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
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POLITIK PAKATAN (ALLIANCE) DALAM DASAR LUAR AMERIKA SYARIKAT

Oleh : Mej Murtadza bin Hj Noordin

SINOPSIS

Tujuan negara membuat pakatan selain dari untuk mendapat 'collective good' adalah untuk menentukan keselamatan antarabangsa terjamin, kestabilan dan mencapai status. Bagi negara adi kuasa seperti Amerika, tidak banyak keuntungan berbentuk material yang diperolehi; hanya sekadar untuk mempertahankan imej dan kredibiliti serta keupayaan tenteranya yang ternyata adi daya walaupun dengan kos yang tinggi. Umumnya dasar luar Amerika merujuk kepada 'isolationism', 'containment' dan 'intervention'. Ternyata tidak semua politik pakatan dalam dasar luar Amerika berjaya kerana perubahan kepada persepsi ancaman dan konsep kepentingan strategik kadang-kala telah membuatkan berlakunya 'dealignment.' Walaupun demikian, ianya tidak sedikit pun mengubah objektif dasar luarannya yang strategik terutama di dalam peperangan antiterrorisme global.

PENDAHULUAN

Apabila sesebuah negara berhubung dengan negara lain, hubungan itu dilaksanakan melalui satu dasar yang dikenali sebagai dasar luar negara. Dasar luar negara sesebuah negara diertikan sebagai garis panduan bagi segala tindakan yang diambil oleh negara itu apabila ia berhubung dengan negara lain. Dasar luar sesebuah negara itu sebenarnya berkait rapat dengan dasar dalaman ataupun dasar domestik negara. Malah dasar luar negara merupakan kesinambungan daripada dasar domestik. Ini bermakna bahawa dasar luar digubal mengikut kehendak dasar negara dan asas-asas atau kehendak-kehendak kepentingan nasional negara itu yang merangkumi berbagai-bagai kepentingan sosial, ekonomi, politik dan ketenteraan.

Kata Glenn P. Hastedt, perkara pokok yang perlu dibincangkan di dalam pembuatan dasar luar Amerika Syarikat(AS) adalah sesuatu yang berkaitan dengan apa yang di panggil '**National Interest**'. Di dalam usaha untuk menentukan 'national interest' nya terpelihara, maka Amerika

telah terlibat dalam politik pakatan dengan banyak negara di serata dunia.¹

Sejak dari tahun 1945 hingga ke hari ini, AS telah mengalami pencapaian yang unggul di dalam arena antarabangsa yang mana hanya beberapa negara sahaja di dalam lembaran sejarah mampu mengalaminya. Di dalam dekad tersebut, AS dinobatkan sebagai sebuah negara yang mempunyai kuasa militer dan ekonomi yang mantap dan telah membentuk satu rangkaian pakatan yang telah membuatnya komited di dalam mempertahankan lebih 50 negara jika diserang. Amerika Syarikat telah sejak sekian lama mengekalkan kekuatan militer berjumlah hampir setengah juta orang di seluruh pangkalan tentera di merata negara.²

¹ Glenn P. Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988, hal 1.

² Robert J. Art, *America's Foreign Policy*, Roy C. Macridis(eds), *Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989, hal 125.

Mengapa 'Alliance'?

Menurut **A. Leroy Bennett**, pertubuhan jenis pakatan adalah merujuk kepada sesuatu yang orientasi politik dan militernya adalah untuk memberi perlindungan keselamatan terhadap pelaku luaran (aggressor).³ **Stephen Waltz** mengatakan pakatan adalah 'as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states'.⁴ **Dingman** juga memberikan definisi yang hampir sama: 'Alliance refers to written, formal agreement among two or more states which is designed to serve, for a specified term, the interests of those states, or of their statesmen and bureaucrats, in regards to national security'.⁵ Formal atau tidak bermaksud mungkin ada perjanjian (treaty) dan ada juga pakatan yang di buat tanpa apa-apa perjanjian. Kata **Waltz**, seperti pakatan Amerika-Israel walaupun tidak pernah wujud 'formal treaty' antara keduanya, namun tiada siapa yang berani mempersoalkan tentang komitmen antara mereka.⁶

Menurut **Waltz** lagi, tujuan pakatan adalah untuk menjamin keamanan; terutama politik pakatan dalam dasar luar Amerika seperti mana beliau memetik kata-kata Setiausaha Amerika, Dean Rusk: 'America's alliances are at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of America was worthless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophe'.⁷

Bagi negara kecil (weak states) mereka akan mendapat banyak 'collective good' apabila menjadi 'allies' kepada kuasa besar seperti Denmark, Iceland dan Belgium yang hanya perlu keluar belanja yang kecil untuk pertahanan kerana mendapat 'security umbrella' dari NATO.⁸ Negara

besar seperti Amerika dan Rusia, mereka berlumba-lumba untuk mendapatkan seberapa banyak negara kecil sebagai sekutunya. Bagi mereka kesediaan mereka untuk membayar kos yang tinggi untuk menentukan sistem politik pakatan kekal sempurna adalah untuk mengekalkan 'status-quo' sebagai kuasa hegemoni. Dasar luar Amerika yang global ingin mengekalkan 'status-quo' sebagai kuasa dunia sanggup berbelanja besar untuk politik pakatan yang mana membuatkan mereka kadang-kadang terlebih belanja dan tanpa disedari membuatkan mereka semakin lemah. Satu contoh yang klasik adalah penglibatan Amerika di Vietnam.⁹ Begitu juga dengan apa yang berlaku di Iraq dan Afghanistan ketika ini, Amerika bukan sahaja di kutuk oleh masyarakat antarabangsa malahan oleh rakyatnya sendiri.

Berdasarkan kepada kepelbagaian definisi yang diberikan oleh sarjana, sebab utama negara membentuk pakatan adalah untuk mencapai keselamatan antarabangsa, kestabilan dan status. Persamaan ideologi dan strategi politik membuatkan negara berpakat dan begitu juga sebaliknya ia mampu membawa kepada pembubaran pakatan kerana ia mampu mengakibatkan 'instability' seperti mana yang berlaku kepada SEATO dan Pakatan Warsaw.¹⁰

TUJUAN

Apakah bentuk dasar luar negara yang telah dimainkan oleh Amerika Syarikat terutama di dalam aspek politik pakatan yang telah membuatnya menjadi kuasa hegemoni tunggal dunia dewasa ini. Tujuan artikel ini adalah untuk membicarakan tentang bagaimana dasar luar negara Amerika Syarikat memainkan peranan di dalam aspek politik pakatan. Memandangkan dasar luar Amerika bersifat global, maka artikel ini akan hanya membincangkan dasar luar Amerika sejak pasca perang Dunia Kedua hingga berakhirnya Perang Dingin dan melibatkan dasar luar di Eropah, Israel, Timur Jauh, Selatan Pasifik dan Asia Tenggara sahaja.

³ A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organisation: Principles and Issues*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, hal 249.

⁴ Stephen Waltz, *The Origin of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, London, 1987, hal 12.

⁵ Roger V. Dingman, *Theories of, and Approach to Alliance Politics* (ed), Paul Gordon Lawrence, *Diplomacy, New Approach in History, Theory and Perspectives*, hal 249.

⁶ Waltz, hal 12.

⁷ Ibid, hal 3.

⁸ Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, Frank Cass, England, 1990, hal 149.

⁹ Ibid, hal 155.

¹⁰ Bennett, hal 249.

Dasar Luar Amerika Syarikat

Setiap hari Amerika Syarikat seperti juga negara-negara lain menghadapi ratusan ataupun ribuan perkara darihal dasar luar yang merangkumi pelbagai hal dari perdagangan, diplomatik hingga ke masalah lapisan ozon. Perkara ini adalah penting dan keputusan yang melibatkan pemilihan kepada hala tuju dan komitmen bukan dibuat oleh birokrat tetapi oleh kumpulan elit barisan pertama iaitu Presiden dan penasihat kanan utama negara.¹¹ Umumnya dasar luar Amerika merujuk kepada 'isolationism', 'containment' dan 'intervention'.

Puncak Pembendungan(1945-1968)

Jika di lihat dari perspektif sejarah, dasar luar Amerika selepas 1945 adalah sesuatu yang revolusioner. Sejak 150 tahun, dari 1800-1945, Amerika telah mengamalkan dasar 'isolationism'. Tetapi sejak dari tarikh itu, Amerika telah membabitkan diri hampir di seluruh dunia; sebagai ganti kepada dasar 'isolationism' itu. Ia telah memburu dasar yang internasionalis di sebalik 'containment' dengan tujuan untuk membendung penyebaran komunisme.¹²

Walaupun pembendungan komunisme telah menjadi sesuatu yang konsisten dalam dasar luarannya pasca tahun 1945, 'containment' ini telah melalui 3 fasa utama:¹³

- Dari 1945-50, Amerika telah terlibat di dalam dasar luar yang tegas di Eropah dan instrumen dasar luarannya yang utama adalah politik dan ekonomi bukan militer.
- Dari tahun 1950-68, dasar 'containment' ini telah di globalisasikan yang mana instrumen utama adalah pakatan, bantuan luar dan pergantungan kepada kuasa militer.
- Dari 1969 dan seterusnya, dasar 'containment' telah di hentikan tetapi tidak berakhir kerana

wujudnya 'detente' antara Rusia dan China. Instrumen dasar luarannya telah berbalik kepada pergantungan yang besar kepada sarana-sarana politik dan ekonomi.

Di dalam fasa pertama, ancaman utama yang dijangka adalah berdasarkan kepada bukan serangan tentera Rusia ke atas Eropah Barat tetapi kehancuran dalaman negara-negara berkenaan di dalam komunisme akibat dari kemusnahan ekonomi dan kekacauan yang berlaku pasca Perang Dunia Kedua. Dasar luar Amerika yang menitikberatkan keselamatan dan pembangunan ekonomi Eropah Barat pasca Perang Dunia Kedua telah melahirkan pakatan NATO.

Sewaktu fasa kedua, terdapat dua ancaman utama, hasil dari Perang Korea; iaitu ketakutan dalam tahun 50an; serangan terus oleh Rusia ke atas Eropah Barat dan kemunculan Fidel Castro yang telah merampas kuasa di Cuba. Manakala di dalam fasa ketiga, ancaman utama bukan lagi berbentuk luaran kepada Amerika tetapi dari dalaman di mana orang awam Amerika akan menarik diri dari komitmen untuk membendung komunisme dan kembali kepada 'isolationism'. Dasar luar Amerika di dalam memburu 'containment' tetap menjadi isu utama yang digunakan untuk menghalang tindakan Rusia. Sejak 1945, Amerika jadi komited dan pembuat dasar luar negaranya menjadi 'obsessed' dengan rasa takut jika Amerika gagal untuk memenuhi mana-mana komitmen maka kredibiliti akan dipersoalkan, dasar luarannya akan hancur dan pengaruhnya akan hilang.¹⁴

Dasar Eropah Amerika

Selepas Perang Dunia Kedua tamat pada tahun 1945, Amerika Syarikat telah melihat dunia penuh dengan kehancuran tidak seperti pada tahun sebelumnya. Eropah telah hancur dari aspek politik dan ekonomi. Di sebelah Timur, Jepun telah musnah oleh ledakan atom; China dipecahkan oleh perang saudara; begitu juga di Indochina. Rusia yang telah muncul sebagai salah satu dari lima kuasa besar yang menang telah memulakan proses meletakkan kerajaan boneka komunis di Eropah Timur. Di antara kuasa besar tersebut juga

¹¹ Frederick H. Hartmann, Robert L. Wendzel, *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Harper Collins, New York, 1994, hal 2-3.

¹² Art, hal 127.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ hal 128.

muncul Amerika yang tidak sedikit pun terjejas malahan bertambah kuat dari aspek ekonomi dan militeri. Amerika telah di lihat sebagai satu-satunya kuasa besar yang mampu membangunkan Eropah dari aspek ekonomi dan politik serta membendung pengaruh komunisme dari merebak, ketika kuasa besar lain tidak mampu oleh kerana British yang sibuk dengan masalah bekas tanah jajahannya; manakala Perancis dengan masalah Indochina. Berdasarkan dengan masalah ini, Presiden Truman dari tahun 1945-1949 telah memperkenalkan apa yang dikenali sebagai Doktrin Truman, 'Marshall Plan' dan pada tahun ini juga pakatan NATO telah ditubuhkan.¹⁵

Doktrin Truman

Adalah satu manifestasi pasca perang tentang teori domino. Pentadbiran Truman telah menghantar bantuan ekonomi dan senjata kepada Greece dan Turki dengan tujuan untuk membolehkan Monarki Greece menang perang terhadap komunis dan untuk membolehkan Turki bertahan daripada tekanan yang telah dikenakan oleh Rusia. Ini adalah kerana jika Greece dan Turki dibenarkan jatuh di bawah pengaruh Rusia, maka laluan mudah ke Timur Tengah akan terbuka dan ini akan mengancam simpanan minyak yang banyak di sana. Menurut teori ini, Greece dan Turki adalah domino pertama sebagai punca kepada pengurangan pengaruh Amerika di Eropah Barat.¹⁶

Plan Marshall

Rancangan ini adalah bertujuan untuk membangunkan struktur ekonomi Eropah Barat demi untuk menyekat kejayaan pengaruh komunis yang timbul akibat dari kekacauan ekonomi yang berlaku. Dalam 4 tahun Amerika telah hantar 12 bilion geran bantuan untuk membina semula struktur ekonomi Eropah. Amerika telah menggesa Perancis dan Britain untuk menyatukan dua zon di Jerman dengan Amerika dengan harapan akan dapat membentuk Jerman Barat. Ini adalah kerana ekonomi Perancis, Itali dan Britain tidak akan dapat dibangunkan tanpa pemulihan Jerman. Selain dari

untuk membendung pengaruh komunis, dasar luar Amerika di dalam membentuk pakatan di Eropah banyak dipengaruhi oleh faktor untuk mengawal pengaruh Jerman. Secara tradisi Jerman adalah sebuah 'Central Power' bagi Eropah. Faktor geostrategiknya yang berhampiran dengan Jerman Timur merupakan satu ancaman kepada Eropah jika kekuatan ekonomi dan militernya tidak dibendung. Amerika sedar jika Jerman lemah, maka ia akan mudah dijajah dan begitu juga jika ia terlalu kuat maka ia mungkin akan mengancam negara Eropah yang lain. Seperti yang dikatakan oleh banyak sarjana: "*If German sneezes, the whole of Europe catches cold*". Dengan memasukan Jerman ke dalam NATO, maka Amerika akan dapat mencapai dua objektif iaitu untuk membendung pengaruh Uni Soviet dan mengawal Jerman.¹⁷

Pakatan NATO

Kewujudan pakatan ini adalah untuk memelihara pembangunan kerajaan bukan komunis yang kuat di Eropah Barat. Sejak 1948, kepungan Berlin dan yang lebih penting rampasan kuasa di Czechoslovakia dengan jelas mempamirkan faedah politik yang mungkin didapati oleh Rusia dengan hampirnya Rusia dengan negara Eropah Barat tanpa penggunaan tentera konvensional yang besar. Rusia telah mengumpulkan bala tentera yang besar di sempadan Czechoslovakia dengan tujuan untuk menakut-nakutkan pasukan tentera bukan komunis daripada melawan rampasan kuasa tanpa berdarah oleh komunis. Atas rasa takut yang Rusia akan mengambil tindakan yang sama terhadap Eropah Barat yang mana rampasan kuasa tersebut akan melemahkan moral pasukan anti-komunis kecuali sesuatu dilakukan, kejatuhan Czechoslovakia telah menyebabkan Amerika menubuhkan pakatan NATO pada awal 1949. Dengan pakatan ini Amerika telah istiharkan "*that an armed attack against one or more of them (the signatories) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all*", tujuan NATO bukan untuk memberikan pertahanan yang efektif dari serangan Rusia tetapi untuk menangkis sebarang serangan. Memandangkan para pembuat dasar luar Amerika membuat andaian bahawa kebarangkalian terjadinya serangan adalah rendah,

¹⁵ Ibid., hal 131.

¹⁶ Art, hal 131.

¹⁷ AUGG 6107 Alliance Politics.

jadi kenapa perlu menangkis serangan yang tidak mungkin terjadi?¹⁸

Jawapannya terletak di antara sejauh mana Eropah Barat melihat apa yang telah berlaku di Czechoslovakia dan ini akan menggambarkan motif pentadbiran Truman memasuki pakatan. Kita tahu bagaimana Czech telah dikorbankan oleh Perancis dan Britain kepada Hitler untuk melindungi diri dalam perang tahun 1938. Eropah juga telah melihat bagaimana singkatnya komitmen Amerika terhadap mereka selepas perang Dunia Pertama. Apa yang berlaku kepada Czech dan apa yang Amerika telah lakukan terhadap Eropah mungkin berulang. Justeru untuk memadamkan rasa takut yang Amerika akan kembali kepada 'Isolationism' maka pentadbiran Truman telah membentuk NATO. Tujuan pokok pakatan ini lebih kepada aspek politik iaitu untuk mempengaruhi Eropah yang Amerika masih satu kuasa yang utuh dan NATO adalah sebagai 'security blanket' Eropah disebalik bantuan yang diberikan oleh 'Marshall Plan'. Perjanjian yang telah membuatkan tertubuhnya NATO telah ditandatangani di Washington pada April 1949 yang mana telah diluluskan dan telah dipersetujui oleh Kongres Amerika.¹⁹

Di dalam usaha untuk mempamerkan komitmen dan kredibilitinya kepada sekutunya di Eropah, Amerika telah mempertingkatkan keupayaan pakatan NATO yang pada masa itu baru berusia setahun. Truman telah menghantar Empat Division Tempur ke Eropah. Begitu juga dengan Eisenhower yang telah menghantar ribuan 'Tactical Nuclear Missile Warheads' dengan harapan untuk mempertingkatkan jurang perbezaan tentera konvensional pakatan NATO yang relatif jauh lebih 'inferior' dari pakatan Warsaw. Sekutu NATO telah dipengaruhi oleh Amerika bahawa terup dan senjata nuklear adalah aset yang utama yang mampu untuk menghindari perang.²⁰

Dasar Luar Amerika dan Pakatan dengan Israel

Hari ini, Amerika dan Israel adalah rakan dan sekutu paling akrab. Sejak empat dekad dalam

membangun negara, Israel telah melihat Amerika untuk inspirasi, bantuan kewangan dan militer serta bantuan diplomat. Pada Amerika pula, ia melihat Israel dengan penuh penghormatan di atas kejayaannya untuk mengikut tradisi demokrasi ala Barat, kemajuan ekonomi yang menakjubkan dan kesungguhannya berjuang tanpa kompromi melawan musuh.²¹

Penubuhan negara Zionis Yahudi adalah di atas mandat yang telah diberikan oleh Lord Balfour melalui apa yang di panggil "Balfour Declaration".²² Presiden Wilson telah melahirkan sokongannya kepada deklarasi tersebut dengan berkata: "*The Allied nations with the fullest concurrence of our government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth*".²³

Bukan setakat itu sahaja, Majlis pembuat Undang-Undang di 33 negeri mewakili 85% dari penduduk menyokong penubuhan negara Yahudi di Palestine. Gabenor di 37 negeri, 54 Senator dan 255 ahli Kongres telah menandatangani petisyen kepada Presiden. Sokongan terhadap Israel juga telah dizahirkan pada rekabentuk asal Cop Mohor Amerika yang tertera orang Yahudi sedang menyeberang Laut Merah dengan diikuti di belakang oleh Fira'un dan Nabi Musa yang sedang menunggu di seberang.²⁴

Pada tahun 1947, British yang ketika itu mentadbirkan Mandat Liga Bangsa untuk Palestine telah membawa masalah Arab-Yahudi ke Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu. Perhimpunan Agung telah mengambil keputusan untuk membentuk 'United Nations Special Committee on Palestine' (UNSCOP) untuk menyiasat punca konflik dan mencari penyelesaian. UNSCOP telah mencadangkan penubuhan 'partition' untuk kedua negara Arab dan Yahudi yang masing-masing mempunyai kedaulatan. Amerika Syarikat telah mengesahkan laporan tersebut dan telah meminta Perhimpunan Agung untuk meluluskannya. Presiden Truman telah melobi untuk mendapatkan resolusi

²¹ <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/roots> of US-Israel.html.

²² Henry Cattin, *The Palestine Question*, Croom Helm Ltd, New York, 1988, hal 10.

²³ <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/roots> of US-Israel.html.

²⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸ Art, hal 132.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., hal 142.

dari banyak negara dan kurang dari enam bulan negara Israel telah diistiharkan dengan rasminya. Amerika Syarikat adalah antara negara pertama yang telah memberikan pengiktirafan secara 'de facto' selepas hanya 11 minit ia diistiharkan. Kata Truman: "*I had faith in Israel before it was established, I have faith in it now*".²⁵

Walaupun penduduk Yahudi di Amerika kurang dari 6 juta, aktiviti politik Yahudi yang melihat jalinan erat hubungan Amerika – Israel bukanlah hanya berdasarkan kepada kepentingan negara semata kerana kadar 3% orang Yahudi dari penduduk Amerika adalah tidak signifikan kepada dasar luarnya. Pakatan Amerika-Israel tertanam di dalam apa yang di panggil 'shared values'. Komitmen Amerika terhadap Israel amat tinggi sejak dari Perang Arab-Israel Pertama hingga Keempat dan setengah sarjana berkata yang Amerika adalah punca kepada perbalahan Arab-Israel.

Pengiktirafan 'shared values' masih konsisten oleh kesemua Presiden Amerika sejak dari Truman hingga ke hari ini. Presiden Reagan adalah Presiden pertama yang telah menyatakan secara tegas bahawa Israel adalah aset strategik kepada Amerika. Ketika mengambil alih tugas, Presiden Bush berkata: "*The friendship, the alliance between the United States and Israel is strong and solid, built upon a foundation of shared democratic values, of shared history and heritage, that sustains the life of our two countries.....*"²⁶ Dasar luar Amerika menentukan tiada negara yang akan mengancam anak didiknya. Salah satu punca kenapa Amerika menyerang Iraq, selain dari soal minyak adalah demi mempertahankan 'survival' Israel. Sebab itu juga Amerika tidak akan berkompromi tentang isu nuklear Iran. Lambat laun, walaupun apa natijahnya, Amerika tetap akan menyerang Iran demi Israel.

Dasar Timur Jauh Amerika

Kita dapat lihat bahawa dasar luar Amerika di dalam membentuk pakatan di Eropah (NATO) sangat jelas dan tegas. Satu perbezaan yang jelas telah dibuat di antara kepentingan Amerika di Barat berbanding di Eropah Timur. Amerika di dalam

menggubal dasar luarnya telah mengambil kira berbagai langkah terutama politik dan ekonomi di dalam usaha untuk menentukan Eropah Barat sentiasa berada di bawah pengaruhnya.²⁷

Dasar luar Amerika di Timur Jauh tidak seperti dasar luarnya di Eropah yang mana jelas tidak mempunyai ketegasan. Begitu juga tentang dasar 'containment' Amerika tidak melibatkan rantau ini bahkan dasar luarnya hanya tersedialah apabila terjadi Perang Korea. Dasar luar Amerika terhadap Timur Jauh bukan hanya satu tetapi merangkumi empat dasar yang berbeza, masing-masing satu di Korea, Indochina, China dan Jepun. Dasar luar terhadap Indochina adalah berbeza di mana walaupun Amerika secara resmi membantah imperialisme tetapi secara diam-diam menyokong Perancis kerana inilah yang diminta oleh Perancis sebagai balasan untuk menyertai NATO.²⁸ Dasar 'intervention'nya ketika mempertahankan Vietnam Selatan ternyata gagal apabila terpaksa berundur setelah mengalami banyak kekalahan dan tekanan dari politik domestik.

Dasar Luar Terhadap China

Memperkatakan tentang dasar terhadap China, Amerika tidak pernah menganggap bahawa kejayaan komunis China akan memudaratkan kepentingannya kerana permusuhan tradisional antara Rusia dan China dan semangat nasionalisme mereka akan mudah mengatasi sebarang kerjasama yang telah terjalin walaupun menganut ideologi Marxist yang sama. Adalah sesuatu yang tidak mungkin ataupun mustahil buat komunis China untuk menguasai Asia.²⁹ Perubahan dalam dasar luar Amerika telah berlaku apabila terjadinya 'détente' Sino-Amerika. Presiden Nixon telah membuat lawatan ke China pada tahun 1972 dan selepas itu China bukan lagi satu ancaman.

Dasar luar terhadap Jepun

Dasar luar ini, adalah tentang bagaimana untuk mengatasi masalah domestiknya. Dengan

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ [http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/roots of US-Israel.html](http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/roots%20of%20US-Israel.html).

²⁷ Art, hal 133.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

hancurnya kuasa China di rantau ini, tidak ada rancangan yang telah dibuat berdasarkan kepada peranan yang mungkin dimainkan oleh Jepun dalam politik Timur jauh kerana Amerika tidak mempunyai dasar yang tegas (coherent). Amerika hanya menanda-tangani perjanjian pakatan dengan Jepun pada Sep 1951 di Washington dan antara lain perjanjian pakatan itu menyebut tentang elemen penyelesaian keamanan dengan tujuan untuk memulihkan kedaulatan Jepun, mengurangkan ketakutan negara-negara di Asia dan Pasifik yang lain terhadap Jepun dan menentukan kesanggupan Tokyo secara sukarela bekerjasama (alignment) dengan Washington di dalam Perang Dingin.³⁰ Ironinya, perjanjian ini telah dibebani dengan fasal yang ternyata bertentangan dengan tujuannya. Ia telah membenarkan penempatan bala tentera Amerika di Jepun bukan sahaja untuk memberikan perlindungan keselamatan dan keamanan di Timur Jauh tetapi *'to give aid at the express request of the Japanese government in putting down major internal riots or disturbances caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.'* Fasal ini telah menjadi satu isu yang kontroversi dan ianya telah menggugat hubungan Washington-Tokyo, rusuhan serta kekacauan politik telah menyebabkan Perdana Menteri Jepun letak jawatan dan perjanjian tersebut telah di pinda pada tahun 1960.³¹

Dasar Luar terhadap Korea

Rancangan terhadap Korea adalah sesuatu yang paling mengelirukan. Amerika telah menghantar tentera ke Korea untuk menerima penyerahan Jepun dengan harapan Soviet Union tidak akan menguasai seluruh semenanjung tersebut. Namun dengan tentera Rusia di Utara dan Amerika di selatan telah mengakibatkan Korea terbahagi dua. Amerika merayu supaya Korea bersatu dan pada tahun 1948 telah membuat keputusan untuk mengundurkan tenteranya kerana menganggap bahawa tenteranya yang ditempatkan di sana adalah merupakan satu 'liability'. Walaupun bantuan ekonomi dan peralatan telah dihantar tetapi Amerika tidak mempunyai rancangan untuk menggunakan tentera berkenaan jika Korea Selatan diserang. Dasar luar Amerika terhadap Korea bertukar selepas perang Korea adalah kerana pada

awalnya seperti di Eropah, pentadbiran Truman melihat kaitan yang jelas tentang kekuatan tentera Rusia dan evolusi acara politik di bawah pengaruh Amerika tetapi tidak dengan Korea dan Jepun. Ini adalah kerana wujudnya ruang di antara komitmen dasar luar Amerika dengan kuasa militer yang ada untuk menyokongnya. Kekuatan militer Amerika hanya terserlah pada tahun 1950, tetapi pada sebelumnya ia adalah relatif lemah. Justeru itu, mengikut keutamaan, pertahanan Korea adalah tidak penting. Kekuatan tentera yang tidak cukup untuk mempertahankan Korea mungkin telah membuatkan dasar luar Amerika menganggap Korea tidak mempunyai kepentingan di Timur jauh.³² Perang Korea dan Vietnam adalah dua peristiwa penting yang telah mencorak dasar luar Amerika pasca perang Dunia Kedua. Sejak dari Truman hingga ke Nixon, kesinambungan di dalam pendekatan ini diteruskan dan 'global containment' adalah dianggap sebagai satu dasar luar yang 'bipartisan'.³³

Dasar Luar Amerika Di Asia Tenggara

Salah satu cara buat Amerika untuk membendung Teori Domino adalah dengan menubuhkan Pakatan SEATO pada tahun 1954. Pakatan yang terdiri dari Amerika sebagai peneraju utama, Britain, Perancis, Pakistan, Thailand, Filipina, Australia dan New Zealand ini ditubuhkan untuk merealisasikan dasar luar Amerika untuk membendung pengaruh komunisme. Walaupun pada mulanya pakatan ini ditubuhkan atas dasar mempunyai objektif dan tanggapan ancaman yang sama namun akhirnya ianya tidak bertahan lama kerana persepsi ancaman dan konsep kepentingan strategik ahli pakatan telah berubah. Dasar 'containment' Amerika terhadap pengaruh komunis juga telah berubah apabila Amerika telah menjalin hubungan diplomatik dengan China. Perubahan dasar luar Amerika yang ketara ini dan kesan Doktrin Nixon telah menyebabkan 'cohesiveness' di dalam pakatan menjadi longgar dan telah menyebabkan SEATO akhirnya dibubarkan pada tahun 1977.³⁴

³² Art, hal 134-135.

