


# Sorotan **DARAT**



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
**JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA**

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


Muka surat 16



Muka surat 33

Bil	Elemen	% Keupayaan (OPLAT)	% Kesiagaan		
			(d)	(e)	(f)
(a)	Kekuatan SM	73	64	62	Penilaian Statik (Tahap 1)
	Komunikasi	114	78		
	Mobiliti	77	59		
	Logistik	77	77	79	
	Latihan	89	92		
	Kuasa Tembakkan	86	85	82	
			60% MATA		



Muka surat 50

# ARE INTELLIGENCE FAILURES BECOMING A COMMON PROBLEM, IF SO, WHY?

BY MEJ ZAINUDIN BIN MUSTAFA

## INTRODUCTION



The success of the Japanese Army in capturing Malaya in 70 days is a classic example of an effective and genius tactical planning resulted from intensive work of their Military Intelligence Services. It demonstrated a high degree of effective information gathering during the pre-war preparation by the Japanese by whatever sources they may get, for instance from their citizen residing in Malaya. On the other side, it reflected a poor and devastating British intelligence production that unable to determine the timing and approaches of Japanese invasion thrust toward Malaya<sup>1</sup>.

Intelligence dimension is not only restricted within the military parameter but as time goes by it has passed through its own evolution aligned with the modernisation of technologies and mankind. Intelligence has been a vital instrument in business world, politics, economy, in science and even in sports. One who possesses information is able to formulate a strong strategy in order to beat the other side and is always in the forefront in this competitive area. To quote an example; the absence of reliable

intelligence information with regards to the dropping of Peso and Mexican Government Reserve has caused a turmoil to South American states region<sup>2</sup>.

As for any military strategies and forces on the ground, the paramount of whatever intelligence was to achieve victory and the major principle of war in order to achieve so, is strike by surprise<sup>3</sup>. Likewise, one will suffer grave damage if caught by surprise by their enemy. A few missions that reflect a high degree of surprise that was achieved from a result of superb planning through tremendous intelligence service sources are the Israel rescue mission in Entebbe, the German in Mogadishu, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (1941), the Inchon landing (1950) and the Arab attack on Israel (1973).

## INTELLIGENCE THEORY AND INTERPRETATION

There are various theories and interpretations of what intelligence is all about. However, it is suffice to understand the four main intelligence concepts that are 'intelligence sources', intelligence sources spectrum, intelligence cycle concept, and lastly the

<sup>1</sup> Tsuji Masanobu, Singapore 1941-1942, *The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of WW2*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Saruan Roslan, Sotatan Darat Bil 39, Jun 2002, *Peranan perisikan dalam Dunia Saling Bergantungan (Interdependence)*.

<sup>3</sup> Levite Ariel, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, Chapter 1: *The Study of Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987, p.4-9.

weaknesses, problems and its causes that contribute to intelligence failure. Common United States understanding of intelligence is: 'The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available forms of information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations areas of operations or potentially significant for planning'<sup>4</sup>. On the same note, the United Kingdom (UK) defines intelligence, as "the secret collection of other people's secrets"<sup>5</sup>.

'Intelligence Sources' can be from whatever sources and from whatever means of collection that subsequently treated as information such as data, document, material and even signal frequency spectrum. According to Phillip Davies, the information, which was collected from various sources, will then mix in for decision-making process. He added that the most critical dilemma was mixing the intelligence sources in making major decision i.e. National Decision. Intelligence collection is the means and ways using whatever equipments, technologies or traditional methods using agents HUMINT (Human Intelligence). The collection sources dimension are wide namely through OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), Secret Source Intelligence that break into three categories i.e. HUMINT (Human Intelligence), SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) and IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and lastly HACKINT (Hacking Intelligence). Due to the advancement of Information Computer Technology (ICT), the development of intelligence systems in this millennium offer wider intelligence collection sources spectrum with the collaboration or integration of HUMINT with ICT, ELINT (Electronic Intelligence)<sup>6</sup>.

There are many version or stages of 'Intelligence Cycle' that however the overall

prime concerns are the product or output (intelligence production) and some says 'Intelligence Solution'. Ariel Levite explained that the intelligence solution undergone three approaches that are: first approach intelligence collection, second approach is evaluation and the final stage is dissemination<sup>7</sup>. Another version is the National Intelligence Cycle that have four stages; Tasking, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination. The military version of intelligence cycle includes Direction, Collection, Collation, Interpretation and lastly Dissemination<sup>8</sup>.

In simple explanation, intelligence is about collecting and processing information. Intelligence is the output of whatever information that was gathered and gone through a systematic or scientific analysing process. The policy makers then used it as input for planning purposes and in formulating of any strategic, operational or tactical decision-making.

The essay is to discuss the importance of intelligence towards an organisation, subsequently the impact of intelligence failure and to identify causes of the failure. At the end of the discussion, to argue the probability that intelligence failure is a common problem.

## CLASSICAL INCIDENCES OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

The recent and most disastrous incident that initialised the turning point of World Order was the incident of Sept 11 2001. Despite the advancement of her technologies and possesses many leading sophisticated gadgets, the US Intelligence Agency unable or failed to assess in anticipating such tragedy would happen. The incident has caused death to thousands of people and witnessed New York World Trade Centre

<sup>4</sup> Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1955.

<sup>5</sup> K.G. Robertson, academician 1987.

<sup>6</sup> Ghazali Ismail, Artikel Sorotan Darat Bil 39, *Sistem Perisikan Pada Alaf Baru*, Jun 2002, pp 2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. Chapter 4, p168-169.

<sup>8</sup> Philip Davies handout note on National Intelligence and Strategy Policy, dated 17 Feb 2003.

collapsed to ground zero. The incident was an example of the failure to use HUMINT effectively.

The failure to detect, identify or locate the exact hiding location where Osama and his group based, indirectly has reduced or scratches the image of the United States intelligence capabilities and integrity. The massive bombings and projected strikes towards suspected hiding locations that ends with none impressing result, shows the unreliable US intelligence output from a weak intelligence inputs.

Indian nuclear weapons tests represent a major intelligence failure as commented by White House press secretary Mike McCurry and a similar comment by Sandy Berger National Security Advisor. The US Government had no advance indication that the tests would take place and to make matter worst, even post testing National Security Advisor is yet to receive an independent confirmation that the tests had taken place<sup>9</sup>.

John Pike in his article 'A Major Intelligence Failure' stated the most important Western intelligence failure was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi incursion has caught many strong military nation intelligence agency and leaders that there is some shortcoming in of their intelligence establishment. The Nato's, German, French and even Israeli intelligence agency has zero information on the possibility of Iraqi intention to invade Kuwait<sup>10</sup>.

## REASONS OF THE FAILURE

There were plenty of write-ups published by various authors, strategists, academician, and war veterans on their analysis on certain wars or conflicts. However it seems that only a few or perhaps none has categorised the reasons as a terminology. Dr Phillip Davies' article in Journal

'PEMIKIR' (Jan-Mac 2003), stated that: 'the failure to detect, to identify, to appreciate threat are vital indicators that might change world history'. He categorised the reasons of intelligent failures into five common reasons that are 'Deaf Capt Syndrome' (Sindrom Kapten Pekak), 'Group think' (Pemikiran Kelompok), 'Mirror Imaging' (Bayangan Cermin), 'Information Congested' (Keseratan Maklumat) and lastly 'Analysis Paralysis' (Kelumpuhan Analisis).

**'Deaf Captain Syndrome'**, is the refusal of a leader mostly those Iron Regime Leaders that exercise autocratic or dictator-style of leadership that most of the time ignore intelligence sources even from a reliable one. Their decisions mostly based on their instinct and deny relevant facts. Hitler failed to attack Eastern Europe due to wrongly assessed allies' troops landing point. He thought that Normandy was only a faint landing point and the main is at Pas de Calais. To add, Retired Admiral Jeremiah who headed a panel investigation of the intelligence failure of India said that US Intelligence agency unable to predict the India's nuclear tests because the agency should seek others views and advises and even consulted experts from outside intelligence community to share information more effectively<sup>11</sup>.

Psychologist Irving Janis (1972) explained that '**small groups**' phenomenon that he labels as '**group think**' (Kumpulan Pemikir) which comprises certain individuals in the group who are involved in decision making, are said to provide a clue to the causes of the failure of decision makers. In some instances, to reach an accurate appraisal of the situation on the basis of the information available to them. These factors could also explain the occasional selection by the policy makers of highly inappropriate and extremely risky courses of action<sup>12</sup>. Their resolutions or assessments are not to be argued or

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/ms/wg/msbb98/no8..int.htm>  
<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p2.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/06/980602-fail.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Levite Ariel, 1987, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises, *The Study of Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, New York. P. 10.

challenged by outside body or non-members individuals. The Falkland War, 40 years after the end of World War 2, is an example of the failure of the 'group think' intelligence process decision-making. British High Commission Office in-charge of Joint Intelligence Committee failed to assess the seriousness of the intention by the Argentine to invade Falkland. They assumed that the Falkland Islands are too small and not important to the Argentine even though there is evidence that shows the intention of Argentine to capture the islands which they claimed historically and geographically belonged to them. The Joint Intelligence Committee ignored the assessment report from their Defence Attaché and Special Intelligence Service in Buenos Aires which they treated and categorised as no /less priority as far as national threat is concerned.

The '**Mirror Imaging**' (Bayangan Cermin) theory is to explain the phenomenon that those policy/decision makers applied in deriving decisions by jumping into conclusion and assuming that if Falkland Island or not important to them, likewise to the Argentine. The case of failing to predict Indian nuclear weapons test by the United States Intelligence Agency, was an example of a recent intelligence failure case. A statement made by (Retired) Admiral David Jeremiah, who headed the panel investigating the intelligence failures of India said, '*The U.S. Intelligence Agencies did not predict Indian Nuclear tests because they assumed things work in India much as they do in America. The U.S. doesn't think like the other nation thinks. What drives them and what is their National Security requirement? This is also because they had a mind set that everybody else is going to work like U.S. does*'<sup>13</sup>.

The third major reason that normally resulted in wrong or weak decision making was because of '**Analysis Paralysis**' (Kelumpuhan Analisis). This phenomenon happened due to the dilemma by decision makers executives or

whoever the leader in selecting the best option that derives from the intelligence analysis that were made by several intelligence agencies. In a situation where there are too many information available, and to make it worst, not co-ordinated by whomever that responsible, will lead to the selection of a wrong decision. The '**Information Overload**' (Kesaratan Maklumat) situation can be illustrated in the case of US actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis during Richard Nixon era. US itself has three major agencies i.e. CIA, State Department and Pentagon. The variant assessment on the situation at that particular time by the three agencies has marred the overall credibility globally or regionally.

All those reasons that were mentioned earlier are the major reasons of many causes of intelligent failures. However, all the reasons fall in the analytical stage of intelligence cycle; whilst the initial stage of intelligent cycle process that is the collection stage is equally or probably more important to be seriously looked into and closely monitored. During this stage (collection stage), two major errors commonly occurs; firstly failure to access whatever information required and secondly the flooding of too many information (information overload). The unavailability of information due to the inaccessibility of targeted information, is directly an operational failure facing difficulties in penetrating through a complicated and unique security system. There are some codes that was never ever been broken by the opposition party, for example during the cold war period, the west has never succeeded in breaking through soviet diplomatic codes. In other situation, there are problems to recruit double agent as an informer. In the case of India's nuclear weapons tests, the cause uncovered was on collection, assessment, as analysis should have suggested a significantly increased probability of a test and the probability of Indian measures to hide preparation for a test through denying and deception activities. As for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, French Defence Minister (Pierre Joxe) recognised the failure due to 'inadequate interpretation of available information'.

<sup>13</sup> [Http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/ms/wg/msbb98/no98.htm](http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/ms/wg/msbb98/no98.htm).

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, regardless of the development of science and technology that offer better operating and production system to mankind, some traditional techniques are still relevant due to some constraints of the system and also technology is still bound to technical errors. Therefore, intelligence failures will still be a subject of concern and believed to be repeated. Consequently, the prime concern is not to abolish or curb the causes of failures that are relatively impossible but to minimise the error. The matter of the level of the damage done as a result from the failures is more vital.

In this present global situation, that emphasises on the interdependence between many parties and the changes of security conception, it clearly reflects how both factors have brought the wind of change towards intelligence functions in order to effectively function in response to new threats dimension. Intelligence agency's roles and tasks have been more demanding with wider spectrum compared with previous situation. However, even though present intelligence product very much relies on

modern science and technology in its information gathering process, the previous conventional or traditional methods must not be ignored. New approaches by integrating old methods with new techniques are seen to be more effective such as employment of HUMINT i.e. 'Peoples and Human Intelligence Skill' and 'Non-Official Cover Agents', 'Co-operative Intelligence between nations and agencies will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence process. The importance of intelligence can be summarised based on Clausewitz in 'On War' (1832) '*By Intelligence we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country-the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations*'.

Despite our best intentions and technology, the system is sufficiently dysfunctional that intelligence failure is inevitable and failures may be of various forms. Shortcomings in intelligence analysis as well as an obsolete organisational structure could be prescribed by greater reliance on non-traditional sources and non-governmental expertise as well as greater consolidation of intelligence functions and responsibilities.

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# AS I CLICKED IT : THE BUSH DOCTRINE

LT KOL ABU MUSLIM BIN ISMAIL

## INTRODUCTION



t was the Doctrine that spells the need for US to 'liberate' Iraq. It was the Doctrine that spells there could be a few others 'axis of evil states' that would be attacked. It was the Doctrine they say that made the US ignored the chanting of 'we want peace' by some 200,000 Malaysians, young and old, that shook Bukit Jalil's Stadium. It was the Doctrine they say that made the US despised the demonstrations held by millions of people all over the world, including some tens of thousands in the US itself. But what Doctrine is it, and why?

This article dwells to see from the internet sources, (in the way one can say pick and patch with due acknowledgements given), about such Doctrine adopted by one most powerful nation in the world, that almost unilateral; acting without the United Nations (UN) Security Council approval, invades another sovereign nation, in the name of freedom and democracy. A click into the Internet gives some 260,000 hits on 'Bush Doctrine'. That amount of information alone is enough to fill some 50 volumes of this journal. Therefore, the aim of this article is to gather enough information about the Doctrine for the benefit of those who find interesting. If further study is required, a substantial amount on Internet bills is inevitable.

## WHAT IS BUSH DOCTRINE?

It was very interesting to note some discussion points of some laymen from the Internet forum on what Bush Doctrine is all about. One said "invade anyone who looks at you funny, unless they've got nukes, then, ignore them".<sup>1</sup> Another said, "We will attack anyone we feel like, even if they don't attack us first".<sup>2</sup> One great citizen felt that "it is the unflinching desire to destroy the last vestiges of dignity, rationality and humanity left in America".<sup>3</sup> Each thought that they were right, and in many ways, they are.

Actually, the much said Bush Doctrine is the manifesto for US foreign policy, pledged by the Bush Administration. It is a **must read** document contained in some 30 odd pages of 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', released on 20 September 2002, and available online at the White House website.<sup>4</sup> The Doctrine postulates an imminent, multifaceted, undeterable, and potentially calamitous threat to the US - a threat that, by virtue of the combination of its destructiveness and invulnerability to deterrence, has no precedent in American history.<sup>5</sup> By implication, such a threat demands an unprecedented response.

Hence, the Doctrine is a forward-reaching, pre-emptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist groups, while also expanding development assistance and free trade, promoting democracy, fighting disease, and transforming the

US military.<sup>6</sup> In a way, the National Security Strategy is also considered the US's survival guide in the post-Cold War and post-September 11 world. At its centre, the concept of the Cold War tactics of containment and deterrence are finished. In a world filled with 'rogue states' and terror, the US's might and the willingness to use it are the keys to global security.<sup>7</sup>

To briefly quote a detail evaluation by The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, the Bush Doctrine has three primary objectives.<sup>8</sup> Firstly, to combat and defeat terrorism which entails to targeting states that harbours terrorists, or 'rogue states' that might supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. Secondly, is to construct good relations with other great powers like Russia and China, and focusing on potential areas of cooperation. And thirdly, is to encourage free and open societies around the world with a sustainable model for national success – freedom, democracy and free enterprise.

There are three core elements to the strategy.<sup>9</sup> Firstly, is prevention; the use of an aggressive strategy of diplomacy, law enforcement, arms-control and export controls to prevent the threats of terrorism, destabilizing regional conflicts and weapons proliferation. Secondly, is pre-emption; the pre-emptive and anticipatory use of force to counter the threats of terrorism and potentially 'rogue states' even if there is uncertainty as to the enemy's intentions, timetable or target of aggression. And thirdly, is defence; to focus on deterrence and defence by maintaining a military capability that is so overwhelming that no country will attempt to challenge it. A detail, military biased description on the evolution of the Bush Doctrine by John T. Correll, the then Editor in Chief, is available at the Air Force Magazine Online.<sup>10</sup>

## INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO BUSH DOCTRINE

Editor Steven Wangness analysed 40 reports from 23 countries during September 21

to 23, 2002, a few days after the Doctrine was introduced. The results saw most writers agreed that the Bush Doctrine represented a paradigm shift in the US post-war international security policy.<sup>11</sup> Following his observations, some Europeans writers saw merit in the logics of pre-emptive strikes as the threat against US's national security has changed, and the new enemy neither rational nor predictable, and thus not controlled by deterrence. However, they have also raised doubt about the strategy reflected US unilateralist, and worried about the future relevance of the UN, EU and even NATO. Even writers who sympathised with the goals of the strategy warned that the US was taking the risk of building a fortress and leaving its allies behind.

Some observers found the new policy of the pre-emptive strike dangerous and unpredictable, when pre-emptive attack becomes rule rather than exception, and worried that the notion would spread. This certainly was in the mind of Russia's reformist Vremya Novostei editorial, possibly with Georgia on its mind, declared that the new US doctrine would seem to give Moscow the right for a resolute struggle against terrorism. Some unwelcome statements can also be seen in China's official China Daily that declared the new strategy is part of the Bush Administration's desire to consolidate a unipolar world by maintaining its military superiority. In Pakistan's Karachi-based editorial, the Bush Doctrine is seen as a declaration of an open war against Islam and the Islamic world.

The true international reaction to the Bush Doctrine was seen when the US failed by a wide margin, to gain the UN Security Council resolution to legitimise a war on Iraq. The motion to go to war with Iraq faced strong opposition from France, Germany, Russia, China and the great majority of UN member states as well as world public opinion. Nevertheless, after months of threats and a long military build-up, the US attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003. The war has since created a deep

humanitarian crisis in Iraq and a deep political crisis in the international system.<sup>12</sup>

## THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUSH DOCTRINE

The implications of the Bush Doctrine are many, both to the internal and external dimensions of US. To start with, the Canadian American Strategic Review correctly noted that the Doctrine is a complete reshaping of US global strategy and interests, which had been containment and deterrence.<sup>13</sup> It has been fundamentally redefined by al-Qaeda; an extraordinary threat that has posed an extraordinary solution to be implemented.

Another implication of Bush Doctrine is on its military. Since the Doctrine has ventures well beyond containment and deterrence, the demand is an expanded US military power.<sup>14</sup> The issue raised is of military sufficiency - building a force to back up the doctrine. When President Bush took office, the armed forces were in the backwash of a decade of neglect. The armed forces were a third smaller but far busier. Equipment was aging and modernisation was slack. By some estimates, the military needed an additional US\$100 billion per year just to prevent further deterioration. On top of that, Bush had proposed building a new, multibillion-dollar missile defence system and dumped the old 'two-war' force-sizing standard for a more-expansive '4-2-1' standard. It calls for forces powerful enough to deter aggression in four theatres, swiftly defeat foes in two theatres, and occupy one nation, if necessary.

The Bush Doctrine also brought in some legal implications. The term pre-emptive and prevention was used interchangeably in the Doctrine. The difference between pre-emption and preventive war is important as it gave different implication. Pre-emptive attack is justifiable if it meets its strict criteria and the legal standard, that the threat be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation". Pre-emptive war has legal sanction. Preventive

war, on the other hand, has none, because the threat is neither certain nor imminent. In the case of the war on Iraq, the Bush Administration says that they are taking pre-emptive action, but what the Administration had really called for was preventive war, which flies in the face of international rules of acceptable behaviour.<sup>15</sup>

Another legal implication is that the Doctrine proclaims the right of the US to intervene in any country it deem a threat. Hence it had created a bad precedence that can be used by any country to intervene in the sovereign affairs of any other state that it subjectively perceived as a threat. The US has now no moral authority to reprimand North Korea for attacking South Korea, or for India attacking Pakistan, or for Israel attacking any of its neighbours pre-emptively again. There would soon be disregard for the UN or any external authority, but just the enforcement of the principle that might is right. That would bring us back to the law of the jungle and all the progress that the international community have made over the years would be wiped out by the Bush Doctrine.

One other most dangerous implication of the Bush Doctrine is its resurrection of the idea of tactical nuclear weapons, and that the use of nuclear weapons can serve a tactical function under battlefield conditions.<sup>16</sup> The Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review proposes building a new generation of small nuclear bombs to be used against terrorists hiding in caves, as well as against underground command posts and biological weapon facilities. It also represents a decisive break with Cold War doctrine in which nuclear weapons were seen as strategic deterrents, mutual assurance that no country would use nuclear weapons against any other. To make matters worst, predictably, there will be a new arms race. Russia and China won't sit idly by with the US building and threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons. Hence, the Doctrine's disregard for international agreements and opinion is as dangerous as it is monumental.

## IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE THE RIGHT DOCTRINE?

It was a conventional wisdom that the best defence is a good offence. Elsewhere, in his 'Offence, Defence, and the Causes of War', Stephen Van Evera had proposed a theory that war is more likely when conquest is easy. But in the war against terrorism, the new thinking is that the only defence is offence.<sup>17</sup> Hence, the fundamental question that rises, is Bush doctrine the right doctrine? Obviously it is a right doctrine, at least to the US President and the majority of his cabinets. An exclusive interview by a managing editor of an online magazine with a four personalities gave some varying but generally positive response.<sup>18</sup>

Firstly, Professor Victor Davis Hanson grades the Doctrine an A.<sup>19</sup> He argued whether the policy appears to be cynical as enforced, or thinly disguised real politic, is not entirely the point. Secondly, former Director CIA James Woolsey, grades the Doctrine a solid A-.<sup>20</sup> Woolsey argues that the statement as a whole deals well with a wide range of issues and the pre-emptive language is clearly limited to cases involving the risk of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A- only because it fails to note that we don't need pre-emption as a doctrine to justify moving against Iraq. Thirdly, Associate Professor Daniel Brumberg grades a B- for content, and thus far then, a B+ for execution.<sup>21</sup> Brumberg argued that a vague, expansive doctrine have their place when their ambiguity not only keeps one's adversaries on their toes, but also gives American policy makers room to contest the meaning of those doctrines in ways that enhance the practical effectiveness of the doctrine. Fourthly, Senior Fellow James Lindsay appropriate a grade "I" for incomplete.<sup>22</sup> He argued that doctrines could be judged only by whether they work, not by whether they make your pulse quicken.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy could be one of the millions that could not find the Bush Doctrine right. When addressing the Floor of the US Senate

weeks after the Doctrine was released, he spoke of it as a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept.<sup>23</sup> The Senator continued to argue that it is the antithesis of all that America has worked so hard to achieve in international relations since the end of World War II. The shift in US policy toward preventive war would reinforce the perception of America as a 'bully' in the Middle East, and would fuel anti-American sentiment throughout the Islamic world and beyond. It would also send a signal to governments all over the world that the rules of aggression have changed for them too, which could increase the risk of conflict between countries such as Russia and Georgia, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan.

An individual pointed that the US attack on Iraq was not supported by some of the poorest nations of the world, particularly those like Guinea and Cameroon on the Security Council.<sup>24</sup> The US could not even BUY the votes of these nations to get them to GO ALONG and get a new resolution on Iraq. Hence, one will become aware of how frightening this doctrine is to most of the nations of the world. They fear it so much that they will stick to the principals established by international law, rather than let the US be the final arbiter of that law. This alone, he argued, should convince anyone that the Bush Doctrine is not in the best interest of the international community.

Others commented that the Bush Doctrine confirms the US foreign policy is on an increasingly overt imperialistic course and some of the nobler ideals with which they have traditionally associated their nation - the pursuit of justice and international cooperation, for example, have waned considerably.<sup>25</sup> The Doctrine had also threatens UN credibility over the long term as it risks success in speaking with an authoritative voice to all countries, large and small, influential or not so.<sup>26</sup> There are also arguments that the Doctrine is horribly flawed as the international support for that strategy is close to zero, the US will lose too much economically and their military cannot fight

and win clean victories against their foes.<sup>27</sup> Another argued that the Doctrine rings hollow, as it is only workable on non-nuclear states like Iraq and Iran but not on other nuclear 'axis of evil' state like North Korea.<sup>28</sup>

## IS BUSH DOCTRINE A BUSH DOCTRINE?

International law establishes principles and criteria, based on treaties, conventions, court cases and the UN Charter that govern the circumstances under which states may legally go to war. Generally, the principles of the Bush Doctrine met with a wide spectrum of responses. Some argued that the Bush Doctrine with a strategy that proclaims the right of the US to carry out pre-emptive wars and attacks is contrary to international law, and in part, letting the jungle law, the right of superior force, rule in international relations, that will damage the UN, the whole international system based on agreements, and international law.<sup>29</sup> This was especially true as, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that use of force without Security Council endorsement would "not be in conformity with the Charter" and many legal experts now describe the attack on Iraq was an act of aggression.<sup>30</sup>

There are some fine arguments by law experts available online about the legality of Bush Doctrine and the attack on Iraq.<sup>31</sup> It is based on 'Article 51 of the United Nations Charter', which says that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security".

On one extreme, some argued that even if there were some legal right of pre-emptive self-defence, the Bush Doctrine was so far beyond it as to be transparently unlawful. On the other, others said that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made the claims of the US reasonable, when dealing with extreme cases like Iraq. Between these positions, other experts maintained that some forms of pre-emptive self-defence were legitimate, but all questioned whether an US attack on Iraq would meet the necessary tests, as there is need for some substantial proofs.

## CONCLUSION

There is no slightest doubt that the Bush Doctrine as laid out in '*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*' is a departure from the US former foreign and security policy of containment and deterrence. Whether or not it is the right policy is subject to interpretation. Nevertheless, it has drawn some international reactions and brought some implications to the US internal and external dimensions. Towards this end, asking again the fundamental question whether the Bush Doctrine is a bush doctrine, I still see nodding head. Put yourself in the shoes of the President of the most powerful; politically, economically, socially and militarily, nation in the world. What you would do if your country's population and territory were at stake? Apply the bush doctrine is the best bet. If you are still unhappy with this article, go on clicking yourself.

