengan berlandaskan doktrin dan konsep musuh yang dimainkan. Jika tidak, tentangan yang diadakan terhadap Pasukan Biru adalah tidak begitu realistik. Pelaku meja permainan atau pengendali bawah Pasukan Biru pula hendaklah mengamalkan sikap berkecuali apabila melaksanakan pergerakan serta tindakan unit-unit Pasukan Biru yang dimainkan. Jika sikap ini tidak ujud, maka tugas pengendali untuk mewujudkan simulasi yang tepat lagi realistik akan menjadi amat sulit.

Akhir sekali, di dalam latihan yang dipandu oleh risalah TEMPUR PERTAMA, tumpuan tidak

seharusnya diberi kepada keputusan serta nisbah kecederaan di dalam satu-satu konflik. Jika angka-angka ini dijadikan ukuran untuk menilai kebolehan pelaku, usaha untuk menipu permainan atau 'to beat the game' akan mula menular di kalangan pelaku dan nilai latihan permainan tersebut akan l吕ut. Walaupun risalah TEMPUR PERTAMA menggunakan buah dadu untuk menentukan keputusan satu-satu konflik, ini tidak bermakna bahawa kalah menang di dalam *permainan* perang bergantung kepada nasib semata-mata! Kejayaan tetap bergantung kepada faktor-faktor seperti penggunaan pasukan yang seimbang (balanced force), deploymen tektikal (tactical deployment) yang waras lagi bijaksana dan kefahaman mendalam tentang keupayaan pasukan musuh dan pasukan sendiri. Pelaku-pelaku harus rela menerima akibat hasil pertempuran yang disimulasikan oleh TEMPUR PERTAMA walaupun ia merupakan satu bencana. Kita harus sedar bahawa peperangan adalah kekusutan (muddle) yang lebih dahsyat dari apa yang boleh diwujudkan di dalam keadaan aman dan jika kita boleh bertengang, kekusutan yang paling dahsyat sekalipun akan bertukar menjadi teratur seperti sediakala. Yang penting ialah untuk kita berusaha mencari sebab-sebab berlakunya kekusutan itu dan cuba menghindar berlakunya di masa akan datang.²⁰



Penuntut-penuntut MTAT di meja peraduan

EGO

Di dalam ucapan penutupnya kepada Exercise PURMA yang dijalankan oleh Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera (MTAT) pada 4 – 5 Ogos 1983, Komandan MTAT menyarankan bahawa pelaku-pelaku di dalam permainan perang harus mempunyai muka yang ‘tebal’ jika mereka ingin mendapat manfaat permainan tersebut. Saranan ini sangat tepat kerana tidak seperti latihan-latihan lain, di dalam permainan perang musuh adalah hidup. Oleh yang demikian, penemuan masalah-masalah dan peluang-peluang yang tidak diduga tatkala kita membuat perencanaan memang lazim berlaku. Andainya kita hanya biasa bertinjau dengan bayang-bayang, nanti apabila masuk ke dalam gelanggang dengan penentang yang hidup, keakuan (ego) kita pasti akan tercedera akibat dari pembongkaran kelemahan sendiri. Adalah diharapkan supaya pelaku-pelaku latihan pos pemerintahan yang dipandu oleh sistem *permainan* perang mengambil bahagian dengan sikap yang positif dan pemikiran yang terbuka. Hendaknya, mereka jangan menitikberatkan kalah menang di dalam latihan kerana permainan perang yang bersifat latihan hanya mewujudkan “syhthetic history”.²¹ Keputusan pertempuran yang disimulasikan tidak semestinya menunjukkan dengan tepat akan berlakunya keputusan yang sama di dalam pertempuran yang sebenar. Walau bagaimanapun keputusan yang dihasilkan oleh pertempuran yang disimulasikan itu boleh digunakan sebagai asas untuk mengkaji serta menganalisa sebab ianya berhasil sedemikian. Inilah dia nilai latihan yang harus kita semua cuba perolehi dari permainan perang. Kata orang: ‘berlatih untuk kejayaan, bukan berjaya di dalam latihan.’

EVALUASI DAN PENYELIDIKAN MELALUI PERMAINAN PERANG

Jika kita semak catitan sejarah, kita akan dapati bahawa penggunaan permainan perang khusus sebagai alat evaluasi telah berlaku sejak kurun ke 19 lagi. Rencana-rencana operasi telah dinilai melalui permainan perang sebelum keputusan diambil sama ada rencana tersebut boleh diterima,

perlu diubahsuai atau harus ditolak bulat-bulat. Misalannya, permainan perang telah mengesahkan kepada pihak Prussia betapa pentingnya kegunaan rangkaian landasan keretapi di dalam peperangan mereka dengan France dalam tahun 1870-1871.²² Begitu juga, permainan perang telah menghasilkan *Rancangan Schlieffen* di dalam Peperangan Dunia Pertama. Di dalam Peperangan Dunia Kedua pula, permainan perang telah digunakan secara meluas oleh pihak Jerman untuk menghasilkan antara lain rencana-rencana operasi seperti serangan kilat ke atas France melalui kawasan pergunungan Ardennes dan Operasi Barbarossa dalam tahun 1942. Rancangan untuk melanggar England dalam tahun 1940 juga telah dipermain perangkan dan Hitler telah membatalkan rancangan tersebut kerana *permainan* perang yang diadakan telah menunjuk bahawa kemungkinan kejayaan dicapai amat tipis. Perancang-perancang militer Jepun juga telah banyak bergantung kepada *permainan* perang untuk menguji dan menganalisa rencana-rencana operasi mereka. Serang mengejut ke atas Pearl Harbour, penawanian Midway dan Aleutian Barat, perampasan (seizure) New Caledonia dan Fiji adalah di antara rencana-rencana operasi yang telah dipermainperangkan oleh Instituti Penyelidikan Perang Jepun.

Namun, sambil mengakui rekod kegunaannya yang mengagumkan itu, hasil sebenarnya yang telah diperolehi oleh permainan perang sebagai alat evaluasi tidak boleh dikatakan kejayaan yang mutlak. Jepun dan juga Jerman telah mengalami beberapa kecelakaan di dalam Peperangan Dunia Kedua walaupun operasi-operasi mereka telah di-permainperangkan terlebih dahulu. Secara zahirnya ini membayangkan kelemahan permainan perang sebagai alat evaluasi. Tetapi kita harus jangan lupa kenyataan bahawa *permainan* perang hanyalah merupakan satu alat. Sekiranya satu-satu alat itu disalahgunakan maka akibatnya mungkin buruk.

Brewer dan Shubik berpendapat bahawa *permainan* perang tidak bertanggungjawab atas kecelakaan yang dialami oleh Tentera Jerman dan Jepun di dalam peperangan Dunia Kedua. Sebaliknya mereka berpendapat bahawa *permainan* perang yang dilaksanakan oleh Jerman dan Jepun telah dicacati oleh campur tangan agresif pihak

atasan serta tekanan politik di luar bilik *permainan* perang. Kedua-dua faktor ini telah kerap kali memaksa pemilihan opsyen strategik yang tidak dihasilkan atau dibayangkan oleh permainan perang.

Pertempuran Midway (Battle of Midway) adalah satu contoh yang nyata tentang mudarat yang boleh dihasilkan oleh pengawalan agresif pihak atasan terhadap apa yang berlaku di dalam permainan perang. Di dalam permainan perang yang diadakan untuk menguji rencana serangan ke atas Pulau Midway, Pasukan Nagumo iaitu Angkatan Kapal Induk (Fleet Carrier Force) kepada Angkatan Laut Jepun telah diserang oleh kapal terbang-kapal terbang Amerika Syarikat yang berpengkalan di darat tatkala kapal terbang-kapal terbang dari kapal-kapal induk Pasukan Nagumo sedang menyerang Midway. Mengikut peraturannya, pengendali permainan perang telah memutuskan bahawa kapal induk AKAGI dan KAGA telah diserang dengan berkesan dan ditenggelamkan. Naib Laksamana Ugaki yang menjadi pengarah latihan enggan menerima keputusan ini dan secara sewenang-wenangnya telah membatalkan keputusan pengendali permainan. Beliau memutuskan bahawa sebuah sahaja di antara dua buah kapal induk yang diserang itu telah tenggelam dan beliau membenarkan Pasukan Nagumo menyertai permainan seterusnya.

Kita semua tahu apa yang sebenarnya berlaku di dalam pertempuran di Midway pada 4-6 Jun, 1942. Dengan penenggelaman empat buah kapal induknya di pertempuran tersebut, Pasukan Nagumo telah musnah dan sekali gus ini juga telah melumpuhkan Angkatan Laut Jepun. Pertempuran di Midway ini merupakan satu penentuan yang telah menukar haluan kempen di Pasifik. Jika diamati, sebenarnya permainan perang tidak menyebabkan malapetaka yang ditanggung oleh pihak Jepun di Midway. Sebaliknya, *permainan* perang telah menunjukkan ketidakkebalan (vulnerability) Angkatan Laut Jepun terutamanya Pasukan Nagumo walaupun atas andaian ketidakhadiran Pasukan Kapal Induk Amerika Syarikat di sekitar Midway!²³ Sepatutnya Laksamana Yamamoto menerima kenyataan ini dan mengubahsuai rencana operasinya. Khususnya Pasukan Nagumo harus diperkuatkan supaya Laksamana Nagumo mem-

punyai kapal terbang yang mencukupi untuk melindungi kapal-kapal induknya dari serangan Amerika Syarikat. Malangnya Yamamoto tetap berpegang teguh dengan rencana asalnya.²⁴

Pemimpin-pemimpin Soviet juga telah mendapat manfaat pengajaran yang serupa secara pahit tatkala mereka membuat persediaan untuk menghadapi Perang Dunia Kedua. Pihak tentera telah mengadakan beberapa siri *permainan* perang untuk menilai strategi mereka. Malangnya, sebarang *permainan* yang tidak mematuhi doktrin strategik yang diilhamkan oleh Stalin telah disingkirkan secara kilat dan kejam. Ramai pelaksana pelaksana permainan perang di kalangan Jeneral-Jeneral Soviet telah dinyahkan (purged) kerana di dalam *permainan* perang yang dijalankan, mereka telah membuktikan betapa salahnya (fatally wrong) andaian-andaian strategik yang dihasilkan oleh Stalin. Oleh sebab yang demikian, pemain-pemain perang (war gamers) Soviet terpaksa *bermain dalam keadaan dikongkong dan menipu diri* (self delusion). Akibatnya, *permainan* perang telah dijadikan alat untuk membuktikan kecemerlangan satu-satu rencana operasi atau strategik dan betapa bergeliganya pemikiran sipereka rencana tersebut. Mengikut pendapat Brewer dan Shubik, ramai lagi di dunia ini yang masih belum lagi menyedari hakikat ini.

APA YANG KITA PERLUKAN?

Apakah kita juga perlu menggunakan *permainan* perang di dalam bidang evaluasi dan penyelidikan kita? Soalan ini telah dijawab oleh Departmen Tentera Darat.²⁵ Banyak aspek-aspek profesyen kita yang akan mendapat manfaat dari *permainan* perang. Kita boleh menilai organisasi unit tempur, struktur pasukan (force structure) dan pengelompokan tempur kita serta menguji kesan tempurnya apabila menghadapi musuh-musuh yang kita jangkakan (our perceived enemy). Sebagai contohnya, batalion infantri 'gaya baru' merupakan bahan yang sesuai sebagai titik permulaan. Tanpa menidakkann usaha cemerlang pihak yang telah menghasilkan organisasi ini, mungkin ada baiknya jika kita banding dan bezaikan kesan-kesan tempurnya dengan batalion biasa. *Kor Cavalri* kita yang mempunyai organisasi dan komposisi yang unik adalah satu lagi bahan yang

perlu diuji melalui *permainan* perang. Seterusnya adalah difikirkan penting bagi kita mempastikan apakah organisasi briged dan divisyen yang paling mantap serta mempunyai daya tempur yang tinggi. Atau, mungkin kita ingin mengukur daya tempur briged dan divisyen kita mengikut organisasi yang ada sekarang.

Pada hari ini Tentera Darat sedang di dalam proses merumuskan doktrin untuk kegunaan kita sendiri. Doktrin-doktrin asas ini, rencana operasi/pertahanan atau rencana-rencana kontinjenji — yang sudah pasti tersedia — juga elok diuji dan dievaluasikan melalui *permainan* perang. Di dalam proses permainan nanti, kita pasti akan mendapat petunjuk atau bayangan tentang bantuan logistik yang diperlukan oleh formasi-formasi di dalam peperangan yang dijangkakan. Dari petunjuk dan bayangan ini, mungkin kita boleh merumuskan satu konsep logistik yang sesuai (*viable*) yang kemudiannya boleh dievaluasikan dengan *permainan* perang? Tidak keterlaluan jika dikatakan bahawa skop *permainan* perang sebagai alat evaluasi dan penyelidikan amat luas! Tetapi jangan disalah fahamkan. Kita tidak memaksudkan bahawa evaluasi yang disebutkan di atas dapat dilaksanakan dengan menggunakan TEMPUR PERTAMA. Jauh panggang dari api kerana TEMPUR PERTAMA hanya mampu untuk digunakan sebagai alat latihan sahaja iaitu untuk mensimulasikan operasi di medan tempur bagi memandu latihan pos pemerintahan. Nilainya sebagai alat evaluasi sangat minima kerana sifat-sifat tertentu yang ada pada model tersebut. Pertama, nilai kekuatan tempur (*combat strength value*) yang diberikan kepada tiap-tiap satu elemen tempur atau sistem senjata hanyalah merupakan bayangan am (*general indication*) sahaja tentang kekuatan tempur zahir elemen atau sistem senjata tersebut secara relatif dengan elemen atau sistem senjata yang serupa atau yang mempunyai fungsi yang agak serupa. Ia bukannya nilai kekuatan tempur yang mutlak yang diperolehi secara saintifik.

Kedua, prosedur TEMPUR PERTAMA telah dicipta dengan penumpuan terhadap kemudahan *permainan* (*playability*). Oleh yang demikian, secara relatifnya, segala prosedur yang diadakan telah dipermudahkan. Sifat ini mengurangkan


kesahannya. Misalannya sebuah organisasi yang dienaliti dengan nama HERO (Historical Evaluation Research Organisation) telah mengenalpasti 73 jenis ubahan tempur yang boleh mempengaruhi kesan sistem senjata, 'posture' dan mobiliti satu-satu pasukan.²⁶ Sedikit sahaja di antara 73 ubahan-ubahan ini yang diambilkira di dalam TEMPUR PERTAMA: kebanyakannya meliputi faktor muka bumi (*terrain*) dan 'vulnerability'. Ubahan-ubahan yang lain dikira sebagai 'constant' dan kesan serta interaksi mereka digantikan dengan 'chance formula' mudah yang berdasarkan undang-undang 'probability'.

Ketiga ialah tentang sistem untuk menentukan kecederaan dan hasil tempur. Sistem yang digunakan oleh TEMPUR PERTAMA terlalu mudah dan tidak begitu tepat untuk tujuan evaluasi dan penyelidikan. Oleh sebab itulah maka pelaku-pelaku *permainan* perang yang menggunakan model TEMPUR PERTAMA diingatkan supaya jangan terlalu menumpukan perhatian kepada nisbah kecederaan yang diperolehi dari 'Casualty Results Table' yang terkandung di dalam model tersebut.

Jadi, jika kita mahu menggunakan *permainan* perang di dalam bidang evaluasi dan penyelidikan, maka hendaklah kita menyediakan model yang lebih sesuai. Perkara ini perlu dibincangkan secara berasingan. Setakat ini memadailah jika dikatakan bahawa masakini ada beberapa sistem untuk dipilih dan penyediaan modelnya bukan satu perkara yang mustahil jika kita benar-benar mahukannya.

MASA HADAPAN

Di awal rencana ini telah dinyatakan bahawa tindakan positif telah diambil untuk mengenalkan kembali *permainan* perang kepada Tentera Darat. Sebuah organisasi yang dinamakan Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat telah dijudjuk secara 'ad-hoc'. Buat masa kini Tim tersebut adalah di bawah naungan Markas Kor Tentera Darat. Keanggotaan Tim ini jika dilihat dari segi pangkat dan jumlah anggota sangat menggalakkkan.²⁷



Rajah 1 – ORGANISASI TIM SIMULASI TEMPUR TENTERA DARAT

Pengenalan dan penyebaran (dissemination) TEMPUR PERTAMA telah dimulakan sejak awal tahun 1983 dan penerimaannya sangat berbeza mengikut tempat dan personaliti yang terlibat. Walau bagaimanapun, hingga ke akhir tahun 1983, boleh dikatakan tiap-tiap divisyen sudah ada – dengan bilangan yang memadai – pegawai-pegawai yang telah didedahkan kepada TEMPUR PERTAMA dan keupayaannya sebagai alat memandu latihan pos pemerintahan. Kini terpulanglah kepada markas-markas formasi untuk menganjurkan latihan-latihan pos pemerintahan mereka. Jika latihan-latihan ini diselaraskan dengan rapi, tidak ada sebab mengapa Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat tidak dapat memberi bantuan jika perlu.

Apabila menggunakan TEMPUR PERTAMA kita harus ingat kepada dua perkara penting. Pertama, kita jangan lupa bahawa TEMPUR PERTAMA hanyalah satu alat untuk mencapai matlamat latihan. Oleh yang demikian, kita tidak harus terjebak di meja permainan sehinggakan kita lupa apa yang berlaku di pos-pos pemerintahan yang sedang dilatih. Ini mudah berlaku dan sudah pernah berlaku. Maklumlah, tiap yang baru pasti menarik. Kedua, kita harus jangan sekali-kali lupa bahawa TEMPUR PERTAMA bukan pengganti latihan medan dengan terup terutama di peringkat rendah iaitu seksyen dan pelatun. Tumpuan latihan diperingkat ini ialah pengendalian anggota dan senjata-senjata. Tidak banyak faedah latihan yang boleh diperolehi oleh seorang ketua seksyen atau

pelatun dari *permainan* perang. Kebolehan serta kecekapan yang mereka perlukan lebih mungkin diperolehi melalui latihan di medan yang dilaksanakan secara realistik.

Apabila TEMPUR PERTAMA sudah terasas teguh sebagai alat latihan maka Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat bolehlah bersedia untuk melaksanakan projek-projek evaluasi dan penyelidikan. Di peringkat awalnya, model yang sesuai hendaklah disediakan. Seterusnya, prosedur untuk melaksanakan *permainan* perang evaluasi hendaklah dirumus dan diuji terlebih dahulu. Untuk ini memang kita tidak perlu menanti pakar-pakar penyelidik yang mempunyai ijazah yang berjelajela panjangnya. Tetapi adalah tidak berfaedah juga jika setaf-setaf Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat tidak terlatih atau tidak mempunyai bakat dan kecenderungan di dalam bidang penyelidikan dan jika pengetahuan ketenteraan mereka terhad kepada apa yang terkandung di dalam risalah dan pamflet latihan sahaja. Konsep *permainan* perang adalah mudah dan senang difahami oleh sesiapa pun. Tetapi, untuk mendalami serta mengembangkan konsep ini dan seterusnya menggunakan di dalam bidang evaluasi memerlukan ilmu pengetahuan ketenteraan yang hakiki, daya analisa dan keanjalan pemikiran. Inilah di antara sifat-sifat penting yang perlu diambilkira apabila merancangkan keanggotaan Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat jika hasil yang diinginkan melebihi pengenalan dan penyebaran TEMPUR PERTAMA seperti yang dilakukan sekarang.

Organisasi Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat perlu dikaji semula untuk memungkinkan pelaksanaan fungsi evaluasi. Secara rangkanya organisasi yang disarankan adalah seperti di dalam Rajah 2.

Fungsi kedua-dua Sel yang dicadangkan adalah:


* *Evaluasi dan Penyelidikan*

- * Mengembangkan model-model selaras dengan keperluan Tentera Darat.

- * Melaksanakan permainan perang evaluasi.

* *Bantuan Latihan*

Meneruskan pengenalan dan penyebaran TEMPUR PERTAMA dan lain-lain model yang dibentuk untuk kegunaan latihan.



Rajah 2 – ORGANISASI PUSAT SIMULASI TEMPUR TENTERA DARAT

Andainya Markas KOR Tentera Darat 'dihidupkan' semula, penempatan gantian yang sesuai perlu disediakan untuk Tim Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat supaya ia dapat meneruskan fungsi secara berkesan. Antara lain, faktor yang perlu dipertimbangkan ialah keperluan untuk Tim ini berhubung rapat dengan institusi pengajian tinggi tentera seperti Maktab Turus dan Maktab Pertahanan Angkatan Tentera.

PENUTUP

Ada banyak petunjuk-petunjuk yang membayangkan bahawa angin permainan perang sudah mulai bertiup di dalam Tentera Darat seperti juga yang berlaku tidak berapa tahun yang lalu. Jika petunjuk ini benar, adalah diharapkan angin ini akan terus bertiup. Pandangan pihak pembuat dasar amat jelas di dalam hal ini. Apa yang perlukan ialah tindakan positif serta dedikasi dari semua pihak yang mengimplementasikan rancangan ini supaya harapan membuat dasar akan menjelma. Departmen Tentera Darat sudah pun membuat permulaan yang positif di dalam usaha untuk menubuhkan apa yang kita harap akhirnya boleh disebut Pusat Simulasi Tempur Tentera Darat.



Leftenan Kolonel Hashim Bin Karim telah dinauliahkan ke dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja pada Bulan Disember, 1966. Beliau telah mendapat didikan setaf di Maktab Turus Tentera Darat British di Camberley, UK dan Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, UK dalam tahun 1977/1978. Masa kini, beliau adalah Pegawai Turus 1 Operasi, Tim Simulasi Tempur, Tentera Darat.