³³ Ibid, hal 141.

³⁴ Kertas Seminar Politik Pakatan AUGG 6107, Kajian Kes Pakatan SEATO oleh Ibrahim Mohamed, hal 4.

Pembubaran SEATO adalah satu fenomena yang menggambarkan kegagalan dasar luar Amerika di rantau sebelah sini ketika itu. Baru-baru ini Setiausaha Negara Amerika Syarikat telah mengadakan lawatan rasmi ke rantau sebelah sini di dalam usahanya untuk mengulangi komitmen Amerika Syarikat.

Dasar Luar Amerika di Selatan Pasifik dan Pakatan ANZUS

Kepentingan keselamatan Amerika yang global telah menyebabkan Amerika melebarkan pengaruhnya menjangkau ke Selatan Pasifik atau Oceania. Kepentingan strategik Amerika di selatan Pasifik dikekalkan dengan wujudnya pangkalan yang berpusat di Filipina dan Guam. Tetapi setelah perjanjian 'Philippines-US Military Base Agreement 1947' tamat dan tidak diperbaharui, telah memaksa Amerika untuk menjadikan Guam sebagai pangkalan strategik dan kompleks bantuan di Pasifik yang menempatkan armada Ketujuh.³⁵

Dalam usaha untuk mempertahankan rantau Pasifik dari pengaruh Soviet dan China, ANZUS telah ditubuhkan pada Sep 1951 yang terdiri dari Amerika, Australia dan New Zealand. Pada pandangan Australia dan New Zealand, ANZUS memberi peluang perlindungan dari kemungkinan ancaman Soviet dan China manakala bagi Amerika, ANZUS adalah sebagai satu peluang yang nyata untuk memperkuat pakatannya di seluruh dunia. Ini secara tidak langsung akan dapat mencapai objektif dasar luarannya yang global.³⁶

Sebagaimana komitmen Amerika di Eropah, senjata nuklear merupakan aset penting sebagai 'deterrent factor' untuk menghindari perang. Tetapi New Zealand tidak berpandangan sedemikian. Krisis dalaman pakatan ANZUS bermula apabila Parti Buruh telah mengalahkan Parti Nasional dalam pilihan raya parlimen 1984 dengan menggunakan isu anti nuklear. Pada tahun 1986, New Zealand telah melarang kapal tentera laut Amerika dari memasuki pelabuhan di New

Zealand kerana membawa senjata nuklear. Jabatan negara Amerika menganggap New Zealand telah melanggar 'ANZUS obligation' dan Amerika telah mengurangkan hubungan ketenteraan dengan New Zealand. Menurut New Zealand, 'strategic environment' di Pasifik Selatan tidak memerlukan senjata nuklear dan keselamatan rantau ini dapat dipelihara dengan menggunakan senjata konvensional.³⁷

Walaupun wujud konflik dalaman di dalam ANZUS, namun New Zealand tidak mahu meninggalkan pakatan kerana masih yakin dengan politik pakatan dengan Amerika. Walaupun dewasa ini tidak wujud ancaman tetapi jika ia muncul, hubungan dengan Amerika masih penting. New Zealand tidak perlu pertingkatkan belanja pertahanannya dengan adanya payungan dari Amerika. Tiga negara ahli pakatan ini masih setia mempertahankan ANZUS walaupun secara praktikalnya ANZUS tidak lagi operatif sejak peristiwa tersebut. Namun bagi Australia, ANZUS merupakan hubungan pertahanan yang mantap dengan Amerika. Bagi Amerika, Selatan Pasifik bukanlah rantau yang memungkinkan perebutan kuasa antara kuasa besar di masa terdekat. Walaupun rantau ini tidak pernah diletakkan sebagai penting di dalam agenda dasar luar Amerika namun buat Amerika, ANZUS adalah penting untuk menghalalkan kehadirannya di rantau ini.³⁸

KESIMPULAN

Terdapat pelbagai cara untuk mencapai objektif dasar luar sesebuah negara, salah satu daripadanya adalah melalui politik pakatan. Pakatan adalah satu daripada produk keperluan dasar luar yang berdasarkan kepada situasi dan persekitaran untuk mencapai ataupun menentukan 'national interest' ataupun 'survival' sesebuah negara.

Tujuan negara membuat pakatan selain dari untuk mendapat 'collective good' adalah untuk menentukan keselamatan antarabangsa terjamin, kestabilan dan mencapai status. Bagi negara kuasa besar seperti Amerika, tidak banyak keuntungan berbentuk material yang diperolehi; hanya sekadar

³⁵ Henry S. Albinski, *The US Security Alliances System in the Southwest Pacific*(ed), William T. Tow and William R. Feeny(eds), *US Foreign Policy and Asia-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1982, hal 137.

³⁶ <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa067.html>.

³⁷ <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa067.html>.

³⁸ Ibid.

untuk mempertahankan imej dan kredibiliti serta keupayaan tenteranya yang ternyata adi daya walaupun dengan kos yang tinggi. Penglibatan Amerika di Vietnam yang berlarutan adalah semata-mata kerana takut sekutunya akan berpaling tadah jika ia berundur. Dasar 'containment' Amerika di Vietnam ternyata gagal apabila Doktrin Nixon menjadi asas kepada pengundurannya dari Indochina.

Pada Amerika, satu hipotesis yang nyata yang menggambarkan tentang ketidakselamatannya adalah apabila sebarang tindakan yang memaparkan kelemahannya di arena antarabangsa akan menjadi sesuatu yang memalukan dan tidak mungkin dapat dipulihkan. Amerika melihat ideologi adalah sebagai satu sebab yang membentuk pakatan; justeru Amerika percaya semua kerajaan Marxist dan kumpulan kiri adalah satu aset kepada Soviet. Agen dan bantuan luar akan membentuk negara satelit yang setia dan pada negara yang non-Marxist yang menerima bantuan material akan membuatkan dasar luar Amerika terancam.³⁹

Selain dari kebaikan terdapat juga keburukan pada negara yang menjadi sekutu Amerika. Bagi negara yang kecil dan lemah, sebagai jaminan

kepada perlindungan keselamatannya, telah terpaksa membenarkan kehadiran tentera asing di negara sendiri yang mana telah menimbulkan banyak masalah sosial dan politik seperti yang berlaku di Jepun, Jerman dan Filipina. Salah satu sebab 'Philippine-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947' telah tidak diperbaharui setelah kontraknya tamat pada tahun 1991 adalah bukan sahaja kerana bayaran pampasan yang tidak mencukupi tetapi takut dengan adanya pangkalan tersebut, Filipina akan terdedah kepada serangan senjata nuklear.⁴⁰

Ternyata tidak semua politik pakatan dalam dasar luar Amerika berjaya kerana seperti yang telah dibincangkan di atas, perubahan kepada persepsi ancaman dan konsep kepentingan strategik kadangkala telah membuatkan berlakunya 'dealignment' seperti yang berlaku kepada SEATO. Namun politik pakatan dalam dasar luar Amerika adalah satu yang unik terutamanya dalam konteks hubungannya dengan Israel. Di sebalik kesepaduannya di dalam NATO, kegagalannya di Indochina, pembubaran SEATO dan masalah dalaman ANZUS tidak sedikit pun mengubah objektif dasar luarannya yang global dan strategik hingga ke hari ini.

³⁹ Waltz, hal 41.

⁴⁰ George K. Tanham and Alvin H. Bernstein(eds), *Military Basing and the US/Soviet Military Balance in Southeast Asia*, Taylor & Francis, New York, hal v.

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Lain-lain

Nota AUGG 6107 Politik Pakatan.

Kertas Seminar AUGG 6107 Politik Pakatan, Kajian Kes SEATO oleh Ibrahim b.Mohamed, hal 4.



Mej Murtadza Hj Noordin telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Armor DiRaja pada 27 Jun 1981. Beliau pernah menjawat berbagai jawatan penting dipusat latihan dan Markas Tentera Darat. Antaranya ialah sebagai Ketua Jurulatih, Timbalan Komander PULAMOR, Pegawai Staf Dua Kerjaya dan Pegawai Pemerhati Tentera di UNTAC, Kemboja. Beliau memiliki ijazah Sarjana dalam bidang Pengajian Strategik dan Pertahanan Universiti Malaya dan kini bertugas sebagai Pegawai Staff Dua Kerjaya di Jabatanarah Armor.

TERRORISM; THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION

By : Mej Zulkarnain bin Haron

SYNOPSIS

Despite the events of 11 September and the ongoing 'War on Terrorism' there remains no agreed definition of terrorism. Academics, scientists, military experts, the media, governments and security experts all expound a plethora of definitions. Some focus on the methods used, others on the organisations themselves, and others place the emphasis on motivations and characteristics of individual terror groups. However, despite an apparent world united front, with a few notable exceptions in Iran and Iraq, it would appear that an agreed definition is no closer. If the world is to continue to remain united in the war against terrorism then it must first know what enemy it is fighting against. If they do not know who their enemy is then victory may be impossible. So why does no clear definition of terrorism exist? Defining terrorism is very important since it is no longer a local problem of specific countries but an issue involving a number of international aspects. Terrorist organisations may perpetrate attacks in a variety of countries and terrorist organisations secure their financial help from throughout the world. They also manage to enlist support from different ethnic communities and receive direct and indirect assistance from different states. Therefore, terrorism is an international phenomenon and the responses to terrorism must be on an international scale. All countries must have a common definition towards terrorism so that they can formulate or enforce regional agreements against terrorism. This essay tries to discuss why does no clear definition on terrorism exists and finally come up with an agreed definition. This may not be the perfect definition of terrorism as the 'normal moral framework of humanity' is open to interpretation. However this 'normal moral framework' may in future be defined by the UN as it sets out what can be expected from the new world order.

'However certain the facts of any science may be and however just the ideas we may have formed of these facts, we can only communicate false impressions to others while we want words by which these may be properly expressed'

A. Lavoisier¹

INTRODUCTION

Despite the events of 11 September and the ongoing 'War on Terrorism' there remains no agreed definition of terrorism. Academics, scientists, military experts, the media, governments and security experts all expound a plethora of definitions.² Some focus on the methods used,

others on the organisations themselves, and others place the emphasis on motivations and characteristics of individual terror groups. However, despite an apparent world united front, with a few notable exceptions in Iran and Iraq, it would appear that an agreed definition is no closer. If the world is to continue to remain united in the war against terrorism then it must first know what enemy it is fighting against. If they do not know who their enemy is then victory may be impossible. So why does no clear definition of terrorism exist?

¹ Schmid, (1988), p1.

² Interestingly not even the CIA and the FBI agree on a definition.



In their book *Political Terrorism*, Schmid and Jongman cited some 109 different definitions of terrorism, obtained primarily from academics in the field. This article will explore the definition of terrorism by discussing the often-quoted statement that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" and the issues this raises; the differing cultural perspectives on terrorism and the rationale behind these differences; before finally arriving at a conclusion on how terrorism might best be defined.

The Difficulty In Defining Terrorism

One of biggest obstacles in the quest to define terrorism is the often-quoted statement, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" as it places terrorism along side the struggle of nationalism and guerrilla fighters. This statement may well appear credible if considering groups such as the IRA³ or even the PLO but it would appear not so when looking further a field; the attack on the World Trade Centre is a prime example, as it was not carried out in the name of freedom within the US. Arguably, it may have been carried out in the name of freedom from the perceived US occupation of Islamic Holy Lands in the Middle East. However, the attacks

were allegedly carried out by a group who did not live in a state where the US were involved. The basic differentiation between a guerrilla struggle and that of terrorism is the methods used, and specifically target selection. Guerrilla fighters tend to target legitimate military targets, whereas terrorists are less discriminating and will target civilians; shown to effect in the gas attacks on the Tokyo underground⁴ and by the attack on the Oklahoma government office building.⁵ These attacks were most definitely not carried out in the name of freedom.

The terms freedom fighter and terrorist depict many images to many people, or in other words the meaning is in the eye of the beholder. This can be aptly demonstrated by looking at the Northern Ireland situation. Some US citizens see the IRA struggle as one of nationalism and funding has been forthcoming from US based sympathisers. The UK's position on the other hand is firm; it sees Northern Ireland as part of the UK and will not accept any legitimising of the IRA as a freedom fighting army. Similarly, much of the world sees the PLO as terrorists who kill and injure innocent Israelis. However, the Arab world sees the PLO struggle as one for freedom, as they struggle to rid their land of Israeli occupying forces. Therefore, it can be seen that defining terrorism is dependant on cultural perspectives, as the manner in which an armed struggle is defined, either as terrorism or freedom fighting, differs depending upon the definer and the interest or even morals the definer may have.⁶

In some eyes, terrorism involves making moral judgement, which means that certain acts of terrorism could be considered morally justifiable. Yet in the eyes of others no act of terror is justifiable. Again the PLO can be used as an example of this moral issue. Israel sees the PLO as an illegitimate terrorist organization using morally unacceptable strategies of violence (suicide bombers but one example) to achieve its goals. Equally the Arab nations view the PLO as a political group, using legitimate, morally acceptable and justifiable violence, not terrorism,

⁴ Carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo cult

⁵ Carried out by Timothy McVeigh in 1995 killing 166 people.

⁶ Onwudiwe (2001), p31.

³ The term IRA refers to the Irish Republican Army in both the 'provisional' and the 'real' movements.

to achieve moral political ends⁷ and the regaining of their territory. This was well demonstrated by the Arab League in April 1998 when they emphasised 'that belligerent activities aimed at "liberation and self-determination" are not in the category of terrorism'.⁸

Political Terrorism

Politics and terrorism share a number of similarities. Both have developed in response to changes in the international environment. But, the major difference is that terrorists use violence in order to achieve their political ends. In Southeast Asia, various nationalist and separatist groups use political terrorism as tools to achieve their ultimate goal. Nationalist groups will continue to struggle to achieve a redistribution of wealth and power and the settlement of claims for ethnic, religious and social rights. Whatever form terrorism takes, it will continue and will most likely expand to take advantage of new vulnerabilities within modern societies.⁹



The difficulty in defining terrorism, aside from its variation across numerous nationalities and cultures, is that a terrorist act may be perpetrated for numerous reasons. First, individual acts of terrorism may be designed to extract specific

concessions, such as the payment of a ransom or release of prisoners. Second, terrorism may also be an attempt by an organisation to gain publicity; Third, the terrorists' goal might include the spreading of disorder, the demoralisation of society or the breaking down of social order. Fourth, terrorism might try to induce the government into repression, hoping that the government will then self destruct. Fifth, terrorism can be used as a tool to enforce obedience and cooperation. Finally, terrorism is often meant to be a form of punishment. Indeed, terrorists often declare that their victims are somehow guilty or responsible for the attack against them.¹⁰

It is true that many terrorist acts may be aimed at the redress of specific grievances (i.e.; the release of jailed terrorist colleagues, the acquisition of funds, the taking of hostages and so forth). However, where terrorist demands are couched in broader terms and linked with ideas of revolution, the question of whether terrorism is guerrilla warfare or takes a revolutionary form has been raised. Wilkinson, for example, distinguished between three broad types of terrorism: 'revolutionary' terrorism, aimed at political revolution; 'sub-revolutionary' terrorism, having political motives other than revolution and 'repressive' terrorism, aimed at restraining certain groups, individuals or form of behaviour deemed to be undesirable.¹¹

According to Peter Chalk, political terrorism is the 'systematic use of the illegitimate violence that is employed by sub state actors as a means to achieve specific political objectives - these objectives differing according to the group concerned. It is psychological tactics that seek to induce fear in a group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate targeting of civilians and other non combatants'.¹² Political terrorism of all types has certain common features. It is the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or threat of murder, injury or destruction to realise a

⁷ Ibid, pp.31-32.

⁸ Boaz, Gabor, <http://www.ict.org.il>.

⁹ Gary, R. Perstein, Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 24, 16 Dec 89 :1339.

¹⁰ W. R. Farrell, 1982, p. 10.

¹¹ P. Wilkinson, 1974, p. 36-40.

¹² Peter Chalk, 1996, p. 22.

political end such as repression, revolution or change in the policy of a regime. As a means to their end, terrorists seek to create an atmosphere of fear, despair and collapse among their target group in order to coerce, intimidate or blackmail their targets into succumbing to their demands.



Furthermore, terrorism is inherently indiscriminate in its effect. This is partly a consequence of the nature of much terrorist weaponry and the frequent deliberate terrorist attacks on the civilian population and public facilities. As Aron noted, 'an action of violence is labelled "terrorism" when its physical effect are out of proportion to its physical result... the lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if no one in particular is a target, no one can be safe'.¹³ Even if terrorists claim to select individual or group targets, their acts of assassination are inevitably planned in a secret and appear entirely arbitrary to the communities in which they occur. It can be summarised as the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or civilian targets in order to attain political aim. The reasons behind this are terrorism in this respect share three common elements ie; the essence of activity is the use or threat to use violence, the aim of the activity is always political and the targets are civilians.

Religious Fundamentalists, Separatists, Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?

As discussed earlier, defining terrorism is very important since it is no longer a local problem of specific countries but an issue involving a number of international aspects. Terrorist organisations may perpetrate attacks in a variety of countries and terrorist organisations secure their financial help from throughout the world. They also manage to enlist support from different ethnic communities and receive direct and indirect assistance from different states. Therefore, terrorism is an international phenomenon and the responses to terrorism must be on an international scale. All countries must have a common definition toward terrorism so that they can formulate or enforce regional agreements against terrorism.

Most of the terrorist organisations, in order to rationalise their actions use the tactic of confounding 'terrorism' with 'political violence'. As stated by Salah Khalef,¹⁴ "... by nature, and even on ideological grounds, I am firmly opposed to political murder and more generally, to terrorism. Nevertheless, unlike many others, I do not confuse revolutionary violence with terrorism, or operations that constitute political acts with others that do not".¹⁵ He tries to present terrorism and political violence as two different and unconnected phenomena. The implication of this statement is that a political motive makes the activity respectable and at the end justifies the means.

Another argument links 'terrorism' and 'national liberation', which give some ground to the religious fundamentalist groups, or separatists to justify their actions for political end. For example, the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait in early 1987 stated in its resolution that, "The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to

¹⁴ Salah Khalef is also known as Abu Iyad. He was Yasser Arafat's deputy and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September.

¹⁵ Abu Iyad, 1993, p. 146.

¹³ Raymond Aron, 1966, p. 170

distinguish the brutal and unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, groups or by states from the legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values and by international conventions".¹⁶ In fact, most of the Arab leaders emphasised, based on a document 'Arab Strategy against Terrorism', that belligerent activities aimed at self determination and national liberation are not in the categories of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against the regimes or family of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assault.¹⁷ This model is adopted by the majority of the groups in Southeast Asia in their struggle against regimes in their own countries because they try to justify their means (terrorism) in order to achieve their ultimate aim (autonomy of region or independence).

For instance, many countries in Southeast Asia have different perceptions and policies towards terrorism. Indeed most of the people in the region, especially the Muslim community have a perception that terrorism and national liberation/separatist or freedom fighters are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for independent states or autonomous regions or national liberation is seen as positive and justified, whereas terrorism is the negative act. For this reason the numbers of acts of political violence are increasing every year in the region and many organisations manage to get popular support either internally or externally.

Groups or organizations that choose terrorism as a means cannot use the aim of their struggle to justify their actions. As stated by Senator Jackson, "... the idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do... It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured

word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists"¹⁸. In addition to that, Chutterbuck in his book also stated that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is a cliché which betrays a lack of understanding of what terrorism is. Terrorism is a technique – 'killing one to frighten ten thousand' – used by all sides; by guerrillas, by freedom fighters, by dissidents, by political activists, by the left or right, by nationalist, by ethnic and religious groups, by Mafia-style criminal gangs, by drug trafficking organisations.... 'to which they turn a blind eye or which they discreetly sponsor.'¹⁹

These acts of terrorism are visible and clearly demonstrated in various incidents in areas such as southern Philippines and southern Thailand. The claim that freedom fighters, religious fundamentalist, separatist, revolutionary movements cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing is of course groundless. A terrorist organisation can also be a movement or group as mentioned above and the concept of terrorist and freedom fighter/revolutionary movement/national liberation/separatist are not mutually contradictory.

The 'liberalisation and self-determination' issue presents many problems for the definition of terrorism, as it appears to be the main dividing point in finding a UN definition. However, it would appear that most authorities on terrorism (the beholders) agree that an act of terrorism is one that breaks International Law; further focused to mean the planned killing of innocents or non-combatants (especially women and children). This is illustrated well by Paul Pillar²⁰ who sets four key elements of terrorism:

- a. *'It is premeditated – planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage'.*
- b. *'It is political – not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order'.*
- c. *'It is aimed at civilians – not at military targets or combat-ready troops'.*

¹⁶ Quoted in Benyamin Netanyahu, 1985, p. 18.

¹⁹ Richard Chutterbuck, 1994, p.5.

²⁰ Paul Pillar is a former deputy chief of the CIA's Counter terrorist Centre.

¹⁶ Al-Anba'a, Kuwait, January 30, 1987.

¹⁷ Haaretz, April 21, 1998, See also <http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/def.cfm?id=50>.

*d. 'It is carried out by sub national groups – not by the army of a country.'*²¹

Most would agree in the main with Pillar's first two points. Point three on the other hand seems rather hypocritical considering the US attack on Hiroshima in WWII. Point four seems equally hypocritical, as there appears little difference between a country's army carrying out an act of terror and a country sponsoring an act of terror; the US giving assistance to Osama bin Laden in his fight against the Russians is a prime example.

Legitimacy And International Law

There is a distinct difference between an act conducted by a terror group and that by a legitimate state army and that is one of accountability. The present laws and conventions pertaining to armed conflict cater for legitimate armies: an army purposely attacking civilians in time of war perpetrates 'war crimes'; an army attacking civilians when not at war perpetrates 'crimes against humanity', both seen during the conflicts in the Balkans. By this reasoning the fight between a legitimate sub-state group within a state and the state itself can also be categorised. Any struggle that targets deliberate violence against legitimate military targets to achieve their goals can be recognised as a 'guerrilla army', whereas terrorism can be defined as the deliberate use of deadly force against civilians or non-combatants in order to achieve their goals²². The targeting of civilians and the breaking of international law seems to be a recurring theme in defining terrorism.

Yonah Alexander²³ defines terrorism as "the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of International Law, by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals". He goes on to say "terrorists are not

insurgents, not guerrillas, terrorists are beyond all norms. They do not recognize any laws."²⁴ Failure to recognize international law means terrorists fail to show regard for the moral framework it sets out and by which the general community lives. Kofi Annan fully understood the legal and moral issues of terrorism when he said "As I told the General Assembly on 1 October, I understand and accept the need for legal precision in defining terrorism. But there is also a need for moral clarity. There can be no acceptance of those who seek to justify the deliberate taking of innocent civilian life, regardless of cause or grievance." He went on to say "The only common denominator among different variants of terrorism is the calculated use of deadly violence against civilians for political purposes."²⁵ It is evident from this speech that a definition of terrorism is needed but he stresses a greater need - that of common morality.

CONCLUSION

In summary, although different cultures define terrorism in different ways, international law seems to hold the key to a common definition. That said the targeting of civilians is considered morally unacceptable in the majority of definitions explored. Currently states are answerable to international law if they target civilians but terror groups, although answerable to their own people can only be answerable as individuals. Therefore, if a grouping is involved in any operations that include the "deliberate taking of innocent civilian life, regardless of cause or grievance"²⁶, they must be defined as terrorists on the world stage.

A working definition of terrorism can now be pieced together. Firstly a terrorist is not a freedom fighter, as it is generally accepted that a freedom fighter targets legitimate military targets only. If however the freedom fighter does target

²¹ The Council On Foreign Relations in cooperation with the MARKLE foundation – <http://www.terrorismanswers.com/terrorism/introduction>

²² Ganor, Boaz, (2001) <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledef.cfm?articleid=393>.

²³ Yonah Alexander is the director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York.

²⁴ ABC news article by Oliver Libaw, 11 October 2001.

²⁵ Kofi Annan in a speech to the UN Security Council on threats to international peace and security caused by by terrorist acts – 12 November 2001. <http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2001/sgsm8021.doc.htm>

²⁶ *ibid*.

civilians he then becomes a terrorist because he has committed an act of terrorism. Therefore, terrorism is the deliberate targeting of civilians. Secondly, terrorists fail to regard the moral framework of international law; the cultural aspects of whether an act is seen as breaking international law or not must be ignored when civilians are targeted. Pillar identifies what a terrorist act may be, 'premeditated, political and a deadly act of terror', and finally, Alexander adds 'threat and use of both psychological and physical force' and 'terrorists are beyond all norms'. Piecing these together we see that a terrorist can be defined as:

A person or group of people, who threaten the use of and use both psychological and physical force in premeditated and politically motivated deadly acts of terror, which deliberately target civilians, in direct contravention of international law and the normal moral framework of humanity.

This may not be the perfect definition of terrorism as the 'normal moral framework of humanity' is open to interpretation. However this 'normal moral framework' may in future be defined by the UN as it sets out what can be expected from the new world order.