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# BARAT DAN SENTIMEN KEGANASAN

OLEH LT KOL IBRAHIM BIN YASIR

## PENDAHULUAN

**J**slam adalah satu agama yang cintakan keamanan dan kedamaian. Menyeru umat ke arah hidup yang harmoni dan aman damai adalah merupakan misi Rasulullah s.a.w dalam menciptakan kehidupan adil di maya ini, agar manusia tidak mengeksplorasi manusia yang lain. Namun '**kealpaan'** dan '**keegoan**' umat manusia, telah mengakibatkan pelbagai malapetaka telah menimpa dunia. Wujudnya masalah dan pelbagai tragedi ini adalah berpunca dari '**masyarakat yang kuat**' sentiasa prejudis terhadap '**masyarakat yang lemah**'; negara yang besar dan kukuh menindas negara kecil dan lemah.

'**Kealpaan**' ini semakin keterlaluan sehingga akhirnya menimbulkan sentimen yang terlalu sinis dan menudung ke arah agama pendamai (Agama Islam) ini. Negara-Negara Barat, kerana kesilapan, keegoan dan sikapnya yang sentiasa menindas negara-negara lemah khususnya negara Islam, dengan prejudis mengaitkan Islam sebagai '**pengganas**' dan '**penceroboh**'.

Sentimen dan persepsi Barat terhadap Islam bertambah memuncak berikutan tragedi 11 September 2001. Tragedi tersebut menyaksikan berakhirnya '**riwayat**' lambang kebanggaan Amerika Syarikat, World Trade Centre (WTC) di New York, dan detik mula isu keganasan yang



Gambar hiasan: Tragedi 11 September 2001

mengundang padah bagi masyarakat Islam seluruh dunia. Semakin hari masyarakat Islam terus dianiaya, bumi Afghanistan menjadi Padang Jarak Padang Terkukur, anak-anak kecil dan masyarakat Iraq menderita kebuluran kerana sekatan ekonomi antarabangsa dan kini sudah hancur akibat serangan penceroboh. Israel semakin '**gah**' di bumi Palestin. Di samping itu, orang Islam di kebanyakan negara Barat menjadi mangsa kebencian seperti yang berlaku di Amerika Syarikat, Eropah dan Australia.

Hakikatnya, adakah pihak Barat dapat membezakan di antara keganasan dan '**jihad**' untuk pembebasan dan kemerdekaan?. Ternyata mereka keliru atau mungkin ingin terus menggelirukan fakta sebenar, supaya Islam dan umatnya akan terus dilabelkan sebagai '**penaja keganasan**'.

## TAKRIF KEGANASAN SECARA UMUM

Wajah Islam bukan wajah keganasan itulah hakikat kita sebagai umat Nabi Muhammad s.a.w. akui dan sedari. Namun Barat berpandangan sebaliknya, dan sering melabelkan Islam sebagai agama yang menaja keganasan dan umat Islam memiliki rangkaian pengganas yang boleh mengancam keamanan sangat. Pandangan sinis Barat, sebenarnya telah wujud dari awal perkembangan tamadun Islam. Mereka dengan '**egonya**' berpendapat bahawa tamadun Islam ini terbinar dan Agama Islam ditegakkan dari mata pedang. Malahan mereka turut berpendapat bahawa Nabi Muhammad s.a.w iaitu pemimpin teragung umat Islam adalah seorang pengganas dan menggunakan kekerasan untuk menegakkan syiar Islam. Pendapat tersebut telah dikemukakan oleh seorang paderi kristian terkenal di Barat iaitu Jerry Falwell dan disiarkan secara langsung dalam TV CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System)<sup>1</sup> tanpa mengambil kira sensitiviti umat Islam.

Berikut itu wujud satu titik pemisah antara Islam dan Barat dalam mentafsir istilah sebenar keganasan. Kenyataannya, definisi atau tafsiran yang pelbagai tidak dapat diterima bersama oleh semua kaum, bangsa dan agama. Ini timbul kerana masing-masing secara langsung mentafsir keganasan berdasarkan acuan dan kepentingan peribadi bukanya secara 'universal'. Di samping itu ada pandangan yang mentafsir keganasan dari perspektif moral. Tafsir tersebut merujuk kepada kekerasan yang dibenarkan (justifiable) dan kekerasan yang tidak dibenarkan (unjustifiable). Namun begitu penggunaan tafsiran tersebut masih mengelirukan dan sering berprasangka.

## KEGANASAN MENURUT BARAT

Hakikatnya, erti keganasan terlalu relatif, mungkin sesuatu tindakan dianggap ganas oleh

sesuatu pihak tetapi tidak bagi pihak yang lain. Menurut Barat, istilah 'terorisme' antarabangsa bererti keganasan yang melibatkan warga negara atau wilayah lebih dari satu negara. Sebutan 'kelompok teroris' bererti setiap kelompok atau sub kelompok yang mempraktikkan keganasan antarabangsa. Barat terutamanya Amerika Syarikat menggunakan istilah tersebut untuk memelihara kepentingan dan reputasi di kaca mata dunia. 'Polis Dunia' itu, telah memanfaatkan penggunaan istilah dan seterusnya '**menuding**' dan membuat tuduhan tidak berasas kepada negara-negara tertentu, yang menentang serta boleh menjelaskan '**populariti**'nya.

Setiap tahun Jabatan Luar Amerika Syarikat, mengeluarkan senarai nama kelompok yang dianggap melakukan keganasan dan negara-negara yang mendokong serta menaja keganasan. Menurut laporan pada tahun 1993, yang bertajuk 'Pattern Of Global Terrorist', Amerika Syarikat telah menyenaraikan Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Korea Utara dan Syria sebagai negara yang menaja keganasan<sup>2</sup>. Malahan laporan tersebut dengan berani menyatakan Pertubuhan Pembebasan Palestin (PLO) pimpinan Yasser Ararfat sebagai organisasi teroris. Amerika Syarikat yang menganggap negaranya sebagai 'Polis Dunia' dengan lantang menjelaskan bahawa pemerintahannya akan sentiasa bersikap tegas, tidak mahu berunding serta tidak sekali-kali ingin berkompromi dengan keganasan. Mereka akan sedia menghukum sesiapa sahaja yang melakukan perbuatan terorisme atau 'bersekongkol' dengan kelompok-kelompok yang melakukan perbuatan tersebut.

Namun, sikap Amerika Syarikat terhadap isu keganasan ternyata berat sebelah. Mana-mana negara atau individu yang menentang dan boleh menjelaskan kepentingannya dengan mudah dan tanpa bukti kukuh dilabelkan sebagai teroris dunia, manakala pihak yang disenangi dan membela

<sup>1</sup> Utusan Malaysia, 'Sikap Musuh Islam' oleh Mohd. Shauki Abd Majid, 10 Okt 2002

<sup>2</sup> Utusan Malaysia, 'Mentakrif Keganasan' oleh Shaharom TM Sulaiman, 28 Sept 2001.

kepentingannya, tetap dianggap benar dan '**penyelamat**' keadaan walaupun telah melakukan pelbagai aksi keganasan. Ini jelas dilihat berdasarkan ketegasan dan kedegilan pihak pemerintah Barat menyerang Afghanistan untuk menghapuskan Osama bin Laden dan rangkaian 'Al-Qaeda' yang dituduh terlibat dalam tragedi 11 September 2001. Manakala isu keganasan yang sedia wujud dan kekejaman yang dilakukan oleh Israel terhadap rakyat bumi Palestin seolah-olah dipandang '**sepi**'. Perjuangan rakyat Palestin ditafsirkan oleh mereka sebagai tindakan ganas dan Israel sentiasa bertindak untuk mempertahankan haknya. Situasi yang lebih memilukan umat Islam sejagat, pihak Barat sanggup pula menaja, membantu dan menyokong kegiatan ganas rejim Israel untuk menghapuskan pejuang-pejuang dan seluruh rakyat Palestin yang tidak berdosa.

### KEGANASAN MENURUT PERSPEKTIF ISLAM

Islam sentiasa membela kebebasan serta kesejahteraan dan sama sekali menolak keganasan. Sikap ganas dan kekerasan yang dilakukan ke atas umat Islam mahupun bukan Islam amatlah ditegah. Menurut Rasulullah s.a.w seseorang yang beriman adalah orang yang menjaga dengan baik kehidupannya, dan juga orang lain dengan aman apabila ditangannya (bersifat amanah). Al Quran menyebut jalan perdamaian dan perundingan merupakan jalan keselamatan (Al-Maaidah, 16). Diperjelaskan juga bahawa Allah s.w.t tidak menyukai kerosakan di muka bumi (Al-Baqarah,205). Malah manusia dicipta oleh Allah s.w.t adalah sebagai khalifah yang bertanggungjawab memakmurkan alam ciptaan-NYA demi untuk keharmonian dan kesejahteraan segala makhluk. Oleh itu, sikap toleransi dan terbuka sentiasa dituntut oleh agama Islam. Jika setiap manusia di bumi Allah menyedari serta mengamalkan tuntutan agama suci ini, maka dunia akan sentiasa aman serta makmur dan tidak akan wujud pertempuran serta perbalahan yang berlanjutan. Berdasarkan dalil-dalil di atas, jelas

bahawa Islam tidak pernah menghalalkan keganasan tetapi sebaliknya menggunakan perundingan sebagai jalan terbaik dalam menyelesaikan sesuatu konflik.

Menurut perspektif Islam, umumnya tindakan keganasan merujuk kepada satu tindakan yang bertentangan dengan akhlak pendakwah Islam yang menyuruh agar manusia bersikap lemah lembut, bertimbang rasa dan berbincang dengan cara yang terbaik. Sikap yang dituntut ini terkandung di dalam firman-Nya yang bermaksud:

*'Dan hendaklah ada di antara kamu satu puak yang menyeru kepada kebijakan mengembangkan Islam, dan menyuruh berbuat segala perkara yang baik, serta melarang dari segala perkara yang salah, dan mereka yang bersikap demikian ialah orang-orang yang berjaya'* (Ali Imran: 104)

Berikutkan itu, pendirian Islam amat jelas dan tegas tentang tindakan keganasan. Agama Islam terutamanya junjungan besar Nabi Muhammad s.a.w terang-terang menolak keganasan serta menggunakan penyelesaian secara aman dalam menangani pelbagai isu. Beliau dan seluruh pemimpin Islam yang terdahulu dan kini, sentiasa mengambil tindakan secara toleransi dan waras. Jelas bahawa, jihad dalam Islam tidak bertujuan untuk menyerang musuh, tetapi disyariatkan untuk mempertahankan diri atau maruah agama bila diancam oleh musuh.

Di samping itu, Islam sebagai agama yang sentiasa rasional dan cintakan kedamaian tidak sewenang-wenangnya menuduh serta berprasan-kan buruk terhadap kafir dan Barat. Sesuatu isu dan peristiwa yang wujud akan dinilai dan diteliti secara positif, malahan umat Islam khususnya pemimpin sentiasa berpandangan jauh serta bertindak waras tanpa mengabaikan sensitiviti kelompok lain. Ini ternyata berbeza dengan sikap Barat, setiap isu dirumus dan tindakan yang dilakukan sentiasa mengikut 'kata hati'. Malahan mana-mana negara, kelompok atau

individu yang menentangnya dianggap pengganas dan tindakan menyerang secara kejam kelompok-kelompok berkenaan diambil tanpa terlebih dahulu membuktikan kesahihan fakta. Mereka sentiasa '**bertopeng**'kan isu keamanan, tetapi jika kita kaji dan selidiki, Barat khususnya Amerika Syarikat dan Israel merupakan '**dalang**' utama tindakan ganas yang melanda dunia sejagat. Tanpa melupakan perkataan keganasan yang hendak ditakrifkan dan pada masa yang sama perlu difikirkan kehendak dan suasana semasa umat Islam sejagat amnya, umat Arab di bumi Palestin berjuang kerana mempertahankan buminya tetapi dianggap sebagai tindakan keganasan.

Tindakan keganasan yang dilakukan terhadap orang kafir oleh umat Islam tidak harus dihalalkan dengan alasan jihad kerana bukan semua orang kafir itu wajib diperangi. Jika perang yang diputuskan, maka ia bukan kerana kekafirannya, tetapi kerana mereka lah yang terlebih dahulu melancarkan perang terhadap umat Islam. Hadis sahih pula ada menyatakan terdapat beberapa kumpulan orang kafir yang tidak boleh diperangi, iaitu wanita dan kanak-kanak yang tidak terlibat dengan perang, hamba, orang lanjut usia, peniaga, orang kurang upaya dan paderi yang sedang beribadat dalam gereja.

### PUNCA-PUNCA KEGANASAN

Terlebih dahulu, sebelum dihuraikan secara lanjut tentang punca-punca berlakunya keganasan perbincangan dalam artikel ini adalah merujuk kepada sentimen keganasan yang diperbesarkan oleh negara-negara Barat. Sentimen yang prejudis dan tuduhan melulu yang menyatakan negara-negara Islam sebagai penaja keganasan. Dalam hal ini, Malaysia turut dikaitkan secara langsung dalam sentimen buruk Barat tentang keganasan. Malaysia dituduh menyimpan, memelihara dan membantu golongan-golongan militan yang melakukan keganasan. Rakyat Malaysia dan rakyat negara Islam lain yang ingin memasuki negara-negara Barat akan diperiksa

dengan teliti seolah-olah, mereka adalah penjenayah dan pengganas. Wajarkah negara yang menggelar negaranya sebagai Polis Dunia dan mengakui mempunyai teknologi perisikan dan senjata yang canggih dan termoden takut dengan negara lain? Begitulah keangkuhan dunia Barat dan akhirnya mereka takut dengan '**bayang-bayang sendiri**'.

Peristiwa Pengeboman WTC pada 11 September 2001, Pertempuran di Semenanjung Gaza, letupan bom di Kuta, Bali, pelbagai peristiwa rampasan kapal terbang dan (yang terbaru) serangan ke atas kepentingan Israel di Kenya, dengan penuh berprasangka Barat telah mengaitkan dengan ummah Islam. Barat menyatakan tindakan keganasan tersebut telah didalangi oleh negara-negara Islam dan pertubuhan utama Islam seperti Al-Qaeda (pimpinan Osama bin Laden), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Hamas, Penggerakan Al-Fatah dan Briged Jihad Al-Aqsa. Lantaran itu, tanpa mengindahkan pandangan negara lain dan mengikut prinsip penyelesaian masalah yang telah digariskan oleh Pertubuhan Bangsa-bangsa Bersatu (PBB), tindakan keganasan dan serangan akar umbi telah dilakukan ke atas negara-negara yang '**menyorokkan**' pengganas yang dikehendaki. Tetapi sebagai satu kuasa besar yang dipimpin oleh pemimpin yang dikatakan berwibawa, sepatutnya mereka berfikir panjang dan punca utama sesuatu misi keganasan itu harus dikaji dengan mendalam. Ini kerana dengan mengetahui punca, secara langsung kaedah penyelesaian yang lebih tepat akan dapat ditentukan.

Berdasarkan penelitian situasi semasa yang melanda dunia sejagat dapat dirumuskan bahawa, isu keganasan adalah berpunca dari dua aspek utama iaitu dalaman dan luaran. Aspek dalaman merujuk kepada pengaruh atau tekanan yang sedia wujud dalam satu negara atau kelompok itu sendiri. Kebiasaannya, pengaruh atau tekanan yang wujud ini seterusnya mendesak mereka untuk bertindak dalam dua keadaan sama ada secara diplomasi ataupun kekerasan (yang

akhirnya mengundang tindakan ganas). Jika kaedah diplomasi gagal mencapai misi, mereka secara langsung akan menggunakan alternatif kedua iaitu kekerasan. Namun bagi kuasa Barat dan pihak Israel mereka lebih cenderung menggunakan kaedah keganasan bagi menguasai musuhnya. Aspek-aspek dalaman yang menjadi punca sengketa dunia dan keganasan adalah seperti berikut :

- **Kekuasaan dan Pengaruh.** Faktor ini merupakan faktor asas yang mendesak sesuatu pihak menggunakan kekerasan dan aksi keganasan untuk menguasai penempatan atau negara lain. Dunia sejagat mula terancam dan keamanan telah terabai kerana wujudnya sikap ingin membesarluaskan kekuasaan dan pengaruh masing-masing ke atas individu, kelompok atau pihak yang lain. Secara langsung, ini menimbulkan satu keadaan yang pincang di mana pihak yang kuat sentiasa menindas yang lemah, negara besar menguasai negara kecil dan yang kaya memandang rendah dan menindas yang miskin. Kesannya, keseimbangan dan kestabilan politik, ekonomi dan sosial sukar diwujudkan sehingga penyelesaian bersama dicapai. Contoh yang paling jelas yang boleh dilihat adalah sikap kuasa besar dunia iaitu Amerika Syarikat menyerang Afghanistan. Motif yang dinyatakan dalam melaksanakan misi serangan tersebut adalah untuk memburu kumpulan Al-Qaeda dan pemimpinnya Osama bin Laden, tetapi motif yang tersirat dan tidak diperjelaskan kepada umum ialah mengekalkan kekuasaan dan memperluaskan pengaruh yang hampir '**tercalar**' kerana peristiwa 11 September 2001. Malahan serangan ini merupakan satu tindakan ganas yang bukan hanya mengorbankan pejuang-pejuang Al-Qaeda tetapi turut mengorbankan nyawa kanak-kanak, wanita dan masyarakat awam yang tidak berdosa.

- **Penguasaan Kekayaan Ekonomi.** Kekayaan ekonomi ini merujuk kepada semua aspek perolehan sumber fizikal dan semulajadi yang dimiliki oleh sesuatu pihak atau sebuah negara. Setiap lokasi, kawasan dan negara mempunyai sumber kekayaan yang berbeza-beza berdasarkan bentuk muka bumi, iklim, struktur tanah dan sebagainya. Kekayaan ini dari satu sudut merupakan satu kelebihan yang amat bernilai dan jika dieksplotasi dengan baik akan menjadikan negara itu terus membangun dan maju. Namun, jika dipandang dari sudut risiko, negara-negara luar amat berminat dan bercita-cita untuk mengembangkan kekuasaannya ke lokasi-lokasi yang sebegini.

Desakan dari keinginan untuk menguasai ekonomi negara-negara yang kaya dengan sumber ekonomi ini merupakan satu motivasi dalaman yang akhirnya mendorong mereka bertindak langsung untuk mencapai misi penguasaan ke atas negara tersebut. Tindakan keganasan merupakan satu opsyen utama dalam menentukan keupayaan merealisasikan keinginan mereka. Dalam hal ini, kita boleh merujuk kepada kesiagaan dan persiapan rapi Amerika Syarikat untuk menyerang Iraq. Mereka '**bertopeng**'kan isu kedeganan Iraq untuk menghapuskan senjata berbahaya yang dimiliki oleh negara tersebut, namun hakikatnya, mereka disyaki mempunyai niat yang tersirat untuk menguasai dan seterusnya mengeksploitasi segala sumber kekayaan yang ada di negara tersebut terutamanya bekalan minyak.

- **Motif Kepentingan Peribadi.** Umumnya, motif untuk memastikan kepentingan peribadi terbina dan terus terjamin merupakan satu tindakan nekad sehingga mendesak satu-satu pihak atau

negara bertindak ganas dan menyerang kepentingan pihak atau negara lain. Sikap dan perbuatan seumpama ini akan menjelaskan penguasaan pihak lain dan seterusnya turut menafikan hak negara berkenaan di bumi sendiri. Situasi ini telah sedia wujud dan ternyata menjadi isu besar yang gagal diselesaikan dengan bijaksana. Tindakan keganasan terus dilakukan oleh pihak yang bermotifkan kepentingan peribadi dan negara luar yang sepatutnya mengambil peranan untuk mencari penyelesaian, terus hipokrit dan secara terang-terang menghalalkan tindakan kroninya yang turut bertujuan untuk memelihara kepentingan peribadi mereka di lokasi berkenaan. Lantaran itu, nyawa nyawa pejuang jihad dan masyarakat awam yang tidak berdosa terkorban kerana kerakusan sikap manusia yang tidak bertanggungjawab. Contoh boleh dilihat dengan merujuk kepada peristiwa kekejaman Israel terhadap bangsa Palestin di Semenanjung Gaza. Golongan Israel melakukan tindakan ganas demi membina kepentingan peribadi dan seterusnya menguasai Semenanjung Gaza untuk membina negara sendiri. Sedikit demi sedikit bumi Paletin dikuasai dan segala tindakan Yahudi yang mencabul keamanan Semenanjung Gaza hanya dipandang '*sepinya*' oleh negara yang mengaku sebagai '*Polis Dunia*' atasan alasan kepentingan peribadi yang tersendiri.

- Kepimpinan Yang Tidak Berpandangan Jauh.** Corak kepimpinan yang benar-benar berkesan dan bijak, perlu mengambil kira, menilai dan menyelesaikan sesuatu isu secara teliti serta bertoleransi. Pemimpin terutama yang memimpin negara yang berpengaruh dan maju mesti sentiasa berpandangan jauh dan memikirkan secara langsung implikasi kepada tindakan yang telah diputuskan. Tambahan pula dalam isu-isu yang

melibatkan kehilangan nyawa, kehancuran dan kemasuhan sebuah negara yang seterusnya boleh mengancam keamanan dan kemakmuran sejagat.

Faktor ini bukan hanya merujuk kepada kepincangan kepimpinan Barat tetapi turut kegagalan sesetengah pemimpin Islam mematuhi garis panduan yang ditetapkan dalam Al-Quran dan Al-Sunnah. Kelompok-kelompok dan golongan pemimpin yang berkenaan tanpa berfikir panjang dan berpandangan jauh mengambil keputusan menggunakan kekerasan untuk mencapai misi tertentu. Walhal, perperangan dan kekerasan seharusnya digunakan sebagai penyelesaian terakhir dalam menangani sesuatu isu dan digunakan demi untuk mempertahankan maruah, hak dan agama bila diancam oleh sesuatu anasir luar. Contoh semasa yang relevan dengan faktor ini adalah sikap Presiden Bush yang tidak berpandangan jauh dan sering menggunakan kekerasan menyerang sebuah negara yang dianggapnya mengancam kepentingannya (sedangkan Jabatan Perisikan gagal memberi bukti kukuh). Tindakan sebegini adalah tidak wajar dan menimbulkan ketidakpuasan kebanyakan negara khususnya negara Islam. Malahan tindakan yang diambil ini mengundang pelbagai musibah dan tindak balas dari negara-negara dan secara langsung memburukkan lagi situasi keamanan dunia.

Manakala aspek atau faktor-faktor luaran adalah desakan yang timbul dari luar diri seseorang individu, puak dan negara. Faktor ini menjadi punca penyumbang utama sehingga berlakunya pelbagai tindakan ganas yang mengancam keamanan dunia. Pada peringkat awal, mungkin tindakan perundingan digunakan namun setelah tiada penyelesaian dalam mempertahankan hak dan maruah agama, tindakan alternatif terakhir

terpaksa diguna pakai. Tujuannya bukan untuk menyerang kepentingan negara lain, tetapi lebih tersirat untuk memperjelaskan bahawa setiap isu perlu ditanggani dengan adil, saksama dan tegas. Antara faktor-faktor yang berkait langsung dengan aspek luaran adalah seperti berikut:

- **Faktor Sejarah.** Barat serta Yahudi dan Umat Islam, mempunyai satu sejarah silam dan '*titik hitam*' dalam hubungan mereka. Sejarah silam ini memberi implikasi yang mendalam sehingga mempengaruhi tindakan setiap pihak yang berkenaan. Barat serta Yahudi sentiasa prejudis terhadap Ummah Muhammad dan akan mengekalkan tradisi prasangkanya walau zaman telah berubah. Secara realiti dan tersurat, dapat dilihat mereka mempunyai hubungan yang agak baik dan memuaskan, namun yang tersirat sejarah silam tidak pernah berubah dan terpadam. Melalui faktor ini, tindakan mereka tidak pernah bersatu dan mereka akan sentiasa berbalah dan menentang antara satu sama lain. Implikasinya dunia sejagat ini sentiasa terancam, keamanan yang dikecapi dunia mudah goyah dan musnah. Pelbagai siri keganasan telah berlaku dan akan terus berlaku, akibat pengaruh kuat dari sejarah silam.

Contoh boleh dirujuk kepada peristiwa Perang Salib antara Umat Islam dan Kristian, peristiwa pembunuhan beramai-ramai umat Islam Palestin di Sabra dan Shatila pada tahun 1982 oleh kaum Yahudi. Peristiwa silam merupakan '*dendam kesumat*' dan telah mencetuskan kontroversi yang mengundang padah seperti Peristiwa Kekejaman Israel di Tebing Barat dan Genting Gaza dan tindakan berat sebelah Barat untuk menangani isu-isu keganasan yang wujud.