Nota rujukan

- 1 Fil Marsyal Sir William Slim, **Defeat Into Victory** (Cassell & Ltd 1956 m.s. 224).
- 2 Mej H C Bell, "Audacity in Battle", **Military Review**, October 1965, m.s. 52.
- 3 Mej C H Dunn Jr. & Kapt S J Kempf, "Terrain Board as Tactical Instructional Aid." **Military Review** October 1975 m.s. 17.
- 4 Robert J O 'Neill, **General Giap, Politician and Strategist** (Cassell Australia Ltd 1969) m.s. 33.
- 5 Arahan Latihan Tentera Darat 1983.
- 6 TEMPUR PERTAMA telah dipadankan dari FIRST FORAY (Tentera Darat New Zealand). Usaha awal telah dilaksanakan oleh PULADA. Markas 9 Bde (setelah digantung) telah mengambil alih tanggungjawab untuk menyiapkan model ini.
- 7 Walaupun TEMPUR PERTAMA baharu dikenalkan kepada Tentera Darat kita, sebenarnya sebagai satu jenis latihan, simulasi tempur bukannya satu perkara baharu. Lihat risalah "Training For War" Part 3 Army Code No 9626 Revised 1969) Chapter 4.
- 8 Von Mueffing, Ketua Turus Tentera Darat Prussia (1824) disebut didalam Garry D Brewer dan Martin Shubik, **The War Game** (Harvard University Press 1979) m.s. 45.
- 9 Mej C H Dunn Jr & Kapt S J Kempf, op cit, m.s. 21 – 22.
- 10 "Selected Readings in Tactics – Forward Deployed Forces, Europe" (US Army Command and General Staff College, May 1975) m.s. 1 – 27.
- 11 Kol T N Dupuy, Numbers, **Prediction and War** (Macdonald and Jane's London, 1979) Jadual 9 – 2, m.s. 121.
- 12 "Selected Readings in Tactics – The 1973 Middle East War" (US Army Command and General Staff College, May 1975) m.s. C – 12. Garisan Bar-Lev diharap dapat mengesan dan menahan penyeberangan Terusan Suez oleh Mesir untuk sekurang-kurangnya selama 48 jam.
- 13 Kol T N Dupuy, op cit m.s. 11 – 13, 39 and 62 – 63.
- 14 Di dalam ofensif-balas Jerman di Ardennes (Disember 1944), keunggulan mereka telah disia-siakan oleh keadaan tanah yang tidak memungkinkan mobiliti yang diperlukan.
- 15 Lihat Risalah "Training For War" Part 3 Army Code No. 9626 (Revised 1969) m.s. 40.
- 16 Syaranan mendiang Fil Marsyal Lord Wavell kepada siswa Maktab Turus Tentera Darat British, Camberley dalam tahun 1933. (Dipetik dari 7 Army Staff Course – 1973 Training 3 Precis).
- 17 Garry D Brewer & Martin Shubik, op cit m.s. 48.
- 18 Garry D Brewer & Martin Shubik, op cit m.s. 48.
- 19 Mej C H Dunn Jr & Kapt S J Kempf, op cit m.s. 18.
- 20 Syaranan mendiang Fill Marsyal Lord Wavell.
- 21 Theodore E Stern, "War Games: Validity and Interpretation" Army April 1966 m.s. 64.
- 22 Butir-butir yang diperolehi di dalam peperangan saudara Amerika berkaitan kegunaan rangkaian landasan kereta untuk bantuan logistik telah digunakan oleh Prussia di dalam Simulasi tempur mereka.
- 23 Pasukan Kapal Induk Angkatan Laut Pasifik (AS) tidak dimasukkan ke dalam senarai Simulasi tempur kerana mengikut tafsiran Yamamoto kapal induk HORNETS dan ENTERPRISE berada di Lautan Pasifik Selatan sedangkan YORKTOWN telah dilapurkan tenggelam di dalam Pertempuran Coral Sea.
- 24 R E Dupuy & T N Dupuy, **The Encyclopedia of Military History**, (Macdonald and Jane's, London 1976) m.s. 1146 – 1148.
- 25 KP/TD/LATIH/5287/B bth 7 Dis 82.
- 26 Kol T N Dupuy, op cit m.s. 32 – 33.
- 27 Sebagai perbandingan Pusat Simulasi tempur Tentera Darat Australia yang ditubuhkan pada 1hb Nov. 85 (mengikut rancangan mereka) mempunyai 15 orang pegawai yang diketuai oleh seorang Leftenan Kolonel.
- 28 Nama ini adalah lebih sesuai dari nama Tim Simulasi Tempur atau "Battlefield Simulation Team" kerana ia lebih tepat mencerminkan aktifiti yang dijalankan.

AN EPITAPH

*how the nation's
2nd highest
gallantry award (SP)
was won*

Leftenant Kolonel Mohd Ainuddin bin Abdullah

MISSION

The ambush at Tanjung Batu Babi, Ulu Katibas, SARAWAK on 20 Jan 1971, by the communist terrorist upon 13 personnel of 1st Battalion Malaysian Rangers is one set piece of battle, where determination, esperit de corps, quick thinking and discipline played an important part in defeating an enemy force twice the size. This particular ambush infact had been planned by the communist terrorists for a period of one month.¹ They were observing the movements of the army boats along the Katibas river for about a month before they actually launched the ambush.

It all happened one fine day when 13 men under the command of 2Lt Annuar Basha Khan bin Zakaria left on a specific mission in the assault boats. The mission of the patrol was to contact the Penghulu or Tuai Rumah in the area of Nanga Bangkit. These Penghulus were to attend a local civic assembly, to be held at the Tactical Headquarters on 21 January 1971 at 1100 hours. The patrol left the Tactical Headquarters at Nanga Engkuah (Approximately 10 Kilometers North East of Tanjung Batu Babi) at about 1400 hours on 20 January 1971.

Having accomplished the mission, the patrol, whilst on the way back to the Tactical Headquarters was ambushed at close range by a group of approximately 20 CTs (Communist Terrorists) at Tanjung Batu Babi (north bank of Sungai Katibas) at 1700 hours. The enemy opened fire with their shotguns and automatic weapons at the leading boat while the second boat was about 65 meters behind. During the initial burst of enemy fire, the outboard motor of the leading boat was hit and consequently the boat was drifting fast downstream due to the strong current.

During the initial burst of fire, 3 soldiers including the boat operator of the first assault boat fell into the river. 2Lt Annuar, the platoon commander, while trying to restart the outboard motor was shot in the head.



Kelihatan gambar Mejaz Anwar Basha Khan (Ketika itu Lt Muda) berada di Hospital Daerah Sibu selepas peristiwa serangkendap di Sg Katibas sedang dilawati oleh mendiang Tun Datuk Patinggi Temenggong Jugah.

Seeing that the first boat was under enemy fire, WO II Lenggu and his crew headed towards the river bank where the enemy were in ambush position. By now the first boat was out of enemy ambush area. The enemy having realised that intention of the second boat, concentrated all their fire onto it. WO II Lenggu took the initiative and courage, despite the heavy enemy fire to lead his men to do a frontal assault.

WO II Lenggu and his men continued to brave their way towards the enemy. By the time they reached the bank, 3 soldiers were already killed in the assault boat as a result of heavy enemy fire. Despite having been left with 2 men, WO II Lenggu continued to assault the enemy position shouting the Ranger Corps war cry *Agi Idup Agi Ngelaban*.² By the time they reached the top of the hill and finally gained possession of the high ground, the remaining 2 men of WO II Lenggu were killed. The WO II himself was badly shot in the stomach and head.

The enemy in the meantime, was trying to come down to the river bank to collect the weapons and equipment from the dead soldiers. This action of the enemy was interrupted and stopped with the wounded WO II Lenggu firing a couple of rounds everytime the enemy tried to come down, until the arrival of the commanding

officer and his party. Infact when WO II Lenggu was avacuated, not even a single ammunition was left in his rifle magazine.

The Commanding Officer and his party met the first assault boat which was drifting downstream near Rumah Entong. The platoon commander who could speak at that time, briefed the CO of the ambush. The CO directed the wounded personnel to be sent to Rumah Entong for temporary shelter. The CO and his party left immediately for the scene of the ambush. They arrived at the scene at about 1720 hours. The Shooting was still going on and that some of the CTs could be seen coming down from the hill trying to collect weapons and other equipment from the soldiers killed at the bank and in the boat.



Pegawai Waren II Lenggu a/k China

Another immediate assault was carried out on the enemy's position. During the fire fight, which lasted for about 15 minutes, 2 CTs were killed, one of whom was personally shot dead by the CO. The enemy finally retreated from their position dispersing in various directions. The pusuit had to stop, as the ammunition was running low.

Subsequently during the follow up operation, 1 enemy camp was found on the 24 January 71. The camp could accomodate about 20 persons and was about 1500 meters North West of the ambush position. It was about one month old. 2 more

dead CTs were found at the vicinity of the ambush. These CTs could have been killed by the daring frontal assault by WO II Lenggu and his men.

That same night of the ambush, the wounded personnel were evacuated by Nuri helicopter to Sibu Hospital for immeditate surgical operation. Those KIA (killed in action) were evacuated the following day and buried with full military honours.

TURNING POINT

The SUNGAI KATIBAS incident was one of the most significant examples of men who, with courage, determination and spontaneous action were able to defeat an enemy force twice their size. This episode also marked a mile stone in the history of our army when thoughts were given to new techniques and tactics in riverine patrol within the Malaysian environment. It was also the turning point in the communist terrorist struggle in Sarawak when the CTs who had planned an ambush for one specific month, lost four of their men including one of their section commanders. They bolted after seeing the determined and aggressive action from a small force. Their moral was badly effected after this incident and infact they practically sat tight for one whole month, too frightened to do any operations against our forces.

The points highlighted as a result of this episode can be summarised as stated below. It is recommended that further research be done in the following glaring leassons learnt:

- * The CTs main target is the outboard motor so as to render it unserviceable. Once it is unserviceable, spontaneous action against the enemy cannot be carried out. Armour plating cover need to be improvised.

- * All assault boats or longboats should be mounted with *Light Machine Guns* or *General Purpose Machine Guns* so that effective and aimed fire can be directed towards enemy positions.

- * Out of 9 casualties we had, including 2 KIA, 7 suffered head injuries. It is recommended that steel helmets be worn for future riverine operations.

* Riverine movement along proned ambush positions should not be done after 1500 hours so that if ambushed there is still sufficient daylight for any follow up tasks, casualty evacuations and reinforcements.

* Thorough and detail briefing by the convoy commanders is essential and each and every member in the boat should know exactly what to do in the even of being ambushed. A convoy should not be less than 3 boats with 6 men in each boat and it should be in visual distance.

* RMAF pilot can fly their helicopter during night time if the situation warrants.

The incident was the first in the history of Sarawak that the Security Forces made a gallant fight back when being ambushed in the river.

INSPIRATION

In a riverine ambush, troops could easily be wiped out while the enemy escapes with complete victory. But due to the spontaneous courage and determination of the soldier involved in this particular incident the ambush by the enemy in this case, was a total failure. The gallantry action by 2Lt Anuar and WO II Lenggu is one of most outstanding to date. They, despite being seriously wounded and outnumbered by the enemy were determined enough to engage the enemy and inflict casualties on them. Such examples set by

them should not only be recorded and accorded with the recognition it deserves but it should also be studied, discussed and emulated by all true warriors. The incident should be an inspiration to all of us in the Armed Forces. It was a decisive battle and it had not been for WO II Lenggu's spontaneous and gallantry action, the result of the ambush might have been very different.

Morally the effect of the battle was still more decisive. Strategical skills coupled with numerical superiority can be compensated by spontaneous action of a smaller force inspired by a dedicated and determined leader. In appreciation of his gallantry action, WO II Lenggu was awarded the nation's 2nd gallantry award of 'SRI PAHLAWAN GAGAH PERKASA'!

Footnotes:

1 — This was revealed by 2 SEPs who surrendered to the authorities at Kanowit Later.

2. — This motto was first initiated for the Sarawak Rangers by Sir James Brooke, the first white Raja of Sarawak. It means whilst there's life there's fight. Subsequently this motto was adopted by the 1st Battalion the Malaysian Rangers and in due course the Ranger Corp.

3 — This was revealed by 2 SEPs who surrendered to the authorities at Kanowit later.



Letnan Kolonel Mohd. Ainuddin bin Abdullah telah ditauliah didalam Kor Peninjau DiRaja pada 17 Februari 1966. Beliau bertukar ke Kor Rejimen Renjer pada bulan September 1969. Pernah bertugas di Kementerian Pertahanan sebagai PT 2 kebajikan TPE and KMA 1 Bde, Pegawai Memerintah 103 Bn Inf dan selepas itu Pegawai Memerintah 1 Renjer dan kini bertugas sebagai PT 1 Gerak di Markas RASCOM Sarawak.



Meiar Masood B. Zainal

DISIPLIN DALAM ATM – SUATU PERSPEKTIF

"Mengapakah mereka itu diberi latihan berbaris yang tidak terhad, dan berbagai kerja yang tidak berhati-hati hingga kaki dan tangan, hati dan jantung mereka menjadi hangus. Semua perbuatan itu bukanlah kerana hendak menjadikan mereka soldadu-soldadu yang segak, tetapi ialah kerana hendak membentuk mereka menjadi soldadu-soldadu yang terlatih dan cekap sekali di Semenanjung Tanah Melayu. Kebersihan alat perkakas dan gerak-geri tingkah laku adalah perkara yang penting dalam latihan mereka. Mereka itu telah diberitahu barangsiapa cuba merosakan nama skuad itu adalah bererti sama juga seperti perbuatan menjatuhkan nama keluarga sendiri, Raja-raja sendiri, bangsa sendiri dan tanahair sendiri".

Lt. Kol Mc IS Bruce MC
Pegawai Memerintah Pertama
Askar Melayu

AM

Bila tercetusnya sahaja perkataan TENTERA di kalangan orang-orang awam, memang dengan tersendirinya tersirat gambaran satu organisasi yang baik di mana ahli-ahlinya yang begitu terlatih dan tinggi disiplin serta tinggi hemat tingkah lakunya. Satu organisasi yang pada pandangan umum mempunyai daya tarikan yang tersendiri, tata tertib yang tidak boleh dipersoalkan dan jentera-jentera berupa manusia yang senantiasa bersiap sedia menunggu perintah dari pihak atasan untuk digerakkan tidak mengira keadaan cuaca, tanah dan suasana. Begitu hebat dan gambaran yang garang yang telah berjaya dipamerkan oleh pihak tentera dari zaman ke zam'an.

Sejarah Angkatan Tentera Malaysia kini telah menjangkau usia 51 tahun. Detik kelahiran atau pembentukan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia adalah berdasarkan kepada hasil Kerajaan mengujudkan satu pasukan Askar Melayu sebagai Kompeni Percubaan pada 1 Mac 1933 di mana pengasasnya adalah daripada pihak penjajah yang ingin melihat anak-anak watan negara ini memainkan peranan mereka di dalam mempertahankan ibu pertiwi. Kumpulan kecil perwira-perwira pengasas seramai 25 orang anak Melayu adalah babit yang telah menyuburkan kemungkinan lahirnya satu kekuatan Tentera Darat yang akan memainkan satu peranan penting dalam mempertahankan tanahair kita Malaysia. Dengan semangat dan tekad yang tinggi sekali pengasas-pengasas tadi telah mengharungi pengubahsuaian tata hidup yang asing sekalipun daripada kebiasaan hidup sehari-hari mereka. Mereka mula dipraktikkan dengan disiplin yang ketat, latihan yang keras dan suasana-suasana alam ketenteraan yang tradisional.

Kumpulan pengasas itu telah menunjukkan sikap dan tauladan yang terpuji dari segi disiplin ketenteraan yang setaraf, malah melebih daripada tentera penjajah sehingga sebuah akhbar tempatan Akhbar Straits Times bertarikh 4 Ogos 1933 telah melapurkan dengan kata-kata yang berperangsang:

"Pada zahirnya seorang itu tidak akan terjumpa sekumpulan orang-orang Melayu di Negara ini yang amat cergas dan bertatertib, melain-

kan kumpulan di Port Dickson inilah, sepertimana yang kita lihat mereka itu pada hari ini selepas lima bulan hidup dengan sempurna berserta dengan latihan yang keras!"

Begitu tinggi sekali pandangan umum akan tata tertib tentera di kala itu. Kompeni Percubaan Askar Melayu telah menjadi kekuatannya kepada 150 orang pada 1 Februari 1934 dan telah dianggap berjaya dan seterusnya pembesarannya diteruskan sehingga menjadi satu batalion yang penuh. Ke-gigihan anggota-anggota pengasas itu sampai kepada kemuncaknya pada tahun 1936 apabila 4 LLP (Lain-lain Pangkat) anak-anak watan telah menerima tauliah sebagai Leutenant Muda daripada Pesuruhjaya Tinggi berdasarkan kepada sifat-sifat individu iaitu kebolehan, kekuatan peribadi dan daya kepimpinan.


Dengan meletusnya Perang Dunia Kedua di mana api peperangan hampir menyambar Tanah Melayu waktu itu, kekuatan Askar Melayu ditambahkan menjadi 2 batalion. Mulai detik itulah Tentera Darat mulai berkembang dan berterusan sehingga kini. Kenangan para perajurit Infantri yang tergulung daripada orang-orang lama zaman penjajah dan selepas penjajah membayangkan betapa tingginya mutu tata tertib di dalam Tentera Darat semasa itu.

PERBEZAAN ZAMAN DAN KEADAAN KEHIDUPAN

Memang tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa pengasas Tentera Malaysia adalah daripada daya usaha penjajah Inggeris. Merekalah mula memperkenalkan sistem ketenteraan yang moden serta melatih anak-anak watan menjadi perwira-perwira tanahair. Usaha mereka mendidik dan mengasuh anak-anak bangsa sehingga membentuk satu tentera darat yang sempurna cukup dengan tata tertib yang tinggi dan sikap keperwiraan yang sihat dan terpuji bagi tentera moden dihargai sehingga kini.

Anak-anak watan zaman penjajah memang ketara sekali lemah dari segi pelajaran dan ramai masih belum dipengaruhi dengan kehidupan yang mewah dan pengaruh-pengaruh yang tidak sihat. Walau bagaimanapun mereka ini kaya dengan sifat-sifat ingin maju, rindukan kemerdekaan dan tahan lasak serta subur dengan sifat kemelau-

an mereka iaitu 'TAAT – SETIA'. Gejala-gejala seperti dadah, kemudahan-kemudahan mewah dan pengaruh-pengaruh luar masih dikira asing bagi mereka di kala itu.



Lt. Jen. Sir Hugh Stockwell membalsik tabik hormat di upacara perbarisan – Port Diskson 1953.

Oleh hal yang demikian, dengan fikiran yang masih belum dipengaruhi serta badan yang tahan lasak oleh sebab zaman, mereka-mereka ini telah dapat dibentuk dan dilatih menjadi soldadu-soldadu yang tinggi tatatertib dan sikap keperwiraan yang terpuji.

Memang ketara sekali bahawa zaman itu menentukan akan sikap dan peribadi seseorang itu. Taraf kehidupan yang rendah serta pahit maung yang dilalui semasa zaman meleset dan zaman perang membuat manusia di zaman itu lebih insaf dan tahu akan nilai-nilai hidup sebenarnya.

ZAMAN KEMAJUAN

"Sekali air bah sekali pantai berubah", begitulah kata pepatah Melayu. Inilah yang dihadapi oleh anak-anak bangsa zaman kemajuan ini. Zaman berubah mengikut keadaan masa dan corak pemikiran. Soal-soal rindukan kemerdekaan, pertahanan ibu pertiwi telah mulai luput di lambong gelombang zaman. Anak-anak bangsa mulai bersikap materialistik dan pentingkan diri sendiri. Fikiran mereka telah

mulai dinodai dan dipengaruhi oleh gejala-gejala yang tidak sihat berunsurkan lebih daripada lagak dan mencari kepusan hidup mewah. Soal pertahanan negara menjadi asing kepada mereka. Dari segi pelajaran, memang boleh dibanggakan kerana ramai di antara mereka telah mencapai mercu kejayaan yang terpuji. Bidang pekerjaan memang tidak payah dipersoalkan. Menceburkan diri di bidang ketenteraan telah mula membebankan mereka. Dipandang dari segi semua sudut bidang ketenteraan adalah bidang yang terakhir dipilih sebagai menampung periok nasi mereka. Setelah gagal dalam segala bidang pekerjaan, dengan hati yang berat dan perasaan yang berbelah-bagi mereka ini menjelak ke alam ketenteraan tanpa semangat yang diharapkan oleh ibu pertiwi. Mulai dari detik itulah maka segala masalah yang akan timbul akan dibebankan oleh Tentera Darat khasnya. Air telah surut, pantai telah mulai berubah wajah. Adakah generasi muda ini dapat mengkekalkan tatatertib yang tinggi serta sikap keperwiraan yang tulin yang telah dipamirkan oleh soldadu-soldadu generasi masa lampau? Sama-sama kita perhatikan.

TRADISI TENTERA DARAT KHASNYA KOR INFANTRI

Tradisi di dalam Tentera Darat, khasnya Kor Infantri memainkan peranan yang amat penting di dalam mengekalkan kehidupan ketenteraan yang tulin dan mengekalkan semangat keperwiraan yang telah dipupuk oleh ahli-ahli rejimen tersebut dari zaman ke zaman. Tradisi sesuatu rejimen itu adalah menjadi lambang kebanggaan setiap pegawai dan parajurit yang berkhidmat di bawah naungan panji-panji rejimen mereka. Adalah diperhatikan bahawa tradisi yunit-yunit dan Kor Infantri telah mula dilupakan dan telah diubah-suaikan mengikut selera pihak-pihak tertentu sehingga mengakibatkan hilangnya tradisi yang asal. Perubahan ini dapat dirasai oleh semua peringkat di dalam Kor ataupun rejimen tersebut. Walaupun pada mulanya perubahan itu tidak begitu disangsikan sangat, tetapi lama-kelamaan perubahan itu dapat dirasai terutama oleh golongan orang-orang lama dan perasaan 'sense of belonging' mereka mulai tergugat.

Pernah dialami satu ketika dahulu dimana 'badge' Askar Melayu, 'Singa Berjuang' telah digantikan dengan lambang Tentera Darat dan arahan telah pun dikeluarkan agar semua peringkat menggunakan lambang yang baru itu, sebahagian daripada anggota-anggota Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja telah enggan berbuat demikian. Akhirnya di atas desakan dan paksaan mereka ini dengan semangat yang luntur dan titisan air mata telah menyerahkan lencara 'Singa Berjuang' yang selama ini dijunung walaupun di hutan belantara raya. Diperhatikan juga kebanyakannya daripada mereka mencium sepas-puas hati mereka lencana tersebut sebelum menyerahkan.

Begitulah mendalamnya semangat seorang parajurit itu akan tradisi yang dipikulnya selama ini tiba-tiba duubahsuaikan mengikut selera zaman.

KEANGGOTAAN

Perkembangan pesat Angkatan Tentera telah dilakukan begitu mendadak sekali sehingga menyebabkan kekurangan dari segi anggota di dalam kompeni-kompeni dan batalion Infantri begitu membimbangkan. Lanjutan daripada keadaan yang demikian, yunit-yunit telah diarahkan membuat pemilihan dan melatih rekrut-rekrut baru. Pusat-pusat latihan telah mulai melatih rekrut-rekrut yang ramai melebihi daripada had yang boleh diterima. Pengambilan para pegawai kedet, juga menghadapi perubahan yang sama. Disebabkan oleh jumlah yang kira maka mutu yang diperlukan telah diketepikan.

Parajurit-parajurit yang kurang mendapat latihan ketenteraan ini disebabkan oleh desakan masa telah diserapkan ke dalam kompeni-kompeni dan batalion Infantri begitu membimbangkan. Lanjutan daripada keadaan yang demikian, yunit-yunit telah diarahkan membuat pemilihan dan melatih rekrut-rekrut baru. Pusat-pusat latihan telah mulai melatih rekrut-rekrut yang ramai melebihi daripada had yang boleh diterima. Pengambilan para pegawai kedet, juga menghadapi perubahan yang sama. Disebabkan oleh jumlah yang diambil kira maka mutu yang diperlukan telah diketepikan.

Parajurit-parajurit yang kurang mendapat

latihan ketenteraan ini disebabkan oleh desakan masa telah diserapkan ke dalam kompeni-kompeni dan batalion Infantri semata-mata untuk mengisi kekosongan yang ujud akibat perkembangan pesat Angkatan Tentera. Di sinilah mula dikesan akan mutu-mutu parajurit yang diterima. Masalah timbul diperingkat kompeni repal dimana ketua-ketua kompeni terpaksa menumpukan masa menyelesaikan masalah peribadi daripada masalah professionalisme. Masalah berikut kerap timbul dikalangan perajurit-perajurit baru.

- * Ketagih dadah.
- * Buta-huruf
- * Kurang disiplin.
- * Tidak hadir tanpa cuti.
- * Penyakit misalnya – lemah jantung, darah tinggi, gila babi colour blind' dan lain-lain.

PENTADBIRAN

Masalah pentadbiran dengan tersendirinya bertambah akibat daripada perkembangan yang pesat. Masalah pergerakan dan pertukaran anggota-anggota meningkat dan mengendalikan pentadbiran harian yunit-yunit. Masalah-masalah yang ditimbulkan diatas telah mula mengugat perjalanan pentadbiran yang licin. Kerja-kerja saingan yang sepatutnya dikelolakan oleh yunit-yunit latihan telah diserahkan sebahagian daripadanya kepada yunit-yunit Infantri. Oleh kerana terlalu sibuk dengan 'issue' perkembangan, aspek-aspek lain berkenaan dengan keanggotaan telah mulai terjejas dan dengan secara tidak langsung melibatkan ke-melesetan tatatertib dikalangan anggota.