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TUNTUTAN DI LAUT CHINA SELATAN : ADAKAH CHINA AKAN MENGEKALKAN TUNTUTANNYA KE ATAS LAUT CHINA SELATAN (LCS)

Oleh : Mej Wan Azni bin Wan Muhammad

PENDAHULUAN

Konflik Laut China Selatan (LCS) adalah merupakan salah satu konflik yang mampu mencetuskan ketidakstabilan kepada rantau Asia-Pasifik pada masa hadapan. Di antara isu-isu yang terdapat dalam konflik ini adalah isu tuntutan bertindih oleh 6 buah negara ke atas Kepulauan Spratly, tuntutan ke atas Kepulauan Paracel antara China/Vietnam dan juga tuntutan sempadan maritime antara Malaysia / Indonesia di perairan Kepulauan Natuna. Walau bagaimanapun konflik yang paling diberikan perhatian dan dianggap mempunyai potensi ancaman keselamatan yang besar adalah Isu Pertindihan Tuntutan di Kepulauan Spratly. Ini adalah disebabkan kerana terdapatnya pelbagai kepentingan sampingan yang lain yang dapat dinikmati oleh mana-mana negara yang berjaya menguasainya.

LCS dengan keluasan 648,000 batu nautika persegi adalah merupakan lautan pinggir yang terbesar dari 6 lautan pinggir dunia. Ia disifatkan sebagai '*dangerous ground*' oleh para pelaut berikutan pelbagai tuntutan yang dibuat ke atasnya oleh beberapa buah negara. China yang merupakan salah satu negara yang terlibat telah mengemukakanuntutannya ke atas hampir 80 peratus LCS termasuklah Kepulauan Spratly dan Kepulauan Paracel. Tuntutan oleh China adalah disifatkan sebagai suatu halangan yang besar terhadap usaha penyelesaian kerana ia mendakwa mempunyai kedaulatan penuh ke atas Kepulauan Spratly.



TUJUAN

Membincangkan sebab-sebab China akan terus mengekalkanuntutannya ke atas LCS, dan berdasarkan kepada penemuan terhadap persoalan ini suatu cadangan bagi '*possible solution*' akan diketengahkan. Bagi memperolehi jawapan kepada tajuk ini, persoalan kenapa (*why*) China mengemukakanuntutannya perlulah dijawab. Walau bagaimana pun sebelum memulakan perbincangan esei ini adalah wajar untuk kita memahami konflik ini dengan melihat secara ringkas asas-asas tuntutan yang dibuat oleh negara-negara terlibat khususnya oleh negara China.

Umumnya tuntutan yang dibuat oleh China ke atas LCS adalah berasaskan faktor sejarah dan juga pendudukan. Tuntutan yang dibuat oleh 5 buah negara yang lain adalah berdasarkan asas-asas seperti berikut; Vietnam, berasaskan asas sejarah, '*continental shelf*' dan '*economic exclusive zone* (EEZ)'; Filipina, berasaskan kepada perjumpaan dan pendudukan atau status '*terra nullius*'; Malaysia, berasaskan '*continental shelf*' dan '*economic exclusive zone*' (EEZ); Brunei, berasaskan '*continental shelf*' dan Taiwan pula berdasarkan penyerahan oleh Jepun selepas Perang Dunia Kedua.

Merujuk kembali kepada asas tuntutan oleh China, mereka telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen yang terperinci untuk menguatkan *'historical argument'* bahawa Kepulauan Spratly adalah miliknya kerana ia telah dijumpai, dibangunkan dan ditadbirkan oleh China semenjak zaman kuno lagi. Rekod sejarah China mengandungi pelbagai rujukan berkenaan aktiviti oleh tentera laut dan penangkapan ikan di persekitaran Paracels serta beberapa dokumen yang melaporkan tentang serpihan-serpihan perkuburan, tokong-tokong dan lain-lain peninggalan sejarah yang dapat menyokong tuntutan penemuan awal China dan pendudukannya di Paracels dan Spratly. Kapal-kapal tentera laut China juga pernah menjelajah, menamakan dan meronda di kepulauan LCS semasa era pemerintahan Dinasti Sung (96-1278 AD), Yuan (1280-1341) dan Ming (1368-1644).



Asas-Asas Tuntutan China

Rujukan awal mengenai kehadiran China di Pulau Spratly turut dibuktikan pada tahun 1867 bila kapal pengkaji British terserempak dengan penangkap ikan warganegara China di Pulau Itu Aba. Pada tahun 1883 kerajaan German menghantar kumpulan pengkaji ke Spratly tetapi ia terpaksa menghentikan kerja pengkajian selepas dibantah oleh kerajaan China, ini jelas menunjukkan kedaulatan China pada

masa itu. Pada tahun 1902 China menghantar 3 kapal tentera lautnya ke Paracels untuk mengibarkan bendera China dan memasang tugu batu, suatu tindakan pemilikan dan pengistiharan kedaulatan. Pada tahun 1907 Gabenor Guangdong menghantar ekspedisi ke Pulau Paracels dan pada tahun 1946 kerajaan China menghantar *'naval task force'* ke Pulau Woody di Paracels dan Pulau Itu Aba di Spratly di mana mereka mengasaskan pemilikan selepas pengunduran Jepun pada tahun 1945. Untuk menguatkan lagi tuntutan mereka, China mendakwa bahawa Spratly telah berada di bawah kawalan pentadbiran Wilayah Guangdong sejak tahun 1947. China juga mengambil kira *'San Francisco Peace Treaty'* pada 8 September 1951 di mana berdasarkan Akta 2 bahagian 2 perjanjian ini Wilayah Spratly (Nansha) dan Paracels (Penghu) termasuk dalam wilayah yang diduduki Jepun pada masa Perang Dunia Kedua. Ini bermakna selepas kekalahan Jepun Kepulauan Spratly diletakkan kembali di bawah hak perundangan Wilayah China. Pada tahun 1974, China telah menawan Paracels daripada Vietnam Selatan dengan alasan Vietnam Selatan memulakan perselisihan. Walau bagaimanapun tindakan ini dianggap sebagai suatu langkah China untuk menyatakan kedaulatannya. Sejak kejadian ini *"China stand firm that it has indisputable legitimate sovereignty over those islands and absolutely allows no country to encroach upon his sovereignty"*.

Umumnya, kekuatan asas-asas tuntutan ke semua negara terlibat adalah hampir sama tanpa suatu *'evidence'* serta dokumen yang kukuh. Menyedari hakikat ini maka beberapa negara seperti China, Filipina, Vietnam dan Malaysia mula memilih pendekatan *'possession'* melalui penempatan serta kehadiran tentera masing-masing di LCS khususnya di kepulauan Spratly bagi menguatkan lagi tuntutan yang sedia ada. Fenomena inilah yang telah membawa kepada kemungkinan peningkatan potensi konflik LCS yang lebih buruk lagi pada masa hadapan.


Setelah mengetahui asas-asas tuntutan yang telah dibuat khasnya oleh China, penulisan ini akan melihat kenapakah negara China benar-benar menunjukkan minat dalam konflik ini. Pada umumnya, kita tidak dapat menafikan bahawa sesuatu reaksi atau *'act'* oleh sesebuah negara

adalah diasaskan oleh *'national interest'* mereka. Dalam persoalan di LCS, China mempunyai kepentingannya yang tersendiri iaitu bagi *'survival'* negaranya di masa hadapan, kepentingan ini boleh dilihat melalui pendapat salah seorang pengkaji sejarah, Eric Hyer yang menyebut *"domination of the South China Sea 'heartland' would give the Chinese great political, economic and military sway over the 'rim-land' states"*.

Aspek Ekonomi

Dilihat dari sudut ekonomi, LCS adalah merupakan suatu kawasan yang dikenal pasti kaya dengan sumber galian seperti minyak dan gas. Dianggarkan Spratly mempunyai stok simpan minyak dasar laut yang berjumlah 200 billion barrel, suatu jumlah yang cukup besar yang membuatkan semua pihak berlumba-lumba untuk memilikinya. Sejak tahun 1989, China di bawah pimpinan Deng Xiaopeng telah berusaha ke arah reformasi ekonominya berikutan sokongan melalui konsep *'open door'* oleh Amerika Syarikat berikutan tamatnya Era Perang Dingin, amat memerlukan bekalan tenaga untuk industri dan pembangunan pada masa hadapan. Pada tahun 2000 China dianggarkan terpaksa mengimport 12 million barrel minyak untuk kegunaan domestiknya. Kepentingan sumber ekonomi seperti minyak telah menyebabkan tercetusnya beberapa ketegangan yang serius di LCS, misalnya tindakan Vietnam Selatan yang mengikat kontrak carigali minyak dengan Syarikat Mobil Corporation pada tahun 1994 telah menyebabkan pihak China menghantar dua kapal perangnya untuk menyekat bekalan yang dihantar ke pelantar carigali Vietnam di kawasan Wananbei-21. Walaubagaimanapun ketegangan ini akhirnya berjaya dikurangkan oleh kedua-dua pihak melalui lawatan Presiden Jiang Zemin ke Hanoi pada bulan Disember 1994. Selain dari sumber alam kepulauan di LCS turut memiliki potensi besar untuk aktiviti pelancongan serta kaya dengan sumber perikanan. Jelaslah di sini LCS amat bernilai dan ibarat khazanah bagi China di masa hadapan, Seorang penulis terkenal, Micheal Leifer menyatakan bahawa *"The South China Sea (SCS) hold an intrinsic attraction for the government in Beijing because of the prospect of discovering and exploiting valuable*

natural resources.....which would in turn make a major contribution to continuing economic development".



Strategi Keselamatan

China juga melihat LCS dari aspek strategi keselamatan. LCS adalah merupakan laluan utama (SLOC) yang digunakan oleh semua jenis kapal merentas Lautan Pasifik menuju ke Lautan Hindi dan Asia Barat. Malah kuasa-kuasa besar seperti Amerika Syarikat dan Rusia yang mempunyai *'naval base'* mereka di Pasifik Utara dan di Vietnam juga menggunakan perairan LCS untuk ke Timur Tengah yang sering bergolak. Sejarah turut membuktikan LCS pernah dijadikan sebagai *'launching pad'* oleh pihak Jepun bagi menyerang China, kini ia dilihat sebagai kawasan kepulauan yang berpotensi bagi pembinaan pengkalan *'transit'*, *'forward radar'* dan *'logistic dump'* yang strategic untuk kegunaan tentera laut dan udara. Oleh yang demikian China percaya dengan penguasaan ke atas Spratly khususnya, akan membolehkannya mengawal SLOC, suatu hak yang diperakui oleh Konvensyen Undang-undang Laut Antarabangsa (UNCLOS) 1982. Hak penguasaan ini penting untuk China mencapai dominasi keseluruhan LCS sekaligus memberi ruang yang memihak kepada China dalam pengujudan *'Balance of Power'* di rantau Asia Pasifik khasnya

dengan Jepun dan Russia. Kepentingan konsep *'balancing'* ini bukan hanya penting bagi China malah ia juga perlu untuk mana-mana negara sekalipun, sesuai dengan pendapat yang menyatakan bahawa *"states are highly attentive to changes in their relative power position because relative powers have crucial security implications"*. Peluang China meneruskan tuntutannya ke atas LCS juga semakin terbuka luas sepertimana pendapat seorang pengkaji sejarah terkenal, Michael Mc Devitt yang menyebut *"As long as Beijing can claim that nothing it does impedes those seafarers, it keeps the US out. It also keeps the issue from being internationalized-which is the last thing China wants"*. Keadaan ini telah mendorong pihak China meningkatkan keupayaan tentera mereka menerusi program modenisasi Angkatan Darat dan transasi Angkatan Laut kepada *'blue-water power'* di mana perkembangan ini disifatkan oleh kebanyakan negara serantau sebagai *"will provide a marked improvement in its power-projection capability"*.

Aspek Politik

Dari aspek politik pula, penguasaan LCS oleh China atau mana-mana negara bererti mereka memiliki kelebihan dalam *'political influence'* berasaskan kepada kedudukan *'geostrategic'*nya. Keperluan untuk *'political influence'* ini telah dijelaskan oleh seorang penulis, Kenneth Waltz yang menyatakan *"we know from structural theory that states strive to maintain their positions in the system"*. Kekayaan hasil minyak dan gas serta kepentingan maritime LCS membolehkan negara yang menguasainya muncul sebagai kuasa ekonomi yang besar, sekaligus meletakkan negara tersebut dalam kekuatan politik di peringkat regional dan antarabangsa. Perkaitan ini adalah selari dengan pandangan yang menyebut *"country can exert political influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength"*. Selain dari itu terdapat juga pendapat yang mengaitkan masalah *'China domestic constituency'* telah menyebabkan China begitu aktif membuat tuntutan ke atas LCS demi menyatukan semula nasionalisma dan patriotisma rakyatnya. Sehingga kini China amat bernasib baik kerana politik dunia semasa masih menyebelahnya,

menurut seorang penulis, Qimao Chen *"obviously, under the current situation, The United States and other Western countries do not pay as much attention to China position as they did in the Cold War period"*. Sikap Barat yang tidak campurtangan secara serius dalam kemelut politik dalaman China dan isu-isu LCS secara tidak langsung telah menyelamatkan kekuatan dan kestabilan politik China.

Walaupun Era Perang Dingin telah menyaksikan kejatuhan Ideologi Komunisma dan pengaruh Soviet Union di Asia Pasifik namun bagi China ia menganggap kejatuhan komunisma dunia memberikan kesan dan cabaran besar kepada masa depan ideologi berkenaan. Peristiwa Medan Tienmien pada akhir 1991 adalah bukti besar ancaman terhadap masa depan kerajaan China sekarang. Bagi China dengan penglibatan serius mereka dalam konflik di LCS serta beberapa konflik yang lain seperti Taiwan dan sebagainya akan membantu usaha menarik sokongan domestik daripada rakyatnya yang sekaligus menyelamatkan komunisma China serta mengkaburkan perhatian dunia luar terhadap masalah domestik yang berlaku. Usaha China ini dapat dilihat melalui perubahan-perubahan polisi mereka yang amat ketara dalam menangani isu-isu di LCS di mana mereka mengamalkan *'low-profile pattern'* pada tahun 1950 an hingga 1960 an, *'growing concern pattern'* pada tahun 1970 an dan akhirnya kepada *'high-profile pattern'* sejak tahun 1980 an.

China juga menyedari bahawa kemerosotan pengaruh Soviet Union di pertengahan tahun 1980 an, telah menyebabkan kekuatan ideologi komunis terus pudar di Asia Pasifik, kini hanya China yang merupakan satu-satunya negara yang masih mampu mempertahankan maruah komunisma di mata dunia walaupun ia kini mengamalkan beberapa dasar yang lebih terbuka dengan pihak Barat demi mencapai apa yang disifatkan sebagai *'economic-strategic concern'*. Oleh itu penglibatan China dalam konflik di LCS menjadikan China satu-satunya negara komunis dunia selepas Era Perang Dingin yang difikirkan bakal mempunyai potensi *'hegemonic dominance'* di rantau ini pada masa hadapan, malah menyedari kemungkinan ini kebanyakan negara yang terlibat dalam konflik di LCS berpendapat

penglibatan aktif China dalam beberapa siri perundingan ke arah mencari jalan penyelesaian amat diperlukan.

Selain dari itu, usaha ke arah pengekalan status quo *'strategic culture'* adalah dianggap sebab serta kemungkinan kenapa China akan mengekalkan tuntutan mereka di LCS. Dunia sedia maklum bahawa China mempunyai *'strategic culture'* yang istimewa berdasarkan pada unsur tradisional dan *'revolutionary heritage'* pada masa silam. Oleh yang demikian, kemungkinan untuk China berundur dari tuntutan yang sedia ada adalah dianggap suatu yang mustahil sebaliknya mereka mungkin akan menggunakan kekuatan yang ada pada mereka sebagai jalan penyelesaian kepada konflik di LCS. Malah kekuatan *'strategic culture'* dalam masyarakat China turut diasaskan berdasarkan kepada tradisi, nilai (values), kepercayaan (beliefs), *'attitudes'*, *'symbol'* dan *'culturally based'* dalam menerima situasi serta penyelesaian masalah. Meskipun situasi di China kini telah berubah namun mereka masih kuat berpegang pada *'historical consciousness'*, malah sejak pembentukan PRC pada Oktober 1949 China telah didapati menggunakan kekuatan tentera sebagai alat polisi luar negara sebanyak sepuluh kali dan ini terbukti dengan satu pernyataan yang menyebut " *the threat and use of force is central to China's history.....while calling for peaceful resolution of international conflict, Beijing would not hesitate to resort to violence to protect its interests*".

Oleh itu berdasarkan kepada semua kepentingan serta potensi sumber kekayaan yang besar yang akan dimiliki oleh China melalui penguasaan ke atas LCS maka persoalan bahawa China akan terus mengekalkan tuntutannya telahpun terjawab. Ini boleh disokong dengan pendapat umum yang menyatakan bahawa di antara sebab-sebab yang ketara kekaburan dalam hal keselamatan di Asia Tenggara selepas Perang Dunia Kedua adalah lanjutan dari tindakan China melalui apa yang dapat diperjelaskan sebagai " *China's long-term intentions towards maritime Southeast Asia based on its claim to the Spratly Islands and therefore, much of the South China Sea, these are reinforced by the systematic development of a fledgling blue-water naval capability*".

Apakah kemungkinan jalan penyelesaian yang ada bagi konflik ini? Jawapannya terletak pada negara-negara yang terlibat sendiri khususnya China sebagai pembawa peranan utama melalui kerjasama serta tolak ansur, apatah lagi negara-negara yang terlibat adalah ahli ASEAN yang menjadi sumber pelaburan dan rakan dagangan China yang berpotensi dalam abad ini. Di sini digariskan langkah-langkah penyelesaian yang telah disyorkan oleh China dan juga pendekatan penyelesaian yang lain termasuklah pendekatan pihak ASEAN.

Kemungkinan Pendekatan Penyelesaian

Dalam usaha mencapai penyelesaian konflik di LCS, pendekatan-pendekatan yang diketengahkan oleh China banyak dipengaruhi oleh dasar luar dan dasar keselamatan baru China yang memberikan penekanan dalam hubungan luar yang berteraskan kepada " *five principles of peaceful coexistence*". Pertamanya; *'mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty'*, keduanya; *'mutual non-aggression'*, ketiganya; *'mutual non-interference in each other internal affairs'*, keempatnya; *'equality and mutual benefit'* dan kelimanya; *'peaceful coexistence'*.

Oleh yang demikian pendekatan-pendekatan terkini yang diambil oleh China dalam menangani konflik di LCS adalah merupakan perubahan dari *'hard approach'* kepada *'new soft approach'* yang memfokuskan kepada beberapa tindakan utama, di antaranya mereka cuba membentuk hubungan yang lebih baik dengan negara-negara terlibat melalui usaha pengukuhan hubungan dan kerjasama dua hala dengan China. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan melihat wujudnya peningkatan lawatan rasmi pemimpin-pemimpin mereka pada tahun 1990 an dan di awal abad ke 20 misalnya lawatan Presiden China ke negara-negara yang membuat tuntutan di LCS seperti Malaysia, Singapura, Vietnam dan sebagainya. China juga kini tidak lagi berminat meluaskan pengaruh ideologi komunisnya ke luar negara sebagai menghormati dasar luar barunya. Walau bagaimanapun ada pihak yang berpendapat perubahan tindak tanduk China ini adalah sebagai mencari pengaruh *'hegemony'* nya di masa hadapan khususnya di Asia Tenggara. Hasrat China ini telah

didedahkan oleh dua ilmunan China yang menyatakan “ *China objective is to become a new world class Pacific power in the twenty-first century* ”.

China juga mulai mengamalkan ‘*omnidirectional diplomatic policy*’ untuk memperbaiki tahap hubungan dengan semua negara seperti dengan negara-negara ASEAN dan juga dengan kuasa-kuasa besar khususnya Amerika Syarikat. Polisi baru ini menunjukkan berlakunya perubahan dalam dasar luar China kerana sebelum ini mereka seringkali mencetuskan ketegangan melalui tindakan agresifnya di LCS misalnya insiden penguasaan ke atas Pulau Paracel diikuti dengan insiden ‘*armed clash*’ dengan Vietnam pada tahun 1974 dan 1988, adalah merupakan suatu tindakan yang di sifatkan oleh negara serantau sebagai ‘*stepping stones to the Spratlys*’. Ia kemudiannya telah menduduki Terumbu Mischief pada Februari 1995 yang mencetuskan bantahan hebat kerajaan Filipina. Walau bagaimanapun selepas pendudukannya di Mischief, China telah mengendurkan aktiviti ketenteraannya dan mulai menggunakan pendekatan diplomasi dalam menangani konflik ini. Walau bagaimanapun keikhlasan mereka masih diragui, ramai pihak yang berpendapat China melakukannya semata-mata kerana mengharapkan pelaburan dan dagangan dari negara-negara ASEAN yang berpotensi besar dalam menyokong pembangunan ekonominya di masa hadapan.

Dalam menangani isu di LCS, China telah mengambil beberapa tindakan sebagai usaha ke arah penyelesaian dan juga sebagai usaha menguatkan lagi tuntutan mereka. *Pertamanya*; Beijing bersetuju usaha mewujudkan “*code of conduct*” dengan Manila bagi mengelakkan sebarang tindakan-tindakan yang boleh membawa kepada potensi ketidakstabilan di LCS. *Keduanya*; ‘*military recovery*’. Ia dengan jelas meningkatkan keupayaan People Liberation Army (PLA) sebagai ‘*back up*’ kepada tuntutan mereka ke atas Kepulauan Spratly, ini termasuklah memperbaiki kemudahan di ‘*Woody Island airfield*’ Paracels. *Ketiganya*; China di sifatkan mengambil kesempatan untuk membaiki kedudukan dan pengaruhnya di LCS dengan mengambil peluang dari isu-isu ekonominya dengan ASEAN.

Selain dari itu, China juga telah menawarkan kesediaan mereka untuk mewujudkan ‘*dialogue sessions*’. Namun perbincangan hendaklah berdasarkan ‘*bilateral basis*’ dan ia menolak semua perbincangan yang berbentuk ‘*multilateral*’ dengan alasan bahawa kaedah ‘*multilateral*’ akan menjadikan keadaan konflik bertambah sukar lagi. Kaedah ini telah dilaksanakan di antara China dan Taiwan bagi kes Pulau Itu Aba, Spratly di mana China melaksanakan ‘*soft approach*’ terhadap Taiwan, malah kedua-dua negara bersetuju untuk tidak mencabar tuntutan masing-masing dan akan mengelakkan konflik ketenteraan di perairan Spratly antara mereka. China juga telah menyiapkan deraf ‘*code of conduct*’ nya sendiri tetapi ia tidak menyatakan sebarang bentuk larangan ke atas pembinaan bangunan di atas struktur Spratly yang diduduki, suatu pendapat yang berbeza dengan deraf yang disediakan oleh ASEAN pada Disember 1999. Perbezaan ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa jalan penyelesaian konflik LCS adalah masih lagi jauh.

Pendekatan Syor Dari ASEAN

Manakala pendekatan-pendekatan penyelesaian lain adalah sepertimana yang disyorkan oleh ASEAN, di antaranya adalah melalui usaha ke arah membentuk ‘*multilateral cooperation*’. Ia adalah perlu bagi mewujudkan persefahaman dalam menangani dua kategori isu maritime iaitu soal pengurusan laut dan sumber perikanan serta pengurusan sumber minyak dan gas. Pengurusan laut meliputi aspek-aspek panduarah di laut, mencegah pencemaran, ‘*search and rescue*’ dan mencegah aktiviti lanun serta penyeludupan. Peningkatan jumlah ‘*naval traffic*’ di LCS juga memungkinkan perlu wujudnya ‘*code of conduct*’ untuk mengelakkan salah tafsiran tindakan-tindakan yang boleh mencetuskan konflik. Asas ‘*multilateral cooperation*’ ini penting bagi kesinambungan kejayaan kerjasama yang seterusnya ke arah penyelesaian yang kekal.

Kerjasama dua hala atau ‘*bilateral cooperation*’ juga wajar dipraktikkan di antara negara-negara terlibat bagi mengelakkan ketegangan dan ini pernah dilakukan oleh China dan Vietnam selepas ‘*armed clash*’ di Spratly pada tahun 1988. Kaedah ini telah turut menghasilkan perubahan positif di mana melalui perundingan China/

Vietnam pada 19 Oktober 1993 kedua-dua negara telah bersetuju mengelakkan penggunaan kekerasan dalam menyelesaikan masalah sempadan darat dan di LCS.

Usaha serta penekanan ke arah melahirkan 'confidence building' di kalangan negara-negara terlibat perlu dilakukan secara berterusan untuk memperolehi ketelusan dalam setiap percanggahan isu yang wujud. Salah satu usaha ke arah penyelesaian terhadap konflik LCS yang telah dilakukan ASEAN adalah melalui perbincangan MPC atau 'Managing Potential Conflicts in South China Sea Project'. Walau bagaimanapun sebelum sidang MPC ini diwujudkan, Indonesia pernah menganjurkan perbincangan tidak rasmi bagi menghasilkan 'formal territorial claims' ke atas semua pihak dan untuk mengenalpasti usaha-usaha yang boleh dibuat bagi penggunaan bersama sumber-sumber di kawasan pertikaian LCS. Projek MPC telah dimulakan pada tahun 1990 ternyata memberikan hasil yang positif apabila pada tahun 1995 China mengumumkan bahawa mereka bersedia menyelesaikan pertikaian LCS menerusi norma-norma undang-undang Antarabangsa dan 'UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982'. Perubahan sikap China ini berkemungkinan besar berikutan dari pengalaman dan pengajaran sejarah silamnya, di mana penulis berpandangan bahawa "China has become a firm believer of comprehensive and cooperative security".

Langkah ke arah penyelesaian seterusnya adalah 'Joint Resource Development'. Ia dianggap yang paling baik untuk jangka masa pendek sementara suatu penyelesaian muktamad dicapai. Perkongsian dalam membangunkan sumber di LCS akan memberikan faedah kepada semua negara yang terlibat sekurang-kurangnya untuk tempoh tertentu. China pernah mencadangkan kesediaannya untuk berkerjasama, walau bagaimanapun terdapat halangan untuk melaksanakannya disebabkan perbezaan konsep antara China dengan negara-negara lain yang terlibat di mana konsep 'Joint Resource Development' menurut China adalah bermaksud 'Bilateral Cooperation' di kawasan pertikaian sedangkan negara-negara yang lain lebih condong ke arah 'Multilateral Joint Development Scheme'. China juga menyatakan bahawa mereka hanya sedia bertolak ansur sekiranya negara-

negara yang lain bersetuju untuk menamatkan ke semua tuntutan terhadap 'Kedaulatan Wilayah China di LCS' dan sebarang bentuk perbincangan mestilah dalam bentuk 'informal' tanpa melibatkan negara-negara bukan ASEAN. Walau bagaimana pun syarat China ini sukar untuk diterima oleh semua negara yang terlibat terutamanya untuk memperakui kedaulatan China di LCS.

Kemungkinan jalan penyelesaian seterusnya adalah 'U.S Presence'. Walaupun negara-negara Asia Tenggara tidak pernah menyatakan permintaan ini secara terbuka namun pada hakikatnya mereka amat mengharapkan kehadiran tentera Amerika Syarikat di LCS, atau sekurang-kurangnya melalui tindakan 'show of force' oleh armada laut Amerika Syarikat. Kehadiran mereka juga sekurang-kurangnya dapat memenuhi sebahagian besar dari fungsi-fungsi ketenteraan kearah mencapai kestabilan serantau iaitu sebagai ejen 'deterrence', 'compellence' dan juga 'reassurance/swaggering'. Keperluan terhadap 'US Presence' boleh dikaitkan dengan pendapat yang menyatakan "Beijing's more assertive approach to the South China Sea disputes in the 1990s reflects the complete disappearance of the Soviet factor in SEA and a dramatically reduced U.S presence". Walau bagaimanapun hasrat ASEAN untuk melihat Amerika Syarikat memainkan peranannya di LCS telah dibatasi atau dihadkan dengan ketiadaan polisi jelas Amerika Syarikat pada masa ini dalam konflik ini selain dari konsep ZOPFAN yang diamalkan oleh ASEAN sejak tahun 1971 iaitu semasa Era Perang Dingin lagi.