- **Memelihara Hak, Maruah dan Agama.** Hak, maruah dan agama harus dipelihara dan seandainya terancam ia perlu dibela dan dipertahankan secara rasional. Tindakan diplomasi merupakan tindakan utama dan wajar, manakala tindakan keganasan tidak dituntut untuk dilakukan dalam konsep Islam, tetapi ia boleh diambil sebagai alternatif terakhir. Sejak kebelakangan ini, maruah, hak dan agama pendamai ini sering diancam oleh kuasa-kuasa Barat dan rejim Yahudi. Mereka seolah-olah mempermudahkan kewibawaan maruah Islam dan secara terang cuba menafikannya. Kekejaman demi kekejaman telah dilakukan ke atas Islam dan untuk memelihara hak, maruah dan agama kelompok dan pemimpin jihad Islam telah bertindak balas. Namun walaupun sikap keterlaluan Barat ini mencabar wibawa mereka, tindakan yang diambil masih berdasarkan rasional dan berpandangan. Peristiwa pengeboman WTC pada 11 Sept 2001 telah dikait langsung dengan Kumpulan Al-Qaeda dan Osama bin Laden, tetapi mana bukti kukuh yang membuktikan dakwaan tersebut. Malahan ada maklumat yang menjelaskan bahawa pengeboman adalah perbuatan kejam rejim Israel. Keraguan ini timbul berlandaskan dua fakta penting iaitu 4,000 orang Israel yang bekerja di WTC, tidak hadir bekerja pada hari tersebut seolah-olah mereka telah menerima maklumat awal tentang tragedi tersebut dan wartawan akhbar Israel menjelaskan bahawa Shabak menghalang Perdana Menteri Israel ke New York untuk menghadiri pesta anjuran Pertubuhan Zionis<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Mohd Aidid bin Mohammad, 'Osama b. Laden, Hidup atau Mati', Creative Enterprise Sdn Bhd, 2001 m/s 101

**• Kegagalan Menanggani Isu Dengan Adil dan Saksama.** Sikap ‘berat sebelah’ dan kegagalan menyelesaikan isu dan pergolakan semasa yang melanda dunia secara saksama dan adil telah menimbulkan ketidakpuasan hati sesetengah pihak. Pihak yang mengambil tindakan mungkin merasa tindakan mereka wajar dan rasional namun pihak yang menghadapi risiko keputusan tersebut kecewa kerana wujud satu kepincangan yang nyata dan sukar diterima. Ketidakadilan dan ketidaksamaan kaedah dan cara menyelesaikan masalah, akhirnya mendesak pihak yang terasa ditindas bertindak ganas dengan tujuan memulihkan semula keadaan. Walau bagaimanapun, ia sukar berlaku dan keganasan menjadi titik tolak sehingga hubungan dua pihak yang berbelah menjadi semakin parah dan mendorong terjadinya pelbagai *‘gejolak’* yang lebih dahsyat. Secara langsung, kita boleh melihat ketidakadilan sikap Amerika Syarikat yang menganggap dirinya sebagai *‘Polis Dunia’*. Tindakan negara kuasa besar dalam menanggani pelbagai isu agak pincang dan berat, ada setengah isu yang dianggap penting dan melibatkan kepentingannya ditanggani secara serius, manakala isu-isu lain yang melibatkan kepentingan hak umat Islam dan kroninya diabaikan, malahan timbul keadaan di mana negara tersebut menjadi *‘dalang’* di sebalik tabir kekejaman yang berlaku. Antara contoh ketidakadilan Amerika bertindak adalah, memandang *‘sepinya’* terhadap keganasan pihak rejim Yahudi di Tebing Barat dan Semenanjung Gaza serta menganggap rakyat Palestin yang

bertindak mempertahankan hak sebagai pengganas yang perlu dihapuskan. Manakala isu pengeboman 11 Sept 2001, dipandang terlalu serius dan terus bertindak kejam (tanpa bukti nyata) demi mencari pengganas paling dikehendaki. Ini akhirnya telah mendorong pejuang-pejuang jihad bertindakbalas dan tindakan secara ganas terpaksa diambil untuk membalas kekejaman. Siapa yang bersalah dalam situasi yang semakin parah ini? Jawapannya pasti negara yang menyatakan dan sentiasa melaungkan tentang isu keamanan.

## PENUTUP

Isu keganasan ini masih jauh untuk diselesaikan sama ada melalui jalan damai mahu pun dengan cara berperang, di sebalik serangan-serangan keganasan yang berlaku iaitu tragedi runtuhnya bangunan WTC, pengboman di Bali dan yang terbaru kemusnahan di Kenya. Berasaskan alasan-alasan atau punca-punca yang dikemukakan terdahulu, kesimpulannya ialah Barat terutamanya Amerika Syarikat dilihat oleh masyarakat Islam sebagai kuasa besar bongkak yang secara berterusan telah melakukan sejumlah ketidakadilan ke atas mereka, ia bermula dari isu Palestin. Api kemarahan oleh masyarakat Islam terutamanya ke atas Barat yang sedang meluak-luak ternyata tidak boleh dipadam dengan ‘api’ sama seperti yang pernah diungkapkan oleh pencinta keamanan, Mahatma Gandhi tentang budaya keganasan “mata yang buta tidak boleh dibalas dengan membuatkan mata lain kerana akhirnya seluruh dunia akan menjadi buta”. Selagi pemasalahan akar umbi keganasan itu tidak ditangani nescaya akan ada banyak lagi adegan-adegan ganas akan terus berlaku.

## RUJUKAN

Shaharom TM Sulaiman, Mentakrif Keganasan, Utusan Malaysia.  
Mohd. Shanhi Abd. Majid, Islam Mengharamkan Keganasan  
Dr Amran Kasimin , Keganasan Bukan Cara Islam  
NoorAzam Shairi, Dimensi Baru Keganasan.  
Mohd Aidid bin Mohammad, Osama b. Laden, Hidup atau Mati.



Lt Kol Ibrahim bin Yasir telah ditauliahkan dalam Kor Artileri Diraja pada 21 Nov 1981. Beliau pernah menjawat beberapa jawatan penting dalam Kor Artileri Diraja dan Markas Formasi. Beliau memiliki Diploma Pentadbiran Awam dari UiTM. Kini beliau berkhidmat sebagai Pegawai Memerintah di 61 RAD.

# COALITION WARFARE

BY DZIRHAN MAHADZIR



oalition warfare is a form of war that is almost as old as warfare itself; indeed if the Greek poet Homer's writings are true, then the first coalition would be the coalition of Greek city-states against the Trojans in the Trojan War. Among the other examples of coalitions can be seen throughout history such as Greek coalition against the Persian empire from 480 - 448 BC, the anti-Turkish coalition at Lepanto in 1571, the anti-Prussian coalition in the Seven Years War (1756 - 1762) and the anti-French coalition in the Napoleonic Wars. However coalition warfare as a whole comes into prominence during the twentieth century since three major wars in that century, the First World War, the Second World War and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 were won by coalitions. It could also be argued that that the Korean War could also be considered as another example of coalition warfare, though this may not be a good example of such, since basically the command structure was entirely American and the various nations contributing forces had little say over how their forces were to be employed.

What can be seen is that coalition warfare is likely to become a common aspect of warfare in the future. Before going further, the term coalition should be distinguished from an alliance. Alliances, such as NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact are where the nations involved have a treaty that commits their military forces towards a specific objective. Coalitions, on the other hand, are where no treaty exists to commit military forces towards a common objective. There are

several reasons why coalition warfare will be a common trend in the future and this is tied in with the inherent advantages provided by coalition warfare.

Firstly, coalition warfare brings about the advantage of combined resources; by pooling resources and military strength, nations would be able to wage war against other nations which they would have been unable to do so individually, coalition forces also enable the defects or limitations of one country's forces to be made up by another. This has become more important in today's world as the rising costs of maintaining and operating military forces along with the increasing complexity in doing so has led to many armed forces being geared and equipped for specified roles rather than being an all-capable force. In addition the size of military forces has decreased in most nations while the length of time to produce weapons, munitions and trained military personnel have increased considerably. Conversely, the time frame for nations to prepare for conflict and the duration of a conflict (1) has decreased significantly leading to the fact that in most occasions, nations will have to go to and conduct the war with their existing military forces rather than having sufficient time to mobilize their population and resources. This means that forming coalitions will be the most likely way in the future for many nations to be able to bring about adequate military strength in pursuing a conflict.

The other factor is that coalition warfare bestows more legitimacy than a war conducted by a single nation. This has become of more

importance today as the international community views warfare with distaste particularly if it is carried out by a powerful nation against a weaker nation. This was one of the main reasons for the formation of the U.S- led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War. The United States alone could have defeated Iraq but it was necessary for it to do so under the aegis of a multinational coalition to avoid accusations of superpower bullying and also to justify to the American public that the United States would not bear the cost of the conflict alone. This need for justification in prosecuting wars adds to the likelihood of coalition warfare becoming a future trend.

However, coalition warfare poses a number of challenges for its participants that will be discussed here. Basically the challenges faced in waging coalition warfare can be summed up into the following categories:

- Goals
- Command and Control
- Intelligence and Communications
- Capabilities, operational methods and doctrine
- Political Considerations
- Logistics
- Language & Culture
- Personalities and the media

Goals mean the objectives of the coalition and as to how the coalition expects to achieve its objectives. While coalitions are brought about through a unity of purpose, it may not have a unity of effort in achieving that purpose. Each nation will basically have its own ideas as to how victory should be achieved. A clear example of this can be seen in the Second World War, in which the

British and Americans debated continuously on particularly every aspect of strategy against Germany ranging from when and where to attack the Germans to a narrow or broad front advance in Europe. In coalition warfare, unity of effort is essential, as without it, the result would be the same as each nation fighting individually. This can be seen in the First World War where despite the number of nations against them the forces of Germany and Austro-Hungary were able to hold their own simply because there was no coordinated effort or strategy by their enemies against them. Likewise the Axis coalition in the Second World War failed because a lack of unity of effort. Rather than formulating any joint strategy in North Africa and the Mediterranean, the Germans allowed the Italians to fight their own war at the initial stage before entering and then bypassing the Italians in most matters there.

The solution to achieving this unity of effort as stated by General Dwight D. Eisenhower is 'a readiness on higher levels, to adjust all nationalistic differences that affect the strategic employment of combined resources, and, in the war theatre, to designate a single commander who is supported to the limit. (2). The practice of designating a single commander for coalition forces is nothing new, as this was done by the Greeks in their war with Persia and also at Lepanto in 1571 where Don Juan was appointed overall commander of the combined Christian fleet though this practice then fell into disuse as nations became reluctant to surrender sovereignty over their military forces. It should be noted that in the 1991 Gulf War, two joint commanders were designated for the coalition forces which was split into two, that was General Khalid Sultan for the Arab forces and General Norman Schwarzkopf for the remaining forces. This was for political reasons as the Arab nations could not be seen as coming under the command of the United States though the reality was that the United States would be calling the shots behind the scenes.

Unity of purpose though becomes a major problem in a coalition when victory is close to and once victory has been achieved. The overriding purpose of defeating the enemy of the coalition then gives way to the individual aims of nations and divergence on post-war settlements. It would seem that nations forming coalitions would also be wise to articulate the situation and conditions they expect to bring about once victory is achieved. This was what the Allies in the Second World War attempted to do at Yalta in 1945 as to how Europe would be shaped in after the war. Unfortunately President Roosevelt made too many concessions to the Russians that resulted in the Cold War occurring once the oppressive effects of the Russians in implementing communism in their occupied territories could be seen. The debate as to whether the British and Americans should have advanced to Berlin in the closing stages of the war is also another example of the divergence of coalitions as victory nears. There is probably no solution for this problem but both political and military leaders in a coalition must ensure that such a problem does not detract from the current execution of the war and does not lay the seeds for a future war between the coalition partners.

The question of command and control is one that frequently arises in coalition warfare. Nations are often reluctant to surrender sovereignty over their forces therefore some form of accommodation must be reached as to the boundaries of command and as to the selection of the commander. In the Second World War, in the European theater, this was solved by the organization of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force), which was headed by an American commander (Eisenhower) with a British deputy (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder) and staffed by personnel from the various allied nations in Western Europe. In Italy and the Mediterranean similar joint headquarters were also created.

But this alone does not solve the problem for the overall commander of a coalition force must not only be militarily capable but also one who is capable of maintaining good relationships with the allies in a coalition.

Both Eisenhower in the Second World War and Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War (3) had this ability though their selection for coalition command was more due to their military abilities and fate putting them in the position rather than consideration of their diplomatic abilities. Still, both realized the need to give special consideration to their allies (4). Eisenhower was often criticized by his American colleagues for bending backwards to the British (5) yet at the same time his actions were necessary to maintain coalition unity. Schwarzkopf, despite having a reputation for histrionics and exploding at subordinates was a model diplomat when dealing with allies. At the same time though a balance has to be drawn between keeping coalition unity and the successful execution of coalition military operations. Winston Churchill cabled General Harold Alexander, commander of the Anglo-American land forces in Italy in February 1944 the following message; 'I have a feeling that you may have hesitated to assert your authority because you were dealing so largely with Americans. You are quite entitled to give them orders. (6). Eisenhower himself almost relieved General Montgomery in December 1944 for persisting in trying to become the overall ground forces commander (7) notwithstanding the fact that Montgomery was a British national hero.

The need for clear command and control in coalition warfare can clearly be evidenced in occasions where there existed no command and control or poor execution of it. The battle of Kasserine Pass in 1943 clearly illustrates what happens when there is a lack of command and control in coalition forces. In this instance there was a poor command structure with neither the British, American or

French forces being subordinated under an overall field commander (8) and this was further exacerbated by the contempt in which the various field commanders had for the forces of the other. The result was that a German attack inflicted substantial losses on the American and French forces along with causing chaos in the allied frontlines. The allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, which while succeeding in its aim capturing Sicily, failed to trap the German forces there as the two allied armies under Generals Patton and Montgomery became embroiled in a race to capture the Port of Messina rather than to trap the German forces between their two armies. (9)

Intelligence and communications is also a key factor in coalition warfare. The problem with intelligence gathering and dissemination is that nations are sometimes reluctant to share intelligence as it might reveal sensitive sources or collection methods. There is also the added problem of conflicting intelligence reports from each nations' intelligence sources. Therefore it is of primary importance that clear guidelines be laid out on the utilization and dissemination of intelligence within the coalition. Communications between coalition forces is another area of importance particularly in order to prevent confusion and friendly-fire incidents. While the operation of communications may be a technical matter, liaison officers should be attached to ensure adequate communication between coalition forces and also with the overall commanding headquarters.

The capabilities, operational methods and doctrine of each force in the coalition along with their interoperability is one that has to be taken into account by any coalition commander. No armed forces in the world is similar to another therefore any planning will have to take account of these factors for it may prove fatal to make a presumption that the capability of a unit belonging to one

nation is similar to the capability of a unit belonging to another. The most effective method of minimizing this problem is to allocate discrete geographical or functional areas of responsibilities to national forces.(10) The level at which this will be done will depend on the size of the forces involved.(11) A point of interest to note is that more and more armed forces around the world are participating in joint military exercises with other nations and exchanging students between their military schools and this in some extent alleviate the problem of interoperability and understanding of the other's doctrine and method of operation.

Clausewitz's much abused statement that ' War is an extension of politics by other means ' is even more relevant in coalition warfare. What may be sound military strategy or tactics may not be applicable for political considerations as it may jeopardize the unity of the coalition or offend the sensibilities or national pride of a member of the coalition. However at the same time there has to be a balance in deciding between the two in order to avert having a military disaster due to political considerations or a political disaster due to military considerations. Two examples of General Eisenhower's actions in Europe illustrate this balancing act, firstly, his appointment of Montgomery commander of American forces on the northern flank during the battle of the Bulge, while this action would not please many Americans, it had sound military sense that was far more important than any political consideration of appointing Montgomery to take charge of American forces. The second was Eisenhower's decision on January 3, 1945 to defend Strasbourg following an appeal by French President De Gaulle. While withdrawing from the city would make sound military sense, it would have been politically disastrous to do so as the French were reluctant to give up the city (12). In addition attention must also be

paid to forestalling or averting events which may disrupt coalition unity hence we see two examples of this in the 1991 Gulf War where the United States and Britain devoted considerable resources in tracking down and destroying the Scud missiles whose attacks on Israel were threatening to bring Israel into the war along with making substantial diplomatic effort to dissuade Israel from retaliating. Such intervention by Israel would have been unacceptable to the Arab members of the coalition who had made known that they would most likely depart from the coalition if Israel entered the war. The second example is the limits to the actions of U.S military forces in the closing stage of the Gulf War when it became clear that the Arab nations along with the rest of the world were becoming uncomfortable with the ever increasing destruction of Iraqi forces (13).

Logistics is also another matter to be considered. While it may be more expedient to leave each nation the responsibility of supplying and equipping its own forces, there should be some method of coordination particularly in terms of the usage of major facilities such as ports and airfields and transportation networks. The reason why logistical support should be primarily left to individual nations in coalition warfare is primarily due to the combination of factors such as the difference in the operational and administrative manner in which each armed forces provides supply for its forces, the different dietary requirements of troops plus the different equipment and weapon systems employed by each nation. Interestingly though, the factor of different equipment and weapon systems may not be a problem for the United States as to a large extent, many nations which the United States can expect to conduct coalition operations with, particularly the Gulf Arab states are largely equipped and armed with the same items used by U.S military forces.

Language and culture are also major factors in coalition warfare. Care has to be taken into account of the culture and sensitivities of coalition nations. The United States and the other western nations clearly showed this approach in the Gulf War where it took into account Saudi Arabian religious and cultural sensitivities and restricted their troops in their activities (14). Language is also another barrier to overcome even in nations that speak a common language where certain terms may have a different connotation. An example of the problems that can arise in a language barrier can be seen in the American Revolution. The commander of the French expeditionary force, Comte De Rochambeau, spoke no English and George Washington, the American Commander, spoke no French thus the Marquis De Lafayette acted as interpreter in their correspondence and in his interpretations tried to minimize the obstacles faced by both allies with the result that each commander sometimes had the impression that the other had promised more than he delivered. Eventually though Rochambeau managed to get Lafayette to restrict his efforts to translation only.

The final challenges in coalition warfare are the matter of personalities and the media. Personalities mean that some degree of cooperation and amiability is required between the various leaders of coalition forces. Without this, any form of coalition warfare will simply fail or force the coalition to break up with recrimination. Kasserine Pass is an example where the inability of the field commanders, in this case, American General Fredendall and British General Anderson, to get along with each other led to a defeat for the allies. One can also look at the meeting between British General Sir John French and French General Lanrezac in 1914 in which the latter said the Germans had gone to the Meuse to fish in reply to a question by General French as to whether the Germans were going to cross a

river as an example of how conduct between commanders working in coalitions should not be. It is not necessary for the leaders of coalition forces to get along totally but there must be a degree of cooperation. In the Second World War, the Allies were fortunate to have Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe who managed to conciliate the various personalities around him. While the problem of personalities is not solely limited to coalition forces, as anyone looking at the generals of the Israel Defence Forces during the Suez campaign in the Yom Kippur War or the rivalries between the Army and Navy of the United States in the Pacific theatre in WWII can see, difficulties between commanders in coalition forces can lead to the real issue being obscured by nationalistic sentiment. For example the real issue during the Montgomery appointment during the Battle of the Bulge was not so much the fact that American troops would be commanded by a British general but the fact that it was Montgomery, who was disliked by most of the American generals.

Coupled with the problems of personalities is the media that may also add to

the problems of personalities by reporting the statements of individuals which may lead to increased friction or may create its own problem by nationalistic sentiment in its reporting. Montgomery's ill-worded press conference after the Battle of the Bulge which ended up having many American generals in an uproar is an example of the first while during the Sicilian campaign in 1943 the B.B.C outraged many Americans by broadcasting an announcement that Patton's Seventh Army was sitting down eating grapes in Sicily while British forces were fighting there. The problems of personalities and the media is not one that can be easily resolved and no set answer can be put down for it. The only solution perhaps is to stress to all parties the importance of maintaining coalition unity.

In conclusion, it can be seen that coalition warfare while highly advantageous also provides a vast number of challenges which illustrates why those who have carried out coalition warfare successfully are rightfully hailed in the annals of military history.

#### **Endnotes:**

1. This excludes guerrilla wars, which have a longer time span. Conventional wars since the Korean War have largely been fought in short time spans, for example the Six-Day War between the Arab and Israelis in 1967, the two-week Yom Kippur War in 1973, the three-month Falklands War in 1982 or the 1991 Gulf War, if taken from the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, lasted seven months with the actual ground fighting lasting 100 hours. There are of course aberrations to this trend as the ten-year Iran-Iraq War shows.
2. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*.
3. General Colin Powell wrote in his book *A Soldier's Way* (pg. 475) that Schwarzkopf's greatest single achievement was to weld the coalition armies into a single fighting force without offending dozens of heads of states.
4. Eisenhower, during the Tunisian campaign warned his American generals that he would send home those who criticized the British. Rick Atkinson's book *Crusade*, on pg. 72 alleges the following on Schwarzkopf, ' Privately, Schwarzkopf despised Khalid (Sultan, commander of the

Arab half of the coalition) as a pompous, arrogant dabbler, "a joke". Yet he sat with the Saudi general for endless hours, drinking coffee and passively listening as Khalid spun his grand theories of combat. If this is true, then it clearly illustrates Schwarzkoph's awareness of the need to accommodate allies.

5. The following excepts are from General George Patton's diary entry for April 16 1943, "*It appears to me that Ike (Eisenhower) is acting a part and knows he is a damned near Benedict Arnold.... (Generals) Bradley, Everett Hughes, General Rooks and I, and probably many more, feel that America is being sold.*" *Patton Papers 1940 - 1945*, pg 222.

6. Churchill's communiqué was in regard to the Anzio landings.

7. This was during the Battle of the Bulge, General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote in his diary; '*Monty has had another interview with Ike. I do not like the account of it. It looks to me as if Monty, with his usual lack of tact, has been rubbing into Ike the results of not having listened to Monty's advice.*' Montgomery compounded this folly by sending a letter among the same lines to Eisenhower on 29 December 1944. Only the intervention of Montgomery's chief of staff, General De Guingand who persuaded Montgomery to write a subsequent letter of apology, saved Montgomery from being sacked.

8. Eisenhower was the direct commander of all three forces but he was 400 miles away in Algiers.

9. General Harold Alexander was in overall command but did nothing to coordinate the actions of the two national armies.

10. General Patton offers an alternate reason: *Allies must fight in separate theatres or they hate each other more than they do the enemy.* Pg. 234, *Patton Papers, 1940-1945*.

11. In World War II in the European theatre, units up to Army level were solely comprised of one nationality with the exception being the smaller allied contingents attached to it. During the Gulf War, national contingents were at the corps level, the Arab nations forming a single Arab corps while the British 1st Armoured Division and the French Daguet Division were attached to the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps respectively.

12. Eisenhower in *Crusade in Europe* on pg. 363 wrote that Winston Churchill, who was present at Eisenhower's meeting with De Gaulle, said of Eisenhower's decision, "*I think you done the wise and proper thing.*"

13. This problem is becoming quite common as many societies today seem unable to accept the military principle of total destruction of the enemy's forces in war.

14. Schwarzkoph in pg. 386 - 392 of his autobiography *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, illustrates the number of problems he faced from the Saudi Arabians in this area particularly in regard to the matter of women and Christianity.

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# KERETA KEBAL : KEWAJARAN DAN PRAKTIKALITI

OLEH MEJ ANUAR BIN MOHD NOOR

**"The one thing to realize is that mechanical warfare is going to supersede muscular warfare. That is to say, more and more is war going to depend on engine than on man's legs. Success in war depends upon mobility and mobility upon time. The Tank is first of all a time-saving machine, secondly a shield – it is in fact an armoured mechanical horse".**

Lieutenant Colonel JFC Fuller  
June 1917

## PENDAHULUAN



mpian untuk mendapatkan kereta kebal telah lama diidam-idamkan oleh Tentera Darat dan impian ini semakin menjadi kenyataan dengan rancangan pembelian PT 91 dari Poland. Kemuncak kepada pembelian ini

ialah dengan tertubuhnya Tim Projek Kereta Kebal di Cawangan Perancangan dan Pembangunan, Markas Tentera Darat yang kini sedang menguruskan kontrak dan urusan pembelian aset yang sangat berharga ini.

Dalam kesibukan menguruskan kontrak pembelian tersebut, persoalan mengenai kerelevan dan kesesuaian kereta kebal untuk beroperasi di bumi Malaysia masih terus dibincangkan. Lebih-lebih lagi persoalan mengenai pemilihan jenis kereta kebal buatan Poland yang dikatakan serba kekurangan jika dibandingkan



Gambar hiasan: Kereta Kebal: Kewajaran dan Praktikaliti

dengan kereta kebal buatan Negara-negara Barat. Satu persoalan yang sering diajukan sebelum, semasa dan mungkin selepas kita memiliki kereta kebal sama seperti apa yang dialami semasa pembelian kereta perisai yang masih digunakan hingga ke hari ini. Sebagai warga tentera kita sedar dan nampak akan keperluan kereta kebal lebih-

lebih lagi melihatkan sejarah kejayaan operasi-operasi yang melibatkan kereta kebal tetapi minda kita masih perlu disogokkan dengan persoalan kewajaran dan praktikaliti keperluan ini.

Berbagai-bagi usaha telah dijalankan selama hampir dua dekad untuk memupuk idea kerelevan kereta kebal dalam inventori Tentara Darat Malaysia dan penghargaan harus diberikan kepada usaha-usaha yang telah dimainkan oleh pemimpin-pemimpin Tentara Darat terdahulu amnya dan Kor Armor Diraja khasnya yang memastikan impian ini menjadi kenyataan. Justeru, adalah menjadi tanggungjawab pemimpin dan anggota masa kini untuk memastikan usaha memiliki kereta kebal ini tidak disia-siakan. Kita bukanlah masyarakat saintifik dan masih serba kekurangan dalam teknologi, inovasi dan kemudahan untuk mencipta sesuatu yang lain daripada yang ditawarkan oleh pasaran semasa, sesuai dengan cita rasa kita. Realitinya kita masih kekal sebagai pengguna dan bukan sebagai pencipta teknologi. Justeru, situasi ini memerlukan kita menerima kekurangan yang wujud dan memastikan penggunaan yang praktikal dan relevan sesuai dengan keperluan gerakan kita sendiri tanpa berpaksikan kepada doktrin barat yang dicipta untuk kegunaan dan suasana yang jauh berbeza.

Persoalan mengenai kerelawan dan praktikaliti kereta kebal sama ada boleh digunakan oleh negara-negara tropika dan yang beriklim khatulistiwa atau pendapat yang lebih menyakinkan mengatakan bahawa tidak ada negara yang tidak sesuai untuk kereta kebal beroperasi<sup>1</sup> akan terjawab apabila ia mula bergolek di jalan raya dan di bumi negara kita. Justeru, adalah menjadi harapan penulis untuk membincangkan kewajaran dan praktikaliti pemilikan kereta kebal dalam menjalankan gerakan di muka bumi Malaysia serta kawasan sekitarnya serta membincangkan mengenai status

kereta kebal dalam era pasca Perang Dingin ini dengan kelahiran senjata-senjata pemusnah kereta kebal yang terkini serta helikopter penyerang seperti mana yang ditunjukkan dalam Peperangan Di Teluk pada tahun 1991 dan 2003 ini. Adakah pendapat seorang penulis, "The Tank is dead. As dead as the horse cavalry that preceded it"<sup>2</sup> mempunyai kebenaran atau suatu pengamatan yang perlu diketepikan.

## SEJARAH PENCPTAAN KERETA KEBAL

Idea untuk mencipta sistem persenjataan yang lengkap serta boleh dibawa oleh kenderaan berunut sebagai satu usaha untuk meningkatkan keupayaan tempur mula mendapat perhatian pencipta di Perancis pada tahun 1903. Memandangkan idea tersebut melibatkan kos yang besar, ia telah ditolak tetapi mendapat perhatian semula apabila Perang Dunia Pertama meletus. Ini adalah ekoran daripada kemunculan peperangan bercorak kubu dan parit (trench warfare) yang menimbulkan masalah kepada kenderaan untuk bergerak. Untuk mengatasi masalah tersebut maka lahirlah idea kepada penciptaan kereta kebal berunut yang dipercayai boleh melepas halangan perparitan dan kawad berduri serta tembakan mesingan musuh.