LOGISTIK

Dengan perkembangan yang begitu pesat sekali, masalah logistik mulai timbul dengan begitu ketara sekali. Kelengkapan untuk soldadu dan pentadbiran telah mulai kurang, sehinggalah soldadu-soldadu baru hanya dilengkapkan dengan hanya sepasang baju seragam celoreng dan hijau. Soldadu-soldadu kelihatan tidur di bawah khemah-khemah sementara dan terpaksa berhimpit-himpit di bawah satu bumbung tanpa tilam, katil dan almari. Keadaan sedemikian sudah tentu menjelaskan moral dan semangat untuk berkerja di kalangan parajurit-

parajurit. Keadaan sedemikian dengan tersendirinya membawa kepada kemelesetan tatatertib mereka oleh kerana pada anggapan mereka soal kebijakan mereka telah diabai-abaikan oleh pihak atasan.

LATIHAN

Di dalam konteks ini, tidaklah perlu kita membincang atau mempersoalkan akan apakah jenis-jenis latihan yang perlu diberikan kepada seorang parajurit itu untuk dibentuk menjadi seorang parajurit yang terlatih dan berdisiplin tinggi. Perlulah kita kupaskan akan apakah gejala-gejala yang menyebabkan melesetnya tatatertib mereka.

* Latihan Asas.

Sebelum seseorang calun parajurit itu melangkahkan kaki mereka ke alam ketenteraan, mereka ini begitu mentah dan masih takut-takut akan apakah yang akan mereka hadapi sebagai seorang anggota tentera. Semasa ini, mereka ini mesti diasuh dengan apa-apajua cara pun terutama di padang kawad dan latihan medan untuk memupuk perasaan 'fear and respect' di dalam ego mereka. Ketika ini mereka diasaskan dengan perasaan 'patriotic' dan sifat 'Taat Setia' yang tidak berbelah-bagi kepada ketuanya dan negara. Sekiranya matlamat ini tidak tercapai selagi itulah mereka ini dididik dan dilatih sehingga mereka menjadi parajurit yang tulen yang diperlukan oleh perkhidmatan. Jumlah bilangan yang lulus jangan diambil kira, apa yang diperlukan adalah mutu parajurit yang tulen.

* Pelajaran Undang-undang Tentera.

Dalam segi ini perlulah dititik-beratkan hukuman-hukuman yang akan dihadapi sekiranya mereka melanggar undang-undang yang telah ditetapkan. Hak-hak mereka sebagai seorang parajurit mestilah dijelaskan dengan teliti. Selagi mereka tidak memahami akan undang-undang tentera dengan jelas delagi itulah mereka tidak akan menghormati undang-undang yang dibuat begitu rupa untuk melindungi mereka.

* Latihan Medan.

Memang kerap diperhatikan bahawa parajurit-parajurit tidak mengambil berat langsung akan latihan-latihan medan yang dijalankan khas untuk melatih mereka. Sikap dan tatatertib mereka di medan kadangkala membimbangkan pihak atasan. Ini adalah kerana kurangnya alat-alat latihan dan simulasi yang boleh menggambarkan keadaan perang sebenar. Kebanyakan latihan dilakukan tanpa adanya perkara yang sebenar yang sepatut diperlukan untuk menghidupkan suasana sebenar.

* Pelajaran Ugama.

Ugama memainkan peranan yang tersendiri di dalam membentuk sifat seseorang parajurit itu ke jalan yang benar. Adalah diperhatikan bahawa pelajaran ugama memang terhad di dalam mata pelajaran ketenteraan. Adalah amat perlu ajaran ugama tadi digunakan sebagai alat *indoctrination* kepada parajurit untuk memberi mereka keinsafan dan menjauahkan diri dari pengaruh-pengaruh yang tidak sihat.

KEPIMPINAN KETENTERAAN

Orang-orang yang paling rapat dengan anggota-anggota bawahan adalah PTT dan juga Ketua Pelatun termasuk Ketua Kompeni. Berpuncanya kemelesetan tatatertib dikalangan anggota bawahan adalah hasil pimpinan mereka-mereka ini. Sekiranya mereka-mereka ini gagal di dalam memainkan peranan mereka dari segi pucuk pimpinan maka akan lemahlah tatatertib orang-orang di bawah jagaan mereka. Tidaklah perlu dipertikaikan apakah kualiti kepimpinan yang sepatutnya ada kepada seorang pemimpin itu kerana kualiti-kualiti tersebut memang telah diajar kepada mereka sebelum mereka ditauliahkan menjadi pegawai atau dinaikan ke pangkat PTT, malah senarai kualiti-kualiti tersebut ada di dalam buku-buku yang dijual di kedai-kedai buku. Apa yang dititik beratkan di sini adalah sama ada mereka mengamalkannya atau tidak. Perlulah diingat bahawa orang-orang bawahan sentiasa memandang akan tingkah laku dan gerak geri ketua mereka sama ada baik atau tidak terpulanglah

kepada mereka menilaikannya. Kebijaksanaan (tact) seorang pemimpin itu adalah penting untuk mempengaruhi orang-orang bawahnya di dalam menunaikan tugas yang telah diberi.

Apa yang diperhatikan di sini yang menyebabkan kemelesetan tatatertib di kalangan anggota tentera, adalah sikap pemimpin rendah kurang mengambil berat akan dirinya sendiri dan juga kebijakan orang-orang bawahnya. Mereka lebih mementingkan soal diri sendiri dari orang-orang bawahannya. Masanya ditumpukan untuk menyelesaikan masalah peribadinya sendiri sedangkan masalah yang dihadapi oleh anggota bawahannya dibiarkan begitu sahaja. Kelemahan ini kerap dilihat pada pegawai-pegawai muda yang gagal memainkan peranan mereka dan hanya sekadar lepas tangan sahaja kepada PTT — PTT kanan mereka.

Mereka gagal memahami bahawa seseorang pemimpin itu harus menyedari bahawa cara memimpin anggota itu berbeda di antara satu lingkungan (environment) dan lain. Faktor-faktor yang mempunyai pengaruh yang perlu dikaji adalah seperti berikut:

- * Tempat tugas
- * Jenis tugas
- * Keadaan tugas
- * Jangkawaktu tugas

Jelas bahawa faktor-faktor di atas akan mempengaruhi sifat kelakuan orang-orang bawahannya. Justeru setiap pemimpin hendaklah menyesuaikan dirinya dengan lingkungan di mana ia berada. Sekiranya mereka mengikut sesuka hati mereka di dalam tugas memimpin maka akan menjadi purak perandalan keadaan orang-orang bawahannya.

PANDANGAN UMUM

Dipandang sepantas lalu tatatertib di kalangan anggota Tentera Darat di masa lampau di mata umum adalah amat membanggakan dan senantiasa disanjung tinggi oleh masyarakat. Tetapi detik demi detik, peristiwa demi peristiwa berlalu pandangan umum terhadap tatatertib anggota Tentera Darat mulai disangskian. Penghormatan yang dahulunya disanjung tinggi kini mulai pudar. Dimanakah letaknya kesilapan tersebut dan siapakah harus dipersalahi? Puncanya adalah terletak pada kelemahan-kelemahan anggota-anggota

tentera sendiri. Kelemahan-kelemahan ini memang disedari tetapi gagal diperbetulkan. Haruslah disedari bahawa masyarakat tentera perlu berkerjasama dan hormat menghormati dengan masyarakat awam.

Selagi pihak masyarakat awam memandang serong terhadap masyarakat tentera, selagi itulah masalah yang dihadapi masa kini tidak akan selesai. Memang ketara sekali dewasa ini, bahawa pihak-pihak atasan memandang berat akan perkara ini dan berbagai tindak tanduk sedang diambil untuk menaikkan lagi tatatertib anggota tentera agar mendapat balik penghormatan yang telah diberi dahulu.

Kita telah pun meninjau dengan secara kasar akan di antara sebab-sebab melesetnya tatatertib di kalangan anggota tentera, khasnya Kor Infantri. Perlulah ditegaskan bahawa sebab-sebab yang diutamakan adalah pada pandangan mata kasar si penulis tidak melibatkan Kor/Rejimen lain hanya terbatas pada Rejimen Infantri sahaja. Kelemahan dan kesilapan memang ujud di kalangan manusia tetapi tiap-tiap kelemahan dan kesilapan itu haruslah diperbetulkan dan diberi pandangan yang serius untuk kebaikan bersama. Kebanyakan orang membuat kesilapan dalam usaha mereka mendapat pengalaman dan keesahan.

ULASAN

Untuk memperbaiki keadaan dan meninggikan tatatertib di kalangan anggota tentera, perkara-perkara berikut adalah diutarakan.

- * Pengambilan pegawai-pegawai kedet dan rekrut perlulah diteliti dengan mendalam dan janganlah memandangkan kepada jumlah yang harus diperolehi tetapi lebih menitik-beratkan kepada mutu yang akan diperolehi.
- * Pengeluaran rekrut mestilah dari satu yunit latihan agar mencapai persamaan latihan tidak 'double standard' seperti yang telah dilakukan secara Perkembangan Pesat Angkatan Tentera di mana yunit-yunit memainkan peranan yunit latihan.
- * Jangkamasa latihan mestilah mengikut ketetapan yang telah dibuat tidak mengira desa-

kan yang memerlukan tenaga yang banyak dalam jangkamasa yang pendek untuk mengawal mutu kecekapan anggota-anggota.

* Latihan-latihan dipusat latihan rekrut perlu menitik beratkan latihan *indoctrination* pelajaran undang-undang tentera, rohani dan mengasak rekrut-rekrut akan sifat-sifat kebangsaan dan taatsetia serta hormat menghormati.

* Menitik beratkan latihan-latihan medan dengan lebih *realistic* lagi bukan setakat hanya menggunakan perkataan *notional* sahaja.

* Para pegawai dan PTT Kanan perlu memerhati gerak-geri anggota bawahan mereka dengan lebih teliti lagi agar dapat mengesan anasir-anasir yang tidak sihat mempengaruhi anggota-anggota. Tindakan yang cepat perlu diambil untuk menghindarkan anasir-anasir tersebut sebelum ia mempengaruhi anggota-anggota lain.


* Perkara-perkara logistik mestilah diperbaiki agar tidak melibatkan jatuhnya moral seseorang soldadu itu. Alat-alat kelengkapan perseorangan itu mestilah cukup agar boleh ia melaksanakan tugasnya sebagai soldadu dengan sempurna.

* Tradisi-tradisi sesuatu Rejimen/Kor mestilah dikekalkan agar ianya mempunyai identiti tersendiri dan tidak mengugat semangat dan 'Regimental Pride'.

* Pentadbiran unit mestilah berjalan lancar dan teratur agar kebajikan, kejayaan dan lain-lain tidak tergugat. Ini boleh dicapai dengan tidak membebankan yunit-yunit dengan tugas-tugas di luar kemampuannya dan tugas remeh-temeh yang tidak sepatut dibebankan kepada unit tersebut.



Mejar Masood bin Zainal Abidin telah dianugerahkan tsuliahan tetap di dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja pada bulan Mei 1975. Setelah ditauliah beliau telah ditugaskan di 3 RAMD sehingga September 1979. Pada bulan September 1979 beliau ditugaskan sebagai PT 3 di DTD Tadbir KEMENTAH. Dalam bulan Disember 1981 beliau telah ditukar ke 18 RAMD bagi menjawat Jawatan Ketua Kompeni sehinggalah sekarang. Pada bulan Ogos 1983 beliau telah dihantar menghadiri suatu kursus muslihat di New Zealand.



LEADERSHIP MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES SHOULD ADOPT

— a point of view

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The Armed Forces is an entity that is complete with all the ingredients to make it perform its roles effectively. The author discusses what these ingredients are. He singles out the leadership, management and organisation as the essential ones. It is around these topics that he enumerates the various roles the Armed Forces *managers* have to play in order to fit themselves into the environment.

INTRODUCTION

Since independence the Armed Forces have developed very rapidly. Also with independence the security threat has taken new dimension which requires the Armed Forces to expand. This expansion is only part of the national development as laid down in the New Economic Policy. Even though the worldwide economic recession has slowed down the tempo of development somewhat, but this has not effected the roles of Armed Forces *managers*. In fact the challenges faced by them are becoming more stiff as the resources namely money, men and material are getting scarce.

It is therefore timely to discuss the roles that the Armed Forces *managers* should play in managing the resources available to them in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to them. But first, it is appropriate to compare between a combat leader and a manager. This is important because the fundamental role of an officer in the military is to lead. Very often he also needs to be a manager depending on the environment and situation. Hence, a comparison of these two terms is very pertinent.

COMBAT LEADER

In military organisation, leadership is normally exercised by individuals who occupy position of authority. However leadership cannot be equated with everything that is done by people in high places. Effective leadership may or may not be exercised by those in position of authority. Leadership is basically a tool for achieving desired results. Such achievements depend upon the activities of personnel. Leaders must induce their personnel to perform those activities required to achieve results. Leadership can also be defined as a relationship between leaders and led. Therefore leadership is also a process occurring over time in which the leader influences the action of individuals and organisation in order to obtain desired result.

There are many approaches that a leader can undertake to influence those whom he leads in an organisation. The organisations in the Armed Forces are basically categorised into three types namely, *combat*, *combat support* and *services*. The combat and combat support organisations are mission-oriented while that in the services are service oriented. It is therefore not easy to apply just one approach of leadership to achieve the desired results. The combat and combat support organisations are characterised by conflict between us and the enemy. This situation style of leadership that is required will be the one where a leader

exerts his influence over the led. The leader must have the attributes that can guarantee the influence that is desired. This leadership style is known as the 'trait' approach, whereas in the service oriented organisation the leader must possess not the attributes but the knowledge to adopt either authocratic, democratic or even 'laissez-faire' approaches because in the service-oriented organisations the resources are not just men but also money, material and time.

LEADERSHIP APPROACHES

A leader can adopt several strategies to achieve his aim. He can adopt one of the several following strategies:

- * Personal Characteristic Approach.
- * Situational Approach.
- * Decision Making Style Approach.
- * Behaviour Dimension Approach.
- * Interaction Approach.

* Personal Characteristic Approach

This is the 'Trait' or 'Great Men' approach. This approach assumes that the leader posses personal quality of physic, intellect or personality which differentiated him from those led. This approach originated in about 1900. Stogdill⁷ (1948) gave the following factors which are positively associated with leadership position.

Classification	Factors associated with occupancy of leader role.
1. Capacity	Intelligence, alertness, verbal facility, originality, judgement.
2. Achievement	Scholarship, knowledge, athletic accomplishment.
3. Responsibility	Dependability, initiative, persistence, aggressiveness, self-confidence, desire to excel
4. Participation	Activity, sociability, co-operation, adaptability, humour.
5. Status	Socio-economic position, popularity
6. Situation	Mental level, status, skills, needs and interests of followers, objectives to be achieved, etc.

* **Situational Approach**

This approach is also derived from the 'Great Men' approach, assumes that if the leader had not fulfilled the need at the social contact than another individual will emerge to do so. This approach was not influential as leadership was generally considered as reflecting quality of individual people. With the emergence of interest in *Social Psychology* and *Group Dynamics* in 1930's, a 'group situation' approach commands greater interest.

* **Decision Making Style Approach**

Lewin originated the decision making style approach in 1938. He suggested that there are three styles of leadership. First the 'authoritarian' style. This style suggests that the leader controls and directs all activities. Second, is the 'democratic' style which emphasise group discussion and shared decision making. The third is the 'laissez-faire' style which suggests that there is no participation by the leader. Gradually a view become widely adopted that a democratic style was ideal for all situations. The implication was that managers trained to adopt such a style would be more effectively, because team spirit, member satisfaction and group productivity would all improved. This paper however feels that this is applicable in the industry rather than in the military.

* **Behaviour Dimension Approach**

There have been many researches carried out after the 1930's. These researches have established that the leadership is identified from the behaviour dimension of the leaders to distinguish between effective and less effective leaders. For example Fleishman⁴ identified eight dimensions; initiation, communication, production emphasis, representation, fraternisation, organisation, evaluation and domination. This paper does not intent to elaborate on this approach but suffice to mention the existence of it. For more information on this research please read Personnel Management by Derek Tornington and John Chapman.

* **Interaction Approach**

Another group of researchers discovered during their studies that effective leadership is not determined solely by personal characteristics, nor by the characteristics of situation but by interaction of all these. One popular theory is called the 'contingency' theory. This theory was presented by Fielder³ in 1967. The researchers indicated that effective leaders were more considerate and their groups were lowe in the enxity, with more harmonious relationship and the members more satisfied. The less effective leaders were more concerned with tasks, more punitive towards poor workers, with more efficient and goal oriented behaviour. Fielder considers that the effective leader gains his satisfaction from successful inter-personal relation while the less effective leader derives his major satisfaction from task performance.

MANAGEMENT

Let us now discuss on management in relation to leadership. Management can be defined as a process consisting of planning, organising, actuating and controlling performed to determine and to accomplish the objectives. It is also defined as the functions of getting things done through people and directing the effort of individuals towards a common objective. In relation to leadership; it is chiefly a mental activity, it has to do largely with planning, organising and controlling the work of others in accomplishment of group objectives.

Management is efficiently employing men, money, material, and to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission.




Fig 1 Functions of Management

From an examination of the above definition the following observations can be made:

- Management is a process consisting of a number of sub-processes. The processes are shown in Fig 1. The sub-processes are inter-related and interdependent and carried out simultaneously and continuously in an organisation.
- Management assumes a formal group of people working together as member or organisation. Without group activities there is no opportunity for the operation of management. People work in group to achieve goal which normally is beyond the capability of individual accomplishment.

- For management to operate, the group of people must be working towards a specific objective. A group which does not seek to attain an objective is not the concern of management. For example management is not applicable to a club which has no group goal.
- Management implies getting things done through subordinates and efficient manager is one who gets the work done through the effort of his subordinates rather doing it himself.
- It is a skill taken from specialised technical skills. A manager may possess some technical skill but it would be of no use to him in the discharge of his administrative responsibilities.

- f. Management encompasses the total organisation or part of it.
- g. Management is employed at all levels of the organisation hierarchy. At the higher level it is characterised by policy formulation and at lower level by policy execution.
- h. The principles of management would apply to all types of organisation irrespective of the nature of activities that may be engaged in.
- i. Management is not an end in itself, it is only a means to accomplish objectives in organisation.

One of the roles of an Armed Forces *manager* is that he must not only know the principles of management and leadership styles but he is required to know the quantitative approach to analysis as well as social psychology approach. Before this is discussed further it is appropriate at this juncture to mention two more important concepts which the Armed Forces *managers* must know, is discipline and organisation.

DISCIPLINE

Discipline applies not only to individuals but more to members in the organisation. Discipline means the complete and total obedience to rules, directives and orders of superior officer. Secondly it also means self control in the sense of personal responsibility that goes beyond mere obedience. Rules cannot be effective unless reinforced by habits and attitudes. These habits and attitudes are what is mean by discipline. In the Armed Forces the *manager's* objective is to achieve discipline not only through public compliance without private acceptance, but more importantly through private acceptance. The indicators that the *manager* may observe as those that result in discipline are mentioned below:

- * Constantly high level of performance.
- * Confidence.
- * Informal sanctions or norms.
- * Formal sanctions or norms.
- * Goals and moral.

Indicators of breakdown in discipline are:

- * Shock.
- * Source of panic.
- * Oval action.

ORGANISATION

Another role of the Armed Forces *manager*, is that he needs to know the various strategies in organisational structure. The organisational structure can be classified generally as follows:

- * Functional approach.
- * System approach.
- * Man-machine approach.
- * Matrix organisation.

FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

This approach is the traditional approach and has also been called the Scientific Management Approach. This approach propagated by Taylor⁸ in early 1900. Other organisation designers are Fayol² in 1916, Webber¹⁰ in 1947 who produced an analysis on bureaucracy. These people have produced more or less the principles of administration which advocated systematic planning of organisation and management. The organisation is structured into functions and the products that the organisation manufacture are broken down into small parts and each part is produced by the individuals. The approach achieved a tremendous success in the 1920's as proven by the Ford Motor Industry. The firm managed to produce cars in large quantity very efficiently. As time passed by, this approach did not last very long and productivity began to drop and workers' motivation started to decline

SYSTEM APPROACH

This approach is based on the knowledge of the system. The manager is required to think of the organisation in terms of the input, process and outcome. Take the example of the Armed Forces' *Central Ordnance Depot*. This depot is a good example where the input consists of the demands which come from the consumer units, the secondary depots, the suppliers, the decision making authorities at Brigade, Division and Ministry of Defence levels. The input factor is also made up of known resources, machines, materials and money. The other input factor includes constraint which may in the form of policy,

finance, storage space, and equipment. The process part of the system entails various functional areas which in the Central Ordnance Depot cover a large area of inventory management functions. These functions among others include Receipt, Issue, Accounting, Provisioning, Procurement, Traffic, Control, Co-ordination, Planning and Storage Operation. Storage Operation itself covers many functions which are peculiar in nature.

The outcome of the organisation is the long-term result of the process. The short-term result is called the output which may include the number of vouchers issued, tonnage, volume and expenditure. The long-term result on the other hand is expressed in different manner to give a long term picture such as the trend. Examples of outcome

will be Service Levels, Stock Turn Over, Sensitivity Analysis and Cost Benefit. The system is then completed by having a feedback loop from the outcome to the input. In the Central Ordnance Depot the feedback is the Management Information System and control devices to ensure the outcomes meet the organisation objectives. Lastly the system must contain an objective which in the Central Ordnance Depot may be expressed to achieve a Service Level of 95% within the financial constraints. More commonly the objective of the Ordnance is often expressed as to provide the right stores at the right time in the right quantity at the correct place.




Fig 2 Dynamic model of COD

MAN-MACHINE SYSTEM

In the history of industrial psychology there have been many approaches that are developed by psychologist and psychology enthusiasts for managers to apply. One of the oldest approaches on theory is the Scientific Management advanced by F. Taylor. Later the Humanistic Approach was introduced and this approach is based on the human elements and not on science and technology as F. Taylor had advocated. One of the famous studies is known as the "Hawthorne Studies". This study established that productivity and motivation are the attributes of the human element and organisation will benefit from them; therefore it is essential that the managers must appreciate the human attributes. Still later, as industrial psychology became more complex and dynamic, even the scientific management and the humanistic approach were no longer applicable in some developed countries such as the USA and UK. It is from this point that now approaches are found that are considered more effective and these are the man-machine approach and worker participation or industrial democracy which is now known as Japanese technology. It is not something new what Malaysia has adopted the Look-East Policy because industrial democracy has been in vogue in Europe such as the Swedish Volvo for quite sometime.

Now let us discuss about the man-machine approach. This approach advocates that the manager must not only look from the machine aspect but also from a combination of man and machine. A good example is at the Armed Forces printing unit in the Central Ordnance Depot. Earlier we discussed about the system approach for the whole of the COD. It is quite acceptable to do so from the macro aspect but when it comes to looking the trees from the weeds, then the printing unit has both resources ie manpower and machine which are vital to the organisation. The author in an effort to improve productivity has adopted a system approach in the Armed Forces Printing Unit but a lesson learnt from this approach is that the human resource is as important if not more than the machine or system. The system can be looked from the point of view of

the printing programme, the objective objectives and the processes of photography, plate making, printing and binding but these processes are insufficient to achieve the desired productivity. What has happened is that the human element such as incentives, motivation, job satisfaction and job achievement are the vital attributes. The next approach adopted was the man-machine approach during which the workers were called for a dialogue and they were allowed to participate in the designing of the printing programme and to do whatever jobs that they find most satisfying. Their sense of belonging and pride of the organisation were allowed to be exercised and the end result of this experience was a much higher productivity than when the change in the approach was first initiated.

MATRIX ORGANISATION

There will be time when the manager may be faced with a more complex environment, and organisation that exist in this environment is not compatible with the functional structure as discussed earlier on. There are organisations in the Armed Forces which have been called Project Organisation or Task Force Organisation. These names are given to organisations which are made up of individuals from functional organisation and put together to solve a particular problem. The Vietnamese refugee problem for instance has to be tackled especially by Task Force Group stationed in Kuala Trengganu.