KESIMPULAN

Ringkasnya konflik di LCS adalah suatu masalah yang sukar untuk diselesaikan dalam jangka masa terdekat dan sikap bertolak ansur setiap negara khususnya China adalah penting. Menyedari hakikat ini maka kebanyakan negara-negara kuasa besar yang lain khususnya Amerika Syarikat lebih cenderung untuk membiarkan konflik ini diselesaikan sendiri oleh China dan juga ASEAN di peringkat 'Regional'. Kenyataan ini adalah bertepatan sebagaimana pendapat seorang penulis terkenal, Michael Liefer yang menyebut 'United States under Presidents

George Bush and Bill Clinton has been equally reluctant to assume a military balance-of-power role in the South China Sea. Apa yang pasti, peluang berikutan sikap 'neutral' kuasa-kuasa besar ini mungkin akan dipergunakan dengan sepenuhnya oleh China bagi mengekalkan malah memperkuat lagi tuntutan ke atas LCS pada masa hadapan sebagai sebahagian dari usaha mereka untuk mendapat reputasi serta pengiktirafan sebagai kuasa besar di rantau ini. Langkah semasa China yang dilihat

sebagai 'shelving on the dispute and undertaking joint development' adalah dianggap suatu tindakan yang bersifat sementara demi menjaga kepentingan strategiknya yang luas dengan ASEAN dan juga berikutan perubahan konsep keselamatannya selepas berakhirnya Perang Dingin. Selagi tiada perkembangan yang boleh menjejaskan 'Beijing security interests' di LCS maka Status Quo semasa iaitu 'no resolution'/'no confrontation' akan berterusan dalam isu pertindihan tuntutan di LCS.

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Mej Wan Azni bin Wan Muhammad telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Rejimen Renjer DiRaja pada 1 Ogos 1986. Beliau pernah menyandang beberapa jawatan penting seperti Peg Staf 3 Latih, Peg Staf 2 Tadbir & Logistik dan Peg Staf 2 Gerak di Markas Formasi Briged. Beliau berkelulusan MTAT, Haigate dan juga memiliki kelulusan Sarjana Pengurusan (Cemerlang), Diploma Pengajian Strategi dan Pertahanan (Kepujian) dari UM, Diploma Lanjutan Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan dari UKM dan Diploma Pentadbiran Awam (Anugerah Reaktor) dari UTM. Beliau kini menjawat jawatan sebagai Penolong Pegawai Memerintah 2 RRD.

THE IMPACT OF MEDIA ROLE IN WAR

By : Mej Mohd Fadzuri bin Masudoki

Journalists will say that war is too important to be left to generals. Reporting of war is too important to be left to reporters. Soldiers need to get involved in this."

*Maj Gen Patrick Brady – 1999
(Former Public Relations Chief of US Army)*

INTRODUCTION

The revolution in information technology, from the transistor through to widespread digitization, deeply networked communications, as well as, the revolutionary changes in the employment of airpower have profoundly influenced analysts and planners and has completely changed the conduct of war.

The Malaysian Army has long experienced very close relationship with the media during its emergency campaign to overthrow the communist ideology in the year 1945 to 1960. It maximally and effectively utilized the media's role to influence its people not to support the communist insurgents. Every military and police operation at the time was intelligently supported by the media which lead to Malaya's independence in 1957. The Malaysian Army since his early establishment has involved the media in most of it events. Recently media representative were invited for integrated events during the Army's 75th anniversary as a mark of the cordial relationship during peacetime. This article will shift our view from past history to a new era of media role specifically on the rapid changes that the Gulf War afforded the world its first glimpse of the future of warfare. Millions around the globe were treated to precision-guided bombs annihilating targets in downtown Baghdad, learned of satellite uplinks from the battlefield that provided real-time connectivity, and applauded

the ability of Stealth aircraft to ensure aerial dominance. Everyone seemed to understand that something was different about this "video-game war". There was much more to the spectacle than the one provided by previous wars. How much of it was real and how much rigged, are discussed below. The important thing to note is that the revolutions in the field of information technology have caused the media to have a much greater impact on operations. Thus it is imperative to take a closer look at the intricate relationship between the military and the media, and to understand the role of media in war.

AIM

This article is mainly aimed to accentuate our military personel on the importance of media in war which has a great impact on decision making.



The Military or The Media

The question here arises: who needs who? Does the media need the military or does the military need the media? The answer is, however, not that simple. Throughout history both institutions have been at odds with each other. The military is perennially popular, but is at its best in battle and functions like a conditioned athlete. John Peterson noted that in Desert Storm, "both the military and the press were working hard to manipulate information. (John L. Peterson, Info Wars," U.S Navy Proceedings, May 1993). However, it too, has its share of incompetence. So when the military makes mistakes, they can be monumental. Besides territory, a large number of lives can be lost.

The military is disciplined, hierarchical and lives within a homogenous, closed culture that can be — and often is — hostile to outsiders. The news media are often unpopular with the brass, for they function independently, without rules, regulations, or even a code of conduct except for some that are self-imposed. The media's newspapers, radio, TV and cable have a variety of interests of their own and set goals to be achieved. They have their fulsome share of rogues, incompetents and avaricious vultures. Yet at their best, the media provide the nation with a vital service it can get nowhere else. It is one of the pillars of the state.

When the two institutions meet during a conflict, clashes are inevitable. The media wants to tell the story, and the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum. The media wants freedom, no censorship, total access and the capability to get their stories out to their audiences quickly. The military on the other hand, wants control. The greatest fear of a military commander in a pre-invasion scenario is that something might leak out that would tip off the enemy as surprise is the most potent weapon in the commander's armory. On the other hand, the media fears that the military might stifle news coverage for enhancing their public image or cover up their mistakes. Those are fundamental differences that will never change. At times the military and the patriotic media also have worked together in harmony but usually animosity tarnishes their relationship. There is definitely a need for better understanding between the two. A

perfect co-operative union of the media and the military is likely impossible, given the differences in missions and personalities but there are wise heads in both institutions who recognize the mutual need. The media is hungry for stories while the military need to tell their story. Above all they need public support. The media can tell their story and if there is a rapport and understanding, they can tell it well and effectively. Both institutions will work better during the tensions and in the fog of war if they learn to get along in peacetime.

In wartime when there is a life and death struggle for the military, personnel as well as institutionally, patriotism comes to their rescue instinctively and through their long training. Civil media totally lacks such training and has nothing personal at stake. Self-aggrandizement seems to be the *raison d'être* of most. War is good for the media business. Despite the excessive costs of sending correspondents for coverage, using expensive satellite equipment and airtime, armed conflict is precisely the type of event on which the media thrives. This is an alarming situation and something must be done during peacetime to remove this dichotomy. It is for the civil media to come forward with the remedy. On the other side, the military need to provide its own media to fill the gap and, more importantly, to serve as a role model.

Media As A Force Multiplier

Many military leaders have now become more aware that news media coverage of their operations can be a force multiplier. Impressed by Gen. Walt Boomer's example of encouraging favourable news media coverage of the US Marines in the Gulf War - to the point where most observers agree that the Marines received more credit than they deserved, mostly at the expense of the US Army - many military leaders have come to the conclusion that media coverage not only develops public awareness and the support of military units, it also has the side benefit of enhancing their morale by informing their families and friends on the activities of the troops. If used prudently, the media is indeed a force multiplier as it builds public opinion. In the words of Abraham Lincoln: "Public opinion is everything. With it nothing can fail, Without it nothing can succeed."

Overt Sources	Covert Sources
Press briefings.	Own contacts.
Press releases/handouts.	Electronic eavesdropping.
Supervised visit/tour of battle area.	Clandestine visits to battle area.

Media Information Gathering

The media gathers its information from various sources that can be categorized as shown in the table:

With communication networks now blanketing the globe and news organizations developing their capability to report from almost anywhere with new technology such as satellite telephones, hand-phones, laptop computers, digital cameras and other inventions, transmission of news is possible in real time. Soon commercial, high-resolution photographic satellites will be available to news organizations. The capability of the news media to photograph a battle area during time of war and thereby reveal the location of one's own ground units, ships and airbases could be very detrimental to the national security. This makes censorship virtually impossible.

Information Security And The Military Culture

Traditionally, information security implies the military practice of reviewing a reporter's news-copy prior to his filing to ensure that no information of value to the enemy was released. This system was effectively used during the Second World War but now technological innovations have called into question the whole concept. The "Vietnam Syndrome" leads most Americans to believe that they lost the war due to the total freedom given to the media in their coverage of the war. Their pessimistic reports tipped the public opinion against the conflict. The tales of atrocities of US troops in My Lai and Iwo Jima and, Jane Fonda's radio speeches from North Vietnam and media reports of US casualties stirred public opinion in the USA against the War in Vietnam.

In Desert Storm the Pentagon decided to use information security to avoid a Vietnam-like situation. The imperative for secrecy was great, because if Iraqi commanders had had even an inkling of the US attack plan, they could have repositioned their forces, jeopardizing the success of the operation and inflicting significantly higher casualties on the Allied Forces. The US Government demonstrated the means to blackout the battlefield anytime it so chose, even in the presence of hundreds of representatives of the world media. When a television reporter watching the take off of US fighters from a Saudi base began to report that one of the fighter aircraft appeared to be experiencing mechanical trouble, his satellite link was shut down by military electronic counter measures. (Kennedy, William V., 1993)

A British television crew tried to transmit news to London without the knowledge of the PR specialists. Their transmission was intercepted by an airborne AWACs electronic warfare aircraft and they were promptly arrested for this breach of security. (Taylor, Philip M., 1995). The news organizations later challenged this approach. When the Press was kept away from operations at Grenada and Panama, the media actually went to court. Thus in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, better sense prevailed on the military culture of clamping down news information. This has led to an improved arrangement of :

a. Security At The Source

"Security at the source", a preferred approach, is a relatively new concept in which the military strives to develop a plan as far in advance of the operation as possible in order to allow the news media to have broad access to the total action. Where feasible, journalists may be accommodated

with the combat forces. Each reporter is first accredited and then given the ground rules with which he/she is expected to comply. Because they will be located shoulder-to-shoulder with the troops, reporters who had questions about the security aspects of the operation could find someone to respond readily without actually turning in their news-copy for review. If the Security at the source concept is to work, certain understanding with the media must be reached.

- They must accept that the military can only effectively accommodate a finite number of journalists in combat operations. A mechanism must be developed in peacetime to establish the strength of reporters.
- News organizations need to more diligently train their reporters in the area of military operations. The best way to do this is to invite the media for the coverage of peacetime military exercises.

b. The Fog Of War

In wartime, the media serves a variety of roles. With information, they can convey a sense of the fighting to a public divorced from its actual horrors or, with entertainment, they can provide a sense of relief or escape to a public more directly involved such as in a blockade or bombing campaign. Just because they mediate information about the progress of a war to the public, the media can serve not just as providers of 'straight' news and information but also as agents of propaganda and disinformation. This is because the very processes by which war reports are gathered at source, packaged by journalists and disseminated to a wider audience are subject to a wide spectrum of influences ranging from battlefield censorship to broadcasting standards, deception and disinformation campaigns, official information policy and propaganda. These are indeed the pollutants which constitute that overworked idiom: "The Fog of War". Journalists have a front seat at the making of history and it is tragic that by the time the historians become involved 'that first rough draft of history' provided by

the journalists has been so widely disseminated by the mass media that it becomes extremely difficult to dislodge the pollutants that caused the fog of war.

c. Truth : The First Casualty Of War

Robert Capa, the famous War correspondent and photographer, was fond of saying that "if your picture wasn't any good, you're not standing close enough." For most journalists, however, being read is better than being dead - and it is worth noting that perhaps Capa's most famous photograph in Life magazine, that of a Spanish civil war soldier 'the instant he is dropped by a bullet through the head in front of Cordoba' was in fact that of a soldier stumbling in training during peace time. (Taylor, Philip M., 1995). A rule of thumb in both the world wars was to only show pictures of the enemy dead. Own casualty figures have often been minimized and those of the enemy exaggerated. Defeats have simply been omitted or delayed in reporting. Or explained as "strategic retreats".

While still the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, refused to release news that HMS Nelson and HMS Barham had sustained serious damage during World War II. In 1971, the news of the surrender of Dhaka was considerably delayed and was relayed only after the pep-talk of PTV programmes. The sinking of HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missile fired by an Argentine Mirage aircraft during the Falklands War was omitted till it became inevitable to be declared. The fall and recapture of Khafji in the Gulf War was constantly misreported.

Operation "Desert Cloud"

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Pentagon, military and media worked together to develop plans that would make the Gulf War coverage the most comprehensive wartime news coverage in history. It was also the most massive cover-up in history to date. On

the opening night of the US attack on Iraq, ABC anchorperson Peter Jennings made what was perhaps a Freudian slip, mistakenly referring to the start of "Operation Desert Cloud" rather than "Operation Desert Storm" (Gottschalk, Marie). In the light of the fact that many of the US military's most spectacular claims in the Gulf War have since proven to be false, Jennings's slip appears to have been no slip at all.



The problem was not simply that the Pentagon and the US administration misled the media, but that the media generally swallowed without question whatever the military and the US Government dished out to them. They were reduced to the level of stenographers. By the time the truth began to dribble out in the war's wake, it was too late to erase the dominant image of an inevitable, clean, bloodless, high-tech war.

Media and Perception Management

One of the important subjects played by the media through IW that has long been hidden from view is perception management. While everyone knew that perceptions played a major role in shaping the outcome of conflict, the very topic was taboo. It smacked too much of manipulating people in ways that evoked questionable legal issues – issues no one wanted to address.

In preparing for conflict, perception management is essential. The adversary should be led to believe that he is vulnerable and will lose if war is initiated. Potential partners must perceive the cause as just, and victory as assured. The civilian

population and political leadership must also perceive the cost as worth the effort. (Commander Richard P.O'Neill, 1989). zHow all that is accomplished is extremely tricky. Peterson went on to quote General Colin Powell as stating "You can win the battle or loose the war if you don't handle the story right." (Colonel John B. Alexander, 1999)

To deceive the enemy is a fundamental tenet of war. However, it was not until 1994 that a doctrine on deception was published in the USA, and that was in response to the burgeoning field of command and control warfare. The target of the deception is the enemy's decision making processes. This may be done by directly influencing the leaders, or by manipulating the beliefs of the people through media who must support them. Colonel Richard Szarafranski, in addressing IW theory, rightly stated, "An aim of warfare has always been to affect the enemy's information system." His considerations for attacking include "every means by which an adversary arrives at knowledge or beliefs "in that context. He carries that argument to a logical conclusion, *targeting every element in the epistemology of an adversary*. This means attempting to undermine the organization, structure, methods, and validity of knowledge of that adversary. Deprived of valid information using the media, a means to evaluate information properly, or a stable and reliable mechanism for decision making places the adversary at great risk.

There always will be constant tension between the military and the media. Great care must be taken when developing a compelling story, to ensure the basic facts are true. Lies and partial truths will be found out. To be effective in the long run, it is absolutely necessary to be well grounded in facts. Spectacular stories may have an immediate impact but, when found to be false, they do far more damage to institutional credibility. For instance, in the early days of Desert Shield, stories abounded about babies being carelessly thrown from incubators by ruthless Iraqi soldiers. These tales were even quoted in the hallowed Hall of Congress. Later, it was learned they were part of an orchestrated Kuwaiti public relations campaign in the media design to gain American sympathy quickly. (Colonel John B. Alexander, 1999).

We know that world leaders obtain much of their information from CNN. In major campaigns, other news organizations follow their lead. Employing perception management techniques includes gaining the willing support of the major news organizations. This is a tedious process that must be developed over many years through trusting relationships. Reliance should be placed on seasoned reporters who have developed a sense of responsibility, ethics and loyalty. Unfortunately, too many young reporters believe that all institutions are inherently dishonest and the only role for the press is that of an adversary.

In addition to commercial media, there are many other ways to influence the perceptions of an adversary. Psychological operations units have a wide variety of tools, including radio and television stations, plus leaflets and other printed material. The adversary may be presented with a false picture of the developing battlefield. For instance, during World War II, a phantom army was fabricated near Dover, England. Through a complex scheme of radio transmissions and troop movements, the German High Command was led to believe that the Normandy invasion was a feint, while the real attack would come at the narrowest point on the English Channel, Pas de Calais. The brilliantly executed ruse kept the German reserve armored division away from the vulnerable Allied forces fighting to establish a beachhead. In Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein was made to believe that the coalition forces would attack straight north into his main defenses. Blinded, his troops were not aware of the powerful tank force that had quietly maneuvered to the west in Operation Left Hook. When the attack did come, the Iraqi guns were still facing in the wrong direction. (Colonel John B. Alexander, 1999).

Some cover-ups and myths are:-

There are countless examples of disinformation released to the media by the US administration and to the Pentagon. Some are stated below:

- **The USA beckoned Iraq to Invade Kuwait.** A little-noted poll in February, 1991 revealed striking gaps in people's knowledge about the Gulf Crisis. Only 13 percent of Americans

knew that when Saddam signaled that he might use force against Kuwait, the United States through its charming Ambassador in Baghdad had indicated in July, 1990 that it would take no action, (Gottschalk, Marie) which it certainly had taken none.

- **Saddam offered to withdraw from Kuwait.** As early as August, 1990, Saddam had sent messages through diplomatic channels offering to withdraw from Kuwait and release all foreigners in exchange for the lifting of the sanctions, guaranteed access to the Gulf, and sole control of the contested Rumailah oil field.(Gittings, John, ed., 1991).

- **Iraq had no intention of attacking Saudi Arabia.** Defence and intelligence officials informed the US administration shortly after the Kuwaiti invasion that Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia. (Royce, Knut, 1991).

- **Iraq posed a major nuclear and chemical weapons threat.** Prior to the start of the Gulf crisis, US intelligence officials estimated that Iraq would not be capable of producing an atomic bomb for at least five years. But in November, 1990, President George Bush started claiming that Baghdad will be able to build an atomic bomb in just six months time insisting that the time to attack Iraq was now. (Lewis, Paul, 1992)

- **Iraqi soldiers did not remove Kuwaiti babies from incubators.** Despite scant evidence, the allied media propagated that Iraqi soldiers removed hundreds of Kuwaiti babies from their incubators, leaving them to die on hospital floors of Kuwait City. Seven US Senators invoked the event in their speeches while backing the January 12, 1991 resolution authorizing war.(Emmons, Gary, 1992)

- **Smart Bombs Won the War.** The world was mesmerized by Pentagon-produced videos of Stealth bombers neatly dropping sophisticated laser-guided bombs down the airshafts of designated military targets while mercifully sparing nearby schools, hospitals, homes and mosques. Fewer than 8% of the bombs used by the Allied Forces were "smart"

ones and of the 88,500 tons of munitions dropped on Kuwait and Iraq, an estimated 70% missed their targets and caused massive destruction to civilian life and property. (Gellmon, Barton, 1991).

▪ **The Patriot Missile Performed Flawlessly.** Despite tall claims, experts testified before the US Congress in spring 1991 that the much-vaunted Patriot missile may have destroyed only one of the 90 Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Patriots actually increased the amount of ground damage as they crashed into, of all places Israeli streets. (Los Angeles Times, 1991).

▪ **Muzzling Negative Reports.** There was definite attempts to muzzle negative reports. Some examples were quoted earlier. There were numerous other examples. Associated Press (AP) photographer Scott Apple White was handcuffed, beaten, and had one of his cameras smashed when 15 US and Saudi military police officers descended on him as he attempted to photograph the Dhahran barracks where an Iraqi Scud killed 27 G.I.s. (Fialka, JohnJ., 1991).

▪ **Iraqi Casualties.** There was widespread silence about Iraqi casualties, Greenpeace has calculated that 57,000 to 75,000 members of Iraqi military died during the Gulf War while 3,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the air war. Tapes of attacks by Apache helicopter pilots which were not released, revealed Iraqi soldiers being killed mercilessly as they were fleeing their bunkers while thousands were gunned down during their retreat on the open highway to Iraq. (Balzer, John, 1991).

▪ **Saddam Learns from the "Vietnam Syndrome".** Saddam Hussein learned his own lessons from the "Vietnam Syndrome". CNN's Peter Arnett, was permitted to remain in Iraq to report on the other side of the war. He was accused by the White House of "Speaking for the Iraqi Government", by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of "aiding and abetting an enemy" and by Col. Harry Summers, Public Affairs advisor of "treason". (Schechter, Danny, 1991).

Saddam Hussein used Peter Arnett to his own advantage by trying to create a public outcry in the allied nations by allowing CNN to transmit pictures of the destruction of a Chemical Weapons Complex with freshly scrawled "Baby Milk Factory" in English, parading captured Allied pilots on Iraqi TV, declaring their disapproval of the war and displaying the charred bodies of hundreds of civilians killed by Allied air attacks on air-raid shelters. Unfortunately for Saddam, his ploy did not work. It was merely a drop in the Allied scum tide. Perhaps it helped the Allied propaganda machine by providing a posture of objectivity.

Lessons Learnt from the Gulf War

Those who do not learn from history are relegated to become a part of history. It is important to draw lessons so that past mistakes in the employment of media in war can be avoided.

- Public opinion must be supportive as whole nations go to war not just the armed forces. Public opinion can be built by the media.
- Operational secrecy in modern limited wars now requires the active connivance of the media.
- Conflict of interest can also come into play. The media involved in the Gulf War had ties to the US arms industry e.g. NBC, which is owned by General Electric, produces aircraft and missiles, like the widely reported Tomahawk Cruise missile and the Patriot Air Defence System. (Rostrup, Truls). Thus the propaganda effect may be market oriented and in effect an advertising campaign.
- There is a need for reporters to be educated about the military and the military about the media.
- Media coverage is a force multiplier. People get their perception of the military as a dedicated and professional organization from media reports so closer trust and confidence must be created.

“Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets”. Napoleon

- Technology has had a tremendous impact on media. It must be assimilated. News media and military leaders should jointly engage in a study of the security issues posed by real-time reporting from the battlefield.
 - The media is as patriotic as anybody else in the civil life is. We need to build trust.
 - Talk to the media but without ebullience and boast. The USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Michael I. Dugan was sacked in September 1990 for inadvertently revealing air strike plans to the media, during a casual conversation. (Atkinson, Rick, 1997).
 - Deception has formed a part of warfare since the Trojan Horse but the incorporation of the media into such exercises is a highly dangerous game. If the free media, even the patriotic media, discover that they are being used for such purposes, they are likely to distance themselves from the exercise. They may not expect to be told the whole truth during wartime, but they do expect to be told as much of the truth as can be told without jeopardizing military operations and the lives of troops.
- The most effective way of censoring the media is simply to deny them access as was effectively carried out by the pool system in the Gulf War. This can backfire, as the press can become volatile.
- Air power is a very difficult phenomenon for the media. Most coverage has to consist of interviews with pilots and aircrew before or after the missions or footage of take offs and landings. AVTR recordings and gun camera clips cannot be released directly. Both the Allies in the Gulf War resorted to doctoring video clips. The reality of air war evades the media war.
 - “Media Spin” has become a new principle of war. “Media Spin” is defined as paying close attention to public relations, recognizing

that public support is an essential ingredient of combat success. The military must not take media coverage of combat operations for granted, and should avoid operations that will alienate public support, while ensuring maximum media coverage of success stories: In an age where 24-hour instantaneous battlefield news coverage is a fact of life, paying attention to media spin is of paramount importance for a combat commander.

- It is impossible now to assume a Janus-like posture: that of a Holy Warrior guarding the ideological frontiers, for home consumption, and, that of a modern, moderate thinking well-disciplined armed forces for the outsiders. All pervasive, ubiquitous media makes it fail on both the fronts.

CONCLUSION

After assimilating the role of the media in war, and getting a glimpse of the impact of technology on news reporting, the role played by media in those conflicts, it must raise questions in our mind that whereas the military trains hard and well to achieve its goals and reach a level of specialization yet we call upon the media, which is perhaps the only career which starts its profession with zero specialization and most reporters don't know the difference between a company and a brigade, a destroyer and a Fleet Tanker or an F-16 and M-16, to tell the story of the military. Besides that, the impact of media reporting using IW resulted in perception management that is ubiquitous in today's society. People perceptions, and those of their leaders drive to national policy, programs, and actions. The same is true for their adversaries, and the target of IW is the human mind. The only logical solution is to acknowledge perception management and to execute it well.

That makes it all the more imperative for building greater harmony and understanding. We will keep shooting ourselves in the foot if we don't realize the potentials of media as a force multiplier and a weapon of war. Failure to recognize and counter enemy usage of media could lead to avoidable military failures. We must realize that decisions

are no longer based on events but on how the events are presented. So we have to lay greater emphasis on the role of media in war and train for it in peacetime. Finally, war should be avoided at all

costs but training for war cannot be compromised. Therefore, in any important military event, media need to be involved as part of their training.

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
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PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE FROM UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE)

By: Mejar Inderjit Singh a/l Tara Singh



Location Ethiopia & Eritrea

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping refers to a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving civilian and military personnel) that, with the consent of the conflicting parties, implements or monitors arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolutions, or ensures the safe delivery of humanitarian relief. It is a technique initiated by the United Nations as a means for maintaining international peace and security.

Although peacekeeping operations has been the means of providing stability and peace, nevertheless the importance of military involvement assisting the civil organs of the United Nations has been the highlight of all missions. Military

abduction into peacekeeping duties has often been trivial in negotiating all political and humanitarian aspects in seeking assistance to the plight of the people needing support and charitable aid. The combination and compendium of different military background, culture and cross-cultural personalities provides a challenging platform for all militaries from all parts of the world to work in concert. Every mission differs to another in terms of environment, culture, demography and climate but generally the military operations are almost similar with all contributing nations having similar standard military procedures. But such military orchestra have weaknesses which should be strategically looked upon as a catalyst to further improve weaknesses that could hamper intangible factors in a mission which should be addressed and used as a guide especially in future peacekeeping operations involving Malaysian Armed Forces either as contributing forces or providing Military Observers. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is unique as it involves two nations unlike most peacekeeping operations, which constitutes the chartering of warring factions and rebels in displacing the current government.

In the Horn of Africa, the long lasting border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalated to armed conflict in May 1998 when Ethiopia launched military operations against Eritrea in the northern border area. Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 18 June 2000 that provided for an immediate cease-fire between the two countries and requested the assistance of the UN and OAU (Organisation of African Unity) in its implementation. This paper will generally give an overview of the mission and military lessons learnt which can be used as a yardstick for future missions involving the Malaysian Armed Forces.



Children in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT

The peace which followed three decades of civil war over Eritrean independence only lasted seven years. War broke out between independent Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998, triggered by a border dispute. In June 1998 Ethiopia began a process of expelling Eritreans, and by February 1999 more than 50,000 had been deported. Ethiopia claimed nearly as many Ethiopians had been forced to leave Eritrea. Hundreds of thousands more were also displaced by the fighting.