Idea untuk membangunkan kereta kebal bermula pada bulan Oktober 1914, apabila Lettenan Kolonel Sir E.D. Swinton telah memulakan usaha untuk membina kereta kebal, namun berbagai-bagi cubaan yang beliau lakukan telah menemui kegagalan dan ditolak oleh War Office atas alasan tidak relevan. Hanya pada 24 Julai 1915 idea beliau telah mendapat perhatian dan kontrak pertama untuk membina kereta kebal percubaan diberikan kepada William Foster & Co. dengan dibantu oleh Lettenan W.G. Wilson dan W. Tritton. Wilson dan Tritton telah membina ciptaan mereka

<sup>1</sup> Lord Carver, Patton, *The Apostiles of Mobility*, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), hlm. 82.

<sup>2</sup> Major Harold LSpurgeon dan Stanley C.Crist, *Armor in the 21st Century*, ARMOR, Jan-Feb 1994, hlm. 12

secara bersendirian dan ciptaan Tritton telah dapat disiapkan dan diuji pada September 1915. Berdasarkan kepada ujian yang dijalankan, Swinton telah mengariskan keperluan dan ciri-ciri yang perlu dimiliki oleh kereta kebal dan Tritton telah dapat menyiapkannya pada Disember 1915. Uji nilai menunjukkan peningkatan dalam prestasi berbanding dengan ciptaan terdahulu. Selepas itu tiada lagi pembangunan ke atas kereta kebal ciptaan Tritton dan ia hanya digunakan bagi tujuan latihan sahaja ekoran kemunculan ciptaan Wilson yang didapati lebih menonjol. Ciptaan Wilson mempunyai berat 28 ton, dilengkapi dengan 2 mesingan "6-pounder" di kiri dan kanan "hull". Kenderaan ini diuji pada 16 Januari 1916 dan dari aspek pemilihan nama, cadangan untuk menamakannya ini sebagai "Cistern" dan "Container" telah ditolak. Memandangkan rupanya menurut Swinton, "*very similar shapes of the new vehicle and the petrol tank of a popular make of motor-cycle*" kereta kebal tersebut digelar sebagai "Tank".<sup>3</sup>

Penglibatan awal kereta kebal ini ialah dalam Peperangan Somme di Perancis yang melibatkan sebanyak 49 buah. Memandangkan jumlahnya yang kecil ditambah dengan masalah taktikal dan pengaturgerakan, kejayaan yang dicapai begitu terhad sekali. Hanya pada 20 November 1917, kejayaan operasi kereta kebal terserlah apabila 474 buah kereta kebal digunakan dalam Peperangan di Cambrai oleh pihak British. Kejayaan dalam operasi di Amiens pada bulan Ogos 1918 juga turut menyaksikan penglibatan kereta kebal dalam jumlah yang banyak dan telah membolehkan elemen kejutan dicapai. Kedua-dua kejayaan ini telah membuka satu lambaran baru dalam peperangan konvensional moden di mana kereta kebal dilihat sebagai penentu keputusan (The Combat Arms of Decision) dalam sesuatu operasi.

Kejayaan kereta kebal dalam Perang Dunia Pertama, mendorong perkembangan teknologi kereta kebal yang mana banyak negara berusaha membangunkan sistem yang lebih canggih. Perancis merupakan salah satu negara yang berjaya membangunkan teknologi kereta kebal yang agak berlainan yang mana pada bulan Mei 1918, ia berjaya mencipta kereta kebal bertaret yang dilengkapi dengan meriam 37 mm dikenali sebagai Renault FT 17. Ciri-cirinya yang berbeza dengan kereta kebal British menjadikan Kereta Kebal Renault sebagai perintis kepada penciptaan yang lebih moden oleh negara-negara lain. Evolusi pembinaan kereta kebal mula memberikan tumpuan kepada aspek kuasa tembakan, perlindungan perisai dan mobiliti yang merupakan keperluan utama dalam peperangan. Seperti menurut Major Jeneral J.F.C. Fuller, "*improvement in speed, range and reliability would ultimately permits the tank to be employed as an instrument of decision within the enemy's operational depth and once the tank was liberated from the task of supporting the infantry, the effectiveness of its armour would no longer be the only criterion by which its utility might be measured.*"

Kepentingan ketiga-tiga aspek tersebut mula mendapat perhatian namun beberapa pencagahan pendapat telah ditimbulkan mengenai tumpuan atau prioriti dalam aspek mana yang harus diberikan. Lebih-lebih lagi dengan kemunculan senjata pemusnah kereta kebal dan artileri serta peluru anti-kereta kebal. Menurut Mejar General Sir Frederick Maurice, "*We may expect that the experience of the sea will be followed on land and that at one time armour and at another the projectile will be at an advantage. But the history of war shows clearly that no one weapon is for long supreme, the reply to it soon found.*"<sup>4</sup> Adalah sukar untuk membina kereta kebal dengan sifat atau keupayaan yang sama rata kerana peningkatan dan pembaikan pada satu

<sup>3</sup> Colonel H.C.B.Rogers, *Tank in Battle*, (London: Seeley Service & Co. Limited, 1965), hlm. 37-43.

<sup>4</sup> Foreword by Major Gen sir Frederick Maurice to Victor Wallace Germain, *The Mechanization of War*, (London: Sifton Praed, 1927), hlm. ix

aspek akan memberi kesan kepada aspek yang lain pula. Inilah antara dilema yang dihadapi oleh kereta kebal dalam evolusinya.

## PERANAN KERETA KEBAL

Sejak penciptaannya, peranan yang dimainkan oleh kereta kebal dalam peperangan sememangnya tidak boleh dinafikan. Kejayaan-kejayaan tersebut telah memberikan berbagai-bagi gelaran kepada kereta kebal; General Fuller, "Armoured mechanical horse", "Arms of Combat Decision" dan bermacam-macam lagi. Manakala dari aspek kelemahan pula, usaha dijalankan untuk mencari teknologi yang terkini seperti yang sedang dilakukan oleh Amerika Syarikat untuk mencipta kereta kebal termoden yang dikenali sebagai "Future Combat System (FCS)" yang dijangka akan mula beroperasi antara tahun 2010-2015.<sup>5</sup> Walaupun terdapat perdebatan yang mengatakan era penggunaan kereta kebal telah tamat diambil alih oleh helikopter penyerang, senjata pemusnah kereta kebal, senjata tembak dan lupakan ('fire and forget') serta berbagai-bagi lagi senjata kawalan jauh, penyelidikan oleh saintis Amerika Syarikat untuk membina FCS yang berupaya beroperasi dalam apa bentuk muka bumi termasuk kawasan berhutan, jelas menunjukkan kereta kebal masih lagi relevan dan mempunyai peranan pada masa hadapan. Bagi menunjukkan kejayaan kereta kebal menjalankan operasi di hutan atau kawasan yang padat dengan tumbuhan, dibincangkan beberapa contoh operasi yang berjaya dilaksanakan:

- **Operasi Amerika Syarikat Di Kawasan Kepulauan Pasifik.**

Doktrin Tentara Darat Amerika Syarikat FM 100-5 yang dikeluarkan pada tahun 1941 berpendapat unit-unit mekanis

mempunyai sedikit atau tiada nilai kombatan untuk menjalankan gerakan di kawasan hutan. Konsep gabungan kuasa tembakan dan mobiliti tidak sesuai untuk diperlakukan dalam mana-mana operasi di hutan kerana peperangan di hutan dikategorikan sebagai pertempuran rapat dan kenderaan perisai sukar bergerak serta penglihatan terhad. Kewajaran kenyataan tersebut dapat disangkal ekoran kejayaan kereta kebal beroperasi di kawasan hutan semasa Perang Dunia Kedua. Seperti juga kejayaan unit kereta kebal Amerika Syarikat beroperasi di Pulau Wakde, Papua New Guinea pada 17-19 Mei 1944. Operasi ini dilihat sebagai satu kejayaan kepada kereta kebal kerana ia menonjolkan peranan dan kejayaan kereta kebal menjalankan operasi di kawasan yang dikelilingi dengan hutan dan paya. Menurut Kevin C. Holzimer, "*Of the many individual battles between the armies of American and Japan, the Wakde-Sarmi campaign highlights the way in which tanks were utilized in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) which changed the Army doctrine to fit the realities of Armoured combat in a jungle environment*".<sup>6</sup>

Pulau Wakde diduduki oleh Jepun kerana kepentingan strategiknya iaitu mengawal laluan perairan di Lautan Pasifik dan kewujudan tiga landasan kapal terbang yang mempunyai nilai strategik untuk dijadikan sebagai pusat pengisian minyak dan bantuan logistik kepada angkatan yang beroperasi di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Mac Arthur sedar akan kepentingan Pulau Wakde dan percaya kedudukannya dapat mempengaruhi keseluruhan operasi di Filipina dan operasi pada masa hadapan. Beliau telah mengarahkan General Walter

<sup>5</sup> Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon, *The Future Combat System (FCS): A Technology Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment*, ARMOR, July-August, 1997, hlm. 7-13

<sup>6</sup> Kevin C. Holzimer, *In Close Country: World War II American Armor Tactics In the Jungles of the Southwest Pacific*, ARMOR, July-August 1997, hlm. 22

Krueger yang memerintah Ketumbukan Ke-6 Tentera Darat Amerika Syarikat untuk menawan Pulau Wakde. Pendaratan awal dilakukan oleh Batalion Pertama dengan dibantu oleh empat buah kereta kebal Sherman dari Kompeni Kereta Kebal 603.<sup>7</sup> Daripada empat buah kereta kebal yang dilibatkan dalam operasi ini hanya dua buah sahaja yang dapat digunakan (sebuah mengalami kerosakan sistem elektrik dan sebuah lagi jatuh ke dalam air semasa mendarat) bagi membantu infantri dalam menawan ketiga-tiga lapangan terbang dan seterusnya keseluruhan pulau tersebut. Walaupun hanya dua buah kereta kebal dilibatkan dalam operasi tersebut, kehadirannya telah memberikan kelegaan dan meningkatkan moral unit infantri memandangkan kepada keadaan pertahanan Jepun yang sungguh kuat. Menurut Byron L. Paige, "As in the Wakde-Sarmi operation, tanks were utilized to reduce not only carefully planned Japanese strongpoints such as bunkers and pillboxes, but makeshift centers of resistance such as foxholes as well."<sup>8</sup> Operasi ini dianggap sebagai kejayaan kepada kereta kebal kerana dengan mobiliti, ia telah dapat diatur gerak dengan begitu berkesan dan pantas dari lokasi satu kompeni ke lokasi kompeni yang lain yang menerima tentangan daripada pertahanan Jepun. Keberkesanan kereta kebal ini juga dapat dilihat apabila ia mengambil masa yang pantas memusnahkan jaringan kubu-kubu pertahanan Jepun menggunakan meriam utama dan dalam masa yang sama bergerak pantas merempuh belukar dan pokok-pokok.

### • Operasi Di Malaya Dan Singapura.

Semasa memerintah Malaya, kereta kebal tidak pernah digunakan dalam sistem pertahanan British kerana beranggapan ancaman dari penduduk tempatan tidak memerlukan penglibatan kereta kebal dan ia tidak sesuai untuk beroperasi di Malaya memandangkan keadaan muka bumi yang dipenuhi dengan hutan tebal, berbukit-bukau dan jalanraya yang terhad. Dengan tanggapan sedemikian, British percaya musuh juga tidak akan menggunakan kereta kebal dan serangan tidak akan dilancarkan dari utara Malaya. "*No one, at the time thought it possible that the Japanese might effect landings at the northern end of Malaya and drive down to the south to Singapore. The jungles and lack of communications would, it was felt, deter the Japanese from undertaking such a venture. Therefore, the War Office concentrated on the defence of the Singapore Naval Base only*".<sup>9</sup>

Pemikiran yang berbeza ditunjukkan oleh Jepun kerana idea untuk menggunakan kereta kebal telah difikirkan beberapa tahun sebelum menyerang Malaya. Persiapan awal telah dibuat bagi memudahkan kereta kebal bergerak didalam hutan dan kawasan yang sukar dilalui. Kumpulan "*fifth columnist*" telah ditempatkan di lokasi-lokasi penting dan strategik sebagai peniaga, peladang, pelombong dan sebagainya untuk membina jalan-jalan pintas di dalam hutan dan meluaskan denai-denai untuk memudahkan kenderaan bergerak. "*There was even one Japanese in the remote village of Grik at the terminus of the road to Upper Perak. Grik was the focal point of a number of jungle tracks from Siam and the starting point*

<sup>7</sup> Kevin C. Holzimer, Walter Krueger, *Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific War: The Wakde-Sarmi Campaign as a Case Study*, *The Journal of Military History*, 59:4, October 1995, hlm. 661-685

<sup>8</sup> Byron L. Paige, *Campaigning in the Jungle*, *Military Review* 24:1 ,April 1944, hlm. 33

<sup>9</sup> Captain S.G. Chaphekar, *A Brief Study of the Malayan Campaign 1941-42*, (Ponna: S.V. Damla, 1960), hlm. 43

*of a dirt road which, built originally as an elephant road, was improved, until by 1941 it was usable by fairly heavy motor traffic.”<sup>10</sup>*

British juga tidak dilengkapi dengan senjata anti-kelera kebal atas alasan yang sama. “A request for additional anti-tank guns was also denied, presumably on the same grounds; even less intelligible was the refusal to supply extra anti-aircraft guns.”<sup>11</sup> Walaupun perancangan asal pertahanan Malaya yang dicadangkan oleh Percival melibatkan tambahan tiga divisyen, dua rejimen kereta kebal dan bantuan lebih kurang 566 kapal terbang dan 26 batalion tentera darat,<sup>12</sup> perancangan tersebut telah ditolak oleh “War Office”. “Percival’s request for two armoured regiments in August 1941 was firmly denied as the Establishment took the view that the Malayan terrain was tank-proof; even had this been true, the Malayan roads were not”.<sup>13</sup> Justeru apabila perang meletus di Malaya, ia hanya mempunyai dua divisyen campuran dan satu divisyen dari Australia yang tidak lengkap sepenuhnya manakala dari segi kenderaan perisai, “The only armoured vehicles at Percival’s disposal were a number of tracked weapons carriers and ageing Lanchester armoured cars, the latter armed with machine guns but so thin-skinned as to be vulnerable to anything heavier than small arms fire”.<sup>14</sup> Walaupun bantuan tiba semasa peperangan, sebilangan besar anggota bukan anggota kombatan. Satu unit mekanis yang dihantar tidak dilengkapi dengan kenderaan manakala satu rejimen artileri tiba tanpa

meriam kerana tersalah hantar ke Burma. Bantuan 16 buah kereta kebal yang dihantar ke Malaya pada bulan Januari tidak memberikan apa-apa erti kerana unit kavalri tidak tahu atau berkebolehan mengendalikan dengan baik.<sup>15</sup>

Keadaan ini berbeza dengan Jepun yang telah membuat tinjauan awal ke atas sistem pertahanan British di Malaya dan Singapura. “Japan knew our strength in Malaya. She knew all troop movements in Malaya. She knew all about our military camps. This gave them a clear idea of the approximate strength of our forces in Malaya”.<sup>16</sup> Menyedari akan kepentingan strategik kedua kawasan ini, Jepun telah mengatur gerak Briged ke-3 yang mengandungi tiga Rejimen kereta kebal (1, 6 & 14).<sup>17</sup> Rejimen ini dilengkapi dengan 159 buah kereta kebal ringan Jenis 95 dan kereta kebal sederhana Jenis 97.

Kewujudan tiga rejimen kereta kebal tersebut membolehkan Jepun menjalankan operasi serangan kilat dan pantas ke atas beberapa kedudukan pertahanan British. Kereta kebal diguna secara maksimum, “From the first week of war the Japanese used tanks. The tanks enabled them to advance more rapidly especially in the flat country”.<sup>18</sup> Dengan mobiliti kereta kebal Jepun berjaya melaksanakan taktik lencongan (enveloping) setiap kali berhadapan dengan halangan British dan dari arah belakang Jepun dapat menyekat pengunduran British dan seterusnya memusnahkannya sebelum mereka sempat membuat serangan hendap ke atas kemaraan Jepun. Pergerakan juga turut melalui denai-denai dan lereng bukit yang telah mengelirukan angkatan British di mana

<sup>10</sup> Eric Robertson, *The Japanese File: Pre-war Japanese Penetration in Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), hlm. 28

<sup>11</sup> Byran Perret, *Seize & Hold: Master Strokes on the Battlefield*, (London: Cassell, 1994), hlm. 107

<sup>12</sup> Captain S.G. Chaphekar, hlm. 45

<sup>13</sup> Bryan Perrett, hlm. 107

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., hlm 107

<sup>15</sup> Captain S.G. Chaphekar, hlm. 25

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, hlm. 86

<sup>17</sup> Bryan Perret, hlm. 109

<sup>18</sup> Captain S.G. Chaphekar, hlm. 94

seringkali berlaku mereka terperangkap di antara kumpulan serangan dan kumpulan penyekat tentera Jepun.<sup>19</sup> Kereta kebal Jepun digunakan untuk merempuh pertahanan yang didirikan di sepanjang jalan manakala infantri menggunakan hutan untuk menyusup ke belakang atau ke rusuk pasukan pertahanan British. Kerjasama antara pasukan infantri dan kereta kebal Jepun ini meletakkan pemimpin pasukan British dan Bersekutu dalam serba salah dan takut sekiranya di kepung oleh Jepun. *"Our troops couldn't guess from where the enemy soldiers were coming or how many they were. Sometimes our units were completely surrounded and annihilated".<sup>20</sup>*

Kempen yang dianggap paling berjaya dalam aspek penggunaan kereta kebal ialah kempen di Slim River, Perak. Dalam kempen tersebut, British telah mendirikan pertahanan di sepanjang jalan secara pertahanan berlapis dengan dibantu oleh periuk api pemusnah kereta kebal dan blokblok konkrit yang di letakkan di tengah jalan. Halangan-halangan tersebut masih tidak mampu menyekat kereta kebal Jepun yang menggunakan daya kejutan (bergerak di waktu malam) dan serangan kilat, menyerbu dan memusnahkan halangan demi halangan di sepanjang jalan utama tersebut.

#### • Peperangan Di Vietnam

Walaupun evolusi kereta kebal terus berkembang selepas Perang Dunia Kedua, penglibatan kereta kebal dalam konflik secara besar-besaran masih berkurangan. Pasca Perang Dunia Kedua menyaksikan lebih banyak negara berlumba-lumba untuk memiliki kereta kebal bagi memperkuatkan

sistem pertahanan negara masing-masing. Namun penggunaan kereta kebal masih terhad di Rantau Asia Tenggara memandangkan konflik yang dihadapi adalah lebih kepada menentang penganas komunis atau gerila. Tumpuan banyak diberikan kepada kenderaan berperisai yang lebih pantas dan mudah bergerak. Keadaan yang sama turut berlaku di Vietnam Selatan yang pada mulanya hanya perang menentang gerila tetapi telah bertukar kepada campuran perang menentang gerila dan konvensional. Dalam konflik tersebut Amerika Syarikat agak berbelah bagi untuk menggunakan kereta kebal kerana pendapat beberapa pemimpin tentera, bumi Vietnam yang berhutan tebal menghadkan penggunaan kereta kebal. Walau bagaimanapun pada tahun 1965 ekoran desakan beberapa pihak yang merasakan perlunya kereta kebal bagi membantu operasi pasukan infantri, Divisyen Pertama Infantri Amerika telah membawa bersama mereka unit kereta kebal sebagai ujian kesesuaian untuk beroperasi di Vietnam.

Tindakan tersebut telah mendapat komen daripada beberapa orang pemimpin tertinggi tentera seperti Jeneral Westmorland, Komander *Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)* yang berpendapat kereta kebal hanya sesuai digunakan di kawasan pantai di mana Kor Pertama berpengkalan. Duta Amerika di Vietnam juga turut memberikan komen yang negatif bahawa kereta kebal tidak sesuai dalam operasi menentang gerila. Walaupun mendapat tentangan daripada pihak atasan, Divisyen Kedua tetap bertegas untuk membawa unit-unit mekanis dan kereta kebal mereka dan tidak akan ke Vietnam sekiranya unit-unit tersebut ditinggalkan. Sikap memperkecil-kecilkan keupayaan kereta kebal ini berterusan sepanjang operasi di Vietnam sehingga semasa Operasi Tet pada tahun 1968,

<sup>19</sup> Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968) hlm. 71

<sup>20</sup> Captain S.G. Chaphekar, hlm. 90

keupayaan kereta kebal mula mendapat perhatian. Kejayaan tersebut mendorong semua pemimpin pasukan infantri memastikan mereka diberi bantuan kereta kebal apabila ditugaskan dalam sesuatu operasi.

Australia yang turut terlibat dalam konflik di Vietnam telah menunjukkan sikap yang berbeza mengenai penggunaan kereta kebal. Penglibatan tentera infantri mereka disertai dengan unit kereta kebal jenis Centurion. Pemerintah Australian Forces Vietnam, Jeneral Vincent telah memberikan keutamaan penglibatan kereta kebal kerana berpendapat operasi di Vietnam memerlukan bantuan tembakan rapat bagi membolehkan infantri bergerak mara dan memusnahkan kedudukan musuh dan hanya kereta kebal sahaja yang boleh melaksanakan tugas ini. Semasa ketiadaan kereta kebal, tugas tersebut terpaksa dilakukan oleh Kereta Perisai Pengangkut Anggota (KPA) jenis M 113.<sup>21</sup>

Masalah utama yang dihadapi oleh kereta kebal di Vietnam ialah musim hujan kerana kawasan rendah di limpahi air manakala kawasan sawah menjadi becak dan ada kalanya banjir. Keadaan tanah yang lembut ini menyebabkan kereta kebal Centurion mudah tersangkut dan apabila ini berlaku, musuh akan menggunakan peluang ini untuk menyalurkan kereta kebal ke kawasan membunuh mereka sama ada melancarkan serang hendap atau ke kawasan periuk api.<sup>22</sup> Pergerakan melalui hutan primer dan sekunder juga memberikan kesan kepada kereta kebal kerana keadaan hutan yang tebal terutamanya yang ditumbuhi pokok buluh, kerap merosakan runut kereta kebal dan bahagian peralatan

dan peti simpanan di bahagian luar hull mudah tersangkut dan rosak.

Pada awal penglibatan kereta kebal Centurion di Vietnam, ia turut menerima kritikan daripada pemimpin dan anggota infantri kerana berpendapat ia terlalu besar, bising dan asap mengeluarkan bau yang dianggap membahayakan mereka kerana bunyinya yang bising memberitahu musuh akan kehadiran mereka. Pandangan tersebut berubah setelah perlakunya pertempuran di Pangkalan Bantuan Tembakan Coral dan Balmoral di mana kereta kebal telah menyelamatkan keadaan dan menjadi penentu kepada kejayaan operasi. Selepas pertempuran tersebut, permintaan ke atas kereta kebal semakin meningkat. Menurut seorang anggota, Phil Reeves, "*After Coral, every time after that, every time someone get into a bit of shit, they would call in the tanks. We were really well accepted then*".<sup>23</sup>

Satu daripada peranan yang agak sukar dipercayai boleh dilakukan oleh kereta kebal ialah operasi serang hendap. Dengan keupayaan meriam menembak pada jarak yang jauh dan sistem pejera yang membolehkan pemerhatian pada waktu malam, kereta kebal telah digunakan sebagai senjata utama serang hendap di Sungai Song Rai yang merupakan laluan ulang bekal Viet Cong. Menurut pandangan seorang krew yang terlibat dalam operasi tersebut, Koperal Mick Rainey, "*We were trying to catch sampans coming in from the delta and I reckon we got twenty-odd that night. All of the night, I couldn't believe it... We could see stuff-all initially so when we sprang the ambush we had the big searchlights on*".<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Gary McKay & Graeme Nicholas, *Jungle Track*, (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2001), hlm. 177.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., hlm. 56

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., hlm. 109

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., hlm. 114

## KEWAJARAN MENGGUNAKAN KERETA KEBAL

Setelah membincangkan dengan panjang lebar peranan kereta kebal beroperasi di hutan dalam beberapa konflik, penulis akan membincangkan pula aspek praktikaliti dan kewajaran memiliki kereta kebal. Lebih-lebih lagi dalam keadaan dunia yang sedang berkembang maju dalam bidang sains dan teknologi, mendorong penciptaan sistem persenjataan dan peralatan yang canggih dan sofistikated. Terdapat beberapa tanggapan mengatakan bahawa kereta kebal telah semakin dilupakan atau penggunaan kereta kebal dalam menyelesaikan sesuatu konflik semakin tidak relevan. Justeru negara boleh mengurangkan perbelanjaan pertahanan mereka dengan memiliki senjata yang lebih kecil dan murah tetapi lebih efisien dan kredibel dibandingkan dengan kereta kebal. Tanggapan inilah yang sedang hangat dibincangkan dan kewajaran memiliki kereta kebal telah dipersoalkan sehingga turut melibatkan pembelian kereta kebal pertama Malaysia.