The Asian Task Force is to solve the Kampuchean crisis or conflict. In MINDEF the Establishment Task Force was formed for the name it suggest and similarly the Electronic Data Processing Task Force. The Lumut Project and the 'A' Vehicle project are also established along the task force concept. In short the task force and project organisations are the contract of the functional organisation.

A natural development or phenomenon that will take place in the organisation is the need for a *Matrix Organisation*. It is an organisation which is required to deal with the problem of uncertainty

and the management of diverse speciality. In the military organisation, individual from various departments are assigned to one or more project teams to work together for the duration of project and these are managed by Project Manager. The project Manager's authority flow horizontally across the superior/subordinate relationship within the functional activities in the organisation. Through the life span of a given project, personnel at various levels and with varying skills must contribute their efforts to allow for the sequential development of the project. Authority steps from the project manager's charge from top management to get the project done within time and cost constraints. In practice, the project manager must rely heavily on alliances built with peers through negotiations, knowledge and resolution of conflict. Building of these relationship supplements the lack of formal authority over all of the resources needed to complete the project. Thus, the use of influence rather than just formal authority in the organisation is important here.

Implications of the matrix organisation is that members might receive incomptable requests from two managers (functional and project) and therefore leads to role conflict and job stress. Emphasis on Flexibility rather than on permanancy of job assignments might lead to feelings of insecurity about future employment after the project's completion results in lowering of loyalty to the organisation.

An example of Matrix Organisation is the Kumpulan Sistem Komputer Lojistik of which the author is the director.

The Quantitative Approach

Before this article deals with the roles of the Armed Forces *managers* per se it is pertinent to touch on another discipline which one must be familiar ie the quantitative discipline such as Quantitative Technique, Organisation and Method, Operational Research, Computer Science and Accounting. Those quantitative disciplines are the contrast of the arts and social science disciplines which include sociology, psychology and political science. However institution of higher learning appear to combine the social science and quantita-

tive discipline together so that the students are able to have a better perspective when they go out into the professional world and put the theories to practice. That is why the subjects like Marketing, Business Policy and Organisational Behaviour tend to apply the quantitative approach. Similarly quantitative subjects like operational research, computer science and quantitative techniques are looked from a descriptive angle rather than purely from quantitative view.

THE ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES 'MANAGERS'

The roles of an organisation or individual are often expressed precisely. For example the role of the Ordinance is to equip and maintain the Armed Forces. Readers may refer to the roles of the Armed Forces and Services and they are normally expressed in a very brief and precise form. In the same manner the roles of the Armed Forces *managers* should not be superfluous otherwise they will become too ambiguous and they may not be able to perform these roles effectively. Nevertheless in academic article such as this it is possible to enumerate the various roles and tasks that can possibly be formulated for the managers as follows:

- * To lead the personnel and the organisation to meet the objectives. Therefore knowledge of organisational theories is essential.
- * To formulate the objective for his organisation.
- * To ensure that the discipline of the members of each organisation is maintained. He therefore should realise the importance of private compliance in addition to the public acceptance.
- * To be accountable to the authority of what he is doing, for example an officer in the inventory control environment is accountable not only to the Armed Forces but also to the public authority as his responsibilities are related to the public account.
- * He is required to manage the resources that are at his disposal. This means that he must be aware of the manpower, machine,

money, material and facilities as resources and their constraints. Therefore an awareness of system approach is very valuable.


- * He must be responsive to the individual needs of the subordinates. A knowledge of motivational theory of Maslow, Harzberg and others would ensure that he is aware of the individual needs.
- * He needs to be open about various strategies in organising. An organisation may be of the functional, system, man-machine or matrix structure and the continued dependence on functional structure alone may not be compatible with the current needs.
- * He needs to be knowledgeable in the quantitative technique of solving problem as the resources that he has to manage have quantitative values and therefore require quantitative approach to problem solving.
- * He must possess the right sense of discipline so that the discipline that he has developed is of the private acceptance as well as the public compliances.
- * He is required to exercise the right style of leadership depending on the circumstances and the environment as discussed in the paper.
- * He should be responsive to the development in the country and the aspirations to modernise and professionalise the Armed Forces.
- * He should continue to develop his skill to manage and lead successfully in the new era which is characterised by uncertainties and conflicts.

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C A B A R A N

pegawai muda ATM

Leftenan Muda Borhan Ismail

KEMEROSOTAN AKHLAK

Secara sepantas lalu, "Tentera itu disiplin dan disiplin itu tentera". Tetapi dalam kontek perkembangan dan perubahan yang berlaku di zaman ini, ianya telah mempengaruhi Angkatan Tentera umumnya dan anggota Tentera Darat khasnya. Meskipun mereka telah diberi latihan asas ketenteraan dan bimbingan disiplin semasa di pusat-pusat latihan rekrut dan sebagainya, namun latihan-latihan ini didapati masih tidak mencukupi kerana disiplin dan kesetiaan yang dicapai di kalangan anggota kita keseluruhannya masih belum mantap dan membanggakan. Di dalam aspek ini, beberapa masalah boleh dibangkitkan, dikaji dan dibincangkan mengenai bagaimana peranan yang wajar dan sesuai boleh dimainkan oleh pegawai-pegawai khususnya pegawai muda demi mengatasi masalah ini.

Adalah satu perkara yang wajar difikirkan dari manakah mulanya benih atau akar umbi yang membawa kepada kejadian menghilangkan diri tanpa kebenaran serta memberontak dan mengancam pegawai-pegawai atasan. Segala-galanya ini sudah cukup untuk menjatuhkan maruah dan nama baik Tentera Darat kita, ini menggambarkan kemerosotan disiplin and rendah semangat untuk berjuang dan bertaat setia kepada arahan pemimpin. Secara tidak langsung ianya juga memperlihatkan betapa tidak berkesan dan berkelibarnya seseorang pemimpin itu di dalam mengordinasikan dan memimpin anggotanya menjadi satu pasukan yang mantap dan sentiasa siap sedia untuk bertempur.

Dengan kemerosotan disiplin yang menular ini, suatu dasar telah diatur dan diperkelilingkan dalam mana sesiapa saja anggota Tentera Darat samada pegawai atau Lain-lain Pangkat yang didapati terlibat dengan kesalahan-kesalahan yang serius melibatkan moral dan disiplin boleh dihukum dengan keras atau di berhentikan perkhidmatannya. Dasar ini telah pun dikuatkuasakan dan beberapa tindakan telah diambil terhadap anggota-anggota yang bermoral rendah, yang melibatkan diri mereka dalam kes-kes jenayah dan penagihan dadah.

KAWAD

Sejak Tentera Darat ditubuhkan pada tahun 1933, latihan berkawad begitu ditekankan demi

menentukan agar matlamat-matlamat berikut dicapai di kalangan anggota:

- * Kepatuhan
- * Kepercayaan
- * Setia kawan dan kerjasama
- * Kesegakan
- * Kesabaran
- * Ketahanan mental
- * Kesihatan
- * Persamaan

Daripada matlamat-matlamat di atas kepatuhan merupakan matlamat pokok kerana kawad memerlukan para anggota secara spontan dan langsung melaksanakan sesuatu perintah yang diberikan itu tanpa bicara dan menyayal. Adalah diyakini bahawa kekurangan kawad atau tidak langsung mempraktikkan kawad adalah di antara punca menyebabkan disiplin. Sekiranya peraturan dan segala aspek kawad sering dipraktikkan serta dikordinasikan dengan tegas, adalah diyakini setiap anggota yang menerima arahan akan melaksanakan segala arahan-arahan tersebut secara spontan tanpa berosal jawab.

UGAMA

Selain daripada latihan kawad, disiplin dan kesetiaan boleh dicapai melalui pengajaran keagamaan dan moral. Di dalam aspek ini pegawai muda hendaklah menentukan setiap anggota harus diberikan pendidikan semantap-mantapnya bagi menjamin bahawa mereka akan memiliki keperibadian dan sikap yang mulia dan baik sejarah dengan asuhan rohani yang mereka terima. Di samping itu moral atau semangat mereka juga dapat dipertingkatkan kerana pendidikan keagamaan juga memberikan gambaran-gambaran yang ter tentang pertempuran serta kedudukan dari kacamata Islam. Adalah jelas bahawa peperangan serta membunuh musuh ugama adalah suatu perkara yang mulia di sisi ugama. Malahan, Nabi Muhammad (SAW) terkenal sebagai seorang Panglima dan Pejuang Islam yang agong dan gagah perkasa serta telah pun melibatkan dirinya di dalam peperangan sejak di zaman Jahiliah Arab lagi.

Oleh itu bertepatan dengan realiti bahawa majoriti anggota-anggota di dalam Tentera Darat adalah orang-orang Melayu atau kaum yang ber-

ugama Islam maka sepatutnya adalah perkara ke-Islaman ditekankan demi untuk mengujudkan satu Angkatan Tentera Pahlawan yang berjiwa mulia, berdisiplin dan bersatu padu. Bagi anggota yang bukan Islam, mereka tidak dipaksa untuk melibatkan diri di dalam amalan-amalan Islam, tetapi mereka diwajibkan hadir mengikuti kursus-kursus moral dan tata tertib kenteraan.

KERJAYA

Seorang pegawai muda harus juga mengkaji dan memikirkan soal merancang kerjaya anggota-anggota bawahannya, kursus yang sedia ada yang berbentuk kursus-kursus kenaikan pangkat dan sebagainya masih tidak mencukupi untuk meningkatkan moral anggota-anggota. Sebagai seorang ketua platoon, beliau harus berkebolehan merancang dan menyusun sesuatu jadual latihan yang mantap bagi bawahannya supaya setiap anggotanya akan menerima latihan yang cukup dengan cara yang saksama. Maksudnya di sini setiap kursus kerjaya yang dirancangkan haruslah mengutamakan taraf kekanan bawahannya. Ini ialah untuk memastikan agar tiada berbangkit sebarang rasa irihati, cemburu dan sebagainya kerana setiap anggota akan berpeluang mengikuti kursus atau kerjaya apabila tiba gilirannya pula. Dengan ini, disamping dapat meningkatkan kebolehan anggota-anggota melalui latihan dan kursus-kursus tadi, mereka juga dapat dilatih sebagai satu pasukan yang penuh bersemangat, berdisiplin dan memiliki daya tempur yang tinggi.

KEPIMPINAN

Adalah diyakini sepenuhnya bahawa peranan pemimpin adalah amat penting dan paling berkesan di dalam kontek peningkatan moral dan disiplin anggota. Ini adalah kerana pemimpin tentera dapat terus berkomunikasi dengan anggota-anggotanya dan seterusnya menjalankan berbagai langkah dan tindakan bagi menjamin moral anggotanya terus kukuh dan membanggakan. Seorang ketua platoon harus mentadbirkan pelatunnya dengan segala kebijaksanaan yang ada padanya sebagai seorang pegawai bertauliah. Pada pandangan pertama beliau harus menunjukkan contoh yang

baik dan berhemah tinggi serta tegas sama ada dari segi berpakaian, cara bergaul, keperibadian dan sebagainya. Seterusnya beliau harus menentukan kebijakan anggotanya, menanyakan masalah mereka, cuba menyelesaikan masalah-masalah tersebut di samping memberikan tunjuk ajar dan nasihat demi kebaikan mereka.

Bekas President Amerika mendiang John F. Kennedy pernah berkata, "Suatu platon adalah satu daripada pemerintahnya yang terbaik di dalam Angkatan Tentera kerana ianya adalah di mana seorang ketua atau pemerintah yang masih muda memerintah satu platon yang merangkumi urusan pentadbiran dan nyawa di bawahnya, dan sekiranya pentadbiran dapat dilaksanakan dengan baik dan lancar, maka ia lebih mengenali anggotanya daripada ibu-ibu anggotanya mengenali mereka sendiri". Dari kata-kata ini dapatlah disimpulkan bahawa setiap pemimpin harus sejak mula lagi membina daya pemikiran dan tanggungjawab yang setinggi-tingginya supaya kepimpinan mereka akan ditauladani oleh anggotanya. Bagi seorang pemimpin yang mantap ciri-ciri yang perlu ada pada dirinya adalah bergantung kepada ketinggian personaliti serta perwatakan yang begitu menarik dan boleh dijadikan contoh cemerlang oleh anggota bawahannya. Dan jika dianalisa pendapat oleh setengah-setengah intelek barat kepimpinan atau "leadership" bermaksud bahawa pemimpin ialah individu yang bertanggungjawab untuk mentadbirkan diri sendiri disamping perlu juga mentadbirkan orang lain. Untuk menjadi pemimpin bukanlah mudah tetapi seorang individu yang telah diberikan kepercayaan serta mandat oleh Kerajaan, maka berkewajipanlah baginya melaksanakan tugas-tugas yang diberikan kepadanya dengan sempurna. Seorang pemimpin muda sama sekali tidak boleh mudah dipengaruhi oleh emosi cemas, takut serta kecewa dan sebagainya. Lantaran itu mereka lah contoh yang unggul di dalam pandangan anggotanya. Oleh itu setiap pemimpin wajar menunjukkan moral courage" dan semangat perjuangan yang tinggi pada setiap masa walaupun pada realitinya mereka sedang menghadapi kesulitan dan berbagai tekanan jiwa.

HUKUMAN

Satu lagi cara yang difikirkan wajar dalam kontek ini ialah setiap pegawai terutamanya pegawai muda harus mengikuti panduan-panduan Akta Angkatan Tentera 1972 dan memperaktikkan hukuman dengan cara yang bijak. Ini adalah supaya satu-satu kesalahan yang dilakukan itu diberi hukuman yang wajar dan bersesuaian dengan keadaan kesalahan tersebut dan hukumannya tidak dijatuhkan secara sesuka hati dan tidak beralasan. Seboleh-bolehnya hukuman yang diberi ke atas pesalah yang berkenaan adalah berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan akal yang baik supaya tiada berlaku sebarang penganiayaan dan hukuman tersebut telah dipastikan sah. Hukuman yang diberi secara kekerasan dan tidak diterima oleh akal haruslah dicegah. Umpamanya menggunakan tangan, kaki atau senjata-senjata yang membahaya terhadap pesalah-pesalah adalah diharamkan di mana hukuman-hukuman cara ini akan menyakitkan hati pesalah di samping berkemungkinan merbahayakan keselamatan serta mentaliti pesalah. Cara yang berbentuk kekerasan ini tidak akan memperbaiki keperibadian pesalah malahan akan berkemungkinan merosakkan lagi jiwa pesalah itu.

LATIHAN

Pada dasarnya latihan perang adalah tugas tentera semasa aman. Demikian juga dengan latihan-latihan fizikal, kelas-kelas muslihat, baca peta dan sebagainya. Tetapi, setelah dikaji dengan teliti, segala latihan dan kelas-kelas yang diadakan ini selain daripada dapat meningkatkan taraf profesionalisme tiap-tiap anggota, ianya juga meningkatkan modal para anggota apabila menjalani operasi sebenar. Oleh itu adalah difikirkan wajib bagi setiap pegawai, khususnya pegawai di peringkat ketua platoon untuk menentukan bahawa setiap anggotanya menerima latihan-latihan yang secukupnya, di samping latihan-latihan lanjutan bagi mempastikan bahawa bawahannya memiliki kebolehan dan daya-tempur yang mantap dan menyakinkan. Jesteru itu satu jadual yang teratur dan efektif perlu diadakan bagi menentukan bahawa latihan-latihan dapat dilaksanakan dengan pesat dan lancar tanpa sebarang gangguan dan ke-

celaakan yang boleh menjatuhkan semangat anggota. Dalam kontek ini, Pegawai Memerintah atau ketua-ketua lain dipertanggungjawab terhadap unitnya harus sentiasa menyedari akan hakikat bahawa latihan tidak boleh dipisahkan dari anggotanya, kerana ruang pemisahan itu akan menyebabkan anggota menjadi lemah dan malas. Walau bagaimanapun latihan-latihan yang keterlaluan bukan satu langkah yang bijak untuk meninggikan semangat anggota. Lantara itu latihan keterlaluan hanya akan menyebabkan anggota menjadi bosan, tidak bersemangat dan jemu untuk menjalani latihan.

PENGETAHUAN PROFESIONALISMA

Segala perkembangan atau pembesaran yang berlaku di dalam unit-unit Tentera Darat telah membawa kepada perlunya penambahan terhadap peralatan dan kelengkapan tenteraan. Selaras dengan pemodenan persenjataan pada masa ini Tentera Darat Malaysia harus juga memiliki senjata-senjata moden demi menandingi serangan dari luar. Dalam soal ini peran yang dapat dimainkan oleh seorang ketua platoon atau pemimpin-pemimpin muda ialah mengorientasi dan mengajar kepada bawahannya mengenai senjata-senjata baru, teknik-teknik penggunaan senjata-senjata bantuan dan sebagainya. Dengan ertikata lain mereka (pegawai-pegawai muda) harus menurunkan segala pengetahuan profesionalisma yang mereka miliki kepada anggota-anggotanya. Dengan ini, anggota bawahannya akan dapat memahami disamping menguasai teknik menggunakan satu-satu jenis senjata itu dengan cara yang tepat dan paling berkesan. Di samping itu juga, ketua platoon perlu gigih mengajar segala ilmu taktik yang telah beliau pelajari kepada anggota bawahannya. Ini termasuklah fungsi senjata-senjata bantuan dan alat-alat bantuan tempur di dalam perangkonvensional dan KESBAN (Keselamatan dan Pembangunan). Latihan-latihan melihat dan penggunaan senjata-senjata bantuan dan sebagainya ini harus ditekankan dengan sungguh-sungguh kerana kemantapan kejayaan di dalam pertempuran. Selain dari itu ianya juga diyakini dapat meningkatkan semangat bawahan dan seterusnya meninggikan kerjasama mereka sebagai satu pasukan yang kukuh. Oleh

itu, sesiapa pun tidak boleh memutuskan bahawa kekurangan kelengkapan dan lain-lain bantuan perkhidmatan akan merobohkan imej dan moral yang tinggi di dalam organisasi Tentera Darat, kerana pegawai-pegawai muda mempunyai peranan yang tersendiri di dalam mengatasi masalah ini.

Kini Tentera Darat telah berkembang pesat dari aspek kuantiti anggotanya tetapi menurun atau merosot dari segi kualiti profesionalisme masing-masing. Adalah menjadi dasar Kementerian Pertahanan pada masa ini untuk menentukan bahawa Tentera Darat kita berkualiti selaras dengan kuantiti yang ada dan bukannya berharap kepada kuantiti sahaja. Dengan ini pegawai-pegawai muda hendaklah terus berusaha untuk meninggikan pengetahuan mereka dalam segala aspek ketenteraan demi menjamin kualiti bagi kuantiti Tentera Darat kita.

ULASAN

Ulasan daripada apa yang telah diperbincangkan, dapatlah dinyatakan disini bahawa pembinaan semangat dan disiplin di kalangan anggota Tentera boleh dilakukan oleh pegawai-pegawai muda melalui aspek-aspek yang telah dikemukakan. Adalah diyakini sepenuhnya bahawa jika mereka dapat

mengaplikasikan segala kebolehan mereka secara tegas dan gigih, suatu imej yang mulia dan membanggakan dapat diwujudkan di dalam organisasi Tentera Darat khususnya. Bukan sekadar itu saja, malah mutu tempur sesebuah unit akan dapat dipertinggikan lagi. Lantaran itu akan meningkat juga profesionalisma di kalangan anggota Tentera. Selain daripada semangat yang tinggi dan kesetiaan yang tidak berbelah bagi, anggota bawahan juga dapat diasuh dengan semangat perjuangan yang tulian dan rela untuk berkorban nyawa demi kedaulatan bangsa, ugama dan tanah air. Selaras dengan itu mereka juga dapat dibentuk sebagai satu angkatan yang begitu efisyen dan mantap serta digeruni oleh musuh. Seiring dengan berbagai krisis keamanan yang ujud pada masa ini adalah difikirkan tidak ada waktu lagi bagi negara ini untuk memiliki sebuah angkatan bersenjata yang besar. Hal yang seharusnya berlaku ialah bahawa segera memiliki sebuah organisasi ketenteraan yang kecil tetapi berkeupayaan tinggi dan disegani oleh dunia. Jika keadaan ini dapat dijudikan, tentulah negara tidak mudah diancam atau dicerobohi oleh kuasa-kuasa politik yang dahagakan pengaruh dan sumber-sumber kekayaan di negara ini.



Lt Muda Borhan bin Ismail, telah ditauliahkan dalam Rejimen Gerak Khas Malaysia pada tahun 1981, setelah beliau tamat Latihan di Sekolah Pegawai Kedet Kem Segenting, Port Dickson. Lt Muda Borhan sangat minat di bidang penerbitan kreatif dan ingin melanjutkan pelajaran dalam bidang tersebut. Kini beliau berkhidmat sebagai Ketua Terup Sekuaderan Intip.

EXPENDITURE DOWN PRODUCTIVITY UP

how can it be done in the MAF ?

The aim of this article is to discuss generally ways to cut the expenditures and increase the productivity of the Armed Forces.

The paper will address its discussion on the Armed Forces generally, with specific references to the Army where applicable.

In his article the writer, does not only take some but lot of liberty in approaching the subject matter, including the style of presentation. He does not promise any solution at the end, but only thoughts. And thoughts or proposals do not become solutions until the problem is solved. Beyond thoughts, there is, therefore, a need to put action into motion, and keeping its momentum going until it has reached the finishing tape. To enable to see a proposal through needs an amount of courage, a fair degree of commitment, and complete integrity and soul-searching.

Kolonel Abd. Malik Alwi

CUTS & INCREASES

Even though Awang Sulong Merah Muda talks about "taking one tahil leaving one kati, and the taking of another tahil and still leaving one kati", cutting costs and increasing productivity are not usually mutually complementary measures. The two measures can only find a common meeting point if we make two assumptions, that is to say, there are areas of unnecessary spending and wastage, and the productivity is not at its optimum because the machinery available is functioning below capacity. "Machinery" here refers to both the hard stuff called plants, tools, engines and other equipment, but does not include hardheaded humans, who should be included under a sub-category of "soft machines" along with other soft-headed humans.

There are some dangers if we accept the above assumptions (which we shall refer as the null hypothesis). The primary risk is with the boss. He is likely to lose his head, for his will be the first on the chopping block (which if is of any consolation, was assured by Dr. Guillotine, as the neatest and least painful method of severance; however, there was no living proof to confirm his assurance). It is not because the boss is responsible for all (he may just be responsible for some) the ailments of the Services and the attendant wastage of funds, or the under-utilization of hard machinery and sluggish production of the soft machinery. It has to do with the military philosophy of command regarding a leader's accountability for his personal "feassance, misfeassance and nonfeassance" as well as those of his men. It is what lawyers call the master's liability for the deeds and misdeeds of his

servants. That is why some staff prefer to remain staff perpetually; there are always others on top of them to take the rap if anything goes wrong. There is an element of security of tenure which makes a staff portfolio very sought after. Of course some staff usually have a love-hate relationship between the security of tenure as a staff and the insecurity of tenure (but better remunerations and status) of their superiors. Some staff may even end up in the position where they have always been trying to avoid, but they usually get used to the new chair and will even like the new roles.

Now, if we hold an alternative hypothesis, that is to say, there is no wastage, productivity is at its optimum, and the machinery is at full capacity, then what is left is purely to arrest the problem of cutting on expenditures. The solution is simple. list down the areas of expenditures and sub-itemise them in priority. Cutting from the last serial upward would be logical, it is something the writer strongly advocate. Stop cutting when the amount desired to be saved is achieved. Of course, there is nothing to stop from being an over-achiever, in which case cutting the whole list is recommended. Then perhaps, we will not have a service paper; a piece of memorandum would suffice.

So, Rule 1 is:

"For everything life, there is a priority. Therefore, prioritize".