Kunama Tribe in Eritrea

Eritrea embarked upon a rapid and massive process of rearmament and remobilization. By mid-2000, Eritrea had an estimated 300,000 people under arms, more than at any one time during the liberation struggle. The battles fought were extremely violent. Tens of thousands of people were displaced, and in May 2001, the number of casualties on the Eritrea side was stated to be 19,000. Eritrea and Ethiopia signed an agreement to end hostilities in June 2000. This was followed by a comprehensive peace agreement in December providing for the delimitation and demarcation of the border and the release of all prisoners of war and others detained as a result of the war. The UNMEE monitors the disputed border, which facilitates through mediation. The war has largely reversed the benefits which independence and peace had brought Eritrea after 1991.

The Security Council issued resolution 1312/31 July 2000. The resolution calls for rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force. The disputed Ethiopian – Eritrean border lies between latitudes 13 and 18 degrees North and runs about 900 km East – West from Djibouti to Sudan. Both sides accused one another of responsibility for starting the conflict, and built up substantial forces along their common border, mobilizing well over 200,000 troops on each side, buying hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of weaponry from Russia, Eastern Europe and China, and embarking on extensive propaganda campaigns.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1320

On 31 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 1312 (2000), decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization. The strategic aim of UNMEE is to remove the sources of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and re-establish relations between both countries in order to contribute towards peace, prosperity and security in the Horn of Africa whilst the operational goal was the creation of a secure climate allowing the successful completion of

the border Delimitation and Demarcation in order to re-establish peaceful and cooperative relations between both countries. In the Security Council resolution there is the authorization of the deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military observers. Resolution 1398 (2002) extended the mandate of UNMEE at the troop and military observers levels by its resolution 1320 (2000) until 15th September 2005 and it continues acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.



Effects of the war in Eritrea

UN MANDATE

- ◆ Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
- ◆ Assist, as appropriate, in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed by the parties.
- ◆ Monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998.
- ◆ Monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed.
- ◆ Simultaneously, monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometers from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy.

- ◆ Monitor the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
- ◆ Chair the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
- ◆ Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it.
- ◆ Coordinate the Mission's activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other organizations in those areas.

Despite all efforts, the fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted again on 12 May 2000. By its resolution 1297, adopted on the same day, the Security Council expressed its concern with the renewed fighting and noted that the new outbreak of violence had a serious humanitarian implication for the civilian population of both countries.

For operational purposes, the Mission area is divided into the Western, Central and Eastern Sectors. In January 2001, the Central Sector became the first Sector to be established as the Netherlands/Canadian Battalion (NECBATT) occupied it. This was followed by the deployment of the Jordanian battalion (JORBATT) in Sector West with the Kenyan Battalion (KENBATT) assuming command of Sector East by the end of February 2001. In June 2001 the Indian Battalion (INDBATT) replaced the NECBATT in Sector Centre. In early 2005 the mission was divided into two Sectors, namely Sector West and East taken by the Jordanians and Indians respectively.

MILITARY LESSONS LEARNT

UNMEE was the first mission in the history of UN peacekeeping charged with deploying a 'traditional peacekeeping force' within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council Resolution

establishing such an operation. On 15 Sept 2000, consent was given by Canada, Netherlands and Denmark to participate in UNMEE under the organizational framework of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Within 3 weeks of the respective national decisions, non-permanent staff of SHIRBRIG underwent joint induction training and by 15 November 2000 they were deployed to the mission area.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

The application of the rapid deployment concept provides UN peacekeeping an unprecedented advantage in force mobilization, planning and deployment. In its first major operational test, the SHIRBRIG concept for the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force clearly worked as it sent a strong message from the international community of their commitment to secure the peace, as well as their renewed commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. Militarily, the rapid deployment facilitated fast movement with units available at short notice and provided the Force with a coherent planning capability due to the cohesion of the SHIRBRIG contingent and the fact that both, troops and their command headquarters, had been jointly trained and were well-prepared to set up operations.

The political approval process for participation in a rapid deployment mechanism must be streamlined to meet the operational 30-day deployment deadline. A designated SHIRBRIG representative must be appointed as a focal point for interaction with UN HQ to avoid time-consuming negotiations with each prospective troop-contributing nation participating in the rapid deployment mechanism.

Close cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) New York and SHIRBRIG facilitates accurate mission planning and must be strengthened by co-locating the planning teams of SHIRBRIG and DPKO at the UNHQ during the early mission planning stages. A SHIRBRIG delegation routinely participates in the reconnaissance mission for a peacekeeping mission if its deployment is considered.

The apparent logistical shortages of nations involved meant that they were not able to ensure self-sustainability of their troops. The adoption of the SHIRBRIG concept by members of regional organizations with guaranteed airlift and material support from the more established and endowed states could enhance the establishment of UN peace operations authorized by the Security Council.

The rapid deployment of forces achieved numerous early goals including the opening of land corridors, the occupation of key terrain and the establishment of a visible UN presence on the ground, particularly along the sensitive central front of the war. However flanking forces and most of the non-SHIRBRIG Forces did not arrive in theatre for several weeks or even months, which prevented the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and delayed operational activities. The deployment plan for a peacekeeping mission should ensure that all contingents arrive in theatre in due time together with sufficient numbers of rapidly deployable troops with commensurate logistical support especially airlift capability.

UNMEE experienced some initial difficulties caused by a lack of compatibility of equipment used by the contingents, UN Military Observers (UNMO) and the Force HQ. To ensure interoperability of equipment between contingents and the rest of the mission, technical agreements should be formulated to specify the Memoranda of Understanding. SOPs should be devised between UNHQ and troop-contributing countries.

When SHIRBRIG left after the designated six months, UNMEE was faced with shortages of troops and logistical supplies to replace the initial force and suffered adverse effects on operational readiness. From the onset, mission planning needs to take into account the transition from rapid deployment forces to regular troop contributors and arrange for appropriate strength of troops and logistical supplies to be available to maintain full operational readiness.

ESTABLISHMENT AND MONITORING OF THE TEMPORARY SECURITY ZONE

Under Article 12-14, The Algiers Agreement required UNMEE to establish a 25 km wide buffer zone, which became known as Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and to monitor its integrity. Unfortunately there was no technical agreement concerning operational details, particularly with regards to where the line of the Southern Boundary of the TSZ should lie. The Mission had no choice but to resolve the issue with considerable difficulties, stemming from the deep mistrust between the parties through direct negotiations. Only after months of intense negotiations, the TSZ was finally established in April 2001 with the establishment of the Protocol Agreement, which governs all legal implications in the TSZ, which has been agreed by both parties. While it is recognized *de facto* and respected on the ground, neither party formally accepted it. As such, critical provisions in peace agreements, such as the establishment of a buffer zone, should be complemented by technical agreements that outline the practical details, to spare the peacekeeping mission difficult negotiations at the outset of operations.

Ever since the establishment of the TSZ, UNMEE has gained an excellent record of effectively monitoring the TSZ and of handling incidents on the ground. Close relations has been established with local authorities in a climate of mutual respect. However the context of restrictions of movement in the adjacent area, 15 km on both sides of the TSZ has been consistently debated. While UNMEE has consistently highlighted this issue in its reports to the Secretariat and Security Council, nothing concrete has been established which affects the credibility of UNMEE. In essence restrictions on the freedom of movement of UN peacekeeping forces need to be reported consistently to ensure the credibility of a peacekeeping mission and maintain its ability to implement its mandate.

UNMEE experienced significant difficulties in the procurement of accurate maps of the mission in sufficient numbers and of the same scale. Contingents had to make do with their own materials, often using different maps. This resulted

in communication problems and politically governed uncertainties on sensitive border issues. Accurate maps of the area of operations must be made available upon arrival of peacekeepers.

A peacekeeping mission with a mandate to maintain the integrity of a buffer zone should have the expertise to investigate incidents of incursion. Generic guidelines and an SOP on the handling of such incidents should be devised at the outset of a mission. For example UNMOs have difficulties in keeping track of weapon stockpiles, as no mechanism has been agreed upon in advance on the provision of initial information by the Eritrea police and the militia to UNMEE on the location or changes in stockpiles.

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH BOTH NATIONS

As provided for in the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities (Article 7) UNMEE established a Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to coordinate and resolve issues relating to the implementation of the mandate of the Peacekeeping Mission with the parties. In the absence of a corresponding political coordination mechanism, the MCCs have taken on extra significance in the peace process and have frequently served as a channel to exchange political views, sometimes constructively, on other occasions not, with exchanges degenerating into political grandstanding by both parties. While some critical operational issues were successfully resolved in the MCCs, foremost among them the establishment of the TSZ, its overall progress was slow. Seemingly under clear instructions from their governments, the military delegation often refused to move ahead on specific areas proposed by the Mission. At such separate mechanisms should be established to address political and military issues with both nations to avoid political grandstanding and to ensure effective consultations on operational as well as diplomatic issues.

A team approach to interaction with the parties and diplomatic means ensures unity of message and effort. An informed field commander is more likely to take responsible decisions with regards to his troops. Personal visits by the senior management and the development of a good

rapport with field commanders of both parties contribute to a smooth progress of the peace process. Before any major bilateral meetings, the Force Commander consulted with the UNMEE Special Representative of the Secretary General about content and approach. He frequently undertook field trips to the corps commanders of both nations to clarify important issues and ensure the cooperation of the parties at a local level. This approach was crucial to cultivate relationships and bridge a communication gap between the respective capitals and their local commanders, who were not always given sufficient explanations or information concerning UNMEE's role and mandate.



Team site with military Observers in Ethiopia

MILITARY OBSERVERS

UNHQ should reiterate the qualitative requirements for the secondment of UNMOs to Contributing Countries and enforce a strict repatriation policy when essential skills are lacking. UNHQ should endeavour to standardize the UNMO course held in contributing countries and make successful completion of the course a prerequisite for deployment. UNMEE's Military Observers (UNMOs) have contributed greatly to the successful monitoring of the TSZ and have established excellent working relations with the population of the host country and the local administration. However some UNMOs lacked basic skills required to execute their tasks successfully, including

sufficient proficiency of English, the mission's language, and driving skills. In cases where skills such as GPS reading and radio communication were lacking, UNMEE trained the UNMOs as part of the two-week induction training at the UNMEE HQ. In instances where substantive skills were lacking, UNMEE enforced a strict repatriation policy as outlined in the Force Commander's directives.

The reference in UNMO vacancy notices requesting the secondment of officers of the rank of Captain or Major was often ignored by contributing countries, who sent higher ranking officers (Lt Col). As a result, the standard practice of appointing the officer with the most relevant in-mission experience had to be changed to accommodate the highest-ranking officer as the team leader. This carried the risk of having an adverse effect on morale and the cohesion and effectiveness of a team site. The rank structure of UNMOs should be such that the selection of UNMO team leaders is guided by seniority in the mission area and in-depth knowledge of the area of operations, rather than by rank. The UNHQ should reiterate the requirements for UNMO secondment to Contributing Countries and advise that UNMOs will not automatically be entitled to leadership positions if ranks superior to the specified level are deployed.

UNMOs serving in UNMEE are normally subject to a three-monthly rotation schedule. Conflicting views have been expressed as to the feasibility of this time frame, suggesting that either a three monthly rotation was ideal to prevent complacency or a six months tenure to allow a more thorough familiarization with the area of responsibility and the establishment of closer relations with the host communities. To compensate for the wide disparity in conditions at the different team sites, it was suggested that a system be devised to grade the team sites and ensure that a less demanding posting would follow a hardship assignment. It was felt that all appointments at the UNMO HQ should be preceded by a field assignment and that rotations between Sectors and within a Sector should be obligatory for all

UNMOs. To increase transparency and fairness in the assignment of UNMOs to team sites, a grading system should be established to assess the hardship conditions of each UNMO team site. A difficult posting should then be followed by a less demanding assignment. Rotation within Sectors and between Sectors should be obligatory for all UNMOs, as should field service prior to an assignment at the UNMO HQ.

Staff deployed in the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas have faced serious difficulties communicating with the local authorities and military personnel as an insufficient number of language assistants were allocated, particularly in Ethiopia, where fewer peacekeepers were deployed. In areas where English was not spoken, this clearly hampered the ability of all Mission components to operate. Adequate funds should be allocated for the hiring of national Language Assistants in support of UNMOs, Force personnel and other field staff charged with direct interaction with the population of the host country, especially in areas of operation where the working language of the Mission is not spoken.



Humanitarian Assistance in Rural Ethiopia by UNMEE

Logistical and maintenance requirements identified in their daily situation reports were not addressed in a timely manner. Repairs of vehicles and communications equipment often took an unacceptably long time and requests for equipment were repeatedly ignored. They called for Sector Senior Logistics Officer/

UNMO HQ Chief Logistic Officer to follow up on team site requirements and inform them regularly about any action taken in response to their requests. Additionally, regular preventative maintenance visits should be arranged to service communications equipment and generators. To ensure operational readiness of UNMO team sites, a comprehensive maintenance and repair schedule has to be set up that also covers holidays and weekends.

CIVIL MILITARY ACTIONS

Winning the hearts and minds of the people is the bulk of relationship building whereby UNMEE's Civilian-Military Coordination Cell (CIMIC) served as the primary interface between the military and various humanitarian organizations, and facilitated coordination and cooperation among humanitarian actors. CIMIC activities are an effective tool to establish good relations between the host communities and the peacekeeping force. Where feasible, Force assets should be utilized to assist a war-torn society in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the restoration of basic services. A large number of CIMIC projects aimed at rehabilitating basic infrastructure damaged by the war were executed successfully, including the rebuilding of dams, bridges, roads, hospitals and schools. While UNMEE usually provided logistical support by utilizing Force assets, the local population contributed manual labour and, as available, building materials. This collaboration fostered good relations between UNMEE and the local population and brought relief to war-torn communities.

An administrative framework should be developed to accommodate the humanitarian donations of contingents. Several contingents brought assets such as foodstuffs and rations to the mission area at no cost to the UN and have distributed them as part of their humanitarian activities. While this may have benefited relations between the Force and the local population, problems have arisen regarding the administration of such donations and potential liabilities. SOPs should be developed to protect the Mission

while affording the contingents an opportunity to make donations. The SOPs should establish, for example, financial ceilings for donations, a list of acceptable items and the identification of suitable distribution mechanisms.

CONCLUSION

The border dispute with Eritrea degenerated into war. The conflict claimed 100,000 victims and 1.3 million refugees. The peace agreement signed in Algiers in 2000, paved the way for the deployment of the UN peace keeping force

UNMEE along the border and created a Boundary Commission in charge of deciding the border's demarcation. Military contingents from various identified countries constitute the main ingredient in the peace process of all UN missions providing the security consolidation and the humanitarian assistance to win the hearts and mind of the locals in order to carry out their mandate. The deployment of the rapid deployment force concept provided an impetus to the coherent planning capabilities of the UN Peacekeeping Force. The military lessons learnt will provide a guideline and platform for future military or any UN peacekeeping operations.

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PERKEMBANGAN TEKNOLOGI MAKLUMAT DAN KOMUNIKASI (ICT) MERUPAKAN ELEMEN PENTING DALAM MENENTUKAN HALA TUJU ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA

Oleh : Mej Christopher Ignatius Choong

PENDAHULUAN

Dewasa ini terdapat spekulasi bahawa perkembangan di dalam bidang teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi (ICT) akan melihatkan perubahan yang mendadak di dalam cara suatu organisasi itu beroperasi atau berfungsi. Biarlah ia sebuah organisasi awam mahupun ketenteraan perkembangan dalam bidang ICT akan membawa perubahan yang cukup besar yang mana memerlukan pembangunan dari segi bagaimana organisasi itu akan beroperasi serta berfungsi bagi menentukan hala tujunya itu.

Contohnya pembangunan yang ketara sekali di dalam bidang komunikasi satelit, di mana data-kadar-tinggi satelit-satelit ini akan memberikan transmisi maklumat ke seluruh pelusuk dunia tanpa wayar (*wireless*). Ia juga akan dapat mengeksploitasi keupayaan penghantaran maklumat cara pantas dan moden (Owens, 1995)¹. Sekiranya tercapai "permintaan saluran komunikasi" ini akan membenarkan jumlah maklumat yang tidak terbatas saling bertukar tangan di dalam jangkamasa yang pendek dan dalam masa sebenar (*real time*) di mana jua dalam dunia ini. Ini jelas menunjukkan dunia ini sudah menjadi tempat tanpa batasan (*borderless world*) apabila berbincang mengenai komunikasi.

Dua peramal yang selalunya dikaitkan dengan perbincangan mengenai Peperangan Maklumat (*Information Warfare*) adalah Alvin dan Heidi Toffler, penulis futuris untuk buku, "War and Anti-War" (1993). Kedua-dua Alvin dan Heidi telah menerangkan tentang evolusi yang telah menukarkan keupayaan masyarakat untuk berperang dan telah

menerangkan perubahan ini berlaku di dalam bentuk gelombang atau "waves" (Toffler – 1995)².

Gelombang pertama adalah berdasarkan kepada masyarakat agrarian di mana konflik adalah berkisar di sekitar soal pertanian dan di mana persenjataan adalah berbentuk kuno dan memerlukan kekuatan tenaga manusia. Gelombang kedua diperkenalkan semasa zaman industri di mana persenjataan telah disamakan dan pengeluaran adalah dalam kuantiti yang banyak. Dengan pengeluaran senjata yang banyak timbul pula pemusnahan secara besar-besaran. Fokus gelombang ketiga pula adalah kepada pengetahuan dan maklumat yang menjadi asas kepada sesuatu ekonomi (Toffler – 1981)³. Kemusnahan kepada infrastruktur perintah dan kawalan pihak Iraq dan penggunaan senjata ketepatan semasa "OPERATION DESERT STORM" adalah antara contoh peperangan gelombang ketiga. Kebanyakan perbincangan di dalam Peperangan Maklumat adalah berdasarkan kepada teori gelombang ketiga ini.

Terdapat banyak teori-teori atau faktor-faktor yang menjadi tumpuan kepada ICT dan hala tujunya untuk sesuatu organisasi itu. Pertamanya, kesedaran berkenaan maklumat sebagai aset strategik telah membuatkan perancang-perancang ketenteraan untuk memikirkan semula tentang keunikan medan tempur itu. Faktor kedua adalah pengajaran yang boleh di dapati dari "OPERATION DESERT STORM" yang telah membuktikan kejayaan khasnya kepada senjata-senjata berteknologi yang telah digunakan semasa peperangan tersebut (contohnya peluru dan bom pintar). Satu lagi faktor adalah kemajuan di bidang teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi serta potensi aplikasinya di medan tempur.

TUJUAN

Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk membincangkan tentang perkembangan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi (ICT) yang merupakan elemen penting dalam menentukan hala tuju Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM). Di dalam membincangkan tajuk ini penggunaan perkataan Peperangan Maklumat akan digunakan bagi membincangkan kesan atau impak ICT di dalam Peperangan Maklumat.

SKOP

Perbincangan tajuk ini adalah berdasarkan kepada tajuk-tajuk kecil seperti berikut:

- a. Definisi.
- b. Evolusi Peperangan Moden.
- c. Keperluan Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi.
- d. Kesan Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi Kepada Cara Beroperasi.
- e. Kesan Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi Kepada Hala Tuju Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.

DEFINISI

Perkataan **maklumat** yang digunakan di dalam kertas ini bermakna, “kandungan atau makna sesuatu kawat tersebut” (Mader – 1974)⁴. Biasanya tujuan Peperangan Maklumat adalah untuk memberi kesan yang negatif kepada sistem maklumat dan komunikasi pihak musuh. Di dalam konteks pemahaman yang lebih luas, sistem maklumat meliputi cara-cara bagaimana pihak musuh mendapatkan maklumat atau pengetahuannya atau kepercayaannya mengenai sesuatu. Dalam konteks yang lebih senang difahami pula, mengekalkan bahawa sistem maklumat dan komunikasi adalah cara bagaimana pihak musuh mengawal serta mengalihkan dan menunjukkan pasukan penggempurnya ke objektif yang telah dipilihnya.

Digabungkan kedua-duanya sekali, sistem maklumat dan komunikasi adalah satu set menyeluruh yang mengandungi pengetahuan, kepercayaan dan proses membuat keputusan dan sistem-sistem sokongan yang dipunyai oleh sesuatu pihak untuk digunakan ke atas pihak yang lain. Keputusan akhir selepas sahaja serangan ke atas sistem maklumat dan komunikasi pihak musuh adalah maklumat-maklumat yang mencukupi untuk memaklumkan kepadanya supaya menghentikan serangan atau sebaliknya.



EVOLUSI PEPERANGAN MODEN

Apabila institusi sosial mula berkembang dari masyarakat gelombang pertama kepada masyarakat industri gelombang kedua, sistem maklumat dan komunikasi juga berkembang dan proses membuat keputusan juga menjadi lebih rumit atau kompleks. Apabila skop organisasi berasaskan perdagangan dan struktur dominan politik berkembang bersama-sama ia juga telah menambahkan kesukaran kepada keadaan yang pada dasarnya telah pun menjadi kompleks oleh kerana perkembangan yang pesat di dalam bidang sistem teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi ini. Struktur institusi yang baru yang berdasarkan kepada, jaringan pengetahuan daripada pengetahuan pekerja (knowledge networks of knowledge workers), telah timbul serta bilangannya telah bertambah selaras dengan keupayaan dan ketersediaan peralatan-peralatan teknologi maklumat. Apabila

teknologi maklumat berkembang, sistem maklumat membenarkan pengetahuan, atau kepakaran, juga berkembang dan menjadi lebih efektif (Toffler – 1981)⁵.

Apabila institusi sosial berkembang, cara bagaimana masyarakat itu berperang juga berubah. Gong yang berderum, ketukan dram yang mencemaskan serta ranggi panji Sun Tzu, dibantu oleh teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi, telah menjadikan cara peperangan moden kini menjadi operasi psikologi yang canggih. Tujuan peperangan telah bergerak dari kepenatan (penggunaan daya tenaga fizikal) kepada kemusnahan (harta benda dan nyawa) kepada pengawalan (pemerintahan) menurut John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt⁶. Teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi telah berkembang kepada satu tahap di mana pengawalan boleh dilaksanakan dengan penggunaan kekerasan atau tumpahan darah yang paling minima. Pada asasnya ia adalah merupakan suatu perkara yang baik, pada dasarnya pula ia boleh merupakan suatu perkara yang merbahaya tetapi jika dikaji dengan lebih mendalam perkembangan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi sememangnya tidak boleh dielakkan. Organisasi ketenteraan seperti ATM perlu memahami kompleksiti dan mengikut arus perkembangannya. Melengahkan implementasinya ke dalam sistem pemerintahan dan kawalan akan membantutkan hala tuju ATM selaras dengan angkatan tentera di rantau ini khasnya dan di seluruh dunia amnya.

KEPERLUAN TEKNOLOGI MAKLUMAT DAN KOMUNIKASI

Peperangan Teluk pada tahun 1991 telah merealisasikan tentang betapa pentingnya keunggulan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi di dalam sebuah konflik moden. Pendapat yang menyatakan sesuatu konflik itu menunjukkan atau menggambarkan keadaan sesuatu masyarakat itu bukanlah suatu perkara yang baru, tetapi ini adalah anggapan keseluruhan sekali iaitu Masyarakat Bermaklumat memang ada perbezaan dengan rakan Masyarakat Industrinya seperti yang di nyatakan oleh Toffler.

Masyarakat Bermaklumat akan menggunakan apa jua cara untuk mendapatkan maklumat melalui cara komunikasi berteknologi tinggi bagi mencapai cita-citanya yang mungkin berniat baik atau sebaliknya. Ini adalah berdasarkan kepada pengetahuan tinggi di bidang teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi masa kini.

Tidak hairan juga, bahawa, Perang Teluk juga telah melihatkan kemunculan imej alternatif iaitu kerentanan maklumat dan komunikasi. Kemungkinan contoh kerentanan yang telah dipaparkan adalah tuduhan mengenai sekumpulan *hackers* di negeri Belanda yang telah menawarkan perkhidmatan mereka sebagai pahlawan ciber menentang Amerika Syarikat dan sekutu Pertubuhan Bangsa-bangsa Bersatu (UN) (Fialka – 1997)⁷.

Peperangan Maklumat telah dipertontonkan sebagai satu strategi asimetrik yang berguna untuk negara-negara yang telah dilabelkan sebagai negara pengancam (*rogue states*) di dalam senario ancaman rantau, atau untuk kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas yang mana ancaman mereka lebih meluas dan nilai-nilai perjuangan mereka tidak dapat diterima oleh masyarakat biasa (Eriksson – 1999)⁸.

Ancaman-ancaman daripada pengganas-pengganas yang kini menggunakan komunikasi tanpa had dan tanpa batasan sebagai alat atau *tool* untuk memusnahkan infrastruktur sekutu-sekutu Barat tanpa menonjolkan diri telah menunjukkan dengan jelas cara peperangan moden yang dilaksanakan sekarang lebih menyengat dan efektif.

Perkembangan teknologi dari segi mendapatkan maklumat serta komunikasi adalah perlu untuk sesuatu organisasi mara ke hadapan dan bersaing rapat untuk mendapatkan kepakaran, pengetahuan dan pengalaman bagi ia berkembang. Ketinggalan dalam menghayati perkembangan-perkembangan ini akan membuatkan organisasi itu ketinggalan dalam banyak segi, contohnya penggunaan peralatan senjata canggih dan moden, alat perhubungan yang tiada batas penggunaannya dari segi jarak, teknologi satelit dan banyak lagi.

KESAN TEKNOLOGI MAKLUMAT DAN KOMUNIKASI KEPADA CARA BEROPERASI

Semenjak ia diperkenalkan lebih seabad yang lalu, radio tanpa wayar (*wireless radio*) telah digunakan oleh tentera-tentera diserata dunia sebagai satu rangkaian perhubungan tidak terbatas serta sebagai tapak untuk mengkoordinasikan bantuan dan pertukaran maklumat. Prospek untuk rangkaian radio tanpa had telah menimbulkan idea-idea lain yang boleh disatukan untuk membuatkan sistem penyampaian maklumat dan komunikasi lebih efisien sehingga ia tidak lagi di anggap sebagai satu entiti yang berasingan malah ia akan di anggap sebagai satu aset penggabungan perkhidmatan. (Owens – 1995)⁹

Integrasi sepenuhnya sistem-sistem medan tempur tiga dimensi di dalam suatu rangkaian perhubungan akan membawa kepada perkembangan tiga perkara utama. Pertamanya, penyatuan rangkaian sensor-sensor jarak jauh dan persenjataan akan membenarkan penggabungan kuasa dan kadar tembakan yang dahulunya adalah berasingan dan hanya khusus kepada satu perkhidmatan (ketenteraan) atau entiti ke atas sasaran yang sama. Keduanya, secara strategiknya, dengan perkembangan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi, penyelerakkan yang memberikan perlindungan kepada pasukan sahabat daripada serangan musuh jarak jauh akan menjadi lebih berkesan lagi. Ini adalah kerana maklumat dan juga perisikan yang diperolehi adalah dalam masa sebenar dan perhubungan jarak jauh menyebabkan tiada batasan dari segi penyampaian maklumat. Ketiganya dan boleh dianggap yang terpenting sekali, merangkaikan sepenuhnya maklumat-maklumat di antara pasukan-pasukan dan perkhidmatan-perkhidmatan akan menambahkan tempoh operasi dan dengan ini akan mengurangkan kadar kelewatan di antara pemerhatian dan perlakuan sebenarnya di medan tempur. Kesemua tindakan-tindakan di medan tempur akan dapat disalurkan kepada pemerintah-pemerintah secara masa sebenar dan dengan prospek ini akan membuatkan keputusan yang di buat dan disalurkan kepada

pasukan-pasukan bawahanya pula adalah secara masa sebenar.