Jika dilihat dari aspek evolusi perkembangan kereta kebal sejak tahun 1916, perdebatan mengenai kewajaran dan praktikaliti memiliki kereta kebal ini telah lama diperkatakan. Sebagai contoh semasa era Perang Dunia Pertama, kehadiran kereta kebal membawa perspektif baru dalam atur gerak peperangan di mana tumpuan diberikan untuk mewujudkan konsep peperangan mekanis yang memberikan fokus kepada gabungan mobiliti dan kuasa tembakan. Kereta kebal digunakan sebagai bantuan tembakan rapat kepada infantri dan dalam masa yang sama melakukan taktik lencongan memintas kedudukan musuh dari kedudukan belakang atau rusuk. Konsep mekanis ini diperkuat lagi dengan memperkenalkan pula operasi udara (Air mobile operation) yang melibatkan penggunaan pesawat-pesawat udara menerangkan anggota infantri ke kedudukan jauh di belakang pertahanan musuh menjalankan operasi penyekat dan pengasingan

daripada pasukan bantuan juga logistik. Selepas era pemikiran tersebut, timbul pula konsep "*strategic airpower*" yang memberikan tumpuan terhadap penggunaan kuasa udara secara mutlak dan secara tidak langsung mengenepikan tentera darat dalam sesuatu konflik. Konsep ini memberikan fokus kepada serangan agresif dan menyeluruh ke atas pusat penduduk dan industri dengan harapan apabila pusat-pusat ini di musnahkan, semangat berjuang akan luntur dan musuh akan mudah ditawan.<sup>25</sup>

Peperangan Dunia Kedua memperlihatkan bahawa tanggapan-tanggapan tersebut adalah tidak relevan sama sekali. Serangan bom ke atas Jerman oleh Amerika dan pasukan Bersekutu adalah lebih memudaratkan pihak penyerang yang telah menyebabkan kemalangan jiwa yang ramai. Semasa Perang Dunia Kedua, 125,000 orang anggota berkhidmat sebagai krew dalam *Royal Air Force's Bomber Command* dan daripada jumlah tersebut, 59,423 terbunuh atau hilang dan disyaki terbunuh menjadikan jumlah kehilangan nyawa sebanyak 47.5%. Jika ditambah dengan jumlah yang cedera, ia meningkat kepada 54.3%. Jumlah ini jika dibandingkan dengan dua batalion yang terlibat di barisan hadapan semasa peperangan dari tahun 1914 hingga 1918 yang mengalami kadar kecederaan anggota sebanyak 53.9% dan daripada jumlah tersebut 24.8% terbunuh. Perbandingan ini jelas menunjukkan implikasi sebenar penggunaan "*strategic Airpower*" dibandingkan dengan pertempuran di darat.<sup>26</sup>

Walaupun sains dan teknologi memperkembangkan lagi teknologi kereta kebal dengan begitu pesat sekali, teknologi merupakan ciptaan manusia dan sama seperti penciptaan kereta kebal pertama pada tahun 1916, ia akan

<sup>25</sup> Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Howard McCanne, 1942), hlm 43

<sup>26</sup> John Ellis, *Brute Force* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), hlm. 221

terus berkembang dan sesuatu teknologi yang dikatakan tercanggih mungkin tidak akan kekal sama pada keesokan harinya. Konsep peperangan pada masa hadapan walaupun boleh diramalkan seperti mana peperangan Cyber, realitinya tidak siapa dapat menjangkakan apakah bentuk sebenar peperangan tersebut kerana pemisahan antara realiti dan fiksyen akan menjadi lebih kabur. Yang jelasnya peperangan tetap memerlukan senjata dan penglibatan kereta kebal merupakan satu yang pasti tidak dapat dielakkan. Ini adalah kerana tumpuan peperangan dan motif strategi tidak akan berubah iaitu untuk memusnahkan aspek fizikal dan psikologi angkatan tentera musuh di medan peperangan. Kemenangan mutlak hanya tercapai apabila dataran dapat ditawan dan dalam aspek ini hanya pasukan darat yang mampu melakukan tugas tersebut. Justeru itu selagi ada angkatan darat, maka kereta kebal tidak akan terpinggir dan akan memainkan peranan yang penting sama seperti dalam konflik-konflik yang lalu.

## PRAKTIKALITI

Perang Teluk 1991 menyaksikan penggunaan kereta kebal secara maksimum melibatkan berbagai-bagai jenis kereta kebal didahului oleh M1A1 Abram buatan Amerika Syarikat dan Challenger buatan Britain. Kedua-dua jenis kereta kebal ini adalah yang terkini dan termoden di dunia pada masa itu. Kereta kebal menjadi pilihan kerana Iraq juga turut menggunakan kereta kebal di barisan hadapan mereka dari jenis T-72 buatan Russia. Penggunaan kereta kebal adalah sebagai jalan terbaik untuk memusnahkan kereta kebal. Memandangkan kereta kebal yang digunakan oleh Iraq adalah dari versi export yang tidak dilengkapi dengan teknologi terkini, "thus lacking the very high levels of protection associated with modern Russian armour".<sup>27</sup> Tidak hairanlah dalam Perang Teluk,

Kereta kebal Abram dengan meriam 120mm berjaya menembusi bahagian perisai hadapan T-72 dengan tembakan dari jarak 3,500m.<sup>28</sup> Perlindungan perisai merupakan satu aset yang paling penting bagi sesebuah kereta kebal kerana ia menjadikan kereta kebal kebal. Pada masa lalu, pergerakan secara taktikal dan pantas merupakan satu cara mengelakkan kereta kebal daripada tembakan musuh kerana kereta kebal yang bergerak sukar ditembak berbanding dengan yang statik. Walau bagaimanapun, sistem meriam perisai berkomputer yang moden berupaya menghitung masa pergerakan sasaran dan membolehkan sasaran bergerak ditembak. Kerana itulah perlindungan perisai diberikan perhatian dalam membangunkan sesebuah kereta kebal seperti mana yang terdapat pada Abram. Semasa Perang Teluk, terdapat tujuh tembakan yang disahkan dilepaskan dari meriam 125mm, T-72 Iraq dengan menggunakan bom jenis APFSDS. Tembakan tersebut mengenai bahagian hadapan Abram dan walaupun ditembak dari jarak kurang 1000m, projektil tidak dapat menembusi perisai tersebut justeru tiada kemalangan jiwa, bahkan kereta kebal Abram tidak memerlukan sebarang pemberaan.<sup>29</sup>

Kereta kebal juga dilihat sebagai aset yang paling efektif dalam peperangan yang melibatkan penggunaan senjata biologi dan kimia kerana kewujudan sistem perlindungan menyelamatkan krew. Keadaan ini berbeza dengan pasukan infantri atau artileri yang terdedah secara langsung kepada serangan sebeginu rupa. Dari aspek serangan senjata anti-kereta kebal pula, praktikaliti kereta kebal masih dapat dipertahankan dengan penciptaan sistem-sistem baru yang dapat menangkis ancaman tersebut seperti Sistem Armor Perlindungan Aktif atau '*Active Protective System (APS)*' yang mampu memintas kehadiran misil atau peluru anti-kereta kebal terutamanya yang datang dari 'Top attack' sebelum ia mengenai sasaran.

<sup>27</sup> Ezio Bonsignore, Gulf Experience Raises Survivability Issues, *Military Technology*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, Feb 1992, hlm. 65. Penulis berpendapat kereta kebal Iraq yang terbaik perlindungan perisainya adalah dari versi T-72M yang asal.

<sup>28</sup> Alan K. Russel, *Battle Tank and Support Vehicles* (London: Greenhill book, 1994), hlm. 132

<sup>29</sup> Ezio Bonsignore, hlm. 67

Contoh sistem ini adalah sistem Arena ciptaan Soviet yang mampu memberikan perlindungan 300 darjah kepada kereta kebal dan tidak akan bertindak terhadap peluru kaliber kecil. Ia amat efektif terhadap misil ATGW seperti TOW, HOT, MILAN, HELLMIRE dan senjata anti-armor ringan seperti AT-4 dan LAW 80. "Such systems typically include one or more threat detection devices (such as a laser warning receiver or a millimetre-wave radar) linked to a computer which identifies threats and engages them by means of a grenade launcher or similar".<sup>30</sup> Terdapat APS yang lebih agresif di mana sistem tersebut dapat memancarkan laser yang membutakan operator misil ATGW.

Perang Teluk turut memperlihatkan kelemahan kereta kebal terhadap ancaman dari udara iaitu serangan helikopter penyerang dan pesawat yang dicipta khas sebagai pemusnah kereta kebal seperti A-10 dan Apache. Antara kelemahan yang dikenal pasti ialah keupayaan mesingan kapola yang berkaliber .50 in atau 7.62 mm yang tidak berupaya menembak helikopter penyerang yang biasanya berada beribu meter jauhnya. Melalui kajian yang dijalankan, untuk membolehkan kapola memberikan kesan pemusnahan terhadap serangan helikopter, kaliber senjata kapola perlu ditingkatkan ke 40mm kerana senjata tersebut boleh menggunakan amunasi, '*proximity-fuzed, high-explosive, prefragmented ammunition*' dengan jarak berkesan sehingga 4000m. Ini akan memberikan peluang kepada kereta kebal untuk bertempur dengan helikopter yang dilengkapi misil atau senjata pemusnah kereta kebal.<sup>31</sup>

Bentuk muka bumi di Malaysia yang ditumbuhi hutan primer dan sekunder, tanaman kelapa sawit, getah, kelapa dan berbagai-bagai jenis lagi tanaman, merupakan kawasan yang ideal

<sup>30</sup> Mark Hewish and Leland Ness, Shoot First Ask Question Later: Smart Tanks Learn to Defend for Themselves, Jane's International Defence Review, Vol. 29, no. 3, Mac 1996, hlm. 33-36

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., hlm. 14

untuk kereta kebal berlindung bagi menyamarkan diri mereka. Ini penting kerana konflik pada masa hadapan, ancaman terhadap kereta kebal bukan hanya dari darat tetapi turut merangkumi udara. Dengan kewujudan perlindungan semulajadi tersebut, kelangsungan kereta kebal akan lebih terjamin dengan mengambil kedudukan secara bertaburan di pinggiran atau dalam hutan tetapi masih berupaya melindungi antara satu sama lain. Menurut John Stone, "*The future requirement will be for armoured vehicles which can concentrate from dispersed positions and destroy the enemy by means of direct fire before re-dispersing*".<sup>32</sup>

Kereta kebal merupakan salah satu aset penggandaan kuasa (force multiplier) yang mampu mencorakkan sesuatu keputusan di dalam pertempuran. Sejarah membuktikan, "*Control of the land often requires seizing it from opposing ground forces. For example the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu was fought under condition that begged for armour*".<sup>33</sup> Tanpa bantuan kereta kebal dan armor, tentera Amerika Syarikat tidak akan berpeluang untuk diselamatkan, sepetimana menurut pandangan seorang penulis, "*and had to organise an ad hoc extraction force using Malaysian and Pakistan tanks*".<sup>34</sup> Kereta kebal juga dilihat sebagai simbol kekuatan kerana ia juga boleh di gerakkan sebagai alat diplomasi dalam sesuatu konflik di mana kewujudannya dalam ketumbukan yang besar menimbulkan rasa gerun dan takut kepada mana-mana penentang. Dalam aspek ini, "*many feel it was the thousands of allied tanks rolling forward that made Saddam Hussein abandon Kuwait in 1991, not the helicopters flying around*".<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> John Stone, The Tank Debate, (Australia: Harwood Academic Publisher, 2000) hlm. 163

<sup>33</sup> Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, Jan 1995), hlm. 58

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., hlm. 58

<sup>35</sup> Major John W. Blumentritt, Will Airpower Specifically Helicopters Replace Tanks in 2010, ARMOR, Sep-Oct 1998, hlm. 9

tempur. Kereta kebal yang merupakan aset taktikal dan strategik adalah sangat bernilai kerana kewujudannya boleh bertindak sebagai kuasa

deteren kepada mana-mana pihak yang ingin mencetuskan ancaman atau cuba mencabar kedaulatan negara.

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Mej Anuar bin Mohd Noor telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Armor Diraja pada 27 Jun 1981. Beliau pernah memegang berbagai jawatan penting di pasukan, Markas Formasi dan Kementerian Pertahanan. Beliau berkelulusan Maktab Turus dan memiliki Diploma Pentadbiran Awam dari UiTM, Diploma Strategi dan Pertahanan (UM), Diploma Lanjutan Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan (UKM). Beliau kini berkhidmat sebagai Pegawai Staf 1 Doktrin Armor, Markas Latihan Tentera Darat.

# PENGUKURAN KEUPAYAAN DAN KESIAGAAN FORMASI DAN UNIT TENTERA DARAT

OLEH MEJ IR DR NORAZMAN BIN MOHAMAD NOR

## ABSTRAK

*Keupayaan dan kesiagaan sesebuah formasi atau unit adalah suatu maklumat yang perlu diketahui sebelum pemerintah dapat merancang atau gerak sesebuah formasi atau unit. Dengan itu artikel ini akan mengenangkan satu kaedah mengukur kesiagaan pasukan agar kita dapat melihat keupayaan pasukan secara kuantitatif. Kaedah ini juga membuka ruang kepada kita untuk menklassifikasikan sesebuah formasi atau unit mengikut kesiagaan masing-masing.*

## PENDAHULUAN

**P**eperangan adalah kombinasi antara seni dan sains, dengan itu, kita tidak seharusnya mengabaikan keperluan untuk menganalisis kekuatan tentera secara saintifik. Secara amnya tujuan pengukuran keupayaan ini adalah untuk membantu pemerintah menganalisis pasukan sendiri dan pasukan musuh secara saintifik dan sistematik.

Lebih 2000 tahun dahulu, Sun Tzu pernah memperkatakan tentang lima faktor yang akan membawa kepada kejayaan sesebuah angkatan tentera iaitu; *pengukuran, penilaian, pengiraan, perbandingan dan kejayaan*, di mana:

- **Mukabumi** membentuk asas kepada pengukuran.
- **Pengukuran** membentuk asas kepada penilaian.
- **Penilaian** membentuk asas kepada pengiraan.
- **Pengiraan** membentuk asas kepada perbandingan.
- **Perbandingan** membentuk asas kepada kejayaan.

Dengan demikian, kejayaan dapat ditentukan sebelum sesuatu peperangan tercetus. Justeru, kita tidak sepatutnya mengabaikan

kepentingan pengiraan dalam merancang pertahanan negara.

Pengukuran kesiagaan pasukan adalah sesuatu yang sukar dilaksanakan secara objektif. Ini disebabkan ia melibatkan banyak faktor yang tidak dapat diukur secara fizikal. Saintis di negara maju sendiri masih tercari-cari satu kaedah pengukuran yang lebih komprehensif dan jitu untuk mereka gunakan.

Pengukuran kesiagaan formasi Tentera Darat (TD) telah dilaksanakan secara kuantitatif sejak tahun 1994, namun begitu kaedah pengiraan yang digunakan didapati tidak menyeluruh dan kadangkala tidak memberikan gambaran sebenar sesebuah formasi. Pada masa yang sama didapati terdapat beberapa cara pengiraan keupayaan yang digunakan dalam TD yang perlu diselaraskan. Lanjutan daripada itu satu pasukan kajian telah ditubuhkan untuk menyelaraskan satu formula bagi mengukur dan membentangkan keupayaan dan kesiagaan TD secara lebih komprehensif.

Bagi tujuan kajian dan penyelarasannya, Pasukan Kajian telah mengambil kira penggunaan formula berikut:

- Formula yang digunakan oleh Cawangan Operasi dan Latihan (OPLAT).
- Formula yang digunakan oleh Bahagian Inspektorat Tentera Darat (BITD).
- Formula Penskoran Angkatan Bersituasi (Situational Force Scoring (SFS)) (Allen, 1992).

## DEFINISI

Apakah perbezaan antara Keupayaan Tentera dan Kesiagaan Tentera? **Keupayaan Tentera** ialah kemampuan untuk mencapai sesuatu objektif tertakluk kepada sumber-sumber

yang boleh diukur, umpamanya jumlah anggota, kuantiti senjata, dan lain-lain. Selain dari itu, elemen yang tidak dapat diukur seperti kepimpinan, moral serta daya juang dan perpaduan sesebuah unit atau formasi perlu juga diperkirakan.

Manakala, **Kesiagaan Tentera** pula ialah kemampuan sesebuah angkatan, pada sesuatu masa, untuk bertindak pada satu tempoh, tindakbalas tentera mengikut definisi dan tujuan penubuhan angkatan berkaitan. Ia merupakan tahap kemampuan unit untuk diaturgerakan dan bertindakbalas mengikut tujuan asal unit berkaitan ditubuhkan. (Ng & Lam, 1995)

## ELEMEN KEUPAYAAN TEMPUR

Elemen-elemen keupayaan yang akan diberi perhatian meliputi perkara seperti berikut:

- Kekuatan Sumber Manusia.
- Komunikasi.
- Mobiliti.
- Logistik.
- Latihan.
- Kuasa Tembakan.

Ini merupakan penambahan kepada elemen semasa yang digunakan BITD yang hanya meliputi Sumber Manusia, Logistik dan Kuasa Tembakan.

## PERBANDINGAN FORMULA-FORMULA YANG DIGUNAKAN

Perbandingan formula adalah seperti berikut:

- **Formula OPLAT.** Formula yang digunakan oleh Cawangan OPLAT adalah:

$$\begin{aligned} \bullet \quad & \text{Keupayaan} = \frac{\text{Pegangan}}{\text{Perjawatan}} \\ \bullet \quad & \text{Kesiagaan} = \frac{\text{Servisibiliti}}{\text{Perjawatan}} \end{aligned}$$

• **Kebaikan** formula ini ialah ia mudah difahami.

• **Kelemahannya** pula ialah ia mengandaikan semua item di dalam sesuatu kategori adalah sama dari segi sumbangannya kepada keupayaan. Contohnya senjata individu = meriam 105mm, dan kenderaan  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton Land Rover = Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC).

- **Formula Pengukuran Secara Kuantitatif.** Pendekatan secara kuantitatif ini mengambilkira bahawa keupayaan adalah fungsi elemen-elemen utama meliputi sumber manusia (H), sistem persenjataan (W) dan bantuan material (L) serta infrastruktur dan elemen "Intangible" (I) yang tidak dapat diukur. Pemberat (a,b,c) membezakan sumbangan elemen kepada keupayaan (C).

$$C = \frac{aH + bW + cL + I}{a + b + c}$$

• **Kelemahan** sistem ini ialah faktor penting boleh tersembunyi di dalam penggunaan kaedah ini, sebab cara purata berpemberat (weighted average) yang digunakan boleh menyebabkan elemen yang lemah terselindung di sebalik elemen yang lebih tinggi pencapaiannya.

• **Kebaikannya** pula ialah, dengan penggunaan pemberat, ia tidak menganggap semua faktor menyumbang secara sama rata kepada keupayaan, walaupun nilai pemberat itu sendiri boleh dipersoalkan.

- **Penskoran Angkatan Bersituasi (Situational Force Scoring (SFS)).** Kaedah SFS digunakan untuk menganalisis kekuatan tentera berdasarkan situasi pertempuran dan keadaan mukabumi. Andaikan bahawa sesebuah formasi itu akan mempunyai kesiagaan 100 % jika ia dilengkapi sepenuhnya dari segi sumber manusia dan persenjataan. Manakala kesiagaan dari segi mobiliti, komunikasi, logistik dan latihan melebihi 85 %. Formula SFS adalah berikut:

$$\text{Kesiagaan} = \frac{\text{SS}[\text{NoA} \times \text{AS} \times \text{FE} \times \text{SCM}]}{\text{DUS}}$$

$$\text{NoA} = \text{Jumlah setiap Aset}$$

$$\text{AS} = \text{Skor Aset atau Skor Senjata}$$

$$\text{FE} = \text{Keberkesanan Angkatan} \\ (\{ \text{Daya Gerak, Komunikasi, Logistik, Latihan} \})$$

$$\text{SCM} = \text{Pekali Kategori Bersituasi} \\ (\text{Situational Category Multipliers}) \\ (\text{i.e. Pertahanan Terancang di atas Mukabumi Pelbagai (Deliberate Defence on Mixed Terrain)})$$

$$\text{DUS} = \text{Kekuatan Penuh Unit} \\ (\text{Design Unit Strength})$$

• **Kelemahan** kaedah ini ialah ia agak sukar difahami.

• **Kebaikannya** pula ialah ia menggunakan skor senjata (weapon

scores) untuk membezakan antara senjata. Ia juga memperkirakan muka bumi kawasan operasi. Seterusnya ia tidak mengambilkira senjata individu yang melebihi sumber manusia. Contohnya jika sesuatu unit mempunyai 800 repal dengan 500 anggota, maka 300 repal tanpa anggota dikira tidak menyumbang kepada keupayaan.

### KAJIAN KE ATAS 10 BRIGED PARA


Bagi tujuan kajian kes, penyata 10 Bgd PARA telah digunakan iaitu penyata mengikut

kuantiti ataupun inventori peralatan. Untuk tujuan keselamatan, data yang digunakan tidak akan dipaparkan. Berdasarkan kepada penyata 10 Bgd PARA, berasaskan perjawatan, kesiagaan mengikut elemen (mengambilkira ketiga-tiga formula) adalah seperti ditunjukkan di **Rajah 1**.

Jika dibandingkan siagaan kiraan OPLAT dan BITD (kuantitatif), perbezaan keupayaan antara dua formula amatlah sedikit. Justeru, bagi kes ini, kumpulan kajian membuat kesimpulan bahawa penggunaan pemberat tidak banyak membezakan **keputusan akhir**. Dalam kata lain sensitiviti pemberat yang digunakan di dalam formula 'kuantitatif' BITD amatlah sedikit dan boleh diabaikan.

Bil	Elemen	% Keupayaan (OPLAT)	% Kesiagaan		
			(OPLAT)	(Kuantitatif)	(SFS)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	Kekuatan SM	73	64	62	Penilaian Statik (Tahap 1)
2.	Komunikasi	114	78		
3.	Mobiliti	77	59		
4.	Logistik	77	77	79	60%
5.	Latihan	89	82		
6.	Kuasa Tembak	86	85	82	690 MATA

Keupayaan dan Kesiagaan 10 Bgd PARA



Rajah 1. Keupayaan dan Kesiagaan 10 Briged Para.

Tim berpendapat bahawa cara pengukuran keupayaan TD dicadangkan berasaskan cara yang sedang digunakan oleh Cawangan OPLAT kerana kaedah pengiraannya lebih mudah difahami dan mudah diimplementasikan. Pada masa yang sama ia menepati matlamat bagi membantu pemerintah meneliti keupayaan masing-masing bagi merancang rancangan penugasan dan pembangunan formasi.

Bagi faktor latihan, satu kaedah pengiraan dicadangkan iaitu:

- **Keupayaan Latihan.** Keupayaan latihan merupakan purata Keupayaan Latihan Kolektif dan Keupayaan Latihan Individu.

- **Keupayaan Latihan Kolektif.** Jumlah Latihan Kolektif yang dijalankan dalam masa 2 tahun dibahagi 5. Ini membawa maksud untuk mencapai keupayaan 100%, formasi atau unit perlu melaksanakan latihan kolektif sebanyak 5 kali dalam masa 2 tahun dan ini meliputi SLTT 4 dan SLTT 5.

- **Keupayaan Latihan Individu.** Jumlah kehadiran berbanding jumlah kekuatan anggota.

- **Kesiagaan Latihan.** Kesiagaan latihan merupakan purata Kesiagaan Latihan Kolektif dan Kesiagaan Latihan Individu.

- **Kesiagaan Latihan Kolektif.** Keupayaan Latihan di darab dengan purata jumlah anggota yang menyertai Latihan Kolektif setiap tahun dibahagi kekuatan formasi/ pasukan berkaitan. Ini membawa maksud untuk mencapai Kesiagaan 100%, formasi atau unit perlu melaksanakan latihan kolektif sebanyak 5 kali dalam masa 2 tahun

dengan jumlah penglibatan anggota sebanyak 2 kali kekuatan pasukan.

- **Kesiagaan Latihan Individu.** Jumlah lulus latihan berbanding jumlah kekuatan anggota.

Kaedah **SFS** pula didapati sesuai untuk memberi kekuatan formasi atau pasukan dalam bentuk mata ataupun '**strength point**'. '**Strength point**' dapat digunakan untuk membandingkan kekuatan formasi, samada sesama sendiri ataupun dengan ancaman bila diperlukan. Kaedah **SFS** ini juga akan membuka ruang kepada penggunaan kaedah kuantitatif lanjutan (advance quantitative method) di masa hadapan.


## PEMBENTANGAN SIAGAAN

Pembentangan keupayaan dan kesiagaan formasi seperti di **Rajah 2**. Dengan ini kesiagaan setiap elemen jelas kelihatan dan tahap kesiagaan dan kekuatan tempur formasi atau unit dapat dikenalpasti secara analitikal.

**Kesiagaan Tempur** yang ditunjukkan adalah nilai kesiagaan minimum antara keenam-enam elemen dan kekuatan (Force scoring). Rasionalnya penggunaan nilai minimum ini ialah setiap elemen adalah saling menyumbang kepada kesiagaan tempur sesuatu formasi atau unit. Kelemahan sesuatu elemen melambangkan tahap kesiagaan formasi atau unit berkenaan.

Rajah ini juga menunjukkan tahap servisibiliti peralatan di dalam formasi berkaitan dengan membandingkan ketinggian bar keupayaan dan kesiagaan; contohnya komunikasi membayangkan banyak peralatan komunikasi yang tidak dapat digunakan (TBDG) disebabkan perbezaan ketinggian bar adalah besar.

**Klasifikasi Kesiagaan Tempur.** Setelah kesiagaan sesebuah unit atau formasi ditentukan



Rajah 2. Pembentangan Siagaan Formasi dan Unit

Klasifikasi	Peratus Kesiagaan	Bersedia Untuk
Kesiagaan Tinggi	> 90%	Konflik Berintensiti Tinggi
Kesiagaan Sederhana	80% - 89.9%	Konflik Berintensiti Sederhana
Kesiagaan Rendah	70% - 79.9%	Konflik Berintensiti Rendah
Belum Bersedia untuk Peperangan Konvensional	60% - 69.9%	Operasi Ketenteraman Awam* dan Melawan Insurgensi (CIW) secara terhad sahaja.
Belum Bersedia	< 59.9%	

\* Catatan: Jika peralatan POPO mencukupi sahaja.

Jadual 1. Klasifikasi Siagaan Formasi dan Unit

maka ia perlu diklasifikasikan. Klasifikasi yang telah dipersetujui adalah seperti di **Jadual 1**.

Sistem ini telah diprogramkan yang hanya memerlukan '**input**' dari staf formasi dan '**output**'nya akan dikira secara automatik oleh program yang telah dibuat.

Sistem ini juga dapat dibangunkan ke dalam sistem pengurusan maklumat TD yang sedang dibangunkan menggunakan sistem intranet TD ataupun di dalam sistem **P4**.

## FAEDAH PENGIRAAN KESIAGAAN

Faedah pengiraan dan pengukuran keupayaan dan kesiagaan kepada unit atau formasi adalah:

- Untuk mengetahui tahap kesiagaan pasukan.
- Untuk menimbulkan kesedaran tentang tahap dan di mana kekuatan dan kelemahan sesuatu pasukan.
- Untuk mengenalpasti keutamaan untuk meningkatkan keupayaan sesebuah pasukan.
- Untuk mengenalpasti kekuatan tempur sesuatu pasukan (sahabat atau musuh) melalui '**force scoring**'.
- Sebagai input kepada Pemerintah untuk membuat Perkiraan Keadaan.

## PENUTUP

Dalam meneliti kesiagaan pasukan TD, kita membuat perkiraan berdasarkan perjawatan

sesebuah pasukan sebagai '**benchmark**'. Dengan itu, secara tidak langsung, kita telah membuat satu andaian bahawa perjawatan pasukan telah dikaji secara teliti, direka dan ditubuhkan dengan asas yang kukuh. Pada hakikatnya, pembangunan sesuatu angkatan pertahanan haruslah berlandaskan kepada persekitaran, justeru kita harus memerhati pembangunan pertahanan di rantau ini, mengkaji bentuk perperangan yang bakal ditempuhi, seterusnya menentukan '**benchmark**' yang perlu dijadikan ukuran di dalam pembangunan angkatan pertahanan.