What if we take a middle stance between the two abovementioned hypotheses? There is a slight problem of computation here, as we are involved in three major variables: wastage, productivity and machinery. There are, therefore, various combinations in which we can restate this middle stand. Apart from this difficulty, the writer is advised by that great Frenchman, Nopolean Bonaparte, never to compromise in any extreme situation. A compromise in the end neither satisfies any party. The moral of his advise is that, it is better to choose or take one stand, and secure the support of those advocating that stand than to take no stand and not getting any support at all. Of course, there is an art in choosing which stand to take, and the art is to choose the stand shared by the majority. The message is quite clear as Rule 2 states:

"When confronted with uncompromising situations, do not compromise".

If we are no nearer to tackling the desired service paper, the above diversion at least shows that a problem may not appear to be what it is, or what it is stated to be. Under the circumstances, it would be advisable that we look hard at any problem statement; perhaps there is a need for a restatement, or a redefinition. Even if the problem is correctly stated, a second look would serve well. As the span of memory tends to be exponentially shorter with the accumulation of age, a reminder or reminders can be useful in keeping us on course.

KEY FACTORS

The Armed Forces' Special Expansion programme of 1979 – 1983, or PERISTA as it is known by the Bahasa acronymn, was and is profound both in terms of Force Modernization as well as Force Development. By a cynical twist of fate, however, PERISTA was dogged in mid-stream by money shortage. Thus, "grow", "spend" "expand" are now passe; the "in" words are "trim", "save", "cut", "consolidate", and of late, "productivity". From multiplication and addition, we now focus on the mathematics of subtraction and division.

PERISTA typifies the classic Greek tragedy. From a harbinger of glad tidings, it fell victim to the dark forces of economic recession and money shortage. It is, therefore a convenient and appropriate point of reference for our discussion, in addition to some other observations of a general nature. In the examination of our subject, the writer shall for the reasons immediately following, examine four major areas.

- * Budget.
- * Organization.
- * Training.
- * Operational and other activities.

The budget factor is always a key factor ever since free labour and compulsory war-service by serfs for their masters were declared illegal trade practices. The budget factor is closely related to budget planning, spending and resource management.

The organizational factor is also important, for therein lies the soft and hard machines. It is not only the number of machines that is important, but also their shapes and specifications. Unless the organization is efficient and effective, there is bound to be some malfunction. In this event, the system must be put right.

Many would say that the training factor is already implied under the organizational factor. Others would say that as far as the Services are concerned, it is a primary area which deserves a treatment of its own. It is just a matter or personal preference really.

In any event, what is true is that the shape and size of the organization may be right, but that alone will not guarantee that the machinery will function well. Give a Kelantan top to a city folk, and the best use he will have for it is either as an office decoration or paper weight. He will not be able to utilize it for its primary purpose, i.e. to top-spin and enjoy the grace of its motion. Thus, a person must be trained for his job, additionally, he must be utilized for the job he is trained and thirdly, the machine must be put to its proper use, and seldom at all to a secondary use, but never to an unrelated or incidental use. Lest one forget, Rule 3 is:

"Everything has its purposes; put all things and persons to their proper purposes".

Operations and other activities are relevant to our discussion, for both touch on costs and are indicative of productivity. So this area, too, will be examined.

With above overview, the writer shall now make a foray into the battle area. The word "Foray" is chosen with some care for it signifies that besides inflicting enemy casualties, friendly troops are also exposed to considerable hazards of splinters from friendly weapons.

WHERE DO WE BEGIN?

Where do we begin? This is a problem shared by many of us. If we do not know where to begin, then we are in dire state of affair, because where we are and where we are heading for must come from somewhere. It is equally important to know our destination, for if we do not know our destination we will never realize that we are lost in

the first place, how could anyone be lost if he does not know or care where he ends? journey must commence with a start point and end at a destination, interspersed with landmarks and resting places in between. In elementary map reading training, we were told of a basic set drill if we are lost in the jungle. stop, check your map, check your compass, re-orientate, and then only proceed. The same rule, albeit modified, also applies when we found ourselves spending more money than we can afford, or productivity not keeping pace with what was warranted or expected. So, Rule 4 is.

"When off-course, stop, check, orientate and proceed with caution. When totally lost, begin from the beginning".

THE BEGINNING. NATIONAL DETERMINATION

Maintaining an Army, Navy or Air Force is an expensive business. An Army is not formed purely for ceremonial purposes (except perhaps in the Vatican and Monaco) though ceremonies will continue to be an important fact of Service life. This is also a fact which we should always keep in proper perspective. In the final analysis, the Services are subjected to the will of the Nation, which in our context is Parliament, or in less esoteric term, our political masters. Our political masters translate the National Security Objectives, through the process explained schematically in Figure 1 below, of what they want the Services to be or capable of doing.

However, this is not say that Service Chiefs do not have a vital role to play in determining where we want to be. Indeed, Service Chiefs should be active in formulating the postulated threat whether real or perceived, and in mapping out and marrying military strategy with the overall National Strategy. Having determined the military strategy within the context of National Strategy, then only can some idea of Force Level Requirement be conceived, and the ringgit and sen be seriously considered.




Fig 1. THE NATIONAL DETERMINATION

What the writer is trying to say is that unless we reexamine the rationale of our existence, then we should not start talking about cutting on expenditures and increasing productivity yet. Thus, we should neither cut nor trim arbitrarily without reference to the assumptions and strategy which explain where we are in the first place. There is a bottom line beyond which we cannot further scrape without putting our National Security Objectives to unacceptable jeopardy. In other words, we can cut or accept risks so much and no further.

It would be logical at this point of time to take on the subject of Organization first. However, since the first emphasis of this paper is on Costs and Expenditures, expediency shall overrule logics, and the writer shall tackle the question relating to Budget Management, or lack thereof, as the case may be, as well as related matters.

THE SYSTEM

There is a common problem faced by many officers in the area of budget planning, programming and spending. The problem is a total lack of understanding of the system. Those who are fortunate enough to work in a related assignment would learn through observation, participation and exposure some aspects of the Armed Forces budgeting system. Others less fortunate will go through their career spared from that enriching if not altogether glamourous experience and at most perpetually confined to double-entry bookkeeping and wrestling with trial balances.

With an inadequate understanding of the system, we are at best stabbing in the dark, hoping accidentally to hit the target. Now, this is not the best way of doing things, as anybody would tell. We do not, for example, let a soldier take part in a

highrisk operations, unless he is first trained. Otherwise, his shots are equally likely to hit an enemy as hitting his own friends this can be extremely hazardous to health. So, Rule 5 is:

"Know the system throughly. Knowledge is supreme".

Why is budge try planning, programming and spending vital in Force planning? The answer simply stated is that Force planning is circumscribed by resources constraints – the main constraint being fiscal. There is the perpetual problem of satisfying unlimited appetites with limited means. So, one must work or spend strictly within the budget ceiling and ensure that the budget in the first place is based on realistic assumptions based on analysis of past trend and future anticipation. One cannot spend what one cannot afford; this is universal truth whether we are talking about the Jones next door, the Armed Forces; or the country.

Our budgeting system covers formidable transit points, or as someless diplomatic person would say, obstacles. A System is difficult to change overnight unless one has courage and or has mastered the techniques of good salesmanship. Unfortunanately, few of us are imbued with such talents. So we have in most cases to operate within the system and exploit on its favourable points. This is why Rule 5 about knowledge and knowing the system is so important. Often, time and energy is wasted on fighting against the system. Since time expended is not recoverable, perhaps it should be put to more fruitful use. Which reminds us of Rule 6:

"Use your time to productive ends".

Though there appears to be a process of participation by the Armed Forces in their budget preparation, the writer feels that participation begins and ends at the preliminary or preaparatory level only. Fiscal obligation and expenditures, with some exceptions, are not controlled by the users i.e. the Armed Forces. Despite Jethro's advise to Moses on the need to delegate and keep the span of Control within manageable proportion, our fiscal practise is still highly centralized with the

civilian overlords. Sometimes there is attrition on this and some time and effort are wasted by both sides acting out their parts. But overcontrol is as bad as no control at all. We need to ease up all along the line, and share not only in preparing the budget, but in expending, adjusting, and rebudgeting.

The study of the Budget Planning, Programming and Spending system is relevant to the subject at hand. However, because of the many ramifications involved, the writer will not say much more than what has already been mentioned above. He wishes to reiterate that the Services must be equally in the picture about the system and seek, if necessary, means to improve it. However, the responsibility attached to what we sought for is also heavy, and we must be prepared to carry that responsibility. As a start, the writer recommends that we ourselves must be clear of what we want and how we want to be more meaningfully involved in determining the ringgit and sen appropriated to the Services. The components involved in the Budget Planning, Programming and Spending Cycle are explained schematically at Figure 2.

It is not possible to illustrate all the activitives and coordination required at Figure 2. However, what should be apparent are the division of responsibilities between the Service Chiefs and the Secretary of our Ministry, and areas where they should closely liaise and work together. After all, everything said and done, we are still supposed to be a team working for a common good, that is, the good of the country with at least a credible base for defence.

WHAT AND WHERE DO WE CUT?

Cutting down an expenditures, like dieting, is usually a painful exercise. People react strongly on matters affecting their pocket; so do organizations. However, we are in a bad shape today: we are having a serious liquidity problem. This is a fact which we all must accept but there is no necessity to feel despondent or be resigned to fate. It is in advenrsity that our true strength is tested.




FIG 2. BUDGET PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND SPENDING CYCLE

Since bosses normally act on the advise of staff, and staff's advise is circumscribed by their wisdom and experience which in the case of finance and accounting does not amount to much - our actions (though well-meaning) may not add much as cost-saving devices. How much, for example, would we save by not providing pencils and papers during meetings? In situation that we are in today, we have to raise ourselves way above the normal and the trivial. The issues may be basic, but we must, as Rule 7 states:

"Think big. Cut big".

As we are beginning to find out, everything else besides perhaps polluted air, costs money. But this realisation is not enough until all of us - commanders, staff and men alike - are aware of the relative if not the actual worth of our military equipment, material, and activities, as well as the cost implication of our decisions and actions. Coming back to the problem of what and where to cut, there are at least four major general (the pun is not intended) areas to examine:

- * Expenditures
- * Maintenance
- * Manpower
- * Wastage

Some aspects of the above areas and most aspects of Manpower will be discussed in Part V of this paper. The main discussion regarding areas to be examined to effect cuts and savings, however, follows immediately below.

Planning for the Future

Planning for the future is an art assisted by a fair amount of intuition. The only thing certain about tomorrow is that costs will escalate. Planning for future expenditure, therefore, requires estimates of the future course of inflation. Here one can use a rule of thumb, but this may be way off the eventual true rate. A 10% error in the anticipated inflation rate may not mean much if we buy 1,000 pencils, but a purchase of, say, a Squadron worth of Condor for about half a

million ringgit each would add to quite a bit. There are also hidden costs which were hidden either by intention of the vendor, or overlooked by the purchaser. In any case, we come out the worst for it. So, Rule 8 is:

"Plan on realistic assumptions. Caveat emptor (buyer beware)".

So, our estimate of our expenditures, whether developmental or operating, must be accurate. Otherwise, we will be caught in a bind having either to forego certain things or committed to a project which goes beyond our estimate. Any further cost incurances as a result of poor, inadequate, or faulty planning are definitely not going to enable us to achieve saving or cutting of costs. And yet, we continue to accept as a norm, rather than an exception, that the eventual cost of our projects or purchases would be substantially higher than our working estimates. Vendors have a name to justify the additional costs: costs escalations clause. In layman's parlance, this means that we are paying more than what we bargain for.

Physical Activities

All activities incur costs, either directly or indirectly. We sometimes do not feel this because we do not physically see money flowing from one end to another. We only relate to the tangible because the tangible responds to our sensory perceptions. We fail to take into consideration the "hidden" overhead expenditures, opportunity costs, and costs incurred by other people or organization. We have to be sensitive to all these if we are to do an honest and effective job of trimming down our expenditures.

How much of our activities do we cut? Nobody else except our military policy makers, in this case the Service Chiefs as advised by their staff, can determine. There are two determinants: total costs desired to be cut, and the trades-off as a result of the scaling down of those activities. One must accept, for example, less operational deployment as a result of scaling down on fuel consumption and aircraft hours, or a fall in weapon handling efficiency for our gun crew because we have to cut on the purchase of ammunition for training. In other words, everything being equal, a cut is going to inflict a wound somewhere.

The areas of activities affected, and its effect on the efficiency (and therefore, the productivity) of the Armed Forces will be further examined under Part VI of his paper.

Purchases

Purchases of equipment and material are a major portion of military spending. For instance, over the last three years, the Army alone expended about \$1,230 million on Developmental Expenditures. Items consumed must be replaced; empty stock shelves must be refilled; new equipment must replace obsolete ones. For whatever reasons purchases are carried out, there are only two rationale for doing so: either as a replacement decision, or an expansion decision. There is no other justification for purchasing.

Purchasing new equipment is like a capital investment by a commercial company. But unlike the latter where a yardstick for its economic worth can be worked out, it is more difficult to determine the economic and military worth of a military investment. It is important, therefore, that we go through our purchases with care. Paying for mine detectors that does not function, or buying ammunition blanks that cause defects to the rifle are two examples why Rule 8: *Caveat Emptor*, is so important. We cannot begin to talk about cuts before we talk about avoiding wastages.

Inventories

Any inventory needs space for storage somewhere. There is a good reason why our inventories and stocks must be up-to-date and at the correct level. Besides wastage through spoilage, storage incurs costs, either real cost or opportunity cost. This is why our Equipment Table must be constantly reviewed so that our Ordnance Service will not continue purchasing items no longer in use or not suitable for further use. Stocks must also be checked to ensure that a proper level is maintained, and suitable turnover is carried out. If our policy is to hold a 45 days' ammunitions as War Reserves, either sufficient ammunitions must be purchased to bring the holding to that level, or the policy must go; a position of flux must not be allowed to remain.

The problem with cutting on our inventories is that whilst some savings may be realized, there is a trade-off in term of efficiency or productivity. Having a problem like this, however, is no excuse for not making a firm decision on the matter.

Accomodations and Services

Building new accomodations, and maintaining existing ones, are also "big-spenders". As long as we have people, we must provide them with a roof. How do we provide a roof and the same time not spent much money for building accomodations? Unfortunately, there are not many philanthropists around to help us, conversely too, an Armed Forces cannot survive on charity. This is where, perhaps, the Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) can help. At present, it has a substantial amount of liquid assets in fixed deposits. It would help the Government (and the Armed Forces) tremendously if the LTAT can be convinced to divert some of these assets into long-term realty investment by building accomodations and renting them to the Armed Forces. In the long-run, this would benefit both the LTAT and the Government; in the short-run, it would ease Government spending and ease up on Development Expenditures without incurring any loss to the LTAT because the LTAT in effect is really transforming liquid asset into immovable and highly appreciative assets.

There are associate costs wherever we have structure on the ground and whenever we have people or equipment inside them. Money has to be provided to cover all overheads ranging from services and utilitites to maintenance and repairs. These are difficult areas to effect savings. Nevertheless, there are rooms for self-help and initiative, as well as taking proper care of all accomodation which would help not only in defraying maintenance costs, but also instill pride within the personnel involved.

A RESUME

The discussion above has identified areas which incur costs, and these are the areas that we must primarily focus on when money position

become tight. Often we have no other alternative but to take drastic actions, for half-measures may be useful in the short term but may prove expensive in the long run. The thrust of the discussion is that all spending must be geared towards optimising efficiency and enhancing both Service and inter-Services capability. There are many valid interests competing for limited and diminishing fund this necessitates a clear perspective of their relative priority.

PRODUCTIVITY: PROBLEM OF MEASURE

The earlier part of this paper was focused on the problems and areas of costs and cuts. We shall now move on to the second limb of the topic, that is, on Productivity. The writer is tempted again to compare the matter at hand with a commercial undertaking to illustrate the difficulty of determining the measures or criteria for productivity in the Armed Forces. The acid test of a commercial company's productivity is profitability. If one wants to look deeper into the company's performance; there are always historical data to inspect and various ratio analyses to help: one can even ask for an inter-firm comparison. But what do we do in the case of an Army, Navy or Air Force?

Even in areas where there exist some similarity with the commercial sector, as for example, the manufacturing activities of the Armed Forces Manufacturing Workshop (AFMW), and the Aircraft Overhaul Depot (AIROD), it is still not easy to come up with any firm conclusion whether they are sufficiently productive to justify continued existence, or whether they should close down, or be privatised. This is because other factors besides productivity per se, for example, self-sufficiency or gaining new technology, must be taken into account. What is certain, however, is that the Armed Forces, and the country, cannot sustain any activity or organization that is manifestly not cost-effective. The organization must shake itself, examine its performance, look over its horizon, be innovative and justify its existence. If it takes a manufacturing workshop to build, say, a box-body for a vehicle, four times longer with twice more

costs than that by private sources, then it should be equally clear to the decision-maker that the former is highly unproductive in this respect. If similar state of matter recurs once too often, not all justifications or reasons are not going to sound convincing if somebody decides to alter the status or close down the said workshop. The Armed Forces, traditionally, has been known for its efficiency, and not for excuses. And this is an image which we should maintain at all cause.

In the final analysis, testimony of our productivity or otherwise is proven only on the battle-ground. War is a win/lose affair. In a win/lose situation, we are productive only if we win. And for the Armed Forces, unlike any other organization, there is no other choice but to be productive, and to win. For to lose means we means we lose everything — ourselves, and our country. Unlike the insolvent company, we cannot be wound up, and register under another name again the next day.

The present situation, where we have low level real threat (the communist insurgents), relative peace, and an uncertain external threat, makes it more difficult for us to set a measure for productivity. In the last Vietnam War, "body counts" used as one measure, and even that proved to be a misleading indicator; even if it is a good measure for us, our "body counts" has sadly been low compared to our level of operational acitivity.

In the absence of any scientific means of measuring an Armed Forces' performance, we have to resort to more subjective methods. As with many subjective methods, we have to be extremely honest with ourselves, for in the final instance, we are judging our own selves. It's not unlike the communist method of self-criticism. Other people may come up with better and additional views, but the writer would like at this juncture to suggest the following criteria:

Look at the general order and scheme of things. Is everything functioning smoothly, or are there jerks and stalls? If there are jerks in the system, then something is not right somewhere. If something is not right, there cannot be optimal productivity, because productivity is but another name for efficiency.

Examine our general and specific perform-

ances. Are we achieving what we set out to do? Does it take longer today than yesterday? Something is seriously wrong today if one can only reminisce about the good old days, and how efficient everybody was then.

Ask the person next to you for his opinions. If everybody's perception seem to be critical of our performance, it is a good guess that something is wrong somewhere. If it is, we should put it right again. That is what productivity is about.

SOME MANIFESTATIONS OF UNPRODUCTIVITY

Though it is difficult to set meaningful measures to assess our productivity, inefficiency and unproductivity are manifested in many forms which are not too difficult to recognize. Some of them are discussed below; if there, is any resemblance to any person or character dead or alive, this is either purely coincidental or wholly intentional.

We have dealt at length with the problem of men not being able to mate well with his machines, because one of them is impotent. The inability to achieve targetted objectives whether through faulty machines or inadequate facilities or insufficient planning points to just one thing — that we have

expended time (and time means costs) without achieving the desired objectives. We are, therefore, not productives.

Where there is job duplication, or we need to double the personnel to do a job usually done by one person, or when we find a Colonel doing the job which was at one time done by a Major, then it would be adviseable to put on the brakes and assess the situation. Is it because today we have more work and more responsibility than yesterday that such a situation occur? Is it because there is something terribly wrong with our work produce, or is it because today we have a lot of Majors disguising as Colonels?

Before we get carried away with rhetorics, let us return to the subject of organization proper.

PLANNING FOR CHANGE: PERISTA

Same of the organizational changes required are already inferred from the discussion in earlier parts of the paper. The writer has also suggested a broad planning cycle (Figure 2) for budgeting, monitoring, reviewing, and revising process. The planning cycle, as can be seen is directed towards adequate funding of a force requirement to meet military and national objective. We shall now complete the diagram at Figure 3 in order to provide a framework for our discussion on Force level requirement and organization generally.




FIG 3: THE MILITARY DETERMINATION

Volunteer Forces and effect it in a longer time frame, of say, 5 to 10 years. This is not only good economic sense, but a logical proposition for the proper development of all Volunteer Forces.

DOCTRINE

The next block in Figure 3 is Doctrine. Doctrine means simply how we plan to fight. It should precede the discussion on how we organize for battle, because Doctrine provides the concept for accomplishing on the battlefield, and governs how military organizations are to be designed to achieve that accomplishment. In the final instance, our worth counts only if our battle productivity is proven.

Did we ever have any doctrine? Of course we did and we do; they have always been inscribed in our breasts. But unwritten doctrines, like unwritten law, are subject to varying interpretations. For the purpose of understanding by less learned military personnel, they are best written and recorded in some accessible manuals. We have now made a beginning. The fact remains, however, that we have put the reorganizational cart before the doctrinaire horse.

So we are now re-organized. Would we be in any better shape today if there was no economic recession and PERISTA was allowed to take its full course? Is the subject of cutting costs and increasing productivity only valid because of economic recession? With some reluctance, the writer has come to the conclusion that the subject is valid in any situation, and that we would still have some major problems even if PERISTA is allowed to take its course. This conclusion is based on the consequences of PERISTA (Where the quality of leadership has to be watered down to meet the expansion), on some of the problems we faced during the initial stage of PERISTA, and our responses to accomodate or ride through the present lean days of reduced budgets and limited funds.

STANDARD AND ILLOGICS

As far as the Army is concerned, a major inadequacy that we have faced in the past is the

absence of any Army doctrines. PERISTA was launched based on threat appraisal, but the threat assumption became lost in the actual exercise as many of us were quite ignorant of the actual rationale. Many of us conveniently rationalized ourselves into the traps of justifying a lowering of standard in our demand of our leaders and candidates into the Army to meet the burgeoning requirement of expansion.

If we set out standard high, there is no guarantee that we will get the desired candidates in the desired quantity. However, if we set our standard low, or is willing to compromise our standard or values, it is certain that we will attract the desired quantity, but not from the desired quality. And a sub-standard quality is a losing situation right from the beginning. This was what happened during the recruiting of enlisted men and selection of officer cadets during the initial period of PERISTA. The tendency to lower standards were also applicable in the promotions of NCOs and officers during the period. The net result is a rippling effect of a general lowering of quality throughout the Services.

During PERISTA we also allowed ourselves to go along the fallacy of mathematical logics without being completely logical. Our logics were in multiplication; our illogics were in market analysis. Let me illustrate this situation. PERISTA required an annual output of, say, 1000 officers; the Officer Cadet School could only accommodate 250 candidates on each intake and 500 candidates at any one time. So we decided on four intakes each year; with two intakes overlapping at any one time. The mathematical logic is thus satisfied.

COMPETING FOR SCARCE HUMAN RESOURCE

However, a market analysis showed the harsh reality of the outside world where there was a keen competition for valuable, limited resources, which in this case were quality candidates. As far as the candidates for the Services are concerned, there was only one major source: school leavers, and there was only one point of time each year that children leave schools.




FIG. 4: COMPETING FOR SCARCE CANDIDATES

So, we could have ten intakes in the year, but the candidate pool would continue to decrease with the lapse of time as the better candidates were absorbed by the competing sectors. Thus, with the passing of each intake, we would get more and more inferior standard of candidates. It was a classic dysfunctional supply and demand situation.

What has the above situation to do with costs and productivity? Plenty, to start with, our plan was based on the wrong premise; therefore, our subsequent execution went awry. It also took more effort to train less qualified candidates, with a corresponding increase of failure rates. Because the failure rates reached an alarming number, we either had to discharge a good number of them (which means our investment costs are not realised), or retain the remaining borderline cases (hoping for a break-even situation). We have to contend with these borderline cases for a good many years, if not throughout the period of their natural span of career. Of course, some will grow but a few will remain perpetually immature and incapable. A good hard machine will not achieve its optimal productivity unless a good soft machine handles it well. Neither would a unit of soft machines function well if led by a dumb soft

machine. So production suffers; system suffers and mission is likely to be jeopardised. That is where the situation has to do with costs and productivity. Worse still, the "corporate image" of the services also suffers as "the Army becomes an occupation of last resort". So, Rule 9 is:

"Quality begets quality. If you sow lalang, you will not reap rice".