Dengan perkembangan yang pesat ini, tujuan utama di medan pertempuran akan berlaku, transaksi keberkesanan berperang akan dibandingkan atau diukur dengan kepantasan berkomunikasi dan bertukar maklumat daripada kemusnahan pasukan musuh (Cohen – 1997)¹⁰. Pendapat ini adalah berpanduan andaian bahawa kepantasan beroperasi pada masa kini akan membuatkan tindakan-tindakan awalan musuh terbantut dan dengan ini akan menafikan iniatif tanpa menerima apa-apa kesan kemusnahan, oleh yang demikian secara teorinya, musuh akan dapat dilumpuhkan. Cara pemikiran begini akan mengubah corak bagaimana sesuatu ketumbukan ketenteraan seperti ATM melihat bagaimana ia akan dapat mengatasi ancaman dari luar negara mahupun di dalam negara. Ia perlu melihat perubahan ini bukan sahaja dari segi peralatan malahan pengubahan struktur dan juga sumber manusia.

Kadar perkembangan kepada sistem teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi menggambarkan bahawa terdapatnya cabaran-cabaran yang perlu dilalui di masa hadapan dan ia bukannya kepada teknologi itu sendiri tetapi adalah lebih kepada rangka organisasi itu sendiri. Persoalan yang timbul adalah bagaimana untuk membentuk orang-perorangan untuk mendukung sistem-sistem ini supaya keberkesananannya dapat dieksploitasi sepenuhnya. Memang terdapat spekulasi terhadap masa depan teknologi ketenteraan ini tetapi apa yang lebih penting adalah tiada perbincangan yang ditujukan kepada perubahan organisasi yang akan timbul hasil daripada perkembangan teknologi dari segi maklumat dan komunikasi ini.

Semua organisasi ketenteraan adalah suatu masyarakat yang serba lengkap yang mempunyai ciri-ciri kebudayaan, termasuk adat resam yang unik, amalan, hieraki sosial dan kriteria untuk peningkatan ke pangkat yang lebih tinggi serta penyertaan yang sempit. Menurut Elting Morrison, yang telah membuat kajiannya di dalam Tentera Laut Amerika Syarikat, berpendapat bahawa pengenalan teknologi baru khususnya di bidang

maklumat dan komunikasi akan meruntuhkan atau membinasakan struktur yang kukuh ini¹¹. Beliau merumuskan bahawa keadaan ini berlaku kerana keengganaan berubah mengikut perkembangan teknologi dan terdapatnya halangan-halangan untuk menerima perubahan-perubahan baru (Elting -1966)¹². Seperti mana pendapat penulis tersebut adakah ATM bersedia menerima perubahan-perubahan ini atau hanya berdiam diri (*wait and see*) untuk menerima perubahan drastik dari segi ICT ini?

KESAN TEKNOLOGI MAKLUMAT DAN KOMUNIKASI KEPADA HALA TUJU ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA

Untuk merealisasikan penggunaan dan penghayatan elemen teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi sebagai suatu elemen penting dalam menentukan hala tuju Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) terdapat beberapa perkara yang perlu diketahui dan dihayati supaya tidak adanya *resistance to change* yang mana akan melumpuhkan segala hasrat ATM untuk menentukan masa depannya untuk menjadi sebuah angkatan yang kredible dan disegani.

Perkembangan rangkaian maklumat dan komunikasi yang pesat ini akan membenarkan askar-askar di peringkat yang terendah sekali untuk mengetahui akan maklumat-maklumat di seluruh kawasan operasi sepertimana juga komander-komender mereka. Mereka akan mengetahui tentang sasaran-sasaran bernilai, ancaman-ancaman mungkin kepada mereka serta lokasi-lokasi dan status pasukan mereka sendiri. Akibat daripada rangkaian maklumat dan komunikasi yang diperkenalkan ini akan timbulnya pengagihan atau pembahagian pemerintahan ke peringkat yang terendah sekali. Apa yang akan menjadi tanda tanya adakah kita bersedia menerima perkembangan ini dan menerima akibat serta kesan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi ke atas seluruh perkembangan organisasi tentera kita. Perubahan cara mana kita membuat keputusan juga akan mengubah cara mana kita bertindak di medan pertempuran. Perlaksanaan cara pemikiran secara dinamik, iaitu dengan menggunakan cara pemikiran beriniatif dan berinovatif adalah

antara beberapa cara yang telah dirancang dan telah dilaksanakan oleh Tentera Darat bagi mewujudkan pegawai dan LLP yang berdaya saing di peringkat antarabangsa.

Dengan perkembangan yang pesat terhadap teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi akan berlakunya pengurangan dari segi kuasa pemerintahan yang telah timbul semenjak pengenalan radio tanpa wayar lagi. Mungkin perkara ini akan berlaku atau sebaliknya pula akan berlaku. Iaitu pergerakan yang mendadak ke arah pemusatan kuasa di medan tempur, diikuti dengan pengurangan yang tidak pernah berlaku iaitu pengurangan ke atas kedua-dua kuasa individu dan pemerintahan.

Hieraki Pemerintahan yang Lebih Serata untuk Mencapai Kepantasan. Pencapaian dari segi teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi akan memerlukan manipulasi jumlah data serta maklumat yang tidak dapat ditangani oleh sumber manusia sahaja. Dengan kepantasan membuat keputusan yang memerlukan daya saing antara manusia dan mesin, si manusia akan mengalah dan daya membuat keputusan diberi atau diserahkan kepada teknologi daya tinggi ini (Lardner – 1997)¹³. Apa yang diperlukan adalah orang-perorangan yang mempunyai daya iniatif yang tinggi, berpengetahuan, semangat daya saing serta mudah menerima perubahan disekelilingnya. Ini akan mengurangkan pergeselan antara penerimaan teknologi baru dengan membuat penugasan cara biasa. Oleh itu latihan-latihan bercorak membentuk pemikiran individu perlu dilaksanakan untuk menyiapkan mereka-mereka untuk memikul tanggungjawab yang berat ini.

Daripada Peperangan Atriksi kepada Peperangan Ketepatan dan Kepantasan. Perkembangan dari segi teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi juga akan mengakibatkan teknologi-teknologi persenjataan menjadi lebih canggih dan merbahaya. Perkembangan teknologi persenjataan pintar (*smart weapons*) telah membolehkan seorang sahaja askar-laskar mengawal secara tepat, pada jarak tanpa batasan serta pada masa yang dikehendaki untuk memusnahkan sasaran musuh yang bernilai tinggi. Peralihan dari zaman kemusnahan

tinggi kepada kemusnahan yang terhad telah memberi pendapat kepada ramai “penggemar peperangan” bahawa kuasa pengawalan sistem-sistem ini memerlukan penggabungan sistem politik dan sistem ketenteraan yang setara. Ini adalah kerana kelebihan strategik yang akan timbul hasil daripada penerapan teknologi daya tinggi boleh memusnahkan atau memberi kelebihan kepada sesuatu negara itu dari segi sosial atau ekonominya. Kelebihan strategik ini akan dapat dirasai atau kesan teknologi daya tinggi ini akan dapat memusnahkan sasaran-sasaran yang perlu untuk mencapai objektif politik dan ketenteraan sesebuah negara serta sistem ekonomiknya tidak dapat dinafikan (Warden – 1993)¹⁴. Objektifnya kini adalah “satu sasaran, satu senjata” terhadap sasaran kritikal yang paling kecil, untuk mencapai objektif iaitu kemusnahan yang paling minima dari segi kos, kemusnahan harta benda, nyawa dan penggunaan persenjataan (Warden – 1993)¹⁵. Kesedaran ini adalah perlu dan seperti yang telah dilaungkan oleh penulis di atas bukannya semua kemusnahan akan dapat menyelesaikan masalah, malahan ada pendapat futuris yang mengatakan adanya rancangan-rancangan untuk membentuk atau mengembangkan senjata-senjata kurang merbahaya (*non-lethal weapons*) untuk menangani masalah peperangan dan konflik dunia kini.

Automasi untuk Keberkesanan.

Dengan perkembangan yang pesat dari segi pemerosesan data dan penerimaan maklumat, ia akan menambahkan reliabiliti melalui analisa masa sebenar peralaksanaan operasi, yang mana akan mengurangkan masa yang diperlukan untuk membaikinya dengan cara mengautomasi sistem pemerosesan permohonan barang ganti dan bantuan teknikal dan secara tidak langsung akan mengurangkan jumlah anggota-anggota yang diperlukan untuk senggaraan dan pembaikan. Sistem automasi begini juga akan memaklumkan kepada yang berkenaan kalau tidak lebih daripada apa yang ia sudah ketahui, tentang keadaan atau status peralatan dan barangan sesuatu pasukan itu. Ia akan pada suatu masa kelak membenarkan sistem automasi pasukan tersebut memaklumkan tentang laporan kecederaan, di mana di suatu tahap dan jarak, secara

berkesan akan memberitahu seseorang pegawai memerintah untuk mengambil tindakan bagi memastikan kesiapsiagaan operasi dan peralatan pasukannya itu. Keperluan-keperluan ini adalah amat nyata sekali dan ATM perlu peka dengan perubahan ini dan mengambil iniatif untuk mendapatkan kepakaran bagi menangani masalah logistik khasnya dengan pengeluar-pengeluar asalnya atau *original equipment manufacturers* melalui sistem penukaran maklumat dan komunikasi ini.

Pengetahuan Bermakna Pengawalan. Adalah menjadi ketidakupayaan serta ketidakberkesanan untuk seseorang pemerintah mengawal dari jarak yang jauh di dalam pos pemerintah tenteranya, bila di mana kuasa pengawalan dan tanggungjawabnya adalah berada di hadapan bersama-sama dengan tenteranya. Ini adalah kerana ia memerlukan pengetahuan untuk mengawal dan memerintah pasukan tenteranya. Di masa akan datang, dengan berkembangnya teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi akan membenarkan pemerintah-pemerintah atasan untuk mengetahui seberapa banyak sepertimana ia sendiri berada di medan hadapan tempur, kalau tidak lebih daripada apa yang diketahui oleh mereka yang berada di kawasan tersebut, terima kasih kepada gabungan maklumat pelbagai di dalam satu sistem yang dapat memberi gambaran secara masa sebenar (*real time*). Tidak ada sebabnya mengapa pemerintah-pemerintah di masa akan datang, tidak akan terlibat secara langsung di dalam tindakan yang di ambil oleh pegawai-pegawai bawahan mereka, di mana mereka sendiri mempunyai pengetahuan yang cukup untuk melibatkan diri di dalam setiap operasi. Ini bermakna setiap lapisan pemerintah perlu mengambil iniatif sendiri untuk mendalami pengetahuan serta menimba pengalaman dalam penggunaan peralatan berteknologi tinggi.

Akan ada juga impak budaya yang akan mempengaruhi perubahan organisasi untuk mengeksploitasi teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi ini. Contohnya, apabila jaringan rangkaian ini berkembang luas sehingga meliputi seluruh spektra darat, laut dan udara dan juga ke angkasa lepas, tidak akan ada seseorang yang boleh menyatakan ia mempengaruhi hanya satu spektra sahaja.

Fungsi sesuatu sistem itu akan menjadi lebih penting daripada afiliasi perkhidmatan, dengan demikian mengaburkan perbezaan penguasaan antara Tentera Darat, Tentera Laut dan Tentera Udara di medan tempur.

Transisi daripada peperangan cara *platform-centric* kepada cara *network-centric* memberi pendapat tentang wujudnya satu jenis peperangan baru dan seterusnya membentuk pakar-pakar dalam pengurusan peperangan berangkaian yang mana adalah setaraf dengan peperangan armor di darat, peperangan di udara dan kapal selam untuk peperangan di dasar laut. Oleh yang demikian ia memerlukan kriteria organisasi yang baru yang melibatkan kenaikan pangkat dan pengawalan, yang mana melibatkan jumlah pegawai-pegawai yang besar. Ini akan membuatkan sesuatu organisasi tersebut menjadi lebih berdaya saing. Secara tidak langsung hanya mereka-mereka yang benar-benar minat dan berdedikasi sahaja akan terus berkhidmat.

PENUTUP

Sememangnya, teknologi-teknologi masa hadapan tidak akan dapat memenuhi keperluan atau keinginan sepenuhnya seperti yang diperlukan. Walaupun dengan keperluan serta permintaan terhadap teknologi-teknologi canggih di bidang maklumat dan komunikasi, akan ada halangan-halangan dari segi politik, sosial dan ekonomi yang akan menyekat perkembangannya.

Dengan perkembangan yang pesat di bidang teknologi dan komunikasi, keperluan untuk bakal-bakal pegawai atasan yang boleh memimpin organisasi yang lebih dinamik serta berdaya saing tanpa menjejaskan hasrat dan wawasan negara dan organisasinya itu tidak dapat dinafikan.

Perkara yang paling penting di dalam perkembangan institusi tersebut (ATM) adalah iniatif yang diperlukan daripada pegawai-pegawai dan anggota-anggota untuk berfikir tentang konsep yang berbeza dari segi operasi

dan organisasinya. Demikian juga diperlukan pegawai-pegawai dan anggota-anggota yang akan mudah ubah dengan perubahan teknologi ini. Institusi-institusi dan pusat-pusat latihan pegawai dan lain-lain pangkat adalah tempat-tempat di mana mereka-mereka ini boleh dikenal pasti serta dididik untuk mengetuai organisasi yang sering akan berubah dengan perubahan teknologi. Di sinilah juga mereka akan berpeluang untuk didedahkan kepada perubahan yang bakal mengubah corak mereka berfikir dan membuat keputusan sehaluan dengan keadaan sekeliling mereka.

Seperkara yang penting untuk difikirkan secara serius adalah menentukan sama ada tujuan peperangan atau konflik masa kini memberi kelebihan kepada perkhidmatan ketenteraan pada keseluruhannya. Hala tuju sesuatu angkatan tentera akan bergantung kepada bagaimana ia memainkan peranannya di dalam sesuatu operasi atau konflik dan bagaimana ia menyebabkan perubahan pada keseluruhannya. Yang mana misi serta wawasannya mesti seimbang dengan hasrat negara. Ini banyak bergantung kepada bagaimana ia menyesuaikan diri untuk merebut peluang-peluang yang wujud di dalam alaf teknologi bermaklumat ini serta berapa banyakkah yang ia sanggup berkorban untuk mendapatkan atau mengubah organisasi yang pada dasarnya di bina atas kebudayaan yang sudah pupus ditelan zaman.

Untuk menghayati elemen penting ini (teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi) dalam menentukan hala tuju ATM, kesemua perkara-perkara yang telah dibincangkan dari segi sumber manusia, peralatan, maklumat, cara pemikiran, cara membuat keputusan dan cara penerimaan perubahan adalah sub-elemen yang penting yang diperlukan untuk menjadikan ATM sebuah organisasi yang dinamik serta berdaya saing. Adalah sukar untuk menerima perubahan-perubahan yang mendadak sekiranya old guard kini tidak dapat menerima perubahan dari segi penggunaan teknologi daya tinggi bagi membawa organisasi ini ke tahap yang lebih tinggi dan moden.

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NARROWING THE GAP BETWEEN ASEAN COUNTRIES IS IMPORTANT IN ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL INTERGRATION EFFORT. HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE ASEAN'S EFFORT TO NARROW THE GAP AMONG ITS MEMBERS TO THAT OF EUROPEAN UNION?

By: Mejar Randhir Singh a/l Ajaib Singh


INTRODUCTION

Is ASEAN really standing on its own as a group or is it trying to strengthen itself by hooking on to other strong nations and calling themselves as ASEAN +2 or ASEAN +3 unlike European Union (EU). ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) came into being on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand against the challenging backdrop of Vietnam War. Its objective at that point was to instill peaceful political and economic development in the South East Asia region. When ASEAN was initially established it comprised 5 countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. With all these countries forming ASEAN, it is without doubt that ASEAN was and still is a colourful and diversified union. It is without a doubt that ASEAN with a population of about 890 million justifies it as one of the greatest regional markets.

With time ASEAN membership grew with the inclusion of other countries such as Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. In April 1999, after 32 years, ASEAN came to a full circle with the participation of Cambodia as a full member. The latest country to emerge in South East Asia is Timor Leste. ASEAN might see another entry into the organization, but at the moment the leaders of Timor Leste have requested an observatory post within the ASEAN organization.

The journey of ASEAN has not always been a smooth one or without any challenges but its ability to survive against all the odds is indeed a victory by itself. Thus, it is not surprising that

ASEAN is well known for its strength in managing its regional problems and for tackling key issues.



ASEAN at present is 39 years old, not a newborn baby definitely but an interesting question that comes to mind is how much has it evolved through the years? Has it remained stagnant with its views and efforts in remaining as a productive, innovative political block? As Kamarul Idris states in his article – *ASEAN – Long road ahead* (News Straits Times (NST) dated 22/04/04) – *ASEAN looks like a regional community of life-support*. ASEAN in the past four decades has witnessed many challenges to its survival and development and also successes in creating niche for itself as a regional and global player in international politics (NST – dated 8 August 2006, Potholes to avoid on the ASEAN highway).

Comparatively European Union (EU) has emerged as one of the most effective unions where politics, society and religion have blended together. EU like ASEAN is also a salad bowl with sumptuous mix of languages, cultures, societies and economies. However, EU is more centralized in its governing especially with the existence of an EU parliament. ASEAN on contrast seems to be stitched together loosely with its headquarters being in Indonesia. According to Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General at a conference in Fukwoka, Japan, "ASEAN ... was an inter-governmental concept. It was and continues to be driven by elites; its deliberations are confined to a closed circle of ministers and bureaucrats. Europe Union, on the other hand, is far more democratic. Its leaders evangelized and the people converted to the faith....". This statement clearly indicates that ASEAN and its members are playing safe and are being held back by an unseen boundary between them. Thus the gap has undeniably widened, the much-sought vision of integration deems to remain a dream.

Since its formation, ASEAN has been holding talks only and not much has been seen in its effort in forging relationships and integration. It is not surprising to note that ASEAN only held its first summit in 1976, 10 years after its initiation. It is a fact that ASEAN and its people do not interest the media because in reality ASEAN just does not make news. So to achieve successful regional integration, Severino's offer that *perhaps it is time for a new ASEAN* ought to be taken seriously as the saying goes: *'the family that prays together, stays together.'*

ASEAN cannot be compared to EU because they are unique in their own terms. EU countries are far more developed in contrast to ASEAN countries whereby majority of the member countries are either underdeveloped like Burma and Indochina except for Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei. This vast disparity in development itself can distance the ASEAN countries. This is not a problem in the EU countries. They are all well developed except for the new incoming members, whose development status is not known. EU may face a similar problem when the new incoming members are officially accepted into the

organisation. Nothing much can be said now except that time will tell.

Integration among members plays a significant role in establishing solidarity among the member countries. This way the members can instill a sense of *esprit de corps* among themselves and solve external and internal problems that may arise. The integration among the ASEAN countries as compared to EU is indeed very much to be desired. Coordination among the EU countries whether economically or socially is very much integrated as compared to ASEAN countries. The idea of one mind and togetherness is obvious in EU. Issues that are discussed in the EU forums are easily and quickly concluded compared to ASEAN countries which often tend to drag on important issues over to the next forum. This common phenomenon in ASEAN forums indirectly exposes the members to be seen as having very loose integration among them.

Geographically, ASEAN countries are largely scattered and not closely centralised like the EU countries. Philippines and Indonesia are countries made up of islands that exceed 7,000. This makes the movement within their country quite complex especially since most of the areas are under developed. On the other hand, EU countries are geographically close and border each other. Movement within the country and among the EU countries is quite easy due to the availability of various infrastructures that are well constructed.

ASEAN countries are also made up of various races and ethnic backgrounds like Malays, Filipinos, Siamese and others. Further more, most of the member countries practise different religions too. The countries in ASEAN are actually religion based as each country is represented by a different religion. The major religions are Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism besides other lesser religions. EU has basically one common religion that is Christianity, which is a binding power by itself. Besides that, the union comprises one race that is Caucasians. Though EU may have different languages, but it is generally a Caucasian organisation dominated by Christians. This enforces solidarity in EU while these similarities are apparently lacking in ASEAN.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

ASEAN

ASEAN was officially established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. During the signing of the Bangkok Declaration there were only five members namely Thailand Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Subsequently the other members joined ASEAN led by Brunei on 8 January 1984, followed by Vietnam on 28 July 1995 while Laos and Vietnam joined on 23 July 1997. The latest addition to ASEAN was Cambodia in April 1999. There is another new independent nation, Timor Leste which recently emerged after gaining independence from Indonesia, but it has yet to become a full member of ASEAN. Presently it has requested to be an observer in all the ASEAN forums.

During the initial Bangkok Declaration it was pointed that the formation of ASEAN was none other than to promote economic co-operation among its members and to uplift the welfare of the people in the region. The ASEAN's aims and guidelines were set out during the Bangkok declaration. ASEAN was formed with four main objectives:

- To promote the economy within the ASEAN.
- To enhance social and cultural development through co-operative programs.
- To ensure and safeguard the political and economic stability of the region against the big power rivalry.
- To serve as a forum to resolve any differences that may occur within ASEAN.

ASEAN, after all was built on the principle notion of good neighbours when formed in 1967 as a non-binding, informal and non-ideological equal club. The situation was tense at that time with Indonesia having confrontation with Malaysia, the Sabah issue that Philippines raised up after Malaysia split with Singapore and the Vietnam War at the borders of Thailand. During the Bangkok Declaration, the then Deputy Prime Minister and also the Foreign Minister, Tun Abdul

Razak Hussein represented Malaysia. In that forum he said, *it is important that individually and jointly we should create a deep awareness that cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together. Unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of ASEAN nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with our own ideals and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny* (Sunday Times 22 April 04).



It took ASEAN 10 years before the first summit was held in Bali in 1976. During this summit a treaty of Amity and Co-operation in ASEAN was signed to ensure regional peace and stability and to foster economic and social growth. In this meeting a small permanent secretariat was established and based in Jakarta, Indonesia for administrative support and to co-ordinate ASEAN activities.

Subsequently the second summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in August 1977, the third in Manila, Philippines in December 1987, fourth in Singapore in January 1992, fifth in Bangkok, Thailand in December 1995 and the sixth in Hanoi, Vietnam in 1998.

EUROPEAN UNION

The history of EU began in the Second World War. The main idea of this union was to institute integration so as to prevent destructions and killings from ever happening again. The idea of forming this EU was proposed by Robert Schuman, a Foreign Minister from France during his speech on 9 May 1950. This day marked the formation of

EU and is celebrated annually as the European day. EU is a union of democratic countries committed towards working for peace and prosperity.

EU is an organisation that is more than any other international organisation with no intention as a State to replace the existing ones. The trust that the members have in this union is that its members have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at the European level.

The initial EU consisted of just 6 countries. They were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Then in 1973 Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland joined the EU followed by Greece in 1981 while Spain and Portugal were only admitted in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden became members only in 1995.

Recently EU has expanded its membership by taking in another 10 new members in 2004, which are Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. It is indeed an honour for the 10 new nations to be admitted to EU as compared to Turkey, which has been trying for so long without success. Hopefully this expansion may bring peace through prosperity in the region.

The EU is a much organised block. It has a treaty, a constitution clearly setting out the union's aims and values and pointing out the responsibilities clearly. The EU has 5 institutions. They are:

- a. European Parliament (elected by the peoples of the member states).
- b. Council of the European Union (representing the governments of the member states).
- c. European Commission (driving force and executive body).
- d. Court of Justice (ensuring compliance with the law).
- e. Court of Auditors (ensuring sound and lawful management of the EU budget).

There are other important organisations and agencies, which were formed up to complete the system. EU upholds the rule of law as the fundamental principle in governing the union. Treaties signed by the member countries are used as the guidelines on all decisions made and procedures implemented. In the early years, co-operation between EU countries was mainly based on economic and trades.

As time progressed, EU enhanced their system by taking into account important factors which affected people's everyday life such as citizens' rights and freedom, security and justice, creation of jobs to eradicate poverty, development among EU countries, environmental protection as well as ensuring, globalization works for all EU members.

EU policies have been far reaching towards creating stability, peace and prosperity. It is the management ability of EU to raise living standards of its members which is the envy of most developed nations. The creation of the Euro dollar as a single EU currency has strengthened their voice in the world. EU has its own culture and values with different traditions and languages. It has been successful in defending these values and fostering harmony among the Europeans.

ARE THE GAPS BETWEEN ASEAN COUNTRIES NARROW AS COMPARED TO EU COUNTRIES

Political Situation

ASEAN may seem to have very cordial political co-operation among its members but its political differences have somehow affected its integration. History speaks for itself and that is the main crust of the problem that leads to the problem of integration among the ASEAN countries. Kofi Annan Secretary-General of United Nations (UN) on 16 February 2000 during his address stated that *ASEAN presents the collective will of integration among them toward mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and free from external interferences*. These are all due to The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) signed on 24

February 1976 during the first summit. Other major agreements were the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok in 1967, ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok on 8 August 1967; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration on 27 November 1976 and ASEAN Declaration on South China Sea, Manila on 22 July 1992.

Anyway, these agreements do not seem significant, as a lot of political differences exist between ASEAN members. Various forums are held ranging from Ministers level to Heads of Government but yet the key political issues pertaining to certain regional policies are not always met with a consensus. The ASEAN political situation can be divided into internal and external political problems.



Internal Politics

The stability of any country will be affected by its internal political conflicts. In fact ASEAN consists of countries with various different ideologies, which ranges from communism practised in Vietnam, military government in Myanmar (Burma) and democracy in the other countries. The super powers are against the Myanmar's military government and insist on civilian rule but ASEAN is not able to do anything to resolve the issue. Instead ASEAN claims it to be an internal issue which should be resolved by the citizens of Myanmar.

During the last ASEAN summit all its members pressed Myanmar to make a stand on the future of the democratic process and the liberation on

the Aung San Suu Kyi. The last ASEAN Ministerial forum held in Kuala Lumpur Jul 06, the members once again demanded Myanmar to make its stand on democracy and human rights. The Myanmar military leadership seems to have opted for *membership in isolation* preferring instead to set its own agenda for political reform which is different from the general stand made by its members (NST- Potholes to avoid on the ASEAN highway dated 8 August 2006).

The Philippines also faces a similar problem whereby MORO is fighting for Mindanao's independence and so is the Petani United Liberal Organisation (PULO), which is fighting for independence of Peninsular Thailand. The latest incidents in Southern Thailand have taken some toll on the relationship between the Thailand and Malaysia even though it has been denied by both the leaders. Both these regions are Muslim dominated areas.

Indonesia is also not left out of these the internal conflicts. Timor Leste finally got its independence and now Aceh is also demanding independence. Myanmar too is facing a political instability among its military government followed by Cambodia, which has always been plagued by turmoil within its political parties. With this on going internal political problems, the countries concerned will definitely spend more time solving their internal problems rather than to think about ASEAN integration.