Perlu diingatkan bahawa dalam membina sesebuah model, yang pentingnya ialah kebaikan yang ada padanya yang akan memberi manfaat kepada organisasi. Jadi kita perlu bersikiran positif dalam meneliti kaedah yang dibentangkan supaya organisasi dapat dibangunkan dengan lebih seimbang berdasarkan fakta dan angka (*facts and figures*).

Selain mengukur kesiagaan formasi dan unit, kaedah yang sama juga dapat digunakan untuk mengukur kesiagaan sub-unit, termasuk Grup Tempur (*combat group*) dan Detacmen Ketenteraan (*military detachment*) untuk tugas-tugas khas.

## Penghargaan:

Penghargaan diberikan kepada pegawai-pegawai yang terlibat dengan pasukan kajian siagaan Tentera Darat yang terdiri daripada (selain penulis artikel):

- Kol Ir Mohd Salim bin Ali.
- Lt Kol A. Endry Nixon.
- Mej Kamal Ismadi bin Sumeri.
- Mej Zulkifli bin Abdullah.

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Mej Ir Dr Norazman B Mohamad Nor dinauliahkan ke dalam Kor Jurutera Diraja pada tahun 1986 setelah dianugerahkan BSc Kejuruteraan Awam dan Matematik dari University of Texas. Beliau pernah memegang perbagai jawatan di dalam Kor dan Markas Formasi serta Pusat Sains dan Teknologi Pertahanan. Mendapat MSc OR dari USM pada tahun 1995 dan dianugerahkan Ijazah Doktor Falsafah di bidang Sains Ketenteraan dari RMCS, Cranfield University pada tahun 2000. Beliau kini dipinjamkan ke UTM sebagai pensyarah ATMA dan masih aktif memberi khidmat kepada Tentera Darat melalui siri taklimat pengukuran kesiagaan TD.

# PYSCHOLOGY OF TEENAGERS: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN PARENTING

BY LT KOL AMIRUDDIN BIN ISMAIL

## INTRODUCTION



dolescence is baffling. This article tries to demystify the rites of passage that characterize the teenage years. It shatters the notion that adolescence is a cruel invention designed to keep

parents reaching for the aspirin and challenging the blood pressure meter to a new height. Perhaps after reading the title of the article, you expect to find an itemized list of weapons, lethal or otherwise, that you could purchase or assemble in your garage from spare parts. Or you might have expected the names and addresses of boarding schools, all of them out of state and none allowing parental visits. Or perhaps you thought that there had been a sudden revival of interest in parenting techniques used in the middle ages.

You have tried arguing, weeping, begging and screaming – that was on a good days. Then you escalated to taking to your bed, acting hurt, and not speaking to your teenager. And, after all that, the kid still scarcely seems to be affected. You may even think the kid is taking a crash course in "How to Drive Your Parents Crazy" – and getting an A!

## The Job Of Parenting

The current climate of the world makes raising teenagers a challenge. Changing family patterns, exposure to drugs, changing sexual practices and the undesirable aspects of

contemporary society make the task of parenting very difficult. Suddenly the parents may feel that whatever they did in the past no longer works or applies. With teenagers, it is critical to learn to encourage their desire to cooperate with you. This means not only learning to understand your teenager's feelings but also using appropriate consequences when behaviour is not acceptable.

## Why Parents Discipline

One reason parent's discipline is out of concern for how the child is growing up and what he will become in later life. When a teenager is acting out and is unresponsive to discipline, parents sometimes imagine that the child's entire future is in jeopardy. Second, you may discipline based on the example you received from your own parents. If your parents raged or screamed in every situation, you may find that you do the same thing almost without thinking. Many parents discipline out of anger and frustration. They only get firm with their offspring when they are feeling upset or under stress. This is ineffective because your teenager learns more about your anger and frustration than about being responsible for his own behaviour.

## Understanding Agendas

In general, the parents' agenda is to finish raising the child upon whom they have lavished years of patience, generosity and love. They may have felt relatively successful at parenting until

puberty struck. Then suddenly, the kid who share their interests and accepted their ideas and suggestions starts telling them that they are out of it, that they know nothing that is relevant to the twenty first century, and that their presence is barely tolerable. Parents view this as an ungrateful behaviour. In fact, it is the result of the teenage agenda. The task of adolescence is to master the skills needed to become an adult. Its agenda is to grow up and learn about life.

### The Adult Agenda

Your agenda as parents is to implant values for adulthood. Your goal is to see that the values you cherish become embedded in your child's brain. You fear that if you don't do this now, the kid will never become the wonderful human you've been working to produce. Another parental agenda is to keep as much control as possible. Parents fear the loss of control over the behaviour, attitudes and developing values of their child, although this is the reality of parenting growing children. Parents also try to coach their teenagers in their choice of friends. You are worried about the type of friends your teenager has chosen and how they might influence his behaviour. Your agenda is to surround your teenager with people of good characters. A teenager's agenda is totally different, concerned only with whether their friends are cool, cute or fun. Their values? Those are their values! – nothing more, nothing less.

### The Teenager's Agenda

One of the most important issues on the teenager's agenda is to find things out in his own way. The years of experience and good advice offered by the parent won't substitute for the teenager's need to test what he feels about his own life. Sometimes this testing takes the form of rejecting your most cherished beliefs, e.g., religion, political persuasion and the importance

of the family. Another important agenda is to be accepted by friends. This behaviour related to their needs to express their separateness and independence. They feel an intense need not to seem like your little kid. A teenage agenda is to learn to weigh the relative importance of his values versus yours. Teenagers may be reluctant to look to the future because it scares them. Discussions of college, competition, employment and finances can be frightening to anyone. Your teenager may act uninterested in what you have to say. Actually, he knows that what you have to say is valuable but just isn't ready to deal with the issues.

### The Struggle

Parenting children is challenging. Parenting teenagers can seem like an Olympic decathlon. Each year reveals a new set of desires in the teenager and new worries for the parents. Even a teenager who rarely defies or causes concern will occasionally test limits, causing the exasperated parents to ask, what can we do?

The first step toward ending the battle with your teenager is simply to become more aware of yourself. Begin to observe your own behaviour, moods, reactions and patterns. It is a way to focusing your attention on the person who has the real power to create positive changes – you! Being aware of your behaviour can be the most powerful method of changing your interaction with your teenager.

## BEHAVIOUR AT HOME

### Morning Rituals

Parents want desperately to believe that their teenager is old enough to start the day without a great deal of direction. They also think that their teenager is old enough to understand their expectations. There is nothing wrong with these

notions except that they usually lead to disappointment, because what teenagers understand and how they feel about it are totally different issues.

Once a while your teenager acts very mature, and there is no problem about getting up and getting going in the morning. This may lead you to believe that your teenager is truly on the road to becoming an adult. Unfortunately, the explanation is usually less dramatic and far less permanent. Your teenager probably just decided to get organized for a change but eventually will get bored with being so responsible and revert back to normal teenage behaviour. When children are young, they avoid starting the day by playing in their rooms and refusing to get dressed. Teenagers avoid getting started in the morning by staying in bed and tuning you out as much as possible. A teenager's agenda is to become invisible when called by pulling the covers up. With pillow clutched to their head, teenagers are quite adept at shutting out all the sounds of the universe, particularly your voice.

### Telephone Behaviour

Since many teenagers see the phone as a natural extension of their hand, it's hard for them to realize that their dependency on this instrument is unnecessary and excessive. Let's look at the teenager's agenda concerning the telephone. Girls, more than boys, tend to use the telephone to discuss in detail the important event of their lives – their boyfriends, parents and teachers. It is truly a way for them to learn to express intimate feelings and learn about relationships. Sometimes they are able to address issues on the phone that are too difficult to handle face to face. Boys use the telephone in a slightly different way – until they get a girlfriend – generally to make appointments or discuss homework and sports. However, when they get a girlfriend, they may talk on the phone for hours, even if you haven't

had a conversation with this kid in two years! He has a new agenda and it's called teenage love.

### Mealtimes

Sharing a meal with most teenagers can thoroughly destroy the fantasy of the harmonious family dinner. In previous generations, when parents were more authoritarian, children either sat at the dinner table silently or were grilled on such interesting topics as school, homework and chores. Teenagers stayed at the table whether they liked it or not. This gave a sense of family togetherness. Some parents still value the tradition of family meals and have the attitude that "we're going to have a family dinner if it kills us." Many teenagers would prefer to eat in front of the TV or alone in their rooms.

Parents tend to be disturbed by this attitude, but let's look for a moment at the reality of the situation. First, the teenage agenda is that family meals are no longer as important as having a separate life. Parents have to learn not to be offended by this. It's another area where parents have to face the fact that their children are growing away from them. Second, if adults always dominate the conversation or if the teenager's ideas are not accepted as part of the conversation, teenagers may have good reasons to avoid family meals.

### Chores

When your kids were small and you first suggested doing chores, they probably thought it fun because it was something novel. But after awhile the novelty wore off, and the game became tedious and boring. If you haven't made chores a regular part of your child's upbringing, it will be very hard to introduce them in the teenage years. They may simply be seen as a punishment rather than increased responsibilities in the family. Chores

take time away from the exciting things in life, and so they are very unpopular. Chores are a part of being in a family. The parents' agenda concerning chores is to teach responsibility and to teach their teenagers to think about the needs of other people. These are important values for adult life, but getting your teenager to understand them and accept responsibility can be a difficult task.

## Homework

Many teenagers view homework as a mandatory, long-term sentence without possibility of parole, and they are always trying to escape. Homework is often boring and frustrating, so teenagers try to combat the discomfort by watching TV, listening to radio, getting up and down or just spacing out. As you become more worried about your child's potential failure, and more frustrated, you may experience a mild form of insanity. The symptoms include screaming at your spouse (who has no homework), ripping the cord from the TV and threatening to send your teenager to boarding school in Timbuktu.

## Teenager Spending Time In Their Rooms

Beginning around the age of fifteen, some teenagers literally hibernate in their rooms for a number of years. The same kid who always wanted to spend time with the family suddenly disappears behind the door of his room for such long periods that the parents begin to wonder if he will ever return. A teenager's room is a private domain. It's the one place where the kid can be alone, autonomous, and feel totally in control. In this small world, anything is possible without the risk of failure or criticism.

Alone in their room, teenagers like to listen to music, talk on the phone or write in a diary. Some of their stranger pastimes include looking at themselves in the mirror for hours. Although

this may seem strange to parents, it is related to the normal teenage preoccupation with self-image. Teenagers also use their rooms as private places where they can work out such feeling as anger, hurt or sadness on their own. By being physically separate, the teenagers are learning to handle personal feelings without always relying on you for help.

## Leaving Personal Items Around The House

Teenagers walk through the house, randomly dropping clothes, books and other items as if the entire place were their personal storage bin. Teenagers basically don't see the same need for orderliness that their parents seem to cherish. Since they don't need order in their physical surroundings, they are puzzled when their parents harp on tidying up, cleaning and being organized. Part of growing up is learning to develop an internal need for structure. This sense of order usually comes later in life when the young adult gets a place of his own. Until then, most young adults feel like a kid in Mom and Dad's house.

## Relatives

Around the age of fourteen or fifteen, the same kid who used to love spending time with grandparents, cousins or other family members suddenly decides that relatives are boring. It is normal for teenagers to resist spending much time with their relatives, complaining about having to call their grandparents or go with the family to visit them. Their chief complaints about socializing with relatives are that there is nothing to do at their grandparents', their cousins are boring and they would rather just be with their friends. Parents usually feel that the teenagers has become selfish and disrespectful. The parent's agenda is for the teenager to show respect and consideration for their relatives and help maintain that important sense of family. The teenager's agenda in this case relates to the developmental task of learning to

separate from their parents. Although they may appear to be selfish, inconsiderate kids, they are actually struggling to lead their own lives. They are beginning to make choices about how they want to spend their time. This is necessary step in growing into adulthood. Unfortunately, at times this agenda will take the form of inconsiderate behaviour.

### Siblings

Most teenagers argue a good deal with their siblings. After listening to weeks of endless bickering, parents may decide that their offspring are horrendous and should be confined to the Shaolin monastery for life. It is normal for siblings to have mixed feelings about each other as they progress through adolescence. Sarcasm, criticism and bickering are normal ways for many teenagers to relate to one another, but they will develop more positive value because they allow siblings to work out their feelings of anger toward each other. The same siblings who treat each other harshly in their youth can grow up to be very close friends.

### Teenager's Need For Privacy

A continuing theme in the teenager's struggle to become an adult is the need for privacy. Having some privacy, a place to be unobserved, gives teenagers a sense of independence and the feeling of having their own lives. Another reason for the intense need for privacy is the teenager's need to spend time thinking about romantic and sexual feelings. These natural development stages create an intense desire for separateness. Many teenagers experience great frustration because they feel that they have little privacy at a time when they think they deserve the privacy and consideration given to an adult. As they mature and become more comfortable with themselves, the need for privacy diminishes.

### Teenage Driving Habits

It is sometimes difficult for parents to understand their teenager's love affair with cars. For an adult, cars mean payments, insurance and unexpected repairs. For a teenager, the car is synonymous with freedom. All the autonomy they have been seeking is concentrated behind the wheel. A car provides access to the world and the mobility to socialize with friends. Finally, its possession is a status symbol. The teenage boy's agenda when he is driving includes performing antics that will impress his friends and testing his skills by driving fast, which gives him an illusion of control and power. The parent's agenda is to have as much control over the situation without having a complete anxiety attack every time their teenager reaches for the keys. The result is a great deal of stress and worry.

### Teenagers And Their Music

Observing teenagers in the grip of their favourite music, it is often difficult to tell if they are having a seizure and need the paramedics or if they've developed a terrific rash from head to toe; as if they are transported by the lyrics and decibels, they are in a world of their own. Many teenagers choreograph their lives to the sound of their favourite music. They seem to require music to pry them out of bed in the morning and fall asleep to a beat that sends most parents searching for aspirin. Teenagers have also discovered that portable music is an ingenious way to terrorize the general public. Carrying radio the size of air-conditioning units, they leave people cowering in doorways, hands pressed to their ears.

### CONCLUSION

Parents need to remember that the teenage years are the time when a child is progressing toward mastery of adulthood, with all

its demands, responsibilities, challenges and disappointments. So all those crazy things that your teenager does, apparently for the sheer pleasure of driving you up a wall, are actually part of learning to function independently and successfully in the adult environment. It may help you to remember that your teenager's agenda is to act grown-up and be treated as an adult, even though he doesn't really feel ready for the adult world. This ambivalence causes a swing back and forth between very mature behaviour, like getting a job, and very regressive tendencies, such as teasing a younger sister until she's in tears.

As parents, we need to develop a great deal of empathy for your teenager's passage from childhood to adulthood. It is a painful time in which children realize that they must give up the feeling that they can live forever as a kid in the safety of the family. They struggle with the inescapable separation anxiety that comes with this realization. It takes great courage to face the loss of childhood and accept the inevitable responsibilities of

functioning as an adult in the world. All teenagers are frightened by this challenge, yet excited about beginning life as an adult. Some will react to their fear by becoming inappropriately dependent, while others overreact and insist on handling everything without adult assistance. But all teenagers need to know that their parents will always be there for them in some way, no matter how much they are out in the world.

Teenagers want to look at life with hope and optimism. No matter how worried you may be during your child's adolescence, it is important that you convey to your teenager a belief in his ability to have a meaningful life. Think about all that you did and experience as a teenager, and yet you became a responsible, productive member of society. You must have faith that the same will be true of your child, no matter how difficult some adolescent issues have been. When teenagers grow up with the certainty that you believe in them, they gain a self-confidence that creates a real sense of pride in themselves and hope for the future.

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# SPORTS WITHIN THE MALAYSIAN ARMY: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

BY MEJ NAZRUL EDGAR BIN ABDULLAH

*Sports must be accorded an elevated precedence. Whatever little that we can offer, I hope that we leave this forum energized, be creative and act as change agents that would witness sporting activities are given a new lease of life. Hopefully our efforts would be rewarded with Armed Forces being recognized as a sporting powerhouse in not too distant future.*

*Jen Dato' Wira Mohd Shahrom bin Dato' Haji Nordin  
Opening Address Annual General Meeting  
Armed Forces Sports Council, 2003*

## INTRODUCTION

**W**hat are sports to you? How would you rate Armed Forces participation and performance in sporting activities? Many might just wonder and reply, what kind of question is that? Well as personalities (commanders) in position to justify the situation that one's sport is in, are you not confident that your reply might be convincing? Well let's just sum up by saying that though there are certain sports that seem to excel, there is still more that could be achieved or done. Now the question put forward, are we contended with it?

The sporting scenario is just like a battlefield, very fluid, constantly changing,

requiring new options, avenues and solutions. Everyday we read or hear how the nations sports fraternity is constantly subjected to challenges in the form social problems, financial shortcomings, office bearers at loggerheads, players' revolt, administrative delays in audits, delays in paying of dues and many others. Whether we like it or not, the very players that are under our wings would also read of this and compare notes. As government institutions we are not subjected to the question of bottom line deliberations, but that by no means diminish the basic responsibility of managing fundamentals, i.e. sloughing off yesterday, managing growth for tomorrow in terms of policies and strategies and distinguish between healthy growth, putting on fat or cultivating cancer.

This paper serves as an opportunity to provide basic information that may be helpful in

understanding, managing and administering sports related associations, programmes or activities within the Malaysian Armed Forces. The sources of this information were acquired from secondary resources, interviews, discussions, and first hand experiences and grassroots feedbacks. The ideas and opinions promulgated here are by no means exhaustive nor conclusive. Then again there would not be any smoke without a fire.

## IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP

*Are sports a command function? The reality presently is that without the direct involvement of institution's command echelon, all sport related plans and activities would not move.*

*Jen Dato' Wira Mohd Shahrom bin Dato' Haji Nordin*

There are cases where organizations either succeed or fail not only because how well they are led but also how well the followers follow. Within the military sports appointments such as administrators, supervisors and certain executive posts within that sporting association though held as subsidiary (additional) tasks, afford the opportunity for leadership.

The military can be viewed as the proponents to all leadership attributes professed by academic gurus. But then again, not all of us can translate them into results. Sometimes it could be said that we are not looking in the right direction. Let us acknowledge that leadership is something that cannot be got off the shelf. It requires strength of character, diplomatic skills and a sense of steadfast principles to mount a credible front.

Jarod Roch in his article Qualities of Good Leadership stressed "The hallmarks of a good leader lie in his ability to bring across certain key factors to his organization". Understanding the

above statement, there are countless attributes that define a good leader, much of which depends on the context of the reader, nevertheless from a sporting perspective below explained are some compelling views:

- **Charisma.** A leader has got to be charismatic enough to infect his workforce with the will and motivation to get the tasks done. (Please note that motivation would be discussed separately later).
- **Vision.** Though this may be seen as far fetched, but it is axiomatic that every team should have a vision, (though it only be short term or a target at least). This vision thus gives the team a sense of purpose to get excited about, a reason for being charged up, enthused and motivated. Then again without a sound understanding of a vision and the avenues in achieving it, a leader would not be able to get it across, sell and articulate it.
- **Communication.** One needs a pair or two hands to clap, thus communication is a two-way arrangement. The most common ill that besets leaders are that they do not listen and they do not have the patience to do so. The acknowledged fact is that the best leaders understand that listening is a source of unrecognised information and would use it to their advantage.
- **Role Model.** The dynamism in the current leadership paradigm requires that leaders not only see to the end of the project but also to bring out the best of talents in each individual team member.

## MOTIVATION TOWARDS PERFORMANCE

Not a day goes by, when we read or hear of sportsmen and sportswomen being rewarded

for certain outstanding performance. This in turn has created a reward-based syndrome among the sports fraternity which basically more or less demands that they be adequately compensated for all forms of participations. With the cash strapped carrot being dangled, and other forms of financial support being promised, who could be blamed should one resort to this as a profession, or to substantiate their current daily livelihood. At certain instances, depending on the nature and level of competition, these financial rewards could be significantly increased.

Now with much hype and publicity of these incentives over the local media and publications, what is the impact upon minor organizations and leagues? Many would agree that compatible financial support must be offered, should one insist on the desirable results. What about those that have budgetary constraints? What has happened to those who play for the physical fitness, love of the game or pride?

As in the case of governmental organizations, drawing from literature reviews, real life realities and experiences, there is more towards in achieving sporting excellence other than financial rewards. The asset that we can draw upon is through the maximum utilization of human resource. To achieve this, organizations would have to win the love, trust and appreciation of their employees. The age-old theory of Maslow's hierarchy of needs is still very much evident presently, as the core of these organizations is their employee, as such; positive reinforcements must be in place to motivate them.

- **Self-Actualising.** Job satisfaction and recognition.
- **Self-Esteem.** Career development and empowerment.
- **Social Needs.** Team building.
- **Safety.** Job security.

- **Physiological.** Pay and basic needs support (welfare).

Let us now share an opinion of how this can be achieved. From the above illustration it is evident that sportsmen / sportswomen (employees) are no different, for they too require rewards, recognition, support, affiliation and power. Not all that are mentioned above have direct financial implications, but the beauty of it is that most of it is within the manageable capabilities of the officer in charge. Dev Anand in his article 'The Effect Of Motivation On Employees Performance', summarize it into a motivational model called 3R dimension.

This 3R dimension consists of reward, recognition and respect. These three elements are inter-related and integrated within them. Rewards are in the forms of cost and non-cash benefits whereas recognition consists of training, career development and support while respect includes empowerment, trust and transparency.

Today, employees want rewards for their performances and they too want the management to recognize their contributions and efforts in their work. By giving job empowerment, employees gain the respect from the top management by providing creative solutions, decisions and ideas. This in turn would benefit both parties.

## MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL

The present era has witnessed many industries progress rapidly with the aid of technology whilst being forced to accept the reality that along with intellectual capital, one would be able to make significant inroads that could be translated into competitive advantage. Now what is this intellectual capital and why is it viewed important in the sports management scenario.

Now in simplified definition intellectual capital = human capital + structural capital.

Structural capital consist of player's base relationship, potential, culture, daring, etc. Whilst human capital is made up of competence, values, things that cannot be owned.

What present coaches / managers do not realize the strategic advantage that this brainpower possess. These are the first steps into evolving a thinking soldier. Such would be the changes and advancements made, that set pieces, tactical play and sound positioning would not be sufficient to have a winning team. Think of the benefits that could be sought, if we could groom our players in this direction; we provide the space to situate to the situation, develop a desire to be innovative and change, would make playing more fun, enjoyable thus making these players self-motivated. With the want to develop these intellectual assets, people would need to be connected.

### **SPORTS INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY**

How much do we actually know about the sport that we support? Are we competent and confident to market our sport when summoned to do so? As officers entrusted with the responsibility, we are therefore required to be sufficiently informed of its evolution, history, progression, landmarks and perhaps current situation. For, if equipped with this pertinent knowledge, would only enhance our confidence and courage. A good test to gauge our importance in this criteria would be; by comparing which sports organization has a research and development section / office or file for that matter. Well in reality, every little bit that we document whether it is a newspaper article, a bulletin, an incident report, an achievement, an observation etc would someday be sought for references that could be essential at that time. There is a serious lack in the desire for sports bodies to consider noting down all relevant events.

Please do not be misled, progressing in sports also require being abreast with both technological and research advances of modern sports science. Currently and if continued to be accorded low priority, it is actually a disadvantage for us at the starting block itself. As such it is a lost opportunity for the current era to create a difference thus embedding change.

### **SPORTS PROMOTION**

This being one of the four P's of marketing indirectly indicates that it must be approached with much management flavour. Many demote this importance and merely approach promotion related activities from the perspective of media. However there is more to it than meets the eye, as word of mouth, advertising, publicity and incentives are other options.

Whenever we discuss promotions, we always defeat the initiative due to financial constrains. More often than not, we do not seek or opportune other avenues to enhance our sport. Even within the military fraternity many are unaware of the opportunities and sporting events that respective service offers, supports or strives. Such introvert efforts would definitely witness declines in participation, interest and eventual lead its slow demise.

Further to the above, another viable alternative that hardly requires financial implications is via customer relationship management which is currently the buzzword among the commercial / corporate sector. Being respective commanders, the avenues of available are very much within ones scope of influence. Now allow me to discuss what we as military commanders (leaders / managers) can contribute thus enhance one's sport association:

- Personal bearing.
- Knowledge.

- Willingness to interact.
- Documentation.

## CULTIVATE WINNING ATTITUDE

Who would not want to be associated with a winning team? Winning is never accidental, for one needs determination and discipline. Winners would certainly draw a strong and ardent following, and should that transpire it would augur well as a promotion option for to the Malaysian Armed Forces whilst corkibating towards the national sporting agenda.

Design, plan and strategize, capitalize on these opportunities that knock on your door. Winning never comes easy, and as mentioned this is not necessarily confined to the events within the playing turf only. Generally all leaders, players and supporting personnel should consider a leverage to be informed of the following:

- **Attitude.** No doubt talent defines what you can do but motivation determines willingness. Attitude determines how well you can do it. No one can control your alliance, but often we let external circumstances allow this. Develop a positive outlook. Believe in one.
- **Enthusiasm To Lead.** To inspire others, have a positive attitude, need to have passion, cause. Enthusiasm is infectious and can motivate people.
- **Identify Problems.** Learn to identify problems well in advance. Be vigilant to systems such as preoccupation, listlessness, boredom and careless attitude of people. Discover these early for they might lead to crisis of confidence. Mingle around and be attentive to grapevine information.

- **Dare to Dream.** Great philosophers, scientist, explorers and leaders all dare to dream. Take frequent stock of targets and winning objective. Just as a newborn baby.

- **Tackling Setbacks.** Face up to it, take setbacks, learn to overcome adversities, never be afraid of failures/risk taking—convert to advantages/ phases. Take them as windows of opportunity.

- **Sense of Purpose.** When you care passionately of anything, it gives you a sense of purpose. Ask yourself these questions, why am I doing this? Where am I going with this? What am I going to achieve? Compliment education as scarifies that individuals make. Do not complain, understand your team, and make allies in character building. People who make sacrifices have an edge.

- **Learn to Adapt.** Continually adapt to circumstances, failing to do so makes one complacent and obsolete.

- **Self Image and Trust.** Make self-image a powerful weapon coupled as a motivational tool. Do not permit others to make negative assessments of you. Use it to motivate whilst prove them wrong. Build image and trust by viewing yourself through the eyes of others.