EARLY CASUALTY : CORPS HQ

A Corps HQ was raised to take care of all command functions of Army troops. Having raised a Corps HQ, economic depression set in. One of the early casualties were the Corps HQ and seven infantry battalions. Whatever our sentiment for the battalions is, the action is lauded for its boldness. The same thing, however, cannot be said for the handling of Corp HQ which was reduced and given nominal functions to supervise training. This was a half-measure and a violation of the "indivisibility of command function" philosophy. It is conceptually wrong to retain a Corps Commander with less than complete command. Having stripped the Corps HQ of the intended major functions, there is no rationale for its continuance at all – least at all in the present form.

The reduced Corps HQ is a case of half measures, underutilization of personnel, and also a dubious cost-saving device. So what do we do with a Corps HQ in order, if not to cut cost at least to increase productivity? We must either resuscitate it fully, or further trim it to a nucleus Corps HQ (to prepare for its eventual resuscitation) consisting of a team headed perhaps by a Colonel.

WORK-SYSTEM AND WORKLOAD

A major justification for any reorganization exercise, especially at staff level, is increased workload. Therefore, a reorganization is often synonymous with an increase in size. A major question, however, is overlooked, and that is, "Why has work increased"? Work must have increased to service an increasing military population. So, we have a reorganization; we have more people; we do more work; so we need another reorganization.

In justifying for our expansion, we must first look whether our work-system is right, and whether we are doing some other wise guys' jobs? Are we also doing militarily irrelevant jobs? Unfortunately, we have undergone a metamorphosis to a point where we have nearly lost control of ourselves. Our system seems to place more value on a person who works hard (meaning overtime) more than one who manages his time well. We reinforce this value by taking on all jobs – relevant or otherwise, because the "busy image" is a self satisfying ego-feeder and sometimes because we have no other choice but to obey orders.

A RESUME

The essence of the discussion above is that, despite the problem of measuring productivity in the Armed forces, there are sufficient indicators to detect when something is wrong with the organization. The importance of proper planning for change was also mentioned, in order to avoid some of the pitfalls which had already happened during PERISTA. All plans must converge at a common point; otherwise one may find troops, but no accommodation and no sufficient clothings. When we rationalize, it must be based on hard, cold facts; sometime, even time will not heal our mistakes.

An improved work-system requires people who are trained for their respective tasks and responsibilities. We shall, therefore, now focus our attention on Training.

TRAINING AND "PRODUCTIVITY"

Life is always simpler when we were young, because our vision was clearer! Soldiering was also simpler when we first joined the Services. That explain the yearning for yester year. When we first joined the Services, it was drummed into us that, "The mission of the Army in war is to fight and destroy the enemy effectively and efficiently. In peacetime, the mission is to train for war".

The rationale on the emphasis over Training is no complex matter. Confucious told us that "to lead untrained people at war is to throw them". We hope that war will not come, but putting faith on hope alone is risky. We train because when war comes, we will be prepared to fight and win. And bellum pace parati. Training is the one vital cog in imparting skills to enable man to mate with his equipment to ensure optimal productivity. It is the vehicle that successfully carries men into battle.

What sometimes is not fully realized, however, is the diametrical pull-pull effect of cuts on training. You cut expenditures (in whatever field) means cutting on training. There is a chain reaction. A cut on allocation of fuel means vehicles will not move. Drivers, therefore, will not get their quota of driving hours (that's called under-productivity); soldiers are confined to limited radius of the locality for training Austere fiscal constraints mean a cutting down of courses. And not all the effects could be compensated with "self-help" training and initiatives.

MUTTERINGS FROM BELOW AND IN-BETWEEN

Our training policy seems to be realistic. We are committed to clearing "back-log" and to train personnel in basic (not necessarily equivalent to "simple") skills to enable each man to do a good soldier's job. We hope we can keep pace. What we need to examine now is whether the objective of our training are borne out in performance of our

job. Our courses get longer, and more. But the general perception of our capability is no better. From time to time we hear mutterings from above, from below and in-between. We shall mention only those mutterings from below and in-between.

A good training concept is one that allows at least three transitory stages:

- * Train to impart knowledge and skills.
- * Practice to improve knowledge and skill.
- * Test to validate training method and objective.

The perception formed is that commanders and men are not in a position to go through the above stages because of other commitments: operational and other activities either dictated from above or by circumstances, or self-imposed. The remarks were that the unit commander's time and initiatives have been taken away or inhibited by too much centralization, directive, and control.

There is also a need to place less importance on high visibility activities during our period of consolidation, and to devote ourselves to doing our job quietly, unobtrusively, and let our performance be felt rather than be seen.

On a lesser octave, there has also been mutterings on matters concerning courses, specialization, career planning and job placement. There are no specific examples given to back up the mutterings, though grousing whether real or imagined are an indication of morale, and morale is closely related to how a person does his job, that is, his productivity. In any event, it would be a good reminder that we should have not only continuity in a job, but also to ensure that a person and his replacement are first trained for the job. This has to do with the concept of learning associated with all type or nature of works, as illustrated in Figures 4, 5 and 6.




FIGURE 4. THE LEARNING CURVE




FIGURE 5.




FIGURE 6.

The idea is to decrease the period of low-productivity at the time replacement of personnel is effected. This is a major reason why personnel must be trained, and why experience alone may be costly in term of time and productivity. Training is, after all, nothing more than a just buying experience packed into a compact module.

It is desirable that we become a master of all trades. Unfortunately, it is not possible to be everything at all times. We need to excel in one or two specialties besides our primary calling as an infantryman, or artillerymen. Whilst embarking on new skills, we must also not forget our old ones. For example, we were noted not too long ago as good jungle fighters. With the emphasis in training on conventional warfare, the writer feels the soldiers are now somewhat confused and it is quite difficult convince ourselves that we are still good jungle fighters, or any better conventional warriors. The point is this: though we have to be good for what actually have to do (which is to fight in war), we must also be good in what we have to do now.

A RESUME

Let the writer summarise what he had said above. The acid test of an Army's worth or productivity is a winning performance on the battlefield. To carry soldiers there, they need to be trained, properly equipped, properly motivated, and extremely well-led. We should nourish leadership, and we should allow sufficient time for training. We must not allow the urgent and profile activities take precedent over the important. Though we must train eventually for battle, we must also train for the now-and present jobs as well; they need to be done too.

A WORD OF CAUTION

There were and are, of course, many positive aspects of PERISTA. At last, we had our long overdue reorganization, expansion, and tertiary education. There were more career openings and scope, and on the whole we have done quite well, considering the mammoth tasks that we have set ourselves. A lot of enthusiasm was put into our tasks. But, as with many things in life, the positive

comes with the negative, the good with bad; the Chinese have a name for this duality of effects and being: Yang-Ying.

The positive aspects of PERISTA was not dwelled into since the emphasis of this paper is on costs-cutting and productivity. This reminder is necessary; otherwise, we may come to the wholly unfair and erroneous conclusion that nothing is right with the Armed Forces at all.

CLOSING REMARKS

Having said so much, we shall add just a little more. Any reader who expects to bump across a lot of figures on ringgit and sen will be disappointed; that calls for another exercise. What this paper attempts to do is only to identify general areas where we can look more closely in trying to cut on costs, as well as to relate on organizational and training matters to productivity. This paper is conceptual rather than statistical.

The writer has also offered some kitchen wisdoms in the form of rules or axioms. A lot of truth can be simply stated. In parting, he would once again remind:

- * We cannot spend what we cannot afford. So spend wisely.
- * In everything we do, be in full control, Maintain our direction, have a clear vision and focus, and never lose sight of our objectives.
- * Be aware of completing priorities and effect of dysfunctional demand and supply situations, Priorities.
- * Think basic, but think big.
- * Rationalize, but be honest.
- * There is always more
- * There is always more capacity for work and improvement. We are never at our optimal.

If we take care of the basic observations, then we do not need to talk about cutting on expenditures and increasing productivity! they follow naturally.



Kolonel Abdul Malik Alwi, an old putra of the RMC, was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment in 1963. He read Law at The Gray's Inn and was called to the Bar of England and Wales in 1977. In 1978 he successfully received his MSc in Industrial Management from the Loughborough University of Technology. He is also a graduate of the USACGSC. Presently Kolonel Abdul Malik serves as the Director of Equipment in the Department of the Army, Ministry of Defence.

In practice, our nuclear retaliatory power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted nations against a Communist takeover using local or guerrilla forces. It cannot be used in so-called brush-fire wars In short, it cannot prevent the Communists from nibbling away at the fringes of the free world's territory or strength.

John F Kennedy
("The Strategy of Peace" – P 184)

'To vanquish a foe, his will to resist must be destroyed regardless of whether or not his physical capacity to wage war remain intact.'

..... it is time for military planners to restructure their strategic and tactical thinking to include a primary, active psychological component.'

**Lt Col F W Timmerman
2nd Armored Cavalry Regt
US Army**



WIRA BERJASA

Oleh: Pn Azman Ahmad

PENGORBANAN

Darah dan semangat keperwiraan anak-anak Melayu memang telah terbukti sejak zaman dahulu lagi, ketangkasan dan keberanian mereka bukanlah sesuatu yang perlu diragu atau disangsi-kian. Kenangan sahaja betapa gagah dan perkasa-nya perwira-perwira kita sebelum ini yang mana di antara mereka bukan sahaja sekadar menjadi ayah kepada anak-anak atau abang kepada adik-adik, malah ada juga yang telah sanggup berjuang dan berkorban serta bermati-matian demi menjulang terus kedaulatan nusa, bangsa dan ugama.

Tentunya kita masih ingat akan siapa dia Laksamana Hang Tuah, siapa dia Bendahara Tun Perak, siapa dia Panglima Hitam dan ramai lagi pahlawan-pahlawan tanahair yang pernah menjadi kebanggaan dan contoh tauladan. Kita seharusnya tahu bahawa mereka adalah di antara anak-anak Melayu kita yang terkemuka dengan keperkasaan mereka dan yang termasyhor dengan kehandalan serta keberanian mereka. Kita juga seharusnya terus mengenang dan mengingati akan segala sum-bangan tenaga dan pengorbanan mereka yang pernah mereka berikan dan tentunya tidak menjadi kesalahan kalau sifat serta azam mereka itu kita tanam dan semadikan di jiwa kita sendiri agar dengan itu kelak akan berkekalan semangat

perjuangan anak-anak Melayu dan bertambah kukuhlah pengakuan Laksamana Hang Tuah yang mana katanya "Melayu Tidak Akan Hilang Di dunia".

Hari ini syukurlah kita kehadrat Illahi kerana dengan limpah kurniaNya, anak-anak Melayu kita bertambah bilangannya dan semangat keperwiraan mereka juga tidak pernah menampakkan sebarang kemerosotan atau kekurangan, malah, dari sehari keseharian anak-anak Melayu semakin garang dan semakin berkobar-kobar jiwa mereka untuk menyekat pengkhianatan. Ini ternyata kini dengan terbarisnya puluhan, ratusan malah ribuan anak-anak Melayu yang tampil kehadapan sebagai perajurit dan pejuang tanahair. Masing-masing berdiri megah dengan pakaian seragam dan peralatan perang, masing-masing berazam dan bertekad untuk berjuang dan tentunya tujuan mereka adalah semata-mata untuk menegakkan keamanan serta hasrat untuk menghalang kezaliman.

TAAT SETIA

Bayangkanlah kalau dulu pada 1 Mac 1933 kita dapati hanya 25 orang sahaja anak Melayu yang bergiat di dalam Kompeni Percubaan Askar Melayu, tetapi kini pada 1 Mei 1984 kita lihat sendiri betapa jauh perbezaannya dan betapa pesat

perkembangannya. Tidakkah ini merupakan suatu bukti bahawa anak-anak Melayu memang gagah dan berani juga tentunya sudah cukup untuk kita mensifatkan perkembangan ini sebagai suatu kenyataan bahawa anak-anak Melayu memang terkenal dengan semangat berpantang maut sebelum ajal. Mereka kian hari semakin cenderung menjalankan tugas, cekal serta tekun dengan tidak menghiraukan walau apa jua rintangan dan halangan malah sememangnya mereka bertumpu terus kepada tanggungjawab sebagai perwira tanpa sedikit pun merasa takut dan gentar dan tanpa sedikit pun rasa kecut dan gusar. Begitulah semangat Askar Melayu, dan begitulah kejujuran serta kepatuhan yang mereka punyai yang mana sifat-sifat itu merangkum terus dengan cogankata "TAAT SETIA".

KOMPENI AWAL

Kalau tidak dengan keazaman yang bersertakan kejujuran dan kalau tidak dengan kegigihan yang bersalurkan sifat-sifat kemuliaan masakan pihak Inggeris sedia memenuhi permintaan orang-orang Melayu dan masakan pihak Inggeris sanggup berkerjasama dengan orang-orang Melayu. Ini adalah semata-mata apabila pihak Inggeris tahu bahawa orang-orang Melayu memang bersemangat untuk berjuang, orang-orang Melayu amanah, orang-orang Melayu jujur dalam mengendalikan tanggungjawab dan orang-orang Melayu cekap melaksanakan segala kewajipan. Lantaran sifat-sifat inilah, maka dalam suatu persidangan Majlis Mesyuarat Persekutuan, Jabatan Perang dan Jajahan Takluk British telah meluluskan permohonan orang-orang Melayu dan memberi kata setuju untuk menubuhkan sebuah pasukan Askar Melayu. Bukan setakat itu, malah jabatan tersebut telah menjanjikan kesanggupan mereka untuk memberikan latihan-latihan ketenteraan kepada orang-orang Melayu melalui tentera-tentera mereka yang berkebolehan.

Inilah suatu pemberian yang wajar dibanggakan dan tidaklah menjadi sia-sia akan segala sifat gigih, amanah serta taat yang dimiliki oleh orang-orang bangsa kita. Sememangnya tidak salah kalau yang bersih dan yang baik, itu sering mendapat kelebihan dan keutamaan. Sebagai anak Melayu, kita seharusnya bersyukur kehadrat Allah yang

maha kuasa di atas pemberiannya, dan semoga pemberiannya itu akan terus berpanjangan dan berkekalan hingga ke akhir zaman Insya-allah. Dengan kehendaknya jua, ternyata tentera British amat pantas mengendalikan latihan-latihan kepada para rekrut yang mana hanya dengan memakan masa yang tidak sampai beberapa tahun, bilangan anggota Kompeni Percubaan Askar Melayu kian ramai dan sangat memberangsangkan. Pasukan tersebut juga telah melahirkan beberapa orang anggota yang berkebolehan dan secara tidak langsung situasi ini menambahkan lagi keyakinan bagi pihak Inggeris di mana kemudiannya pihak Inggeris sendiri telahpun meluahkan hasrat dan impian mereka untuk menubuhkan batalion penuh Askar Melayu.

Segalanya berjalan dengan lancar dan teratur, dan akhirnya hasrat ini tertunai juga dengan ketekunan serta kegigihan semua anggota, dan setelah pencapaian itu diperolehi, nama Kompeni Percubaan Askar Melayu pun terus ditukarkan kepada "Askar Melayu". Inilah keuntungan dan faedahnya apabila anggota berkerjasama dan saling bertanggungjawab, tidak mengira susah dan senang dan tanpa membeza pangkat dan kedudukan. Akhirnya hasrat menjadi bukti dan mimpi menjadi kenyataan. Semangat sefahaman Askar Melayu, kegigihan dan kecemerlangan mereka sekali gus telah menarik perhatian Inggeris dan telah mematikan sebarang rasa ragu dihati semua kalangan penghuni tanahair. Pihak Inggeris tambah terpesona dengan ketaatan Askar Melayu yang meskipun terpaksa menuruti berbagai-bagi peraturan, disiplin-disiplin yang kuat dan sebagainya dengan sedikit pun tidak menunjukkan rasa susah atau sambil lewa. Kalaulah tidak dengan tertanamnya beberapa sifat murni itu dijiwa Askar Melayu masakan kita kini dapat mencapai kedamaian dan kalaulah Askar Melayu tidak jujur melaksanakan perintah masakan kita kini bebas di dalam keamanan. Memanglah wajar Askar Melayu mendapat penghormatan yang tinggi dan amat bertepatan sekali Askar Melayu dijadikan tauladan bagi pasukan-pasukan yang menjelaknya. Sesungguhnya Askar Melayu sangat mengutamakan keharmonian nusa, terlalu sangat mendahulukan ugama dan mementingkan sangat kedaulatan raja serta rakyat-rakyat seluruhnya dan oleh kerana itu adalah patut kita banggakan apabila

Seri Paduka Baginda Yang Dipertuan Agong mengurutkan gelaran **Diraja** kepada Askar Melayu iaitu sempena ulangtahun rejimen ini buat kali ke 25nya dahulu.

PANTANG UNDUR

Sekarang Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja telah pun menjadi sebuah rejimen yang terbesar di dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia. Apatah lagi kesemua anggotanya adalah terdiri daripada anak-anak Melayu yang berjiwa wajah dan yang berpegang teguh akan cogan kata **Pantang Undur**. Keberanian dan kebolehan Askar Melayu kini tidak disangsikan lagi malah sentiasa menjadi sebutan dan kebanggaan semua. Sampai ke saat ini segala perjuangan dan pengorbanan Askar Melayu telah menjadi kenangan serta abadi menjadi ingatan. Salah satu daripada kenangan yang menyayatkan ialah dengan terdirinya Tugu Negara dan beberapa tugu lain yang secara langsung telah membawa kita untuk mengingati akan jasa dan bakti perwira-perwira kita yang terkorban dalam perjuangan. Bukan setakat itu, malah setengah daripada kenangan anggota-anggota yang terkorban itu ada juga yang telah dijadikan sebuah riwayat atau dijadikan cerita-cerita yang kini dapat sama-sama kita tatap.

Kalaularah kita berkhidmat di zaman penyerobohan Tentera Jepun bersama-sama Allahyar-

ham Leftenan Adnan, tentu kita berpeluang untuk menghayati semangat kependedekarannya dan di saat itu tentu kita dapat menilai betapa gagahnya beliau, betapa cekalnya hati beliau dan betapa setianya beliau terhadap perintah yang diperintanggungjawabkan. Kita juga kemungkinan besar akan berkesempatan mencatat serta merokodkan segala kejadian-kejadian penting yang berlaku di sepanjang perjuangan beliau juga tentunya hingga kehari ini segala peristiwa itu akan kekal menjadi catatan sejarah selanjutnya menjadi contoh dan tauladan yang lebih memberangsangkan, tetapi, kita askar baru, serba serbinya baru malahan ada juga yang belum pernah bertempur, belum pernah bersua dengan pengganas dan sememangnya kita belum layak lagi jika hendak disamakan dengan Leftenan Adnan, Koperal Yaakob dan rakan-rakan yang gugur bersama mereka dan yang nyatanya kita semua masih hidup, kita belum mati, kita masih bernyawa dan masih berupaya untuk melakukan walau apa saja, dan ini tidak bererti yang kita tidak berani juga tidak bermakna kita yang kita tidak gagah, mungkin kita lebih berani daripada mereka, mungkin kita lebih perkasa daripada mereka dan tidak mustahil juga kalau kita lebih berkebolehan daripada mereka. Pokoknya kita belum tahu, masih tidak tahu dan tidak dapat mengujinya.

GAGAH PERKASA



Maka, oleh kerana kita masih hidup, masih bernyawa dan masih berupaya inilah seharusnya kita berfikir panjang, jauhkan pandangan, terus menuntut ilmu-ilmu pertempuran dan jangan sekali-kali ambil ringan atau sambil lewa terhadap tanggungjawab yang telah diamanahkan. Sebagai seorang pejuang tanahair kita sekurang-kurangnya mempunyai semangat seperti mereka setidak-tidaknya pun kita mesti buktikan yang kita juga berkebolehan seperti mereka. Bukan semestinya askar lama sahaja yang mesti berani, bukan askar lama yang mesti jujur dan bukan askar lama sahaja yang wajib berkorban malah siapa jua tidak kira darjat dan keturunan, tidak kira taraf dan kedudukan semua mesti berani, semua mesti jujur dan semua mesti sanggup berkorban apatah lagi kita sebagai Askar Melayu, beragama Islam dan seorang pejuang yang merupakan satu-satunya tunggak penegak kedamaian dan satu-satunya tiang tunjang keagungan. Kita wajib berani dan kita wajar menyemadikan semangat Lettenan Adnan dalam jiwa kita. Juga adalah amat sejajar dengan kehendak Islam kalau kita turut mengamalkan sikap cekal dan pantang menyerah yang diamalkan oleh Allahyarham dan juga rakan-rakannya itu.



Sentiasa berwaspada

Biarpun kelak darah berpercikan bagaikan hujan, meskipun nanti daging berkecaci laksana serpihan, namun kalaulah kita yang berjuang ketika itu dan kalaulah kita yang bersua situasi itu, teruslah dan majulah dengan rasa setia juga maralah dengan hati wajar agar tidaklah sekadar menjadi senikata lagu dan tidaklah hanya menjadi laungan dan jeritan bahawa Askar Melayu Gagah

Perkasa, Rela Berjuang dan Berkorban Nyawa. Senikata inilah yang harus kitajadikan panduan dan sifat-sifat itulah yang patut kita miliki dan hanya dengan mematuhi kata-kata itu juga barulah kita akan tergulung dalam gulungan orang-orang yang taat setia dan kelak menjadi pahlawan kenangan bangsa.....InsyaAllah..

KEPERCAYAAN

Bersama kesempurnaan tubuh badan dan kewarasan akal fikiran wajarlah kita sebagai anggota Angkatan Tentera untuk memberikan bakti dengan penuh kerelaan dan kejujuran sebagaimana yang kita tahu sememangnya kedua-dua sifat ini amat terpuji dan dipandang mulia oleh semua. Malahan kalau tidak dengan kerelaan serta kejujuran itu sudah pasti sesuatu yang kita kerjakan tidak akan mendatangkan hasil atau faedah sebagaimana yang dihajatkan. Ibaratlah, kalau kita dilantik menjadi ketua di dalam sesebuah kumpulan dan diberikan kepercayaan yang penuh oleh seseorang pemerintah, tetapi, kita tidak jujur dan memandang ringan akan tugas dan tanggungjawab kita itu, sudah tentu segala harapan dan cita-cita pemerintah itu tidak terlaksana dengan sempurnanya dan sudah pasti setiap kepercayaan keyakinan pemerintah kita akan hilang dan musnah bersama-sama memarahan dan mungkin juga kita akan menerima berbagai-bagai kesusahan atau kerugian yang lebih teruk dari itu. Jadi di dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawab, kita seharusnya sentiasa bertugas dengan jujur biarpun tiada siapa yang tahu, tiada siapa yang melihat dan tiada siapa yang memuji kerana kita masih ingat bahawa Allah maha mengetahui dan maha melihat, maka InsyaAllah dengan kejujuran kita itu, kita kelak akan menerima kepujian yang lebih tinggi dari yang kita duga dan kemungkinan juga nanti kita akan menerima kurniaan yang lebih berharga dari yang kita pinta.

Kita sebagai anggota Angkatan Tentera, khasnya anggota Askar Melayu, sewajarnya juga memberikan khidmat yang cemerlang sebagai mewarisi perjuangan pahlawan kita yang terkorban sebelum ini dan sepatutnya juga kita berpegang teguh dengan firman Allah yang bermaksud 'berperanglah kamu semua kejalan Allah dengan sebenar-

benarnya' InsyaAllah segala penat lelah dan titisan keringat yang menitis dari tubuh kita ini tidaklah terbuang, begitu sahaja dan tidaklah menjadi sia-sia belaka, dan semoga nanti Allah akan menghadiahkan ganjaran dan agar kelak kita akan beroleh penghasilannya. Sibuta menyanyi sedangkan disanjung, masakan kita yang berbakti diketepikan.