The European Union countries also do have their internal political problems but it is very much curtailed internally. The United Kingdom's Ireland crisis, and the Italian Mafia problem does not politically destabilise any of the governments as it does in the ASEAN region. Germany's unification is a clear cut step to integration. Neither the Berlin wall nor the two different ideologies of democracy and communism could stop Germany's integration. In a broader scope the internal political scenario of the EU is much stable as compared to ASEAN? Even with 10 new underdeveloped countries becoming members, EU does not see it as a threat to its integration.

External Politics

It cannot be denied that there are political problems among the ASEAN countries. Integration cannot work when there are political differences within the members themselves. In fact, almost all the members have some form of external political crisis. Philippines constantly brings up the issue on the Sabah claim whenever there is a change of government especially during Aquino's reign. Indonesia's claim on the Sipadan Island and the Ligitan Islands was only solved recently through the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Singapore's water issue is still hanging while a lot of accusations have been said through the media especially on the problem of pricing. Another issue is the claim on the Island of Pulau Batu Putih which is yet to be resolved. If indeed the Island does belong to Singapore, then its reclaiming of land to expand the Island will affect the Pasir Gudang Port whereby the under current will be faster and this will affect big ships using this passage. The building of the bridge from Malaysia to Singapore is another issue and Singapore is reluctant giving excuses that it is not economically viable. On the other hand, it is willing to negotiate provided Malaysia agrees to some of its demands like selling sand to the Republic and usage of air space by the Singapore Air force amounts to nothing but taking advantage. In the end Malaysia scraped the bridge plan giving various reasons. Incredibly some of these issues are still not resolved.

Thailand, Myanmar and Laos where drugs are produced which is also known as the golden triangle have been blamed for the mass production of illegal drugs. These countries have been accused by the big powers for not doing anything to curtail this problem.

These external problems that exist among the ASEAN member countries do no good towards integration. The Spratly Island in South China Sea is an economic gold and all ASEAN members including China have put a claim on it. These are all political flash points, which could spark conflicts.

EU countries do not have external political issues to that of ASEAN. The external problems that exist

in the EU countries are solved internally through the EU parliament. EU parliamentary system works well as it solves whatever problems that may arise unlike ASEAN. The EU integration is sound and this is due to the fact that all the countries practise democracy which is a plus point for integration.

Economy

ASEAN and EU policies on economy are very much different. ASEAN is not seen as united as the EU members are in this field. ASEAN countries lack economic integration whereas EU has policies on structural funds, which is lacking among ASEAN members. EU's ability to create the Regional fund, Social funds, the European Agriculture Guidance Fund (EAGF) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) is to its advantage. Sadly, ASEAN members do not have this sort of funds in support of its members.

During the 11th ASEAN summit Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi did say that *ASEAN must unify as one economic unit to face the challenges* and must take ASEAN to the people (New Straits Times dated 12 December 2005). With a vast market of 350 million people ASEAN can survive, develop and compete but rather surprising, after 39 years it is still talking about the basics of survivability, development and competition.

Economic Integration

Kofi Annan also emphasised that ASEAN co-operation has resulted in great economic regional integration compared to the early days, which was insignificant. He said that ASEAN trade among its members rose to US \$80 billion from US\$ 43.26 billion within three years of launching of AFTA. ASEAN functional corporation is guided by ASEAN Plan of action of Social Development; ASEAN Plan of action on Science and Technology; ASEAN Plan of action on Culture and Information; ASEAN Plan of action on Environment; ASEAN Plan of action on Drug Abuse and ASEAN Plan of action in Combating Transnational Crime.

Trade and investment liberalisation, and regional economic integration are also being pursued

through the development of the Trans-ASEAN transportation network consisting of inter-state highways and railway networks, principles sea ports and sea lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway and major aviation links. All these have contributed to ASEAN'S growth.

Nevertheless the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in the *Reinventing ASEAN* article has a different view on ASEAN towards its integration. It emphasised that even though many economic groups are formed but the move towards integration does not seem to close the gap due to the limited success of these groups.

It was through the ASEAN Economic Co-operation (AEC) that regional solidarity was to be achieved through creating regional peace and stability. ACE was supposed to be the ASEAN'S core agenda but till 1980s it has not shown any positive results. The continued search for direction and new directions were unsuccessful. This led to a series of major initiatives and the forming of various internal groups. They are ASEAN Industrial projects (AIP) in 1976, the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), in 1977, the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AIC) in 1981; it was then modified to ASEAN Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) in 1983. Besides these there were other suggestions to form ASEAN small and medium Industries Centres (ASMIC), which never actually became a reality. Sadly, ASEAN'S economic achievements were not due to the AEC schemes but rather mainly to its trade and investments links to the outside world. The economic gap did not actually narrow.

The inability to turn the AEC schemes into true reality led to the formation of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, a decision which was considered important to maintain its spirit and bearing. Until now it has not really taken off. ASEAN then made use of the UN-sponsored Kansu-Robinson Report to increase economic productivity via industrialisation. In promoting ACE, ASEAN identified the following factors:

- a. Negotiate trade liberalisation for selected commodities.

- b. Industrial complementary agreements to be negotiated through the initiatives of the private sectors.
- c. Package deal arrangements in the form of joint industrial projects.

In 1977, at the ASEAN Ministers Meeting (AMM) the PTA was introduced. In that meeting it was proposed that liberalisation of trade through the measures such as; (a) granting tariff preferences; (b) long term quantity contracts; (c) preferential terms for financing imports; (d) preferential procurement by government agencies; and (e) liberalisation of non-tariff barriers in intra-regional trade. Again this did not work well as only the tariff preferences were implemented. Actually PTA was designed for trade liberalisation at a speed acceptable to the ASEAN members. It was clear that ASEAN was not consistent in their decisions for example the margin of preferences (MOP), which was set at 10 % and later in 1981 increased to 20 to 25 % and on to 40%. Prior to this, until 1980 preferences were negotiated voluntarily on individual basis between countries and based on products. Anyway this excluded the *sensitive items* so as to protect certain industries in particular countries such as the car industry in Malaysia.

ASEAN industrial co-operation schemes were equally disappointing. The AIP and AIC were agreed upon in 1976 at Bali summit. Investments up to US \$300 to US\$ 400 million were granted under the government-initiated projects for the AIP. The projects included urea for Indonesia and Malaysia, super phosphate for the Philippines, diesel engine for Singapore and soda ash for Thailand. Again it was not well administered and only two of the five projects were implemented.

The failures rate of the AIP schemes was high. The governments did not want to relax its autonomy to invest. Under AIP scheme which involves market sharing, the ASEAN members were not ready. Private sectors were not given a role to play in the AIP scheme. Again ASEAN members moved its focus from AIP scheme of industrial co-operation to industrial complementation. During the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AAM) in Kuala Lumpur the ASEAN countries are expected to sign four important documents such as the

Framework Agreement on Visa Exemption, Framework Document for the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, ASEAN – Canada Joint Declaration to Curb International Terrorism and the Instrument of Extension on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by France (The Borneo Post-12 July 2006). Whether this will be a reality, is yet to be seen.

The United Europe Movement (UME) was launched in London in 1947, was to establish European unity (EU expansion may peace through prosperity-NST April 04-comment by Muhammad Arif Zakullah). Its aim was to create economic unity among EU nations and thus permanently eliminating any possibility of war. The founding members who are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The success of ECSC led to the formation of European Free Trade Area (EFTA) now known as the EU with its own Euro Zone. Free trade in EU might cause economic difficulty but then to assist the new 10 members the EU 15 has implemented a phased program whereby the 10 new members will collectively receive 6,899 million euros during the period 1990-1999.

European Union was able to keep the integration close due to its EU policy goal. The results of the integration led to reduction in welfare disparities. Like Brussels in Belgium, a member of EU, it did not only improve its citizens' welfare but also raised the living conditions of the community. The EU is able to monitor each member's economic policy because it has the ability and the tool to do so. The EU Broad Economic Policies Guidelines (BEPG) provides stability and convergence programs to predict any deficit in its economic, social and environment in line with the agreed objectives. The member states have to provide detail information about their economic policies and in particular their approach to their respective budgets.

In order to avoid the economic disparity among EU countries it created four structural funds. The worry of members failing due to the guilt of losing sovereignty or the lack of funds did not arise in the EU. The four structural funds are used to address the economic and social problems. These funds are for Development, Agriculture, Fishery and Social. These funds have the following objectives:

- a. Assist regions lagging behind in development (income, employment, productivity system and infrastructure).
- b. Provide assistance in the field of economic and social restructuring.
- c. Assist in the adaptation and modernization in the field of education, training and employment systems.

EU has also created a fund known as The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which is the biggest of the four structural funds. It was established to reduce disparities and to promote economic and social cohesion in EU countries. Based on its objectives, this fund is meant for certain countries only. Financial assistance from the ERDF is mainly for:

- a. Supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.
- b. Promoting productive investment.
- c. Improving infrastructure.
- d. Furthering local development.

ERDF is also projected to create jobs and foster competitive and sustainable development. There is another fund known as the Cohesion fund, which provides additional structural assistance to the four least developed member nations, which are Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. With the inclusion of the 10 new members this fund is likely to be extended to them. This fund is for environment and transport infrastructure development. The fund was created during the Maastricht treaty in 1993 to strength economic and social cohesion by providing an avenue for the less developed states to participate in the economic and monetary union.

Single Currency

ASEAN does not have a single currency as to that of EU. In the essence of integration this system is working well for the EU and it benefits not only its integration but also the member nations' economies. Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, the former

Prime Minister of Malaysia did propose a single currency for the ASEAN region but it was strongly objected by Singapore and Brunei. Malaysia's Second Finance Minister said it is not expected to materialise anytime soon as the matter is very complicated (NST 13 April 04). There is nothing on the ASEAN single currency pipeline that could be discussed to achieve integration. In fact, the EU had started discussing this matter since 1957 but it only became a reality in late 2002.

There have been a couple of benefits for EU members using the single currency, euro and the benefits are:

- a. Practical convenience for citizens traveling, as the euro solves the problem of exchange rate.
- b. Member nations will reap the benefits of EU single market as it eliminates exchange rate fluctuations. Uncertainties will be reduced and businesses could be better planned. It eliminates various transaction costs like foreign exchange operations, hedging operations, cross-border payments and management of several currency accounts.
- c. Single financial market which will benefit both savers and the borrowers.
- d. Microeconomic framework of a single currency will benefit the economy as a whole. It will lead to price stability, sound public finances, low interest rates, incentives for growth, investment and employment, and shelter from external shocks.
- e. Enhancement of political integration related to the wider framework of integration.

Thus, integration through single currency will be better in terms of political stability, economic development and social co-operation. The twelve EU countries namely Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and the Finland have already benefited from this single currency implementation. ASEAN'S inability to achieve

this mission of having a single currency is a loss to its members in the near future especially in facing the globalisation era.

Globalisation

This is indeed a challenge to regional economic integration. ASEAN will need to have a common interest, a common mission, and a common stand as a region to face globalisation. With the entry of the four new members, who are economically backwards, ASEAN will have to progress faster towards developing the economies of these nations together with the rest of the region. Although AFTA was formed with the hope of offsetting this disparity in economy but it has not progressed at the pace expected.

To face the challenges of globalisation ASEAN has no choice but to get closer as a group. In comparison to the other massive economic powers like EU, ASEAN stands nowhere near but it can definitely work together than moving in separate directions in the competitive world. Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said integrating our economies requires hard work, political will and often-tough decisions. He argued ASEAN's 2020 deadline for creating a single market for goods, services and capital was a long time away; so one or two countries that were ready to press ahead should not have to wait for other members to catch up (NST April 04). This statement from a head of state shows how fragile is the integration among the leaders of the organisation and there is no sight of this gap narrowing.

A seminar was held on ASEAN and globalisation, integrating new ASEAN members into Asia Pacific on 31 October 2000 and Minister for Foreign Affairs U Win Aung of Myanmar addressed this seminar. He said it is most timely and appropriate for all of us who live in times of vast changes and transformation causing interconnectivity and interdependence of the nations and mobility of the people - a process most well known as globalization. Touching upon the opportunities and challenges; he reiterated this on-going process brings to all nations and all people, particularly warning its economic, social, and cultural impacts upon developing nations.

ASEAN leaders have taken timely measures such as the Agreement in 1992 to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Areas (AFTA) to realise a big market, to create opportunities for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and strengthen cooperation on a board range of economic areas. But global challenges of today necessitate a much wider integration of countries not only among ASEAN countries but also among those in the entire Asia Pacific region. It seems that these forums just lead to mere discussions with no immediate effect on implementation.

ASEAN managed to integrate markets due to globalisation by accelerating the flow of capital, goods, services and people. Its effect was also seen in the vulnerability of financial markets and institutions to manage globalised capital flows (NST dated 8 August 2006 – Potholes to avoid on the ASEAN highway). It said, ASEAN managed to integrate better with global financial markets through liberalisation and deregulation but it did not lead to deeper economic integration at the regional level due to the differences in Government and governance as well as huge disparities in economic development.

EU has been well prepared for the incoming globalisation. In fact they have already been practicing the globalisation policy in EU. Trade liberalization is to the maximum and movement of capital and labour is not limited. The EU is even prepared to face globalization with the incoming new members. To narrow the disparity in economies, current EU members have agreed to provide aid worth up to 4% of their GDP each year, more than double what they spend on their defence (NST 13 April 04). EU leaders have also set a substantial amount of US\$32 billion in aid to be provided through 2006 for the new members to narrow this gap.

AS Dan Mulhall stated in his column 'The weekend guest' (NST 25 April 04) that the EU's main tripods was based on co-operation in economy, politics, security and justice and these should see it through the globalisation even with the entry of the new members. Economic openness demands for regional integration and this has become urgent, and dialogue between regions is an

eminently sensible instrument for management of these global changes.

CONCLUSION

It is noticed that ASEAN has been inconsistent with its policies and it is a near impossible mission to narrow the gap to that of EU. ASEAN has to focus on its economics and politics simultaneously in order to achieve the integration that it is seeking. Forums and summits will not lead anywhere if the stand on issues are not addressed and executed. Forming action groups and later not seeing the resolutions through is definitely a waste of time and money leading to false visions. It is indeed an urgent matter for ASEAN to emulate EU for its future success.

ASEAN should not look inwards for individual success but instead willing to carry out regional collaborations with other developed countries to heighten its progress. ASEAN should focus on setting up funds similar to EU to assists the new members. The rich ASEAN members like Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand could be the front leaders in setting up these funds to assist the development of the underdeveloped members. This initiative has to be acted on urgently so as not to allow the EU or the United States (US) to forge ahead of ASEAN in developing these new ASEAN members. Any delay will be a set back in terms of economic outflow from the ASEAN region into the EU or the US.

It is timely for ASEAN to wake up once and for all, thinking towards integration in terms of not only economics but also politics. If indeed ASEAN wants to emulate the EU it should emulate and follow the EU policies, even though it may be inconsistent with the ASEAN policies. Creating funds similar to that of EU is a stepping stone towards regional integration. Besides that, restrictions on all forms of economic goods, capital and labour market should be lifted, if possible, emulating that of EU.

It is time that ASEAN creates funds to counter any economic or financial crisis that may occur as a result of globalisation. These funds could have

helped countries like Indonesia which was affected by the economic crisis in the late 1990s rather than it going to IMF or the World Bank. The policies implemented by these two institutions have not shown any success till now.

As observed, euro took a long time to be implemented due to political differences but the results of its implementation are very encouraging. Although ASEAN may have just voiced the implementation of a single currency, it is not in vain to try it based on the policies of EU. Even though the euro is in the infant stage but it has shown positive results. ASEAN ought to consider a single

currency seriously especially for the sake of regional integration.

In conclusion, integration can only be achieved if all the members are of a single mind. Economic integration should be seen as prospering thy neighbour. Using Asian values and cultures as a guide will definitely lead to perfect integration. ASEAN comprises Asian societies which advocate collectiveness or togetherness and it should take advantage of these rich values in pushing ahead with plans that have been in the pipeline as the common saying goes 'if there is a will, there is always a way.'

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KRISIS CHINA – TAIWAN : TUNTUTAN CHINA TERHADAP PENYATUAN SEMULA TAIWAN


Oleh : Mej Mohamed Ridzuan bin Zainal Abidin

PENDAHULUAN

Sejak berakhirnya Perang Dunia Kedua, Krisis China dan Taiwan hangat diperdebatkan oleh dunia kerana melibatkan kepentingan tiga segi antara Amerika Syarikat (AS) , Tanah Besar China (Republik Rakyat China – RRC) dan Taiwan(Republik China – RC). Perbalahan antara RRC dan RC tidak pernah reda dan mereka sering pertikai bahawa mereka adalah kerajaan yang sah bagi seluruh wilayah China. Bagi AS, Taiwan amat penting dari segi ekonomi dan kedudukan geografinya yang strategik di rantau Asia Timur. Pada tahun 1971, Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB) telah mengistiharkan bahawa RRC sebagai kerajaan yang sah negara China berdasarkan faktor sejarah yang RRC telah ditubuhkan secara rasmi pada 1 Oktober 1949¹, bagaimanapun pada ketika itu AS tidak mengesahkannya secara rasmi. Ketegangan di Selat Taiwan sejak itu tidak pernah lenyap, hanya selepas tahun 1979 barulah permusuhan di antara kedua belah pihak reda apabila dunia mengakui bahawa RRC sebagai kerajaan yang sah negara China dengan persetujuan AS.

Taiwan terus dipinggirkan oleh dunia dari segi hubungan luar dan diplomatik setelah pengiktirafan tersebut, kecuali beberapa buah negara yang masih mengekalkan wakil mereka dengan RC. RC hari ini berubah menjadi moden, bersatu, mengamalkan demokrasi liberal, bangun dengan keajaiban ekonominya, proses pemodenan politiknya telah berlaku dalam cara evolusi yang tersusun. Semenjak regim nasionalis dengan ideologi demokratik melarikan diri ke Taiwan pada 1949, iaitu selepas pemimpin nasionalis iaitu Chiang

Kai-Shek dan pengikutnya kalah dalam perang saudara menentang militia Mao Tse Tung yang memegang ideologi Komunis di Tanah Besar China, penyatuan semula merupakan agenda utama kedua-dua belah pihak, terutama RRC yang mendakwa RC adalah sebahagian daripada wilayahnya dan mempunyai hak ke atas kedaulatannya.



Semenjak Parti Koumintang menubuhkan kerajaan sementara di Taiwan, RRC secara berterusan mengancam agar Taiwan menerima penyatuan dengan Tanah Besar China atau kuasa ketenteraan akan digunakan untuk membebaskan Taiwan. Para pemimpin terawal di Taiwan sejak berakhirnya Perang Saudara sehinggalah pada 1991, menuntut bahawa mereka adalah kerajaan sah Tanah Besar China dan berhak untuk membebaskan Tanah Besar China daripada Pemberontak Komunis yang telah merampas kuasa secara tidak sah, manakala RRC mendakwa sebaliknya serta menuduh RC sebagai wilayah renegade dan ia berhak membebaskannya menggunakan kuasa ketenteraan.

¹ Arthur Cotterell and David Morgan, 1975, China An Integrated Study, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd p. 277.

Usaha RRC untuk mendapatkan kembali Taiwan selalu menemui jalan buntu akibat campurtangan AS yang berikrar akan mempertahankan Taiwan daripada sebarang bentuk serangan dalam usaha RRC untuk memiliki semula Taiwan, dimana AS mempunyai kepentingan ekonomi ke atasnya. Ketegangan di Selat Taiwan mula reda pada 1979 apabila AS dan China menjalinkan hubungan diplomatik selepas China mula mengamalkan dasar pintu terbuka ke arah konsep modenisasinya dan ujud kerjasama erat antara kedua negara dari segi ekonomi, politik dan usaha damai ke arah penyatuan semula kedua pihak yang bertelagah perlu diwujudkan secara aman.

PERKEMBANGAN PENGARUH CHINA

Semenjak lewat 1980-an hingga 1990-an, China yang bangkit sebagai sebuah negara yang menuju ke arah kekayaan dan berpengaruh, telah menjadi isu utama di Asia dan terutamanya negara-negara Barat². Mengikut perangkaan Bank Dunia, China akan menjadi kuasa ekonomi terbesar dunia menjelang tahun 2010 atau telah menjadi jika ia merangkumi China Unggul (Greater China). Dengan menggunakan perkiraan kuasa berbelanja sama dengan Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK), pada 1994 China telahpun menduduki tempat kedua dalam ekonomi dunia³. China telah mengekalkan kadar pertumbuhan ekonomi hampir dua dekad, disertai dengan publisiti pembangunan yang baik dan peningkatan dalam perbelanjaan ketenteraan, perolehan senjata canggih dari luar, tuntutan hak kedaulatan keatas Laut China Selatan dan Taiwan telah menyumbangkan pandangan menyeluruh bahawa keselamatan masa depan ASEAN bergantung kepada keupayaan dan sikap China⁴.

Oleh sebab beberapa perkembangan di dalam dan di luar pada tahun 1990-an, termasuk pengurangan kehadiran tentera AS, kelenyapan ancaman dari Russia dan perkembangan pengaruh politik ketenteraan China telah memberi peluang

kepada Tentera Pembebasan Rakyat (TPR) berkembang secara menyeluruh, peluang yang tidak ada semenjak penubuhan RRC pada 1949. Oleh itu jika China mengekalkan perkembangan ini untuk jangka masa tertentu, maka dalam jangka masa panjang China akan menjadi saingan kepada AS dan berpotensi mengancam kestabilan ASEAN, walaupun perkembangan ini dapat diimbangi dengan pengukuhan pakatan AS – Jepun namun rantau ini akan kekal samar oleh ketidaktentuan masalah domestik dan kekurangan kejelasan maklumat ketenteraan.



KEUPAYAAN KETENTERAAN CHINA

RRC adalah antara negara di Asia yang telah meningkatkan peruntukan pertahanan dengan pesat, dengan kenaikan tahunan lebih kurang 12 ke 15 peratus sejak 1990. Anggaran perbelanjaan semasa dari sumber rasmi Beijing, adalah kira-kira 9 billion manakala yang diramalkan oleh Agensi Kawalan Senjata dan Pelucutan Senjata Amerika Syarikat adalah dianggarkan 51 billion. Modenisasi semasa Tentera Pembebasan Rakyat (TPR) menunjukkan tujuannya adalah untuk penugasan serantau, bertujuan untuk mengawal zon utama di sepanjang sempadan antara RRC dengan Rusia, Korea, India, Vietnam dan maritim termasuklah kawasan pertikaian di Timur dan Laut China Selatan⁵.

Pada 1985, satu perubahan drastik dilaksanakan

² Kim Taeho, 1998, A Reality Check : The Rise Of China And Its Military Capability Towards 2010, p. 323.

³ Gerald Segal, Mac 1994, China Changes Shape, Brassey's – Adelphi Papers, p. 10.

⁴ Kim Taeho, 1998, A Reality Check : The Rise Of China And Its Military Capability Towards 2010, p. 323.

⁵ A. James Gregor, Summer 1996, Parameters Vol XXVI No 2, p. 96-97.

terhadap strategi ketenteraan dan juga penyusunan semula TPR untuk menghadapi cabaran baru terhadap Keselamatan China. Sejak penghujung tahun 1980, TPR telah meningkatkan operasi sempadan untuk tempoh yang singkat, satu doktrin baru yang dikenali sebagai 'Peripheral Defence'. Bagi maksud ini, TPR menubuhkan formasi kecil tentera yang mobil dengan keupayaan manuver dan kuasa tembakan yang tinggi untuk menghadapi keperluan peperangan masa hadapan yang berkonsepkan 'Limited Local Wars'⁶.

PEMBANGUNAN KETENTERAAN CHINA

Beberapa dekad yang lalu seluruh tenaga dikerahkan untuk mencapai modenisasi perindustrian. China telah berusaha untuk membangunkan kuasa ketenteraan dan mensasarkan pencapaian sebagai sebuah kuasa besar pada penghujung abad ini yang mana ianya telah berjaya mencapai objektifnya⁷.

Belum ada analisis tentera yang percaya bahawa China mampu melancarkan serangan amfibi. China mempunyai terup, tetapi tidak mempunyai kapal yang mencukupi untuk menggerakkan mereka dalam jumlah yang mencukupi. Bagaimanapun Jeneral-Jeneral di Beijing berkata, mereka boleh mempertingkatkan keupayaan ketenteraan dari aspek 'Cruise Missiles', Misil Jarak Dekat, Kapal Selam dan Kapal Terbang berteknologi tinggi⁸.

Laporan-laporan terkini menunjukkan bahawa program modenisasi tentera China hanya tertumpu kepada beberapa program yang telah dinyatakan di atas terutamanya Misil. Laksamana Denis Blair iaitu Komander Tentera AS di Rantau Pasifik berkata China telah mengatugerakkan 200 Misil Balistik dalam persediaan menghadapi Taiwan dan ianya bertambah sebanyak 50 Misil setiap tahun. Jumlah ini meningkat dan merupakan satu ancaman kepada Taiwan. Washington menganggarkan

mereka akan memiliki 650 Misil menjelang tahun 2005⁹. Laporan Pertahanan Nasional Taiwan atau Kertas Putih pada tahun lepas melaporkan ancaman paling serius kepada Taiwan adalah Misil Taktikal Balistik seperti Dong Feng-11 (M-11) dan Dong Feng 15 (M-9). Tentera TPR dari ' 2nd Artillery Corps ' mempunyai sekitar 400 misil ini.



Misil ini boleh ditugaskan untuk pelbagai gelombang dan pelbagai arah serangan. DF-11 dengan kira-kira 100 dalam perkhidmatan TPR China, mempunyai jarak 300 Km dan boleh membawa 10 Kilo Tan (KT) ' Tactical Nuclear Warhead ' atau 1,000 kg ' Conventional Warhead '. Manakala DF-15 dengan kira-kira 300 dalam perkhidmatan mampu membawa 20 Kilo Tan (KT) ' Tactical Nuclear Warhead ' atau 500 kg ' Conventional Warhead '. Laporan ini menjangka serangan misil akan diikuti oleh serangan tentera yang diterajui seramai 70,000 anggota dari ' 31st Group Army ', yang berpangkalan di wilayah Fujian, China dengan kekuatan tambahan seramai 250,000 anggota tentera dari wilayah lain. Tentera laut di jangka mengatugerakkan 300 lebih kapal pendaratan untuk membawa terup (termasuk kapal-kapal perdagangan), sementara tentera udara mengatur gerakkan 1,000 kapal terbang dalam bantuan. Tentera Udara juga berkeupayaan membawa dua Rejimen payung terjun ke Taiwan¹⁰. Buat pertama kali China mengakui akan kewujudan ' 2nd Artillery Corps ' yang

⁶ Kim Taeho, Summer 1998, A Reality Check: The " Rise of China" And Its Military Capability Towards 2010, The Journal Of East Asian Affairs, Vol XII No 2, p. 340.

⁷ Todd Crowell, June 2, 2000, Security – Flexing Some Muscle: Be Prepared, Asia Week, p. 28.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Wendell Minnick, 16 August 2000, Taiwan Paints A Senario Of Invasion By China, Asia Pacific, Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 10.

bertanggungjawab terhadap Program Nuklear Negara. Penganalisa AS menyatakan bahawa secara khusus China sedang dalam program memodenisasikan tenteranya menurut Kertas Putih Pertahanan Tahun 2000¹¹.