- **Pursue Excellence.** Standards set by yourselves are real measures of your dedication. Prepare to give everything. Do not do so to seek approval of others, inculcate respect of yourself too much to accept anything less or substandard. Win or lose, one has to live with the result.

- **Cause and Effect.** If you concern yourself with the welfare of others, you enhance loyalty and respect.

People do not know how much you know until they know how much you care. What is ahead and behind bears little importance when compared with what lies within you.

The above highlighted pointers are by no means a textbook or DS solution for all situations. Here the experience, ingenuity and the creativity of the leader are essential to juggle or introduce other options that may be viable. It takes a little courage and a strong knowledge of the situation for the leaders at times to be bold and venture. That might be instances that your approach might be seen orthodox or out this era / generation, nevertheless if it reaps the desired results, at that moment, that is all that matters. Subsequently the accolades and acknowledged testimony of your determination by itself would be sweet gratification.

## CONCLUSION

In discussing the above topics especially as seen in sports, one cannot exclude the management influence. Further to that, one cannot also deny that manpower is central in all discussions and in order to ensure its enduring

operational success, every organization must give due attention to its human capital investment.

Basically with our military upbringing coupled with leadership and managerial experience, we all possess the required attributes. But what that seems wanting here is the ability to be creative to operationalise these plans. In light with the current ever changing and demanding environment, commanders must be willing to accept and contemplate the possibility of revolutionizing their approach.

The approach towards sports management is somewhat similar to our military education where we were introduced and taught on the ability to cope with failures, to regroup and use setbacks as benchmarks for successful subsequent comebacks. As often seen in our daily routine, the ability of commanders to cope with mistakes and openly discuss the challenges / defeats only demonstrates ones resilience. On that note, being optimistic and realistic in all endeavours would encourage one to consider being proactive and anticipative. It is envisaged that with such enthusiasm, sports management within the Malaysian Armed Forces could experience a change, reenergized thus permit commanders to steer institutions / associations courageously towards the desired direction.

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# STRATEGI PERIKATAN: HUBUNGAN AMERIKA SYARIKAT DAN SEKUTU-SEKUTU KECILNYA

OLEH MEJ SAIFUL ANWAR BIN MD ALI

## PENDAHULUAN

**C**iri-ciri ketidakseimbangan hubungan Amerika Syarikat (AS) dengan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya telah menjadi suatu isu yang sering dibincangkan. Menurut Robert Keohane, "*the cruel and ridiculous paradox, is the big influence of small allies.*"<sup>1</sup> Ini bermakna sekutu-sekutu kecil seperti Israel, Sepanyol dan Turki mempunyai pengaruh yang tertentu terhadap AS dalam membuat sesuatu keputusan. Atas sebab ini, tindakan untuk mengawal sekutu-sekutu kecilnya merupakan satu perkara yang sukar dan memerlukan kos perbelanjaan yang tinggi. Sungguhpun AS merupakan negara yang memiliki kuasa tentera dan ekonomi yang kuat di dalam sesuatu perikatan berkenaan, namun ia bukanlah merupakan satu jaminan bahawa sekutu kecilnya akan bertindak selaras dengan kehendaknya.

Sesetengah pendapat menyatakan bahawa ketidakseimbangan perkongsian terhadap pertahanan bersama dan keengganannya meningkatkan perbelanjaan dalam bidang pertahanan, menyebabkan mereka lebih memerlukan perikatan dari jaminan keselamatan oleh AS. Bagi mengelak dari meningkatnya perbelanjaan pertahanan yang dianggap membebankan, sekutu-sekutu kecil ini mungkin akan berpindah kepada negara-negara besar yang mempunyai kuasa nuklear bagi tujuan untuk

mendapatkan jaminan keselamatan. Dalam menyelesaikan konflik yang melibatkan keselamatan nasional, sekutu kecil ini akan menggunakan pelbagai cara yang akan menyebabkan konflik tersebut merebak ke peringkat antarabangsa. Akhirnya konflik tersebut akan menyebabkan campurtangan dari kuasa-kuasa besar.

Kertas ini bertujuan untuk mengenalpasti pelbagai faktor yang memberi kesan kepada pengaruh hubungan di antara AS dan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya dan melihat bagaimana AS menggunakan kaedah-kaedah baru dalam meneruskan hubungan mereka bagi mengekalkan objektif nasionalnya melalui strategi perikatan.

## Definisi Perikatan

Menurut G. Snyder, perikatan merupakan "*formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states.*"<sup>2</sup> Oleh itu, perikatan merupakan satu gabungan yang terdiri daripada beberapa buah negara selaras dengan kehendak realisme iaitu meningkatkan keupayaan ketenteraan. Dalam meningkatkan keupayaan ketenteraan, negara boleh melaksanakannya sama ada dengan memiliki persenjataan atau menyertai perikatan atau kedua-duanya sekali. Walau bagaimanapun menyertai perikatan adalah lebih

<sup>1</sup> Keohane, Robert O., *The Big Influence of Small Allies*, *Foreign Policy*, No. 2, 1971, pp 161-82.

<sup>2</sup> Kegley, Jr., Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp 468-469.

ekonomikal kerana ia membenarkan bebanan pertahanan dikongsi bersama.

Menurut *The Dictionary of World Politics*, perikatan adalah “*a formal agreement between two or more states to collaborate together on perceived mutual securities issues. At minimum this collaboration will cover mutual obligations upon the outbreak of war. Allies will stipulate in treaty form the conditions under which a military response will be required...The alliance was a key variable in the balance of power.*<sup>3</sup>” NATO merupakan contoh yang terbaik bagi perikatan yang memperkenalkan bagaimana keselamatan bersama dibentuk oleh AS dan negara-negara Eropah Barat. Menurut Stephen M. Walt, negara-negara menubuhkan perikatan bertujuan untuk “*balance against threat*” dan ancaman ini adalah merupakan “*function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceive intention.*<sup>4</sup>” M V Naidu pula menyatakan terdapat enam gambaran khas yang berhubung dengan perikatan secara tradisional:

- *Its fundamental is physical might and preponderant power, because military power is necessary to carry out anticipated attack upon or defense against an external enemy whose threat may be military or political or ideological or economic.*
- *It is targeted against specified or specifiable enemies and areas that are identified in advance, thus the selective security system assumes its particularistic nature.*
- *Because of its specified target and its essentially military nature, a selective*

*security is limited in its scope of policy and action. Hence it demands of its members not total but limited commitments.*

- *It is not supranational, because it does not prescribe or demand surrender of national sovereignties. The final decision-making is vested in the national governments of the member states.*
- *However systematized a regional/selective security alliance may become, it cannot be universal and lasting, because of its particularistic nature. When the particular threat disintegrates or is overcome, that is when security is achieved and status quo is not threatened, the system loses its only reason for existence. It may be dissolved, or more often than not, it may become atrophied.*
- *The necessary and inevitable role of the super power(s) in the system, generates its own dynamic – the problem of the unwise or arrogant or selfish big brother, and the insecure, ungrateful, over-cautious or over-zealous little brothers.<sup>5</sup>*

Pada dasarnya, strategi perikatan ini adalah perkara yang berhubung-kait dengan keselamatan. Dengan pembentukan perikatan, negara-negara ahli akan merasa lebih selamat dan keselamatan mereka lebih terjamin. Negara-negara sekutu kecil secara langsung akan dapat menikmati keselamatan dan keamanan tanpa mengeluarkan kos yang tinggi dan kadangkala dilihat sebagai ‘free ride.’ Ini adalah kerana tiada bebanan atau tanggungjawab yang tertentu dikenakan kepada mereka dari sudut keselamatan.

<sup>3</sup> Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp 12-13.

<sup>4</sup> Walt, Stephen M., *The Origin of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p vi.

<sup>5</sup> M V Naidu, *Alliances and Balance of Power*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975, pp 37-38.

## FAKTOR-FAKTOR YANG MEMBERIKAN PENGARUH KEPADA SEKUTU-SEKUTU KECIL

### Pengaruh Disebabkan Oleh Sistem Antarabangsa

Sistem antarabangsa merupakan faktor utama yang mempengaruhi hubungan antara sekutu-sekutu kecil dan negara-negara berkuasa besar. Sistem bipolar melahirkan satu bentuk persaingan yang memberi peluang dan ruang yang besar kepada sekutu - sekutu kecil. Persaingan antara dua kuasa besar iaitu AS dan Kesatuan Soviet, secara tidak langsung telah menghadkan kuasa mereka untuk bertindak sebagai kuasa besar disebabkan oleh senjata nuklear. Terdapat sesetengah pendapat yang menyatakan bahawa perperangan secara besar-besaran dan *total/tidak* berlaku kerana adanya senjata nuklear. Ini telah memberikan ruang dan peluang kepada sekutu-sekutu kecilnya untuk bergerak dengan bebas.

Kepentingan utama kedua-dua kuasa besar semasa Perang Dingin adalah untuk mengembangkan blok masing-masing kepada negara-negara kecil dan negara-negara yang tidak terlibat dalam persaingan ini. Pada masa yang sama, persaingan juga berlaku antara dua kuasa besar ini dalam usaha untuk menyekat pengaruh mereka dari berkembang ke atas sekutu kecil masing-masing. Sekutu kecil pula memerlukan blok yang bertentangan atau bersaing dengan mereka bagi mengekalkan nilai mereka sebagai ahli kepada blok yang asal. Namun kekuatan sekutu kecil ini adalah bergantung kepada rapatnya jalinan hubungan mereka dengan kuasa-kuasa besar, terutamanya apabila berlaku persaingan di antara mereka. Hubungan yang rapat dengan kuasa-kuasa besar akan memberikan kelebihan dalam menghadapi persaingan dengan sekutu kecil dari blok yang lain. Kekalahan sesebuah negara yang bersekutu dengan sekutu lain yang bersaing dengannya, bermakna negara tersebut hilang keupayaannya untuk berperang dengan menggunakan senjata bukan nuklear. Kekalahan ini sukar diatasi melalui penggunaan kuasa tentera

kerana ia dianggap sebagai kekalahan dari sudut politik. Oleh itu, untuk mengelak dari hilangnya pengaruh atau berubahnya pendirian sekutu-sekutu kecil, maka kuasa-kuasa besar terpaksa memberi perhatian kepada permintaan yang dibuat oleh mereka.

Senjata nuklear yang dimiliki oleh kuasa besar menambahkan lagi jurang kuasa tentera dan keupayaan sebenar untuk menggunakan kuasa ini. Keadaan ini telah menyebabkan kekurangan penggunaan kuasa tentera sebagai satu pengaruh berbanding dengan keadaan sebelumnya. Ini telah dijelaskan oleh Klaus Knor, "*an appreciation of the power of the less powerful and hence the small powers are weak but not meek.*"<sup>6</sup> Dalam sistem antarabangsa, mempunyai elemen-elemen kuasa secara fizikal bukan bermakna pengaruh bertambah secara relatif. Kekurangan dan kelemahan dalam menggunakan skil atau kemahuan kuasa besar untuk menggunakan kuasa mereka secara efektif, dilihat sebagai satu faktor utama yang menyebabkan kurangnya pengaruh mereka terhadap sekutu kecil.

Keseimbangan ketakutan (*balance of terror*) antara kuasa-kuasa besar dilihat tidak memberi kesan terhadap tingkah laku sekutu-sekutu kecil. Disebabkan oleh ketakutan kuasa-kuasa besar berhadapan antara satu sama lain atau perubahan terhadap keseimbangan strategi politik sesama mereka, maka sekutu-sekutu kecil mempunyai lebih kebebasan untuk bertindak. Ini menyebabkan kuasa-kuasa besar yang menjadi sekutu mereka menghadapi kesukaran untuk melaksanakan pengawalan dengan lebih efektif. Tambahan pula, sekutu-sekutu kecil akan menggunakan alasan ini sebagai satu instrumen politik bagi menambahkan kuasa tawar-menawar (*bargaining power*). Dengan menggunakan strategi ancaman bahawa konflik setempat akan merebak secara besar-besaran, sekutu-sekutu kecil ini akan mempunyai lebih banyak pengaruh

<sup>6</sup> Knorr, Klaus., *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp 75-76.

dalam memberi tekanan kepada kuasa besar yang menjadi penaungnya.

### Pengaruh Disebabkan Persepsi AS Terhadap Perang Dingin

Kepentingan sekutu-sekutu kecil kepada AS semasa Perang Dingin memberikan pengaruh yang besar kepada mereka. Konflik ideologi politik antara AS dan Kesatuan Soviet mempengaruhi para pembuat keputusan (*decision makers*) AS dan mereka melihat bahawa ianya merupakan konflik 'zero-sum.' Semua negara kecil yang berada di luar pengaruh Kesatuan Soviet dilihat sebagai ancaman secara terus kepada kepentingan nasional AS. Kejayaan Kesatuan Soviet dalam mengembangkan pengaruhnya ke atas negara lain akan menyebabkan tindakan agresif diambil oleh satu pihak yang lain. Menurut 'teori domino' hampir semua negara kecil dianggap penting oleh pemimpin-pemimpin AS dan persepsi ini telah memberi galakan kepada AS untuk melibatkan diri ke atas kawasan negara-negara kecil tersebut yang bersempadan.<sup>7</sup>

Kepentingan sekutu-sekutu kecil ini bukan sahaja disebabkan oleh teori domino, tetapi juga konsep Perang Dingin yang meletakkan mereka sebagai '*collector's approach*' atau '*interdependence commitment theory*'. Menurut Hans Morgenthau, "*the collector's approach to alliances was to accumulate as many as possible. The more alliances, the better... the more nations sign a legal document declaring their support for our policies, the better.*"<sup>8</sup> Bagaimanapun pendekatan ini dilihat sebagai membahayakan kepentingan politik AS, kerana sekutu-sekutunya telah menukar kepentingan AS di dalam perikatan tersebut untuk kepentingan politik

mereka. Sekutu-sekutu kecil ini lebih cenderung untuk menjadikan perikatan ini sebagai instrumen kepada polisi mereka dengan AS.<sup>9</sup> Teori 'interdependence commitment' adalah berdasarkan kepada, "*belief that the failure of the U.S. to honor one commitment effectively would weaken the credibility of all our American commitments, and hence 'invite' further challenges.*"<sup>10</sup> Konsep ini dianggap sebagai keperluan bukan sahaja di dalam proses tawar-menawar dengan Kesatuan Soviet atau China, tetapi juga tawar-menawar dengan sekutu-sekutu AS dalam usaha untuk memperkuatkan lagi pengaruh AS terhadap mereka. Keadaan ini menyebabkan bertambahnya persepsi terhadap kepentingan untuk melindungi negara-negara sekutu kecil, tidak kira sama ada ia benar-benar penting atau berapa banyaknya kos yang diperlukan. Sebagai contoh, kepentingan Greece dan Turki bertambah dengan begitu mendadak di mata para pemimpin AS apabila Kesatuan Soviet memberikan tekanan kepada mereka. Bertambahnya kepentingan Korea Selatan hanya apabila ia mula diserang oleh Korea Utara. Menurut Schelling, kepentingan India bertambah kerana keperluan untuk menyekat China dan untuk mencerminkan keupayaan penglibatan AS.<sup>11</sup>

Dalam kes Vietnam, negara tersebut bukan merupakan sekutu yang penting kepada AS, tetapi para pemimpin AS menganggap bahawa kehilangannya akan menyebabkan kekalahan AS di peringkat antarabangsa dan domestik. Malah 'Nixon Doctrine' yang cuba untuk mengurangkan penglibatan AS menekankan bahawa pentadbiran AS mestilah menghormati penglibatan tersebut kerana impak kepada perubahan secara mengejut di peringkat serantau dan kestabilan dunia. "*To desert those who have come to depend on us*

<sup>7</sup> George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p 552.

<sup>8</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., 'Alliance in Theory and Practice,' see Arnold Wolfers, (ed), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, p 211.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, p 553.

<sup>11</sup> Schelling, Thomas C., *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp 55-59.

*would cause disruption and invite aggression.*<sup>12</sup> Tahap kepentingan sekutu kecil ini adalah bergantung kepada nilai di mana para pemimpin AS meletakkannya mengikut persepsi Perang Dingin dengan tidak begitu mengambilkira tentang kepentingan sebenar dari sudut strategik dan politik. Menurut Keohane, "the big influence of small allies may be an unplanned but natural result of American globally active foreign policy."<sup>13</sup>

### Pengaruh Melalui Kelemahan

Kelemahan juga merupakan kelebihan kepada sekutu kecil dalam urusan tawar-menawar di dalam sesebuah perikatan. Schelling menyatakan bahawa dalam hubungan tawar-menawar antara dua individu atau dua negara, kelemahan juga merupakan kekuatan. "When a person or a country has lost the power to help himself, or the power to avert mutual damage [in those situations] the other interested party has no choice but to assume the cost or responsibility."<sup>14</sup> Kelemahan memberi peluang kepada proses tawar-menawar kepada sekutu kecil hanya apabila sekutunya yang besar meletakkan nilai yang tinggi terhadap kepentingan perikatan. Dalam perkataan lain, sekutunya yang besar berada dalam keadaan yang lemah di dalam proses tawar-menawar di dalam sesebuah perikatan kerana kepentingannya untuk mengekalkan sistem perikatan. Sekutu kecil kemungkinan akan memanipulasi kelemahan sebagai punca kepada pengaruh mereka. Strategi seperti mempunyai kuasa tentera yang lemah meggambarkan bahawa kuasa besar mempunyai kewajipan untuk membantu sekutu kecilnya bagi mengelakkan berlakunya kekalahan. Negara

sekutu kecil ini mengancam akan mengalami kejatuhan atau kekalahan jika bantuan yang mencukupi tidak diberikan oleh kuasa besar yang menjadi sekutunya. Ini menunjukkan bahawa sekutu kecil tidak mempunyai pengaruh yang seimbang dalam sesebuah perikatan kerana ia mempunyai keupayaan untuk melibatkan sekutu sekutunya yang besar, yang tidak boleh menerima kekalahan oleh sekutu kecilnya yang lemah.

Taiwan dan Korea Selatan misalnya telah memberikan tekanan kepada AS dengan memanipulasi kelemahan mereka sejak sekian lama. Situasi ini memberikan peluang kepada mereka untuk membangun dan mengembangkan negara mereka dalam bidang ekonomi dengan memperolehi jaminan keselamatan dari AS. Dalam konflik Arab-Israel, kedua-dua pihak menggunakan kelemahan mereka pada tahap-tahap yang tertentu sebagai asas kepada kuasa tawar-menawar dalam hubungannya dengan kuasa-kuasa besar yang menjadi sekutu mereka. Dalam "War of Attrition" di antara Mesir dan Israel (1969-70), Nasser telah meletakkan kepemimpinan Kesatuan Soviet dalam keadaan dilema. Mereka terpaksa menerima risiko politik dan ketenteraan dengan melibatkan campurtangan tentera secara terus dalam peperangan tersebut bagi menghentikan serangan udara dari Israel, atau terpaksa menghadapi sebarang bahaya akibat dari kejatuhan rejim Nasser. Penubuhan kerajaan baru Mesir yang berorientasikan rejim pro-barat akan memberi kesan kepada kepentingan Kesatuan Soviet di Timur Tengah. Dalam hal ini Mohamed Heikal memetik amaran Nasser kepada para pemimpin Kesatuan Soviet, "I shall go back to Egypt and I shall tell the people the truth. I shall tell them that the time has come for me to step down and hand over to a pro-American President. If I cannot save them, somebody else will have to do it. That is my final word."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Nixon, Richard., *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace* (Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971), pp 12-13.

<sup>13</sup> Keohane, Robert O., *The Big Influence of Small Allies, Foreign Policy*, p 188.

<sup>14</sup> Schelling, Thomas C., *The Strategy of Conflict*, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, p 37.

<sup>15</sup> Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1976, p 82.

## Pengaruh Melalui Sistem Politik AS

Selain daripada persepsi Perang Dingin oleh para pemimpin AS sebagai faktor utama yang memberikan pengaruh yang besar kepada negara-negara sekutu kecilnya, keadaan semulajadi sistem politik AS juga merupakan faktor utama dalam memahami kuasa tawar-menawar oleh sekutu-sekutu kecil. Israel, Sepanyol dan lain-lain mendapatkan pengaruhnya dengan *"developing close cooperative ties with powerful elements of American society and [by] taking advantage of the fact that U.S. policy is largely the outcome of clash and compromise among separate interest groups and bureaucratic units."*<sup>16</sup> Kebanyakan pengaruh sekutu-sekutu kecil dikenalpasti melalui sejauh mana manupulasi pergantungannya dengan agensi-agensi kerajaan AS. Penerimaan sekutu kecil ini adalah melalui pelaksanaan dan penglibatan mereka terhadap misi yang telah diberikan. Penempatan pangkalan bagi tentera laut dan udara, hak untuk menggunakan penerbangan udara serta lain-lain fasilitas memerlukan penglibatan dari sekutu-sekutu kecilnya. Kebergantungan agensi-agensi ini kepada Sepanyol, Portugal dan Turki dalam menggunakan fasilitas ini telah dieksplotasi oleh sekutu-sekutu kecil ini dalam usaha meningkatkan kuasa tawar-menawar mereka dengan pentadbiran AS. Sebagai langkah untuk terus menggunakan kemudahan-kemudahan ini, agensi-agensi berkenaan lebih cenderung kepada pendapat yang dikemukakan oleh sekutu-sekutu ini. Apabila ini berlaku, ia bermakna agensi-agensi berkenaan telah membantu sekutu-sekutu kecil ini meningkatkan atau menambahkan pengaruh mereka.

Kaedah lain yang menyebabkan pengaruh sekutu-sekutu kecil bertambah ialah melalui sokongan yang diberikan kepada kumpulan-kumpulan tertentu di AS ... "A State following this

strategy solicits support from ethnic groups with common attitudes towards Communism, religious groups, and others interested in foreign policy."<sup>17</sup> Israel merupakan contoh yang terbaik bagi fenomena ini. Dengan menggunakan hubungan etnik Yahudi AS, Israel telah berjaya dari masa ke semasa dalam mempengaruhi dasar luar AS terhadap Timur Tengah. Begitu juga dengan Indonesia yang menggunakan konsep 'serumpun' dalam mempengaruhi dasar luar Malaysia, tetapi dilihat tidak begitu berjaya. Dalam konteks Vietnam, Leslie Gelb menyatakan, *"that domestic, bureaucratic and organizational judgement are involved in defining Vietnam's importance, rather than successful manipulation by Vietnam of the differences within American domestic politics. The domestic repercussions of 'losing' Vietnam probably were important in opening the floodgates to domestic criticism and attack."*<sup>18</sup> Oleh itu, organisasi pentadbiran AS dan para birokrat berkongsi pendapat bahawa Presiden memberi perhatian yang serius terhadap kejatuhan Vietnam. Mereka terpaksa membuktikan bahawa bantuan persenjataan dan nasihat yang diberikan oleh AS kepada Vietnam akan berjaya. Mereka juga terpaksa membuktikan bahawa bantuan jutaan dolar AS boleh mengembalikan keadaan politik seperti sediakala. Menurut Gelb lagi pertimbangan ini bermakna, *"no systematic or serious examination of Vietnam's importance to the U.S. was ever undertaken within the government. Presidents neither encouraged nor permitted serious questioning, for to do so would be to foster the idea that their resolve was something less than complete."*<sup>19</sup> Pengaruh sekutu kecil dalam menggambarkan kepentingan mereka bukan sahaja disebabkan oleh skilnya dalam memanupulasi perbezaan terhadap kumpulan politik AS, tetapi juga terhadap birokratik domestik dan pertimbangan organisasi yang tiada hubungan secara terus atau cuba untuk mempengaruhi mereka.

<sup>16</sup> Keohane, Robert O., The Big Influence of Small Allies, *Foreign Policy*, p 164.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p 166.

<sup>18</sup> Gelb, Leslie., Vietnam: The System Worked, *Foreign Policy*, No. 3, Summer 1971, p 143.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p 147

## Pengaruh Disebabkan Kurangnya Penglibatan AS

Bertambahnya kuasa tawar-menawar sekutu-sekutu kecil berkait-rapat dengan kurangnya keupayaan penglibatan AS. Kekurangan keupayaan ini menyebabkan kurangnya kemampuan AS untuk mempengaruhi sekutu kecilnya secara efektif. Kecenderungan AS untuk mengurangkan penglibatan dan ketidakmampuan untuk memberi penglibatan, menyebabkan kurangnya pengaruh sekutu kecil dalam dasar luar AS. Ia juga menyebabkan kurangnya pengaruh AS terhadap sekutu kecilnya. Perkembangan ini adalah disebabkan oleh keadaan semasa dan antara sebab-sebab yang dikenalpasti adalah seperti berikut:

- *The retreat or the perception of retreat of American military power, because of the passing of American strategic superiority and the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviet Union and because of its inability to finish the Vietnam War with successful military result;*
- *The growth of domestic pressures because of American intervention in Vietnam to scale down U.S. military activities abroad, and the unwillingness of domestic opinion to support new commitments;*
- *The tightening of the links between foreign policy and the demands of internal policy, shifts priorities to domestic problems;*
- *The weakened economic position of the U.S. vis-à-vis others, preventing the U.S. from rewarding its closest allies or punishing them, even assuming that it wished to do so.<sup>20</sup>*

Pengosongan AS di Vietnam dan keengganannya untuk mengambil satu tindakan yang tegas terhadap aksi proksi Kesatuan Soviet seperti di Cuba, Angola dan Ethiopia, mengurangkan keupayaan dan kemampuan penglibatan AS. Secara keseluruhannya, kebergantungan kepada AS telah berkurangan. Sekutu-sekutu kecil AS tidak lagi beraksi sebagai rakan kongsi apabila mereka beranggapan bahawa AS tidak lagi mempunyai kemampuan untuk memberi jaminan keselamatan terhadap ancaman luaran atau domestik. Sebagai contoh, kelemahan kedudukan AS dalam krisis di Iran telah mempengaruhi Arab Saudi untuk membentuk satu polisi yang lebih bebas daripada AS. Jika Arab Saudi tidak mempercayai dan mengharapkan AS berhubung kepentingan nasionalnya, maka tidak ada sebab mengapa ia boleh dipengaruhi oleh AS, tambahan pula mereka mengenalpasti bahawa AS bergantung kepada mereka dari segi pembekalan minyak. Ini menyebabkan Arab Saudi pula mempunyai lebih pengaruh kepada AS dan kuasa tawar-menawar juga lebih berpihak kepada mereka. Jelas di sini bahawa penglibatan dilakukan bukan hanya untuk menghindar musuh, tetapi juga untuk mempengaruhi sekutu-sekutu yang lain. Mengurangkan penglibatan atau persepsi terhadap berkurangnya keupayaan boleh mengubah pengaruh dalam hubungan di antara sekutu yang besar dengan sekutu yang kecil.