Kita kini melihat sendiri betapa kekejaman dan kezaliman kian berluasa di seluruh dunia, masing-masing berjuang dan berperang tanpa rasa belas dan kasihan. Hasrat mereka semata-mata ingin merebut kuasa dan meningkatkan nama mereka sebagai kuasa tertinggi. Mereka setengahnya tidak sedar bahawa setiap dan segenap keganasan mereka itu secara langsung mengancam

atau sekurang-kurangnya apakah yang wajar kita buat mengelakkan negara kita daripada turut menjadi mangsa kezaliman kuasa-kuasa itu.

Inilah yang harus kita fikirkan dan inilah yang harus kita persoalkan sedang bencana ini kian lama kian menulur dan rasanya telah hampir sangat menemui perjalanan dan perancangan kita. Kita sebagai Askar Melayu juga yang merupakan Kor Tentera Darat yang terbesar di negeri ini mestilah sentiasa memperbaharui setiap yang lama dan pasti juga membetulkan setiap yang salah kita semestinya sudah berjaga-jaga dan kita juga sepatutnya kini lebih berhati-hati dengan setiap per-tempuran dan kekacauan yang berlaku dinegara-negara jiran. Sampailah masanya kini untuk kita membuktikan bahawa Askar Melayu 'Tak Kenal

TERUS BERBAKTI




kedamaian serta memudaratkan ketenteraman. Mereka seolah-olah tidak menyedari bahawa mereka-merekalah manusia yang kejam yang tidak punya perasaan dan mereka seakan-akan tidak mengerti bahawa mereka manusia-manusia ganas yang bakal membinaskan diri mereka sendiri. Akibat perbuatan mereka, semua jadi takut, ngeri dan semua berada di dalam kebimbangan. Apakah kita harus membiarkan kebimbangan. Apakah kita harus membiarkan keadaan ini berlanjutan dan apakah kita sanggup mengalami ketakutan, kengerian dan kebimbangan seperti itu. Tentu sekali tidak dan tentu juga bukan impian kita, lantas, apakah usaha kita, apakah langkah-langkah yang harus kita lakukan dan

Menyerah', 'Askar Melayu Pantang Undur', Askar Melayu Taat Setia dan Askar Melayu tetap berani sentiasa sedia berjuang dengan semangat Gempur Wira, Askar Melayu tidak akan undur, Askar Melayu tidak akan tergamak mengecewakan harapan bangsa, Askar Melayu sanggup dicincang lumat, dan Askar Melayu rela dibunuh mati, namun untuk mengalah dan menyerah bukanlah sifat Askar Melayu, malah kita Askar Melayu, sama-sama lah kita bersumpah untuk terus berjuang, terus berbakti untuk nusa, bangsa dan ugama agar perjuangan membawa kenyataan dan semoga bakti membawa kenyataan yang membahagikan dan bukti yang menggembirakan.

Maralah dan majulah semuga Allah
meredai perjuangan kita dan semuga Allah menye-
belahi pasukan kita InsyaAllah.



Parajurit Azman Ahmad telah memasuki alam ketenteraan pada bulan September 1980. Selaku seorang Parajurit dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja (13 RAMD) Azman sangat ingin membaca dan menulis dan keazamannya adalah menjadi seorang penulis terkemuka pada suatu hari kelak.



TEACHING ELECTRONICS

— *the EME approach*

PWI Perumal a/l Munusamy

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TEACHING ELECTRONICS — THE EME APPROACH

INFORMATION

The electronics world is one of the areas of rapid change in the unprecedented expansion of technological developments. In the Armed Services, the rapid introduction of new technologies is not necessarily accompanied by as rapid a removal from service of previous generations of equipments. This leads to a requirement to increase the content of training courses to cover the wide range of knowledge and skills demanded, but at the same time financial and manpower constraints demand that training time be kept within bounds.

The trainer's solution to this dilemma is to

look for new ways to make more effective use of available time. New demands may then perhaps be met without simply adding extra time to courses already running. To make it possible to improve effectiveness and efficiency, everything taught should be strictly in the context of the course objectives and at the same time the presentation of material to the student must be such that throughout the course he maintains his motivation to learn. In addition, any new course design must be readily adaptable to the changing demands of technological development.

The Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers is responsible not only for the inspection, recovery, diagnosis and repair of much of the Army's equipments but also for advice on reliability, maintenance and testing. It is therefore easy to understand the need for both effective and

relevant training in organizations like the School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME School).

AIM

The aim of this article is to highlight the new approach in training the electronics technicians at the Malaysian Armed Forces School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

SCOPE

This article explains how EME School has tackled the problem of designing a new course in electronics, to give EME recruits who have been selected as potential technicians ground-work for training in Control and Computing or RADAR.

THE APPROACH

The EME technician career training scheme does not specify any initial educational attainment but selects recruits for electronics training as a result of a battery or aptitude tests. These are conducted in combination with briefings and interviews to establish suitable motivation and attitude.

SELECTION OF POTENTIAL TECHNICIANS

Recruits are only specifically chosen for the electronic course based on their good performance in mathematics. This will enable them to rapidly understand the complex nature of modern weapons and RADAR systems. At present an input of 24 recruits is planned annually in order to satisfy the manning needs. This is not an easy target to achieve and it is therefore very important at this early stage in their career to preserve the student interest so that failure is kept as low as possible.

COURSE DESIGN

Certain principles of course design are now clear and are embodied within the general subject of educational technology. Armed Services train-

ing and educational courses are frequently designed by full time teams that try both to formulate the course objectives and carry out a full design programme so as to present a complete tuition system to the instructors. This entails the production of a detailed syllabus and its supporting softwares such as precis, programmed texts, laboratory instructions, classroom projection materials and attainment tests. In technical training courses, practical work is usually a vital ingredient, requiring the specification, design and production of laboratory instruments, experiments, demonstrations and the tasks that lead to the learning of relevant skills.

It is appreciated that this rigorous form of course design can involve a considerable work load, particularly of skilled man-hours, but this involvement and the consequent cost can be rapidly repaid by the improved effectiveness of the resulting trainees.

A critical area of the scheme is clearly the initial course in electronics and due to the factors explained in the introduction, an EME School team has designed a new course which departs quite significantly from the usual approach. Normally the approach to Basic Electronic tuition can probably be called one of synthesis, where the properties and internal operation of the individual components, namely inductors, capacitors, resistors, diodes, transistors, integrated circuits and practical active devices, are explained. These are then connected together to provide basic functions such as amplification and conversion and finally such functions are themselves inter-connected to produce an electronic system. Such an approach can be labelled *part-to-whole*.

Equipment teaching is normally *whole-to-part* in that the system properties are explained first. These are then broken down so that ultimately the student comprehends the function of each individual component and can diagnose faults down to component level. Such a *whole-to-part* system has not been applied seriously at the level of basic electronics, since it poses real problems when the student has little prior knowledge of electronic behaviour. What is more, a *whole-to-part* approach requires that relevant system must be both specified and designed so that such an

approach is possible. With the traditional approach it can be more difficult to preserve student motivation particularly at technician and craft levels, since the subject often appears to be academic and abstract. An approach based on systems can provide a positive functional context and prevents any tendency to stress material and teaching points which are less relevant to the aim of the course. Just as important perhaps, with the latest technological trends, emphasis on the properties of discrete components becomes less vital and analysis based on systems becomes more important.

THE NEW COURSE

The new course at EME School is on three fundamental systems which together provide a common preparation for the electronics trade. A direct current electrical (DC) system is a suitable functional context for many of the basic D.C. electrical ideas. The radio receiver transmitter in a simplified form (both amplitude and frequency modulated) is an obvious choice to teach alternating current fundamentals, and since the EME technician's primary task at initial trade levels is one of fault analysis and repair, instruments of analogue and digital measurement form a third system.

Measurement and display is first treated purely functionally and this is followed later in the course by a particular form of detailed treatment around idealized elements and devices. Similarly, the radio transmitter and receiver is introduced at *module* level, followed by more detailed treatment using idealized (or generalized) devices. Finally, functions are explained at practical component level, where actual semi-conductor and *Integrated devices* and their internal operation are treated. The course is thus broadly both *whole-to-part* and in a positive functional context. The basic electrotechnology is covered only when the need arises, rather than in one concentrated block.

The skills included within the course under the heading of *workshop practice* is intentionally not emphasised. This is so because, although this is another carefully tailored module of training, designed to meet the needs of modern soldering, assembling and wiring techniques, the treatment is conventional.

It is now imperative to give some account of the *hardware* involved in the teaching process. Students work at both EME School and custom designed console benches within a combined laboratory and classroom. These student consoles provide all the apparatus needed for the students to carry out laboratory work in pairs, immediately after each topic has been covered by explanation and demonstration. A tightly integrated phasing of seeing and doing can then be carried out.

An elaborate instructional demonstration console is also provided, where demonstrations can be shown at widely different levels of sophistication. An example of the instructional console and of a student console are shown in Figures 1 and 2:




Fig 1 Teaching Electronics – Instructional Console

With *part-to-whole* teaching in electronics, laboratory experimental work has often been a headache for the designer, since discrete component circuits using the minimum of components either require relatively deep theoretical treatments to explain the practical departures from simple theory, or there is a credibility gap between the classroom teaching and the laboratory results. In *part-to-whole* teaching of basic electronics it is a requirement that the laboratory apparatus produces outputs that approach a design ideal. Since measurements are made initially only at inputs and outputs, in support of system description, laboratory exercises can incorporate elaborate

circuitry of an integrated or encapsulated form and be made both reliable and simple to set up. As the course progresses, the student is gradually introduced to the departures that occur with real rather than idealized components and the laboratory work can continue to reinforce, rather than tend to conflict with, the explanatory treatments. The graphic at the beginning of this article shows the microwave transmitter and receiver designed in modular form for students' experiment and fault finding. Also shown is the apparatus for klystron oscillator the only valve experiment given on the course that gives GigaHertz Frequency range, and also the special testing jig and power supply for module experiments. Overlays are associated with each plug-in module to provide simple equivalent circuits of their functions. All the special purpose hardware for the course has been designed in EME School.

Assessment of progress and measurement of attainment is an essential part of any detailed course design. Syllabi, and written material in support of them, must be specific and carefully sequenced so that tests of progress are valid. Most educationalists in the technical field would agree that wherever practicable some form of continuous assessment is desirable, and testing is distributed throughout this new course. An innovation that is being investigated for use in examinations involves a "feedback" classroom

CONCLUSIONS

Courses in the Armed Services are usually intensive and the electronics course that has been described as no exception. It is planned to be eighty weeks long. Since past experience shows that the aptitude of students does not vary very widely within an adequate statistical sample, the success of this preparatory course will be measured by how well it enables them to carry out their subsequent specific training and by the success-rate on the course itself. Good course design and the preservation of motivation in the student are critical needs in this situation and we in EME School hope that results will show that we have spared no effort to train, promote and guide them in this challenging field where technological advances continue at a great pace.




Fig 2 – Fully Equipped Student Console:



PWI Perumal a/l Munusamy T. Eng (CEI) FSERT is the head of Electronic Section in EME School. He has attended various courses in Electronics, RADAR and Fire Control System, in United Kingdom and Sweden. Obtained Higher National Certificate in electronic Engineering in United Kingdom in 1976. Awarded fellowship by the society of Electronic and Radio Technicians in 1978.



Oleh Peg. Waren 1 Nagadiman Hj. Abd. Hamid

Markas I Divisyen telah ditubuhkan pada 1 Julai 1966 bertempat di Haigate, Kementerian Pertahanan. Dengan tamatnya konfrantasi Indonesia terhadap Malaysia serta kesan pengunduran tentera British dan Komanwel, Markas ini dipindahkan ke Kuching bagi mengawal keamanan dan keselamatan negeri-negeri Sabah dan Sarawak. Dengan wujudnya ancaman penganas komunis dan anasir subversif, maka beberapa operasi telah dilancarkan seperti Operasi Harapan, Operasi Jala Raja, Operasi Gandal, Operasi Dendam dan Operasi Sri Aman. Kesemuanya telah mendatangkan kejayaan cemerlang. Kerjasama pengendalian operasi dengan Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI) seperti Operasi Huslana dan Operasi Tertib dipergiatkan juga. Bagi meningkatkan kecekapan profesionalisme ketenteraan, diadakan latihan di peringkat pasukan. Formasi seperti Latihan CPX, Latihan MALINDO, Latihan Siri GONZALES VI dan GONZALES IX. Selain dari operasi dan latihan, aktiviti Geraksaraf dan Jiwa Murni juga dilancarkan bagi memenangi hati rakyat.-

MARKAS WILAYAH II – Sejarah Ringkas

TANGGUNGJAWAB


Markas I Divisyen adalah satu ketumbukan Angkatan Tentera yang telah mencapai tahap *matang* dalam peranannya mengekalkan keselamatan serta kedaulatan Sabah dan Sarawak sejak 16 tahun penubuhannya. Sebagai satu markas ketenteraan ianya juga bertanggungjawab mempertahankan, melindungi dan memelihara keamanan serta keharmonian penduduk berbilang bangsa di rantau ini. Dengan adanya keamanan barulah sebuah negeri seperti Sabah dan Sarawak dapat melaksanakan berbagai projek pembangunan untuk kesejahteraan hidup penduduknya. Bagi memikul tanggungjawab tersebut, markas ini mempunyai 3 Markas Formasi di bawah naungannya, iaitu Markas 3 Bde di Kuching, Markas 5 Bde di Kota Kinabalu dan Markas RASCOM (Tentera) di Sibu.

Pemberontakan di Brunei yang dipimpin oleh Azahari pada 8 Disember 1962 dan Dasar Konfrontasi Indonesia terhadap Malaysia pada 13 Februari 1963 telah memaksa Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia menempatkan yunit-yunit tenteranya di Sabah dan Sarawak bagi menjaga keselamatan dan kedaulatan negara di rantau tersebut.


Dengan berakhirnya Dasar Konfrontasi Indonesia pada akhir bulan Mei 1966 dan rancangan pengunduran tentera British dan Komanwel dari Bumi Malaysia dimulakan pada Julai 1966, maka kedudukan dan perkembangan serta keperluan Angkatan Tentera telah perlu dikaji dengan teliti.

KEM BUKAVU

Bagi tujuan perkembangan Angkatan Tentera dan peri mustahaknya mengisi kekosongan yang telah ditinggalkan oleh Tentera British dan Komanwel serta bagi menghadapi kegiatan anasir-anasir subversif yang masih bergerak di rantau ini, maka Markas I Div yang juga merupakan Markas Pengarah Operasi Malaysia Timur ditubuhkan pada 1 Julai 1966 di Bukit Haigate iaitu di kawasan Kompleks Kementerian Pertahanan. Selepas sebulan penubuhannya ia telah dipindahkan ke bangunan sementara di Jalan Badruddin bersama dengan Markas Polis Kuching. Pada 1 November 1966, Markas ini berpindah pula ke Nanas Road, Kuching, tetapi akhirnya berpindah ke Kem di Palm Road, Kuching pada Mac 1976¹ dikenali sekarang dengan nama KEM BUKAVU.²



Ketibaan Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja untuk mengambil alih tugas daripada tentera British yang sedang berundur.



Sandakan Feb 68 — Panglima 1 Divisyen, Mej Jen Datuk Ibrahim Ismail dengan Pegawai Daerah. En Arthur Jones (tengah) dan DSP Michael Edge.

HQ LFEM

Mej. Jen. Ibrahim bin Ismail selaku Panglima I Div telah dilantik sebagai Panglima Gerakan Malaysia Timur (Director of Operation East Malaysia – DOPEM) pada 13 Ogos 1966 iaitu bagi menggantikan Mej. Jen. G.H. Lea yang bertempat di Headquarters Director of Borneo Operation (HQ DOBOP). Pada 16 Ogos 1966, Markas Gerakan Operasi Malaysia Timur mula menunaikan tanggungjawabnya dalam menjaga keamanan dan keselamatan negara di rantau ini. Markas Tentera Darat Malaysia Timur (Headquarters Land Forces East Malaysia – HQ LFEM) di peringkat awalnya mengandungi susunan perjawatan seperti berikut:

DOPEM	— Mej. Jen Datuk Ibrahim bin Ismail
GSO I (OPS)	— Lt Kol. Mahmood bin Sulaiman
GSO II (OPS)	— Mej Arif bin Yahya
GSO II (RISIK)	— Mej. Izaiddin bin Shamsoodeen
GSO III (RISIK)	— Kapt. Nordin bin Yusof
SO II (LOG)	— Mej. Dulip Singh
Camp Comdt	— Mej. Hj. Omar
ADC	— Kapt. Abd. Latif bin Ahmad

Bagi menghadapi ancaman pencerobohan dan pembenterasan saki-baki anasir subversif maka peringkat susunan pentadbiran Angkatan Tentera di Wilayah ini pada peringkat permulaannya dibahagikan kepada 2 markas Briged. Markas 3 Bde yang bertempat di Kuching di bawah Pemerintahan Brig Jen. Ungku Nazaruddin, adalah bertangungjawab untuk Divisyen-divisyen Pertama,³ Kedua dan Ketiga di Sarawak, sementara Markas 5 Bde bertempat di Tawau di bawah pemerintahan Brig Jen. Mazlan bin Yunus adalah bertangungjawab untuk negeri Sabah serta Divisyen Keempat dan Kelima di Sarawak.

Pada masa yang sama pengunduran tentera British dan Komanwel dilakukan berperingkat-peringkat memandangkan hal-hal logistik yang sedia ada. Dengan keadaan demikian dapatlah ATM pula mengambil alih tugas serta menyesuaikan kedudukan kesan dari pengunduran tentera asing.

Di peringkat awal penubuhan 'HQ LFEM',⁴ Markas ini telah melancarkan beberapa operasi dan di antaranya bekerjasama dengan Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Dalam Operasi Harapan, beberapa pengganas komunis dan anasir-anasir subversif telah menyerah diri. Walaupun demikian terdapat juga sebilangan besar pengganas komunis yang masih menimbulkan ancaman di rantau ini. Antara

1966 dan 1969, Operasi Fiasco di kawasan Lubuk Antu dan Lundu dilancarkan. TNI juga melancarkan Operasi Tertib I dan Tertib II serta Operasi Sapu Bersih di antara tahun 1966-1967.

PROJEK JIWA MURNI

Selain daripada tugas-tugas operasi, Angkatan Tentera juga menjalankan projek-projek Jiwa Murni khasnya di kawasan pendalamannya seperti pembinaan jambatan gantung di Naga Entabai, pembinaan jalanraya Lundu - Biawak di Sarawak dan Tawau - Kalabakan di Sabah serta juga pembinaan beberapa rumah panjang. Projek Jiwa Murni ini bertujuan mendapatkan sokongan dan kerjasama penduduk-penduduk tempatan dalam memerangi anasir subversif.



Sematan 7 Dis 68 – Mej Jen Datuk Ibrahim Ismail menyerahkan kueh-kueh Hari Raya Aidilfitri kepada penduduk-penduduk di Sematan.

Setelah berjaya menuju, mengatur dan melaksanakan strategi di Malaysia Timur, Mej. Jen. Datuk Ibrahim ditugaskan pula menuju ke Markas Divisyen Kedua Infanteri dan seterusnya merangkap jawatan Pengarah Gerakan Malaysia Barat selepas 2½ tahun di Kuching.

Pengganti beliau ialah Mej. Jen. Ungku Nazaruddin yang dahulunya Panglima 3 Bde di Kuching, Sarawak. Bagi tujuan mempercepat dan menghebatkan gerakan menghapuskan saki-baki pengganas komunis di sepanjang sempadan Sarawak/Kalimantan, beliau telah mencadangkan

konsep "Pertahanan Bersama" dengan TNI. Di peringkat awalnya, Indonesia keberatan untuk menerima konsep tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun pada dasarnya pihak Indonesia bersetuju dengan konsep "hot pursuit" yang merupakan satu cara paling efektif untuk menghancurkan gerombolan militan pengganas komunis dan telah dilancarkan di sempadan bersama pada 23 November 1969. Setelah setahun menjadi 'DOPEM', beliau ditukarkan ke KEMENTAH bagi menjawat jawatan Ketua Turus Jawatan Anggota.

OP JALA RAJA

Mej. Jen. Syed Mohd. Alsagoff telah mengambil alih tugas Pengarah atau DOPEM yang baru pada 24 November 1969. Perjanjian untuk melaksanakan konsep 'hot pursuit' telah dibuat semasa. Rancangan yang teratur telah dirancang agar sekitar kawasan Malaysia Timur tidak ditinggalkan tanpa kawalan dan perlindungan semasa pasukan keselamatan memburu gerombolan pengganas komunis di sempadan Indonesia. Operasi yang mengambil masa beberapa bulan itu telah menghasilkan kejayaan.

Operasi Jala Raja pula dilancarkan pada 24 Februari 1979 di sekitar Bahagian Pertama. Ia adalah merupakan operasi besar-besaran yang melibatkan Tentera Darat, TUDM, Pasukan Polis Hutan, Cawangan Penyiasatan Khas dan pihak Pentadbiran Awam. Gerakan dimulakan dengan mengenakan perintah berkurni di kawasan tertentu di daerah Kuching/Serian. Di samping itu kerajaan telah menggugurkan risalah sebanyak 10,000 keping pas Keselamatan yang mengandungi tawaran menyerah diri pengganas komunis di kawasan Operasi Jala Raja. Ini adalah tawaran kali kedua dari kerajaan. Tawaran serupa ini telah diadakan semasa Operasi Harapan dilancarkan.

Mej. Jen. Ismail Ibrahim mengambil alih tugas Pengarah DOPEM dari Mej. Jen. Syed Mohd. Alsagoff pada 30 Januari 1971 hingga 7 Disember 1972. Dalam jangka masa ini tiga peristiwa penting berlaku iaitu penglibatan kerajaan negeri dalam projek Jiwa Murni, pelancaran Operasi Ngayau dan mengisytiharkan Bahagian Ketiga diletakkan di dalam kawasan keselamatan RASCOM (Rajang Area Security Command).

Walaupun Operasi Jala Raja yang dilancarkan sebelumnya mendapat kejayaan, tetapi masih ada kumpulan-kumpulan pemberontak yang dapat bersatu semula dan menambahkan ahlinya. Ini disebabkan kemungkinan adanya bantuan dari golongan yang bersimpati dengan perjuangan mereka baik di bandar maupun di kawasan pendalam.

OP NGAYAU

Sementara itu Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU) bergerak aktif di lembah Rajang. Pengganas-pengganas komunis ini meneruskan keganasan seperti menanam bahan letupan di tempat-tempat awam dan menaburkan dakyah anti keamanan di seluruh Bahagian Ketiga yang mengakibatkan berbagai keraguan dan seterusnya melanggar undang-undang negara oleh sebilangan rakyat yang berpengaruh. Justru itu Operasi Ngayau dilancarkan. Beberapa kawasan di daerah Sibu, Sarikei, Binatang dan Batang Rajang serta Batang Igam dikenakan perintah berkurung. Operasi tersebut mendapat kejayaan dan kesannya ancaman pengganas komunis berkurangan.

Pada 25 Mac 1972, keseluruhan Bahagian Ketiga diisytiharkan sebagai kawasan Keselamatan Khas yang ditadbirkan oleh Pemerintah Keselamatan Rajang (Rajang Area Security Command - RASCOM) di mana Ketua Menteri adalah Pengarah Gerakan. Petugas-petugasnya dilantik pula ialah seorang Ketua Kanan Eksikutif (kakitangan awam), seorang Panglima Tentera dan Ketua Polis. Dengan penubuhan RASCOM, kegiatan pengganas komunis dapat dibendung dan keadaan keselamatan bertambah baik.

Di Bahagian Pertama dan Kedua Sarawak, berbagai operasi lagi dilancarkan seperti Operasi Gandal, Operasi Dendam dan Operasi Silas. Operasi bersama dengan TNI juga ditingkatkan bagi memecah-belahkan kegiatan pengganas komunis di sempadan kedua-dua negara.