## Pengaruh Disebabkan Percanggahan Terhadap Kuasa

Percanggahan ini berlaku disebabkan salah faham berhubung dengan kegunaan sumber kuasa terhadap satu rangkakerja polisi kontigensi yang dianggap sama kegunaannya bagi perkara yang lain. Pengaruh terhadap kuasa lemah dan kuat terjadi disebabkan para penganalisa gagal untuk mengenalpasti bahawa sesebuah negara itu mungkin menjadi lemah dalam satu situasi, tetapi menjadi kuat dalam situasi yang lain. Mempunyai kuasa tentera yang kuat tidak cukup untuk menggambarkan bahawa sesebuah negara itu

<sup>20</sup> George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, p 592.

mempunyai pengaruh yang efektif. Dalam satu keadaan di mana terdapatnya halangan politik untuk menggunakan kuasa tentera sebagai cara untuk mendapatkan pengaruh, terdapat kaedah-kaedah lain yang boleh digunakan untuk mendapatkan pengaruh dengan efektif. Kesediaan untuk membuat pengorbanan yang tinggi atau memiliki sumber ekonomi seperti minyak, boleh digunakan sebagai satu instrumen yang efektif bagi memperolehi pengaruh dalam situasi yang tertentu. Ini membuktikan bahawa, walaupun sesebuah negara itu memiliki senjata nuklear atau mempunyai ekonomi yang kuat, tiada sebarang jaminan yang boleh menyatakan bahawa ia mempunyai pengaruh yang efektif. Sebagai contoh, AS tidak berjaya mencapai objektifnya di Vietnam, tidak berjaya untuk mencegah berlakunya 'Arab Oil Embargo' pada tahun 1973, tidak berjaya untuk mengekalkan pemerintahan Shah di Iran dan tidak berjaya untuk menyekat naiknya harga minyak.<sup>21</sup> Dalam konteks analisa kuasa dan pengaruh ini, penjelasan yang penting ialah bagaimana untuk melihat dan memahami mengapa sekutu yang lemah dan kecil kadangkala dilihat menjadi kuat dalam satu-satu suasana yang tertentu. Perbezaan suasana mestilah dikenalpasti kerana ia mencerminkan kuasa dan pengaruh sesebuah negara.

## Pengaruh Dan Kepentingan

Dengan menganalisa kuasa kepada konteks yang tertentu dan mengesyorkan bahawa hubungan kuasa adalah berbeza dalam pelbagai skop, kegunaan dan penguasaannya, maka pendekatan secara '*contextual*' boleh membantu dalam menyelesaikan peranggahan terhadap pengaruh yang besar ke atas sekutu-sekutu kecil. Sesetengah sekutu-sekutu kecil adalah penting dalam sesuatu konteks, dan oleh itu ianya mempunyai pengaruh. Kuasa tawar-menawar sekutu-sekutu kecil seperti Arab Saudi, Mexico,

Turki, Israel dan Sepanyol bukan sahaja dikaitkan dengan kebolehan atau skil memanipulasi kelemahan mereka atau hubungan pertalian yang rapat dengan masyarakat AS, tetapi mereka juga menjadi penting kerana memiliki sumber kuasa yang diperlukan oleh AS bagi kepentingan nasional atau kesejahteraan ekonomi mereka. Sekiranya sekutu yang lebih besar memerlukan pangkalan atau fasilitas ketenteraan yang lain, seperti stesen elektronik perisikan atau bekalan minyak, maka sekutu yang besar ini akan menjadi '*vulnerable*' terhadap tindakan untuk mendapatkan pengaruh dari sekutu kecilnya. K.J. Holsti menekankan bahawa, "*that this is the primary reason why states which are 'weak' in many capabilities can nevertheless obtain concessions from 'strong' countries.*"<sup>22</sup> Morgenthau pula menyatakan, "*it is possible that a weak nation possesses an asset that is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable. Here the unique benefit the former is able to grant or withhold gives it out of keeping with the actual distribution of power.*"<sup>23</sup> Arab Saudi dan Mexico kepada AS kerana mereka mempunyai minyak. Kepentingan Sepanyol, kepada AS pula adalah kerana kepentingan strategik dari segi geopoliti. Israel boleh menempatkan pangkalan bagi stesen elektronik perisikan. Israel pula menjadi penting kerana ia mempunyai keupayaan ketenteraan dan kesiapsiagaannya untuk mengambil tindakan ketenteraan bagi mempertahankan bukan sahaja keselamatan negaranya tetapi juga sekutu-sekutu kecil AS di rantau tersebut.

Kepentingan sekutu-sekutu kecil kepada AS pada tahun 1970an tidak sama seperti kepentingan dalam tahun 1950an. Sekutu-sekutu kecil masih lagi bergantung kepada AS untuk mengekalkan kepentingan nasional mereka, akan

<sup>21</sup> Baldwin, David A., Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies, *World Politics*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, January 1979, p 168.

<sup>22</sup> Holsti, K.J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972, p 162.

<sup>23</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., *Alliances in Theory and Practice*, see Arnold Wolfers, (ed), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, p 190.

tetapi AS pula bergantung kepada mereka dari segi pembekalan minyak dan kesediaan mereka untuk membantu mempertahankan kepentingan AS. Sebagai contoh, kehilangan stesen elektronik perisikan di Iran selepas kejatuhan Shah telah menyebabkan stesen AS di Turki menjadi begitu penting. Kepentingan stesen di Turki ini menjadi kritikal kepada AS bagi tujuan memerhati pembangunan ketenteraan yang dilaksanakan oleh Kesatuan Soviet. Oleh itu, AS terpaksa membuat pertimbangan berkaitan kepentingan hubungannya dengan Turki. AS misalnya tidak boleh melaksanakan '*arm embargo*' ke atas Turki dengan tujuan memaksanya untuk menempatkan stesen elektronik perisikan di negaranya. Seorang Senator bebas di Turki, Metin Toker dalam satu taklimat kepada pemberita telah menggambarkan konsepsi Turki berhubung perkara ini apabila beliau menyatakan, "*You Americans are most interested in your bases. We Turks are most interested in improving the condition of our economy and our armed forces, which suffered severely from the embargo. Somewhere there must be a meeting of minds.*"<sup>24</sup>

Apabila sekutu yang besar bergantung kepada sokongan sekutu kecilnya dalam usaha untuk mencapai kepentingannya, secara langsung mereka akan mengelak dari mengganggu-gugat di antara satu sama lain. Ini menyebabkan hubungan di antara kedua-dua sekutu ini menjadi saling bergantungan. Perubahan terhadap hubungan dari bergantung sepenuhnya kepada AS kepada saling bergantungan menunjukkan peningkatan pengaruh kepada sekutu kecil. Konsep saling bergantungan yang membawa maksud saling mengharapkan di antara satu sama lain mencerminkan bahawa sekutu-sekutu tersebut mempunyai pengaruh yang sama. Saling bergantungan, mengikut Baldwin, "*is a situation where both sides possess the ability to influence*

*one another in some respects.*"<sup>25</sup> Dari segi penggunaan kuasa, AS lebih banyak menggunakan kuasanya jika dibandingkan dengan sekutu-sekutunya yang lain dalam menjalin hubungan saling bergantungan tersebut dan ini menyebabkan kos yang tinggi terpaksa ditanggung oleh AS. Keadaan ini menjadi sukar seputrimana yang dinyatakan oleh Oran Young, "*for any actor to exercise power at a low cost to itself, as the level of interdependence in a world system increases. Controlling the greatest quantities of power resources is not enough to exercise effective influence in interdependence relationships.*"<sup>26</sup> Pada kebiasaannya sekutu-sekutu kecil akan menggunakan hubungan saling bergantungan ini untuk meningkatkan kuasa tawar-menawar bukan sahaja terhadap sesuatu isu malah melibatkan isu-isu yang lain. Dalam perkataan lain, sekutu kecil ini akan memperolehi kekuatan dan kelemahan pada susut-sudut yang berlainan dalam usaha untuk memaksimakan keseluruhan pengaruh.

### Definisi Semula Hubungan AS-Sekutu-sekutu Kecil: Doktrin Nixon

Doktrin Nixon yang di isytiharkan pada bulan Julai 1969 merupakan polisi AS yang pertama berhubung penglibatan AS ke atas sekutu-sekutu kecilnya, khususnya di Asia Tenggara. Pada ketika ini kedua-dua kuasa besar berada dalam situasi '*détente*'. Menurut Nixon, "*perceptions of the growing imbalance between the scope of America's role and the potential of America's partners prompted the Nixon Doctrine.*"<sup>27</sup> Doktrin Nixon ini dilihat bukan sahaja sebagai respon dari tekanan domestik yang berkehendakkan supaya penglibatan tentera AS dikurangkan, malah mengurangkan pengaruh sekutu-sekutu kecil terhadap AS dalam membuat sebarang keputusan. Nixon juga menekankan

<sup>24</sup> Baldwin, David A., Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies, *World Politics*, p 171.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p 175.

<sup>26</sup> Young, Oran R., *Interdependence in World Politics, International Journal*, Vol. 24, Autumn 1969, pp 747-8.

<sup>27</sup> Nixon, Richard., *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace Report*, p 10.

tentang kepentingan utama sebelum melibatkan diri dalam sesuatu isu dengan menyatakan, "Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than other way round."<sup>28</sup> Doktrin ini bertujuan untuk menyekat penglibatan tentera AS dalam konflik setempat seperti Vietnam dan ianya telah memberi kesan kepada sekutu-sekutunya berhubung tanggungjawab untuk mempertahankan negaranya sendiri. Bagaimanapun AS meneruskan bantuan dari sudut ekonomi dan ketenteraan kepada negara-negara yang menjadi sekutunya dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawab mereka untuk menjadi sebuah negara yang tidak bergantung pada negara yang lain dan percaya kepada diri sendiri (*self-reliance*). Berbanding dengan penglibatan AS semasa Perang Dingin, doktrin tersebut mengesyorkan penglibatan AS adalah bergantung kepada pemilihan kriteria-kriteria yang tertentu dan bagaimana AS harus terlibat dalam usaha untuk menentang ancaman ke atas sekutu kecilnya. Kriteria-kriteria ini adalah, "the national concern of the U.S., the importance of the ally to the U.S., the degree of direct involvement in the local conflict by the Soviet Union, and the efficacy of U.S. direct involvement."<sup>29</sup> Tanpa memberi petunjuk yang jelas, doktrin ini telah cuba untuk membeza-bezakan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya, penglibatan yang memerlukan pelbagai isu dan pelbagai kemungkinan bagi penglibatan AS. Ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa tidak semua sekutu-sekutunya mempunyai kepentingan yang sama kepada AS. Berbanding dengan penglibatan AS dalam Perang Dingin, Doktrin Nixon ini menyeru penglibatan AS supaya lebih rasional dan bergantung kepada konsep situasi semasa. Ini menunjukkan bahawa AS hanya akan memberi bantuan kepada sekutunya apabila mereka mempunyai kepentingan dan dalam satu situasi yang benar-benar memerlukan mereka untuk mengambil tindakan.

Percubaan pentadbiran Nixon untuk melaksanakan doktrin tersebut di Vietnam dan Cambodia dengan 'Vietnamization' atau 'Cambodization' mengalami kegagalan. Doktrin ini adalah berdasarkan kepada penilaian bahawa negara-negara Asia mempunyai keupayaan dan kemampuan untuk mengekalkan order di wilayah masing-masing dan keadaan serantau. Penilaian ini adalah tidak benar dalam kes Vietnam dan Cambodia dan hanya menampakkan kegagalan AS untuk mengekalkan kemerdekaan mereka. Doktrin ini dilihat berjaya apabila digunakan di Timur Tengah dan hanya Israel merupakan contoh kepada kejayaan doktrin ini. Dengan memberikan bantuan ketenteraan dan ekonomi, Israel bukan sahaja telah berjaya untuk mempertahankan negaranya dalam dua peperangan (1969-1970, 1973), tetapi juga mempertahankan kepentingan AS di Timur Tengah. Dengan mengaturgerakkan tenteranya, Israel telah berjaya menghalang Syria dan sekutu-sekutunya daripada meneruskan penaklukan ke atas Jordan pada bulan September 1970. Dengan berbuat demikian, Israel telah berjaya menghalang AS dari melibatkan diri dalam konflik berkenaan. Ketidakjelasan Doktrin Nixon berhubung dengan peranan tentera AS dalam mengendalikan konflik setempat termasuk konflik dalaman, serta kegagalannya di Asia Tenggara memberikan gambaran yang tidak menentu kepada sekutu-sekutu kecilnya. Perikatan dengan AS dilihat telah menghentikan jaminan yang efektif ke atas kepentingan nasional mereka. Tegasnya, Doktrin Nixon dan implementasinya diinterpretasi oleh sekutu-sekutu kecilnya dan negara komunis sebagai bukti yang nyata tentang kelemahan AS.

### **Pengaruh Hubungan Dalam Bentuk Baru**

Terdapat tiga cadangan untuk menyeimbangkan pengaruh hubungan di antara AS dan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya: (1) Kepentingan AS sebagai kriteria utama untuk melaksanakan hubungan ini; (2) Perbezaan di antara sekutu-sekutu kecil mengikut kepentingannya kepada kepentingan nasional AS; (3) Penglibatan mengikut

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p 7.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p 14

konsep *situational*. Implikasi kepada cadangan ini kemungkinan akan membantu untuk menghasilkan satu bentuk baru kepada pengaruh, tetapi akan menimbulkan masalah berkaitan dengan kesepadan dan kestabilan perikatan. Dengan membuat definisi semula ke atas kepentingan nasional AS khususnya dalam hubungan dengan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya yang tertentu dan mengambilkira apakah kaitan hubungan ini dengan kepentingannya, pembuat polisi AS akan dapat menyeimbangkan pengaruh hubungan tersebut.<sup>30</sup> Namun, penggunaan kepentingan nasional sebagai kriteria utama oleh AS akan mengurangkan kestabilan perikatan. Hubungan perikatan bukan hanya berpandukan kepada kepentingan sesebuah negara sekutu sahaja, tetapi juga kepentingan nasional negara-negara sekutu yang lain serta mengambilkira kepentingan bersama dalam perikatan. Sekiranya sekutu-sekutu dalam perikatan mempunyai perbezaan pemahaman berhubung objektif perikatan dan percanggahan berhubung definisi semula kepentingan nasional, maka kestabilan dan kesepadan perikatan berkenaan berada dalam keadaan yang bahaya.

Pengaruh hubungan juga boleh diseimbangkan dengan membuat perbezaan ke atas sekutu-sekutu kecilnya mengikut kepentingannya kepada AS dari sudut politik, ekonomi dan kepentingan strategik. Ini bermakna bukan semua sekutu mempunyai kepentingan yang sama kepada AS. Lebih banyak pemilihan ke atas kriteria-kriteria tertentu dibuat berdasarkan kepada kepentingannya, maka ia menjadikan pengaruh hubungan lebih rasional. Sebagai contoh, Doktrin Nixon mengesyorkan bahawa, sekutu-sekutu penting adalah mereka yang boleh diaturgerakkan dan menggunakan sumber untuk mempertahankan diri mereka sendiri, serta siapakah yang boleh memainkan peranan yang aktif dalam membantu mempertahankan

kepentingan AS.<sup>31</sup> Kriteria ini dilihat hanya terhad kepada pandangan dari sudut ketenteraan sahaja.

Terdapat pandangan yang mengesyorkan kriteria-kriteria yang lebih komprehensif dalam melihat kepentingan sekutu-sekutu kecil kepada AS, antaranya, "due to (1) its economic role (e.g. a major oil supply); (2) its political and strategic role in the regional system; (3) its strategic location; (4) its domestic stability; (5) its readiness to take military initiatives that the U.S. is unable to take, in order to deter threats against America's or the allies' interests."<sup>32</sup> Dengan mengadakan dan mengekalkan perikatan dengan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya yang memiliki kualiti yang penting – sumber ekonomi (Arab Saudi, Mexico); tentera yang sesuai dan sentiasa bersiap sedia untuk bertindak (Israel); kedudukan yang strategik (Turki, Portugal, Sepanyol, Greece) – semua ini memberi kelebihan kepada AS. Persoalannya, apakah kos dan darjah kepentingannya dari sudut pengaruh terhadap sekutu-sekutu ini? Sekutu-sekutu kecil yang penting terpaksa menikmati pengaruh yang relatif dan oleh itu sumbangan yang dilakukan juga berbentuk relatif kepada kepentingan AS. Oleh itu, peranan utama pembuat dasar AS adalah untuk mengenalpasti perkara yang berkaitan dengan kepentingan dan kos. Sebagai contoh, apakah perbezaannya di antara sekutu kecil yang mempunyai kepentingan sumber ekonomi dengan sekutu kecil yang memiliki kuasa tentera atau lokasi yang strategik?

Cara yang paling berkesan untuk menyelesaikan masalah ini adalah dengan mengumpul dan memusatkan jumlah kuasa. Analisa terperinci berhubung kepentingan dan pengaruh bagi konteks yang tertentu seperti kuasa tentera, lokasi strategik, ekonomi menunjukkan bahawa kuasa, kepentingan dan pengaruh adalah mempunyai skop yang berbeza. Kekuatannya dan penguasaannya adalah mengikut keadaan, keperluan dan masa. Misalnya, bertambahnya kebergantungan AS terhadap bekalan minyak

<sup>30</sup> Keohane, Robert O., *The Big Influence of Small Allies*, *Foreign Policy*, p 190.

<sup>31</sup> Nixon, Richard., *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, p 14.

<sup>32</sup> Baldwin, David A., *Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies*, *World Politics*, p 166.

telah menambahkan kuasa tawar-menawar kepada negara-negara pengeluar minyak. Pengurangan AS bergantung kepada pangkalan di luar negara bagi mengekalkan cegahrintang yang strategik, telah mengurangkan nilai wilayah sesebuah negara seperti Korea Selatan, Thailand dan Cambodia. Namun, bagi sebuah negara kuasa besar seperti AS yang mempunyai kepentingan yang banyak dan kompleks, tidak ada satu kriteria yang jelas dan boleh dijadikan sebagai ukuran dan perantaraan bagi meningkatkan kuasa kepada sekutu-sekutu kecilnya. Aset yang dimiliki oleh sekutu-sekutu kecil akan menjadi kurang efektif dalam satu konteks yang lain dan akhirnya dilihat sebagai satu kerugian.

Konsep penglibatan mengikut keadaan atau situasi bergantung kepada penilaian semula kepentingan nasional. Penglibatan kuasa besar mengikut pandangan dan situasi semasa akan menyebabkan sekutu-sekutu kecil bergantung kepada mereka untuk menyelesaikan sesuatu konflik tersebut. Keadaan ini menyebabkan ketidaktentuan politik kepada sekutu-sekutu yang lemah kerana bantuan yang diberikan sentiasa tidak menentu. Sekutu-sekutu kecil AS tidak mempunyai kemahanan lagi untuk untuk berada di dalam perikatan berkenaan atau dipengaruhi oleh AS, sekiranya perikatan tidak dianggap sebagai satu instrumen yang memberi jaminan terhadap kepentingan nasional mereka. Akibatnya, kecenderungan untuk keluar dari perikatan, membentuk hubungan istimewa dengan perikatan yang bertentangan, atau membentuk pertahanan sendiri dengan pemilikan senjata nuklear akan bertambah.<sup>33</sup> Keadaan ini akan menjadikan sistem

antarabangsa tidak stabil dan mengurangkan peranan AS sebagai pemimpin dan kuasa dunia. Penglibatan mengikut situasi ini juga mungkin boleh menyekat pengaruh sekutu-sekutunya, akan tetapi secara jangka panjanya boleh menimbulkan bahaya. Oleh itu, AS haruslah mengenalpasti kos dan risiko apabila menyediakan sesuatu polisi yang berkaitan dengan kepentingan nasionalnya.

## PENUTUP

Pada keseluruhannya, kertas ini cuba untuk mengumpul semua faktor-faktor yang memberi kesan kepada pengaruh hubungan di antara AS dan sekutu-sekutu kecilnya. Adalah jelas bahawa, sekutu-sekutu kecil mempunyai pengaruh yang besar pada masa lalu bukanlah disebabkan oleh persepsi Perang Dingin, skil memanupulasi kelemahan atau perbezaan di antara kumpulan politik AS. Pentingnya sekutu-sekutu kecil ini adalah disebabkan pemilikan mereka ke atas sumber kuasa yang diperlukan oleh AS untuk kepentingan nasionalnya atau kesejahteraan ekonomi mereka. Perubahan dari bergantung kepada AS sepenuhnya kepada saling bergantungan dalam sesetengah konteks, kurangnya keupayaan AS untuk melibatkan diri, kelemahan kedudukan ekonomi AS berbanding lain telah mencegahnya dari memberi ganjaran atau mengenakan hukuman menggambarkan bertambahnya pengaruh sesetengah sekutu-sekutu kecil. Cara bagaimana untuk menyeimbangkan pengaruh hubungan secara berkesan menurut kepentingan nasional AS adalah kompleks kerana percanggahan terhadap keutamaan kepentingan nasional itu sendiri.

33 Brown, Seyom., *New Forces in World Politics*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974, p 20.

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Mej Saiful Anwar bin Md Ali telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja pada 23 Feb 1985. Beliau pernah memegang berbagai jawatan dalam Kor dan Markas Formasi serta jurulatih di ATMA. Memiliki Diploma Lanjutan Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan (UKM), Diploma Strategi dan Pertahanan (UM) serta memperolehi Ijazah Sarjana dalam bidang Kajian Dasar dan Keselamatan dari UKM. Beliau kini berkhidmat sebagai pegawai staf di Jabatanarah Infantri, Markas Tentera Darat.

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# THE NEW KNOWLEDGE CHANNEL

BY LT KOL CHANDRABALAN SINNADURAI

## INTRODUCTION



We are ruled daily by our intuition. Our guts normally simulate our mind to channel our central nervous system to respond efficiently or otherwise. Knowledge can reinvent the way we respond, rethink the quality of our thoughts, transform us into '**doers**', position us to be able to speak out confidently and even can facilitate us to become better listeners. Hence, we can be nurtured to be more sensitive towards human potential and management. Ultimately, it can nurture the corridor for a passionate value system, intrinsic belief system and anchor eventually with *esprit de corps* in the organization.

Though more people scramble for degrees these days, the perception that '**Knowledge is Power**' requires new rejuvenation. We have to be cautious that education does not focus only on the mere accumulation of knowledge. The development of the critical mind needs attention. Many professionals are marginalized in their careers because of the inability to read, write, track, research and present knowledge spontaneously. The new knowledge worker requires this selective cognitive mode to reenergize productivity and to map self-esteem.

The Human Resource Development process is finding it harder to stay ahead of every '**final whistle**' of the bits and bytes. Everything is changing beyond expectations. Faster and more

flexible response is the order of the day. Knowledge to simplify work organizations and work processes is a critical requirement to improve response time. The millennium year 2000 paved the passage for the virtual years where intuition became a core universal value to pound confidence to any ounce of complacency and negligence. Cautiously, the power of judgment and the mechanism of control seem to seek instant priority to assess the volatile years with clarity and confidence.

One must be brave enough to create new '**files**' and challenge traditional ideas. The legacy of depending on old files to '**finish**' work with speed needs re-education. The culture of work smart has its genuine objectives besides its misguided vision. We should avoid from being stamped and dumped as the '**Vice President of the Lazy**'.

Power no longer comes solely from knowledge sourced through academics. Instead knowledge shared through intelligent interaction and networking is spearheading the velocity of thoughts. Learning to work through others will craft our credibility legacy in rediscovering our intellectual curiosity of our mindset.

Everyday learning and thinking should not be contaminated by rigidly following the textbooks and their ideas. We have to realize this contemporary rule in these challenging times against the dark forces of globalisation and liberalization in order to win. The end of the cold

war has strategized the business wars into an increasingly chaotic knowledge battlefield.

## KNOWLEDGE BATTLE

Sun Tzu established on interesting acuity that all warfare is based on deception. I quote: "*A skilled general must be master of the complementary arts of simulation and dissimulation; while creating shapes to confuse and delude the enemy he conceals his true disposition and ultimate intent. When capable he feigns incapacity; when near he makes it appear that he is far away; when far away, that he is near. Moving as intangibly as a ghost in starlight, he is obscure, inaudible. His primary target is the mind of the opposing commander; the victorious situation, a product of his creative imagination*". Unquote. Sun Tzu realized that an indispensable preliminary to battle was to attack the mind of the enemy. This is the traditional backdrop to the knowledge battle.

By drawing upon the knowledge of brain simulation, these pre-emptive mental exercises will download our independent thoughts to enhance better understanding and reduce risks. This further lures you to test your assumptions and uncertainty of your genuine potential power to create the '**the greater you**'. It creates new confidence levels and attitudes through new responses of rediscovery to reach out the windows of the brain and prompt rethink.

Hence, finally you discover and break your intuitive silence of wisdom. This develops every learner not only to improve skills but also to craft a positive belief in oneself. But this '**mindset adventure**' is missing in many of us. We always want to beat the gun and end up losers on the long stretch. Instead, we have to assemble our seeds of thoughts to learn, train and create this powerful experience to trust our intuitive instincts.

## LEARNING CORRIDORS

Learning to learn is more important sometimes than what to learn especially when what we learn becomes obsolete so fast. People must be helped to learn as it is a lifelong crusade to discover '**the greater you..... you never knew**'. Change can be a threat especially when it can corrode the very organizational design values, beliefs and processes to which present positions are dominated. The revolution of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Knowledge Based Systems hold almost unimagined promises for organizations that savvy this. Subsequently, the decision making process adapts to leverage ICT and the knowledge based tools.

The speed and quality of thoughts adds values in this mantra. The essence and power of knowledge must be comprehended and disseminated intelligently as ICT can change the general architecture of the organizational development scenario. ICT can generate the core implication for the way people are valued and managed. But, on the other hand '**careless digital divide**' within organizations can trigger emotional stress. This ignorance can be replaced by the strategic intervention of Human Resource Development.

The positioning for a learning organization framework to '**Learn and Relearn**' will anchor the response for a continuous challenge for growth in favour of these competitive skills. One needs to know how to learn, how to study smart, how to read with speed, how to remember and how to solve problems in this age of push button efficiency. Intuition, like soldiers' eyes will certainly charm these mindset pieces in strange territory to accelerate both organization vision and its virtues. In this case, further mindset training is required if organizations visualize getting the best results. Your organization is a masterpiece...only when you win!



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