OP COMMANCHE

Dalam Operasi Huslana, perkhemahan pengganas komunis telah dijumpai di sempadan sebelah Indonesia. Di masa yang sama juga, Operasi

Commanche masih dilancarkan yang bertujuan mengawal pergerakan pedagang-pedagang bertukar barang antara sempadan. Akhirnya dengan persetujuan kerajaan Indonesia, pusat pemeriksaan sempadan (border check points) ditubuhkan.

Disamping operasi-operasi yang dilancarkan, berbagai projek Jiwa Murni dijalankan bagi menjalani kerjasama dan hubungan di antara anggota tentera dengan penduduk tempatan ke arah membantu gerakan menghapuskan kegiatan pengganas komunis. Projek Jiwa Murni ini melibatkan juga kakitangan awam dari jabatan-jabatan masyarakat, perubatan, pertanian dan penerangan. Usaha-usaha ini lebih ditumpukan di kawasan pendalam yang bukan hanya memerlukan bantuan kebendaan tetapi juga penerangan mengenai dasar-dasar kerajaan.

Mej. Jen. Datuk Mahmood bin Sulaiman mengambil alih tugas DOPEM pada 8 Disember 1972. Di waktunya berbagai operasi dalam tahun 1972 telah menghasilkan kejayaan besar di mana 66 orang pengganas komunis dibunuhi, 42 ditawan, 46 menyerah diri dan 171 meletak senjata.

OP SRI AMAN

Dalam tahun 1973, Bong Kee Chok iaitu Ketua Umum Pasukan Pembebasan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan People Guerilla Force-NKPGF) dan Pengarah Politik PARAKU telah membuat keputusan menghentikan penentangan bersenjata terhadap pasukan keselamatan. Pada 21 Oktober 1973, Bong Kee Chok menandatangani memorandum bekerjasama di Rumah Sri Aman di Simanggang dan kemudiannya Operasi Sri Aman dilancarkan. Dengan kerjasama Bong Kee Chok, di antara 18 Oktober 1973 hingga 4 Mac 1974, 75% anggota penggempur komunis termasuk di antaranya ketua-ketua tertinggi telah meletak senjata dan menyerah diri. Operasi Sri Aman merupakan satu daripada operasi yang mencapai kejayaan besar dalam mengurangkan kegiatan pengganas komunis di Sarawak.

Mej. Jen. Datuk Zain Hashim mengambil alih tugas Panglima Markas I Div pada 10 Januari 1975. Keadaan keselamatan di Sarawak ketika itu bertambah pulih hasil kejayaan Operasi Sri Aman.

Walaupun demikian gerakan menghapuskan saki-baki pengganas komunis masih diteruskan. Pada tahun 1976, pasukan keselamatan menumpukan perhatian kepada apa disebut Parti Komunis Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan Communist Party-NKCP) di mana salah seorang daripada ketua-nya iaitu Lee Lip Fung dari Lundy Group telah ditembak mati. Sepanjang tahun 1976 hingga Januari 1977, pasukan keselamatan telah berjaya membunuh 12 pengganas, 5 ditawan dan 6 menyerah diri.

Bagi mendapatkan penglibatan rakyat secara aktif dalam menentang pengganas komunis, pasukan Ikatan Relawan Rakyat (RELA) dibentuk digerakkan dengan lebih giat. Dengan itu pasukan keselamatan bukan sahaja menerima butir-butir maklumat dari sumber tempatan bahkan tugas-tugas pasukan keselamatan bagi mengawal kampung-kampung dan kawasan-kawasan sempadan bertambah ringan.

Dalam jangkamasa tersebut keadaan keselamatan di Sabah adalah tenang dan terkawal. Walaupun begitu keadaan yang sedemikian kadangkala boleh bergelora. Pada 28 Oktober 1976, dua buah bot lanun telah menyerang sebuah bot ronda Polis Marine ke barat Pulau Tambisan yang mengakibatkan kehilangan dua nyawa anggota kerajaan. Operasi membentras kegiatan lanun dilancarkan yang juga menghasilkan kejayaan besar.

Mej. Jen. Datuk Jaafar Onn mengambil alih jawatan Panglima Markas I Div pada 15 Januari 1977. Pada masa ini juga Parti Komunis Kalimantan Utara (NKCP) sedang berusaha menyatukan anggota-anggotanya bagi mengukuhkan perjuangannya. Akan tetapi segala gerakan tersebut dibentur taras oleh pasukan keselamatan.

OP KRIS

Bagi mengelakkan keamanan negara berterusan, maka berbagai gerakan operasi dilancarkan ke arah menghapuskan saki-baki pengganas komunis. Di samping itu juga aspek-aspek Tugas Turus di tingkatkan. Pasukan-pasukan mengadakan latihan semula supaya prestasi kecekapan profesionalisme ketenteraan dicapai. Pada 1 Jun 1977, satu rombakan kecil perjawatan Pegawai Turus Markas I Divisyen dilakukan. Perjawatan Ketua Turus,

Pegawai Turus Satu (Anggota) dan Pegawai Turus Satu (Risik) diwujudkan bagi memenuhi tugas-tugas yang kian bertambah.

Pada 14 Disember 1978, Mej. Jen. Datuk Hj. Wan Ismail mengambil alih tugas Panglima Markas I Div. Ketika itu keadaan keselamatan di rantau ini adalah tenang. Walaupun demikian tugas-tugas pasukan keselamatan di Sabah lebih ditekankan dalam menentang penyeludupan, ancaman lanun dan anasir-anasir asing. Di Sarawak pula gerakan operasi terus dilancarkan bagi menghapuskan saki-baki pengganas komunis. Operasi Kris yang dilancarkan pada 8 Februari 1977 di kawasan Matang, Sempadi, Lundy dan Biawak telah mendapat kejayaan. Gerakan operasi seperti Operasi Ngayau di kawasan RASCOM masih diteruskan. Kerjasama dalam berbagai bidang ketenteraan dengan pihak Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI) diteruskan.

Mej. Jen. Abdullah bin Shamsudin mengambil alih tugas Panglima Wilayah II pada 10 Januari 1980. Keadaan keselamatan di Sabah dan di Sarawak ketika itu adalah terkawal. Gerakan operasi terus dilancarkan bagi menghapuskan sebilangan kecil gerombolan pengganas komunis yang masih menimbulkan ancaman keselamatan negara. Sepanjang tahun 1980, operasi-operasi tersebut telah mendapat kejayaan. Di perairan Sabah/Filipina, ancaman lanun telah semakin berkurangan dengan adanya rondaan-rondaan yang dilakukan oleh kapal-kapal dan bot-bot peronda TLDM.

KARIPURA MALINDO

Di samping meneruskan tugas-tugas operasi bagi mengekalkan keselamatan negara, di sepanjang tahun 1981, aktiviti ketenteraan di Wilayah ini juga ditumpukan dalam hal latihan. Pasukan-pasukan tempur dan pasukan-pasukan bantuan tempur mengadakan latihan pasukan dan latihan semula bagi meningkatkan kecekapan anggota khasnya dalam latihan peperangan terbuka (Conventional Warfare). Begitu juga latihan CPX - Penyu Satu telah diadakan mulai 24 Jun hingga 26 Jun 1981 di Jalan Bau-Lundy bagi menguji elemen kem semasa pergerakan Markas dalam sesuatu latihan. Dalam bulan Februari 1981 pula,

Latihan Karipura Malindo I iaitu sirî latihan bersama dengan TNI telah diadakan di daerah Semantan Lundu. Latihan yang melibatkan ketiga-tiga perkhidmatan tentera Darat, Laut dan Udara adalah bertujuan menguji Latihan dan Gerak yang terkandung dalam perintah tetap latihan dan gerakan (SOP).

Dalam Siri Latihan Gonzales, Wilayah ini telah menjalankan latihan Gonzales VI di Sabah mulai 21 Februari hingga 7 Mac 1981 dan Gonzales tersebut yang bertujuan menguji kecekapan anggota dan semua organisasi tentera yang bersepadu dalam menghadapi sesuatu keadaan perperangan. Daripada pengalaman latihan ini telah mengingkatkan kecekapan anggota tentera di Wilayah ini khasnya dalam aspek perperangan terbuka.

Di samping menitikberatkan hal-hal latihan, Wilayah ini juga mengadakan projek Gerak Saraf dan Jiwa Murni bagi mengukuhkan kerjasama serta memenangi hati rakyat di antara penduduk-penduduk tempatan khasnya di luar bandar dengan Angkatan Tentera. Ianya juga akan dapat menimbulkan kesedaran akan dasar-dasar kerajaan yang telah, sedang dan akan dilaksanakan. Di antara khidmat Gerak Saraf dan Jiwa Murni yang dijalankan ialah khidmat perubatan, projek-projek pembangunan, pembinaan jalanraya dan khidmat masyarakat.

PERPADUAN KAUM

Dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab Angkatan Tentera sebagai tunggak keselamatan negara serta memupuk perpaduan kaum, maka Angkatan Tentera sentiasa berhubung rapat dengan berbagai agensi kerajaan seperti Pasukan Polis, Jabatan Penerangan, Majlis Keselamatan Negeri dan sebagainya. Kegiatan-kegiatan seperti pentas rakyat, sukan, lawatan sivik, derma darah, projek gotong royong dan anak angkat adalah bagi memupuk kerjasama dan persefahaman di kalangan penduduk tempatan akan khidmat anggota tentera di Wilayah ini.

Mej. Jen. Datuk Abdullah Shamsuddin sentiasa menitikberatkan pentingnya setiap anggota tentera mengekalkan disiplin yang tinggi disamping meningkatkan kecekapan profesionalisme ketenteraan

bagi mencapai kejayaan baik semasa aman atau peperangan.

Mej Jen Dato' Haji Hassan bin Haji Mohamad Salleh telah mengambil alih tugas Panglima Wilayah II pada 21 Januari 1983. Keadaan keselamatan di Sabah dan di Sarawak ketika itu adalah terkawal. Gerakan operasi terus dilakukan bagi menghapuskan saki baki pengganas komunis yang masih menimbulkan ancaman keselamatan negara. Begitu juga rondaan-rondaan perairan di kawasan Sabah/Filipina terus dipertingkatkan lagi bagi mengawal keselamatan negara. Untuk mempertingkatkan profesionalisme setiap anggota tentera, maka berbagai latihan ketenteraan di peringkat pasukan dan Brigade telah diadakan. Begitu juga latihan yang melibatkan ketiga-tiga perkhidmatan Angkatan Tentera iaitu Darat, Laut dan Udara.



Mej Jen Dato' Hj Hassan bin Hj Mohd Salleh berucap merasmikan penutup Latihan Kripura Malindo II di Singkawang, Kalimantan Indonesia.

Dalam bulan Oktober 1983 pula, Latihan Kripura Malindo II yang merupakan siri latihan bersama antara KODAM XII dari TNI dengan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia telah diadakan di Singkawang, Kalimantan, Indonesia. Begitu juga dalam usaha memupuk kerjasama di antara angkatan tentera dengan anggota awam maka berbagai projek Gerak Saraf dan Jiwa Murni telah dipertingkatkan di Wilayah ini.

Dalam perayaan ulangtahun kedua puluh Kemerdekaan Malaysia yang diadakan mulai 2 September hingga 5 September 1983, selain daripada mengadakan Pameran Statik Pasukan Keselamatan di Kuching, angkatan tentera juga telah terlibat dalam pelbagai projek jiwa murni

seperti mengadakan Projek Perkilahan Sungai China Kuching.

Mej Jen Haji Ahmad bin Haji Abdul Kadir mengambilalih tugas Panglima Wilayah Dua mulai 31 Januari 1984. Juga sebagai Panglima Gerakan Sabah dan Sarawak, Mej Jen Haji Ahmad akan terus menyambung dan meningkatkan lagi tahap profesionalisme bagi setiap anggota tentera di samping mengekalkan hubungan erat di antara anggota tentera dengan penduduk-penduduk tempatan di rantau ini ke arah mencapai kejayaan dalam memikul tugas sebagai pelindung keselamatan di Wilayah II.



Mej Jen Dato' Haji Hassan bin Haji Mohd Salleh menyerahkan tugas Panglima Wilayah Dua kepada pengganti Mej Jen Haji Ahmad bin Haji Kadir di satu upacara penyerahan tugas yang di adakan di Lapang sasaran Sempadi, Lundu, Sarawak.

Berdasarkan kemampuan dan pengalaman, Markas Tentera Darat Wilayah II yang telah ditubuhkan sejak 17 tahun akan terus bertanggung-jawab bagi mengekalkan kesaman, kesejahteraan dan mempertahankan kedaulatan Sabah dan Sarawak sepanjang masa.

Berdasarkan kemampuan dan pengalaman, Markas Tentera Darat Wilayah II yang telah ditubuhkan sejak 16 tahun akan terus bertanggung-

jawab bagi mengekalkan keamanan, kesejahteraan dan mempertahankan kedaulatan Sabah dan Sarawak sepanjang masa.

Nota rujukan:

1. Elemen Kem berpindah pada 11 Jun 1974 diikuti dengan Eleman Pemerintah pada Mac 1976.
2. Kem di Jalan Palm diduduki oleh Markas 3 Bde sebelum Markas 1 Div mengambilalih. Kem ini dinamakan KEM BUKAVU oleh Markas 3 Bde sebagai kenangan perkhidmatannya semasa di Zaire, Congo di bawah naungan 'United Nation Peace Keeping Force' dalam tahun 1961. Bukavu adalah Ibukota kawasan KIVU di Zaire, Afrika.
3. Division ini merujukkan kepada division atau kawasan-kawasan bahagian negeri Sarawak.
4. HQ LFEM ialah Headquarters Land Forces East Malaysia atau HQ 1 Div dan diperintah oleh DOPEM (Director of Operations East Malaysia)

Rujukan.

- * Buku-buku serah menyerah Panglima HQ 1 Div.
- * Fail-fail Geraksaraf dan Jiwa Murni.
- * Majalah: Wilayah II Ten Years after: a review (Tahun 1977).
- * Surat khabar dari Cawangan PR.
- * New Straits Times – 1966 – 1977
- * Sarawak Tribun – 1966 – 1977
- * Utusan Malaysia – 1970 – 1977
- * Utusan Sarawak – 1966
- * Vanguard – 1966 – 1970
- * Buku Skrap dan Album MAWILDA II
- * Majalah-majalah ulang tahun RASCOM



PW I Ngadiman Bin Hj. Abd. Hamid, memasuki ATM dalam tahun 1969. Pernah berkursus selama dua tahun dalam bidang pendidikan di Maktab Perguruan Bahasa Kuala Lumpur. Bekas Presiden Persatuan Pelajar Maktab Perguruan Bahasa tahun 1975. Berpeluang mengikuti kursus singkat dalam bidang Pengurusan dan Hubungan Kemanusiaan di Pusat Daya Pengeluaran Negara Petaling Jaya. Kini belliau berkhidmat sebagai Pegawai Waren Pelajaran MAWILDA II sejak Oktober 1980.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM

MIDDLE EAST WARS

— a synopsis



Despite four wars since 1948, the middle east is unlikely to see peace within the foreseeable future. The root cause of those wars is the displacement of two million Palestinians from their homeland by the Israeli regime which not only set government in the then Palestine but expanded the territory progressively. Despite such brutality towards the Palestinian cause is still not strong enough to correct the irregularity. This is largely due to the differential attitude that the various sector in the international community have towards the problem. Attitude therefore plays a vital role in 'Strategic decision' making. In his article the author discusses some aspects of wars fought in the middle-east and to a certain extent he achieved in expounding some lessons for readers to ponder upon.

KOL MEOR OMAR BAKI B ABD LATIPH

THE WAR

Four wars have come and gone in the middle east and the fifth seems imminent. The first in 1948, the second in 1956, the third in 1967 and the fourth in 1973. Arithmetically the fifth round should have already erupted if not for fear of a diplomatic defeat by the warring forces.

As always, after each battle, military analysts were quick to come out with theories on how a

battle was won (or lost) and as most of the journalists were from the western press there is little surprise when we note the manner in which their reports were made.

ISRAELI VICTORY

The first three wars went to the Israelis and analysts pinned the reasons on Israeli resilience, superior weaponry system and better training.

Israel pilots came out for special mention for their ability not only to win aerial fights but for their accuracy in destroying Egyptian and Syrian planes on the ground by hitting them smack on the cockpits. In the desert sands Arab manouvered tanks came out second best.

Israel, idolized by the western press as a besieged nation was the toast of their well wishers. How did Israel achieve so much success in the three wars? Some analysts came out with even greater reasons and these are — their need to survive, their quick and decisive action and proper planning coupled with dedication, the desire to fight and believe in a course. As the so called "besieged" Israel state received more attention from friends, they kept expanding their armed forces. Theoretically therefore, the fourth round of war should establish yet another victory for them and see them through to perhaps Cairo, Damascus and Amman. However, the situation after the war was different. While no one won or lost the war decisively, one thing was clear — Egyptian troops crossed into Sinai and the "invincible" Bar Lev Line was not only destroyed by the liberation force but captured by them and for the first time Israeli troops were seen raising their hands (not their flags) in front of curious Egyptian soldiers.

Perhaps the battle of Bar Lev need special mention because it not only marked the first defeat of an Israeli defensive position but helped to change the political, geographical and diplomatic situations in the region.



THE BATTLE OF BAR LEV

Bar Lev was somewhat 'fortress Singapore' to the British in the second world war; something invincible and something that could not possibly be penetrated let alone overran. In the past the nearest the Egyptian soldiers could get to the line was when they bathed almost naked on the opposite bank of the canal with their guns left uncocked on the sands. Under the circumstances no Israeli general could ever suspect them to cross the waterway and storm into the Bar Lev Line.

However doomsday for Bar Lev was near. On 6 October at past mid-day, Egyptian infantry in rubber boats crossed the waterway. Each platoon was supported by about a dozen men carrying RPG 7 (a shoulder fired anti tank rockets that could tear off the turret off a Patton) and the Milotka (a wire guided missile).



The attack was supported by artillery and tanks. Some 200 aircrafts were deployed in the ground support role and 2000 artillery pieces were grouped together under the command of the Egyptian master gunner Maj Gen Mohamad Said Al Mahl. The fire plan included a barrage that lasted almost an hour pouring about 3000 tons of war heads into Israeli occupied Sinai. In the first minute of the fire works, some 11,000 shells were to be fired.

Egyptian Infantry successfully crossed the canal and as the first wave went tank hunting, subsequent waves expanded their ground gains but initially avoiding the strong point.



Egyptians crossing the canal by pontoon: 'Allah is with us'

Israeli strategy in defending the Bar Lev line included the burning of the water surface using liquid napalm. However unknown to them, Egyptian frogmen had earlier blocked all outlets and leaving the canal surface as cool as they wanted it to be when they did the crossing. Egyptian infantry closed in on the strong point rapidly and stormed into it leaving the out-numbered Israelis little chance to put up a fight. In fact on that day, the Israelis were celebrating Yom Kippur, the holiest date in the Hebrew calendar. Perhaps what they did not realize was that on the same day, the Egyptians (and the Muslim World) were celebrating the Battle of Badr which took place exactly 1350 years earlier.



Israeli 155-mm gun in Bar Lev Line emplacement opposite Suez; captured by Egyptians, October 7, 1973 (official Egyptian photo).

SECRECY

The attack plan in itself was so secretive that Jordanian generals never knew about it. Egyptian Divisional Commanders themselves were told of the attack the night before, the Brigade Commanders, in the morning on D Day and the troops were told of the attack three hours before the actual assault. Only top ranking Egyptian and Syrian Commanders were informed in advance of the impending attack. It was one secret the Mossad failed to crack and perhaps the one secret that caused Israel the Sinai Desert, Abu Roudis oilfields and the Suez Canal.

ANALYSIS

But why do we have to go into great depth on the Sinai Assault? The answer is to examine what the analysts would have to say as a result of this battle. Let us therefore go back to see what then?

If the Israeli troops were so resilient, well trained, dedicated and alert how could they ever lose the Bar Lev? In fact that was not all. In their counter attack, a tank brigade was destroyed and the Israel tank Commander Col Yakhuri was in

fact brought back to Cairo to tell TV viewers how the battle was fought and lost by his men. One lesson we can learn from this particular battle or popularly known as the Yom Kippur war is that no army how strong, how resilient and how powerful can ever expect to win successful battles merely by virtue of past records. What has apparently become important is the need to be alert and not to under estimate the enemy no matter how small and weak he can be. "Know Your Enemy" is the order of the day.

It is therefore obvious that when a battle is fought and won, analysts can easily come out with reasons leading to the victory. However when the victor came out as the loser in the subsequent round the analysts, depending on their attitude can always come out not with reasons why the victor has now lost but with excuses why the victor could not continue to win in that particular battle.

These excuses included things like soldiers were on leave, it was a Sunday, there was a communication breakdown, some one had not passed the message through or the enemy had sneaked in from the back door. But what might not be mentioned was the ability of the previous loser to stand up fight and win for a change. We must therefore be alert on this sort of style of reporting.

Therefore one important thing that came out of the middle east was that we can learn from is the extent of attitude a person or a country can have on its outcome or an its root cause. It is indeed attitude that can start or end the war.

ATTITUDE

An attitude is a kind of mental set or stance. It is a predisposition to form a certain opinion and gives a meaning to facts. People tend to minimise or neglect those facts which are in conflict with the attitude they adopt. In the final analysis they select those facts which favour their attitude and ignore those which are unfavourable to them.

Attitudes have important bearings on our defence efforts. The attitude that some other people have on our problems may decide the extent of support they may render to us in our

time of needs. Learning from battle field results alone can only lead to one conclusion i.e. what shall we do the next time we are faced with the same situation. However learning from what people think of the war that we have to fight can help to determine the extent of their commitment to us. It is therefore of a strategic importance that we should be able to present our case to the international community the way they want to know and the manner in which they like to know. The bare truth does not seem to be important any more.

Going back to the middle east, people seldom ponder over the actual cause of the war but they tend to be more interested to analyse the short term results. At stake are a people the Palestinians whose basic human rights have been deprived off them by Israel and yet there are others who thought it fit to recognise the Jewish State almost at the stroke of midnight. But why? For vested interest perhaps. Under the circumstances the truth is not important and what is important is what they expect to gain out of their move.

Take the war proper; if Israel is the aggressor why does a super power help her with all the arsenal she needs? How come the freedom fighters termed as guerillas? The super power argues that she enjoys a special relation with Israel because the Jewish State serve as the watch dog in a not so friendly area. However what the super power refuses to recognise is that the unfriendly situation was in fact created as a result of the "appointment" of Israel as the watch dog. But how can we change the thinking and the attitude of a super power? They have made up their mind or is it because Israel has successfully presented their case that they have won this support?

Another point to ponder upon is on the arms supply. No matter what Israel did they knew that when the time came they would get what they wanted but for time. So what he needs to do is to stock up their arsenal, go on a rampage into neighbouring countries while at the same time expect their super power supplier to be displeased thereby causing delay in shipment of arms. During this lead time they can lean on their stock pile and as the stock wears out, so will the displeasure of their supplier. Ultimately, the arsenal will flow in again

and the whole system will repeat itself. Its a vicious cycle that no one can stop but for the change of attitude of the arms suppliers.

As the years go by the differences between the two sides (the Arabs and the Israelis) seem to be wider and after 35 years of war of attrition and actual fighting they seem nearer to another round of battle than anything else. This is a fact despite the numerous talks held directly or indirectly between them. A peaceful solution to the problem based on a gradual understanding seems unlikely because:

- They have been fighting for a long time and are still in a state of war.
- They are at a complete tangent the principle issue i.e. the fate of the Palestinians people.
- The Israelis are in no mood to either give up the west Bank and the Golan Height or to agree to a Palestinian self rule in the West Bank and Gaza.
- The Arab countries are unlikely to absorb the Palestinian people and hand over Palestine to the Jewish regime without some form of a fight.

Rujukan

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