Menurut analisa barat China telah berjaya mengeluarkan DF-31 iaitu Misil Antara Benua dengan jarak 5,000 batu dan senjata ini mampu membawa Nuklear seberat 500,000 KT yang berkeupayaan menyerang posisi tentera AS di Hawaii, Alaska dan Pantai Barat di Amerika¹². Terkini, penganalisis risik AS menyatakan China telah membuat ujian roket jarak sederhana (CSS-5) yang boleh membawa kira-kira enam peluru berpandu berasingan pada jarak 13,000 batu. Ia membayangkan bahawa Beijing bersiap sedia untuk melawan pertahanan serantau di Asia seperti yang diusahakan oleh AS dan Jepun.¹³

MATLAMAT CHINA

Adalah menjadi kepentingan utama China untuk mendapatkan semula tanah mereka di Laut China Selatan. RRC akan terus berusaha untuk melindungi kepulauan mereka dari sebarang eksploitasi dan campurtangan asing. Sumber dari kepulauan Spratly adalah penting untuk membangunkan ekonomi China dan taraf hidup rakyat mereka. Ia juga adalah penting untuk Parti Komunis China, dimana ianya akan melenyapkan kepercayaan rakyatnya jika China kehilangan kepentingannya. RRC juga mempunyai hasrat untuk menjadi pemimpin di rantau ini¹⁴.

Sejarah China, terutamanya sejak 1949, membuktikan mereka sanggup menggunakan kekerasan terhadap negara jiran terutamanya yang melibatkan keselamatan dan kedaulatan wilayahnya, sebagai contoh kekerasan yang digunakan adalah semasa konflik Peperangan Korea (1950-1953), Krisis Taiwan (1954-1955,

1958), Peperangan Indo-Vietnam (1962), Pertikaian Sempadan Sino-Soviet (1969) dan Peperangan Sino-Vietnam (1979). Menurut kajian krisis polisi asing pada Abad Ke 20, negara China jika dibandingkan dengan kuasa besar yang lain mempunyai kadar penggunaan kekerasan yang tinggi (72% atau 8 daripada 11 krisis polisi asing dalam tempoh 1949-1985¹⁵).

Pada dasarnya adalah logik bahawa RRC akan menggunakan kekerasan untuk menyelesaikan masalah Isu Penyatuan Taiwan, terutamanya jika dikaji dari sudut sejarah, strategik, ekonomi, politik dan birokrasi, maka tidak mustahil bahawa penggunaan kuasa tentera menjadi pilihan utama tetapi menjadi keperluan utamanya di masa akan datang sekiranya ianya tiada pilihan lain. Pilihan ini boleh diringkaskan dari aspek seperti berikut:¹⁶

► **Sejarah:** China, seperti juga negara lain, mempunyai tentangan terhadap konsep Dua Raja '. Atas kesedaran ini, pemimpin China di Beijing dan Taipei berkongsi tanggapan sama nenek moyang mereka sebab itu tiada di antara mereka yang akan mengaku kalah dalam isu penyatuan semula Taiwan. Beijing melihat Taiwan sebagai wilayahnya yang berdaulat. Polisi RC juga mempertimbangkan Taiwan sebagai wilayah China yang mewajibkan kebebasan dari sebarang penindasan Komunis menurut Dr. Sun Yat Sen, yang dikenali sebagai Bapa Permodenan China. Setakat ini tiada petunjuk positif oleh RRC untuk menggunakan kuasa ketenteraan bagi menyelesaikan isu penyatuan semula Taiwan. Bagaimanapun, pada satu masa apabila keupayaan ketenteraan RRC mencapai keunggulan melebihi Taiwan dan pemimpin di Taipei masih menolak serta enggan bertolak ansur, Beijing mungkin tiada pilihan lain kecuali menyerang Taiwan.

► **Strategik:** Kepulauan Taiwan adalah kritikal kepada China untuk jangka masa panjang. Taiwan mengawal kemasukan kedua-dua Selat Taiwan atau Terusan Bashi, satu

¹¹ Robert Karniol, 25 October, 2000, Chinese White Paper Calls For A New Security Concept For Asia, Asia Pacific, Jane's Defence Weekly, p. 5.

¹² Noor Azman Mahat, Ogos 1999, China: Kuasa Nuklear Yang Belum Teruji, Perajurit, p. 39.

¹³ Berita Harian, Khamis, 25 Julai 2002.

¹⁴ Schwaber Carey, 1995, The Spratly Islands People's Republic of China, Asian – Pacific Council.

¹⁵ Kim Taeho, Summer 1998, A Reality Check: The "Rise of China" And Its Military Capability Towards 2010, The Journal Of East Asian Affairs, Vol XII No 2, p. 355-356.

¹⁶ Martin L. Lasater, 1984, TAIWAN – Facing Mounting Threats, p. 35-40.

laluan sempit bagi pelayaran Armada Rusia ke Timur Asia. Laluan ini juga penting bagi laluan perdagangan Jepun bagi pelayaran ke Timur Asia. Kedudukan Geografi Taiwan menawarkan laluan perkapalan penting kepada RRC dimasa hadapan. Kepulauan itu juga boleh dijadikan pertahanan hadapan ketenteraan dari serangan laut kuasa besar.

► **Ekonomi:** Taiwan amat berpotensi untuk membantu konsep modenisasi Tanah Besar China yang sedang dilaksanakannya. Sekiranya RRC meneruskan konsep sekarang yang berlandaskan Modenisasi Sosialis dan tidak beralih kepada Model Revolusi Sosialis, Beijing amat memerlukan pada masa hadapan Modal Pelaburan, Pengurus Terlatih, Jurutera, Ahli Teknikal, Saintis dan lain-lain tenaga kerja yang berpengalaman untuk merelisasikan konsep modenisasinya dengan jaya. Taiwan mempunyai kesemua kemahiran dan tenaga kerja yang diperlukan oleh RRC manakala Tanah Besar China pula mempunyai semua keperluan sumber asli, peluang pasaran dan keperluan bagi pengeluaran produk industrinya yang sukar diperolehi di Kepulauan Taiwan. Sekiranya Taiwan dapat disatukan menjadi wilayahnya, ianya akan mewujudkan satu masyarakat Cina yang berpengaruh. Oleh itu kemungkinan RRC tidak akan teragak untuk mengambil tindakan kekerasan ke arah penyatuan semula Taiwan dengan mengambil kira kekerasan yang minima tanpa memusnahkan ekonomi Taiwan.

► **Politik:** Kejayaan ekonomi Taiwan merupakan satu tamparan kepada RRC. Sejak RRC membenarkan kelonggaran terhadap kebudayaan rakyatnya, peluang ini telah membuka mata bagi rakyatnya melihat kemajuan di Taiwan yang mana amat membimbangkan pemimpin China. Sebagai contoh kejayaan ekonomi Taiwan telah diperkatakan oleh rakyatnya dengan laungan 'Belajar Dari Ekonomi Taiwan' semasa pelancaran Konsep Empat Modenisasi. Pemimpin China mesti membuktikan kepada rakyatnya bahawa konsep modenisasi bermodelkan komunis

adalah yang terbaik jika dibandingkan dengan model kapitalis yang diamalkan oleh Taiwan, jika tidak rakyatnya akan hilang kepercayaan terhadap sistem ideologi komunis.

► **Birokrasi :** Apa yang perlu dibuat ke atas Taiwan kerap kali menjadi politik bolasepak di Beijing. Rancangan untuk mendapatkan semula kepulauan ini dilihat berbeza-beza dari pemimpin ke pemimpin yang lain. Di bawah kepimpinan Deng Xiaoping dan sekutunya secara tidak langsung strategi keamanan dipraktikkan bagi penyatuan semula Taiwan. Tetapi Deng Xiaoping juga membuat satu ketetapan masa untuk Taiwan dikembalikan. Dalam ucapan beliau semasa Kongres Nasional Kedua pada September 1982, beliau menyatakan pemulangan Taiwan kepada China adalah salah satu daripada 3 matlamat utama pada era 1980 an. Penganti beliau iaitu Presiden Jiang Zemin juga sehingga kini masih mengekal dan mengikuti polisi Deng Xiaoping.

Matlamat RRC boleh dinilai selepas mempertimbangkan semua faktor di atas, bahawa tidak boleh dinafikan yang pemimpin sekarang dan akan datang tidak akan menggunakan kuasa ketenteraan untuk mendapatkan semula Taiwan sekiranya semua usaha diplomatik gagal.

PENYATUAN SEMULA NEGARA CHINA

Tujuan Penyatuan Semula

Pada tahun 1980-an, Negara China dan Taiwan mula melupakan sejarah ketegangan antara kedua-dua pihak. Pada tahun 1998, ketegangan antara kedua-dua negara mencapai tahap krisis yang paling serius sejak tahun 1950-an. Taiwan cuba mendapatkan kemerdekaan dan ini menyukarkan penyatuan semula Negara China. Beijing mula bertindak balas dan mengumumkan bahawa ia tidak akan membenarkan Taiwan mencapai kemerdekaan.¹⁷

¹⁷ Bernice Lee, 1999, *The Security Implications of the New Taiwan*, p. 67.

Deng Xiao Ping dilaporkan memaklumkan kepada Parti Komunis China dalam mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Pusat bahawa 'Saya sentiasa mengharapkan Perang Dingin akan berakhir, tetapi saya sangat kecewa bahawa Perang Dingin Kedua akan bermula selepas Perang Dunia Pertama tamat'.

Perdebatan Perang Dingin baru diadakan di pusat-pusat negara seperti di Washington, Tokyo dan lain-lain tetapi tidak di Taipei. Bagi pemimpin Negara China seperti Mao, Deng dan Jiang, Perang Dingin tidak bermula pada tahun 1945, tetapi pada 1840. Sehingga Negara China balik ke keadaan sebelum Peperangan Candu, iaitu bagi melupakan kehinaan yang disebabkan oleh pihak Barat dan Jepun dengan mengambil semula Hong Kong, Macau dan Taiwan, pemimpin Beijing tidak akan menerima bahawa Perang Dingin antara Timur dan Barat telah berakhir.¹⁸



Dengan penyatuan semula Hong Kong pada tahun 1997 dan Macau pada 1999 dengan Tanah Besar, kewujudan 'wilayah terasing' Taiwan sebagai pertubuhan politik yang berbeza mengganggu dan menghalang penyatuan Tanah Besar China. Ia mengancam dan tidak mengaku kesahihan kerajaan 'wilayah terasing' tersebut. Selepas Deng Xiao Ping berkuasa semula untuk kali

ketiga pada tahun 1978, beliau telah memulakan kempen untuk mempengaruhi dan memaksa Taiwan menerima formula 'Satu Negara, Dua Sistem'. Semasa perbincangan masa hadapan Hong Kong pada tahun 1993, China dengan lancarnya melaksanakan konsep tersebut pada Hong Kong. Sejak tahun 1994, China menumpukan perhatian terhadap menuntut semula Taiwan. Formula 'Satu Negara, Dua Sistem' diperjelaskan.

Pengambilalihan Hong Kong dengan lancar menunjukkan kepada dunia termasuk rakyat Taiwan bahawa polisi Beijing 'Satu Negara, Dua Sistem' boleh dilaksanakan di samping dapat menyelesaikan isu-isu rumit melibatkan Hong Kong dan Macao. Ini menunjukkan kepada dunia bahawa Beijing berupaya menyelesaikan masalah rumit seperti peralihan pentadbiran kedua-dua wilayah.

KESIMPULAN

Kedaulatan Taiwan adalah penting kepada Tanah Besar China dan Taiwan. Kedua-dua pemimpin memegang pada persepsi moyang yang menolak konsep 'Dua Raja Bawah Syurga', di mana hanya satu pemimpin boleh wujud dalam satu negara. Beijing berpendapat Taiwan sebagai salah satu wilayah China yang mana ia perlu menghalang sebarang tindakan luar untuk mengasingkan wilayah tersebut. Pemimpin RRC telah menekan perkara ini sejak perpecahan pada 1949, menerusi politik dan ketenteraan untuk menyatu semula kedua-dua negara. Taiwan telah diancam dan mengambil maklum bahawa tindakan ketenteraan akan diambil sekiranya penyatuan semula gagal. Namun Taiwan masih berupaya mempertahankan pendiriannya disebabkan tenteranya dilengkapi senjata moden yang dibeli dan dibekalkan oleh Amerika Syarikat dan campur tangan Amerika Syarikat dalam semua konflik dan mengancam bahawa ia akan mempertahankan Taiwan sekiranya diserang.

RRC sedari bahawa keupayaan ketenteraan dari segi persenjataan jauh ketinggalan berbanding negara Barat, terutamanya Amerika Syarikat dan ini merupakan salah satu sebab ia tidak menyerang Taiwan. Walaubagaimanapun, RRC masih bertegas bahawa tindakan ketenteraan akan diambil sekiranya Taiwan meneruskan tindakannya mengisytiharkan kemerdekaan. Ini disebabkan

¹⁸ C. L. Chiou And Leong H. Liew, June 2, 2000, Uncertain Future: Taiwan-Hong Kong-China Relation After Hong Kong's Return To Chinese Sovereignty, p. 49.

kepentingan pulau tersebut kepada China dari aspek sejarah, strategik, ekonomik, politik dan birokrasi.

Sekiranya tidak berupaya menyelesaikan masalah penyatuan dan Taiwan mengisytiharkan kemerdekaan dengan disokong oleh Amerika Syarikat dan negara lain atas sebab ideologi berbeza, ini bermaksud ia akan kehilangan kebanggaan dan kepercayaan oleh rakyatnya. Untuk mengelak dikritik oleh rakyatnya, Negara China akan melaksanakan serangan ketenteraan separa untuk tempoh masa singkat atau peperangan terhad untuk mendapatkan semula wilayah Taiwan dan seterusnya menggunakan tindakan diplomatik. Ianya tidak mustahil dengan merujuk kepada rekod sejarah yang mana menunjukkan ia sanggup menggunakan kekerasan terhadap jirannya bagi menyelesaikan masalah keselamatan dan kedaulatannya sepanjang tempoh 1949-1985. Secara strategiknya, ia tidak boleh dinafikan sejak 1985, keupayaan ketenteraannya berorientasikan operasi sempadan dalam tempoh singkat, doktrin baru dinamakan 'Peripheral Defence', yang mana menekankan formasi unit mobil kecil dengan kebolehan manuver dan kuasa tembakan yang tinggi yang direkabentuk untuk memenuhi keperluan 'peperangan terhad' bagi mempertahankan tanahnya yang luas daripada sebarang ancaman luar.

RRC cuba mengelakkan peperangan sepenuhnya dengan Taiwan dan sekutunya Amerika Syarikat, disebabkan matlamatnya ialah tidak memusnahkan saudara sendiri yang

mana Taiwan merupakan aset utama untuk mengerakan pertumbuhan ekonominya. Ia tidak akan melancarkan konfrontasi yang berpanjangan dengan Kuasa Barat kerana akan menjejaskan polisi terbuka ke arah modenisasinya. Walaubagaimanapun, keadaan boleh berubah sekiranya Russia menyokong China atas dasar kedua-dua negara bersepakat menentang sebarang campur tangan Kuasa Barat dalam perkara serantau. Peluang ini akan memberi kelebihan kepada Negara China dan dalam keadaan ini, ia adalah terpulang kepada pemimpin kuasa-kuasa besar ini untuk menentukan masa depan masing-masing, keselamatan serantau dan sedunia, sama ada memilih untuk berperang atau meneruskan dengan usaha perbincangan secara diplomasi.

Pemimpin Negara China berpendapat sehingga penyatuan semula Hong Kong, Macau dan Taiwan berjaya dilaksanakan, Peperangan Dingin antara Timur dan Barat tidak akan berakhir. Sebarang perkembangan politik, ketenteraan dan situasi ekonomi di Selat Taiwan akan menentukan masa hadapan kedua-dua negara.

Sebarang peperangan antara kedua negara akan melibatkan Amerika Syarikat. Amerika Syarikat memandang serius sebarang konflik yang akan timbul di Taiwan. Krisis 1995-1996 menunjukkan Negara Amerika Syarikat tidak memandang ringan keselamatan dan kepentingannya di Taiwan. Amerika Syarikat akan mengambil semua langkah untuk mengelakkan peperangan sehingga ia tiada pilihan lain kecuali mempertahankan Taiwan sepenuhnya.

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Mej Mohamed Ridzuan bin Zainal Abidin telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Artileri DiRaja pada 18 Disember 1982. Beliau pernah berkhidmat sebagai Pegawai Staf Gred 3 di MK Arti 3 Div, sebagai Ketua Bateri di Rejimen Bantuan Rapat dan sekarang memegang jawatan Penolong Pegawai Memerintah di Rejimen Ke 61 Artileri Diraja. Beliau memiliki Diploma Strategik dan Pertahanan (UM). Telah menghadiri kursus di Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera pada tahun 2001.

DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY: ADOPTED BY THE US DURING THE 1990 GULF WAR AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

By : Kol Jeyabalan S

"To introduce into the philosophy of war a principal of moderation would be absurdity. War is an act of violence pushed to the utmost bounds."

Karl Von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTION

On 2nd August 1990 Iraqi military forces, orchestrated by Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 from January 16th to February 28th was fought to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait and restore Kuwait's independence. Significantly it was the first war in the post cold war era and for the first time the two super powers, the US and USSR were not in opposing camps.

The war introduced several notable phenomena. Among them, the war enjoyed an unprecedented level of international support, not witnessed since Korea, 40 years ago. The international coalition comprised 37 countries including Switzerland who was neutral in World War 1 (WW I) and World War 2 (WW II) and the US political machinery was responsible in forging a broad based coalition that confronted the Iraqi military.

Technology was a notable phenomenon of the war. It was in the form of stealth and precision in its weapons which forged a powerful tool against Saddam's inferior technology. Within 48 hours of the outset of the war, Iraqi command and control, air defence and communication centers were crippled by the coalition's superiority of technology in weapons.

The Gulf War also witnessed high level of logistical support between the Allies. An efficient

logistic system which was able to maintain high tech weapons and a large body of troops were also responsible for the tactical and operational success of the coalition force. The preparation time from August 1990 to January 1991 enabled the coalition to put in place a workable logistics plan to support the operational plan.

The US which led the coalition was clear of both their military and political objectives. The political objective was to liberate Kuwait. The military objective was to defeat the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Unlike Vietnam, there was hardly any political interference in military operations. Military commanders were given a free hand to implement their operational plan without any imposed limitations and political influence. They gave little thought to limited attacks and used massive military force to neutralise Iraq.

Public and social support for the US military deployment in the Gulf was encouraging. Such support resulted in shared purpose and a perception of a common goal, perceived not only among the American people but the world community as well. In addition, the UN legitimised the war with its resolutions that was voted in favour by all five permanent members although China disagreeable to the use of force agreed not to veto the motion.

Clausewitz defined strategy as the "use of engagement for the object of war" and Liddell Hart reaffirmed it as "the art of distributing and

applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” Simplistically, it meant the use of the armed forces to attain a given political objective. Clausewitz while simplifying the definition also distinguished between the maintenance of the military and their use.¹ He further described war as a trinity composed of its political objective, its operational instrument and of the popular passion, the social forces.² The planners of the Gulf War took heed of Clausewitz dimensions of strategy and strategised the Gulf War along the political, social, technological and logistical dimensions of war. Each dimension complemented one another to fulfill both the military and political objectives but under different circumstances and environment, one dominates the other.

In the discourse of this paper, it aims to examine the 1990 Gulf War from the operational, logistical, social, political and technological dimensions of strategy. No successful strategy could be formulated without taking into account all these dimensions. These multiple strategic dimensions determined the significance of the war.

OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

In distinguishing between maintenance of the military and their use in war, Clausewitz subordinated all other dimensions of strategy to the operational dimension. However in the Gulf War all the dimensions were given their precedence on their own merits during the different stages of the war that is the planning, execution and reorganisation stage. Once the political objective was formalised the military objective was planned prior to the war. During this stage however the operational dimension took centre stage.

The authority of the Security Council Resolution³ of 2nd August 1990, demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait to positions in which they were located on 1st August 1990. Thus the central military objective of the UN Coalition forces led

by the US was the comprehensive defeat of the Iraqi forces in the air, land and sea. In operational terms the comprehensive military defeat of Iraq entailed a twin assault on two centres of gravity;⁴

1. The strategic centre of gravity: that is the strategic and administrative high command in Baghdad and its ability to maintain command and control of Iraqi Forces in the field.
2. The theatre or operational centre of gravity: that is the Republican Guard located to the rear of the Iraqi frontline in Iraq and in Kuwait.

The liberation of Kuwait meant a comprehensive defeat of Iraq and a land offensive on Kuwait. Before the land offensive was launched, air superiority over the theatre of operation was achieved and command of the sea access to Kuwait was enforced. The logistic support and command and communication between the strategic and operational centres of Iraq were disrupted too.



The operational plan was to begin with an allied coalition, to an air war, followed by a ground assault and finally the liberation of Kuwait. The vast amount of resources in personnel and equipment assembled in the Saudi desert were overwhelmingly applied and they were massive and decisive for the success of the war. Mobility was another major ground asset of the Coalition against the positional defence of the Iraqi forces. It turned out to be the most spectacular

¹ Micheal Howard, *The Causes of War*, 2 Ed, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1983, p 102.

² Ibid, p 103

³ Security Council Resolution 678 provides for the provision of resolution 660 – to use all possible

⁴ Matthews Ken, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, London: Routledge, 1993, p 229.

feature of the ground campaign that cut off the retreating Iraqi Republican Guards.

The coalition's operational strategy used was the destruction of the command, control and air defence facilities of Iraq. This included deep air interdiction into Iraq. Secondly the control of the air space in the theatre of operation and subjecting the Iraqi forces in Kuwait to intensive bombardment which destroyed the men and materiel and reduced their capability. In the final outcome the Iraqi army was defeated in the land battle and Kuwait was successfully liberated.

The Iraqi Armed Forces adopted a strategy which had been applied in their only other large scale military operation – the war against Iran. Its strategy was massive defence in depth with sand berms, trenches and minefields to channel the enemy which would then be destroyed by concentrated artillery fire followed by attacks from mobile reserves. Saddam was using the wisdom of Clausewitz, in that defence was superior in nature to offence in war. However, Saddam failed to evaluate that Clausewitz qualified that by saying forces should be mobile at the culminating point to go on the offence. Saddam in the Gulf War had neither the air force as they were shifted to Iran or the armour to counter the coalition mobile force at the culminating point.

The media also played a role in deception during the war. As the Americans rehearsed and practised for an amphibious landing on the shores of Kuwait, the media highlighted the possibility of an amphibious landing although it was not high on the priority list of the planners. As a result of this exposure by the media, Saddam committed five divisions on the coast until the end of the war, all but in vain. The CNN too became a valuable source of military intelligence for the Coalition. For example, damage assessors compared aerial and satellite imagery of a bombed Iraqi power facility with CNN reporting from the site. It confirmed that the initial strike was successful and no further bombing was required.

LOGISTICAL DIMENSION

Histories of strategy usually are based on past conflicts with emphasis on operations. No campaign

or war can be understood, and no valid conclusions drawn from it, unless its logistical dimensions are studied as thoroughly as the course of operation. Logistics, in military terms, is the creation and sustained support of combat forces.⁵ For this only reason, Clausewitz separated operations (use of military) from logistics (maintenance) thereby giving an impetus to strategic thinkers to broaden their outlook of war from multiple dimensions. In retrospect, the Civil war, WW I and WW II, the victories were not due to operational capabilities but due to its capacities to mobilize its superior industrial strength and manpower into the armies. In the Gulf War too the greatest importance was the capability to deploy the largest and best equipped forces into the operational theatre and to maintain them. This has now shaped the doctrine of most military forces in the world.

The build-up to the Liberation of Kuwait saw the coalition grow in excess of 1 million men from 37 countries and an array of sophisticated weaponry and massive logistical support in order for the operational plan to succeed. Fortunately logisticians had six months to put in place a workable logistical plan to support the operational plan. They had the advantage of time to prepare and the presence of a large number of airfields and infrastructure to work from in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf War also witnessed high levels of logistic cooperation between the allies.

The logistic system had in place enough supplies for 60 days combat use at the start to the ground offensive. The enormity of that effect was difficult to visualise and led General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to say "I can't give enough credit to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off".⁶ More than 60,000 soldiers provided logistic support to the deployed combat forces. In August 1990, a cargo troop flight landed in the theatre every 15 minutes and 10 US vessels arrived in the port each day. The USAF flew approximately 100 logistic flights per day to support Army requirements alone.⁷

⁵ Commander B.C. Robinson "Operational Logistics – A Recent Experience" Naval Supply, June 1991, p 13.

⁶ Douna Miles, "Sustaining The Force, Soldier, May, 1991, p 21.

⁷ Ibid, p 21 – 22.

During the Gulf War logistic planning was embodied within operational planning. This was an important conceptual step where logistic was firmly included as part of the combat operations. Not only did such a concept provide logisticians with the outlook of the operational implication of their logistics decision but it also enhanced responsiveness.

The logistical dimension was not without any problems during the Gulf War. However the simple, flexible, efficient and effective system overcame the odds and was capable of supporting the operational plan.

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

The third trinity of war that Clausewitz described was the social dimension of war. It was the attitude of the people upon whose self sacrifice the war effort depended on. In the Gulf War, there was not only growing popular support from the domestic environment but there was also overwhelming support from the international arena which came in the form of the cohesive coalition force. The United Nations resolutions further reaffirmed the legitimacy of the war.

The initial reaction of the American people about America fighting another war in a foreign land resembled the Vietnam era and the Congress was reluctant to approve it. However the Congress, was subsequently buoyed by the knowledge that although the war was largely a US effort, other nations had also committed their soldiers to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait.

The CNN brought live events of the war directly to the American people. The images influenced public opinions as no public will long support a military operation that appears poorly organised and resulting in heavy casualties. Therefore the US government influenced, utilised and manipulated the way in which the Gulf War was presented by the media to the American people.⁸ In order to achieve this, the military controlled the press by pooling them by sectors and moving them to spots which would give value to sway public opinion.

⁸ Taylor M. Philip . War and the Media, Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1998, p vii.

POLITICAL DIMENSION

Clausewitz described war as, "war is an extension of politics by other means" and Liddell Hart projected it, "as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy". What was meant was that the military is used as a tool to achieve political objectives. In the Gulf War the political objective was to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. Politically this was important because if Saudi Arabia too was to become a victim of Saddam's escalation of the war, it will leave in his control 40% of the world's oil output. Ultimately this will not serve towards the American interest.

The Bush administration needed cohesive political support before intervening in Kuwait and engaging the US troops against the Iraqi forces. Political support was necessary both in the domestic front and in the international front. In the domestic front, it was needed to get the Congress to declare war on Iraq and to intervene in Kuwait. At the same time to gain social support from the people whose commitment and shared goals was important towards the war effort. In order to garner international support, the Bush administration methodically assembled a powerful international coalition of nations. Saudi Arabia, France and Britain, were major players and key allies in the military build up; others like Russia and China, were important because they did not oppose the US policy.⁹ Together the coalition gave the US effort political legitimacy, military and logistical support. The UN was also persuaded to provide legitimacy by passing 12 Security Council Resolutions and with the UN endorsement the Gulf War was legitimised as a Just War and a collective security. The decision to seek by world community UN involvement too was part of a large cynical strategy of the Bush administration to circumvent the US Congress to declare war on Iraq.

Even after the war had started politics had a role to play. Its biggest effort was to dissuade Israel from intervening and widening the conflict. Throughout the war Saddam launched 88 Scud missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel contemplated a 100 planned counterstrike

⁹ Maxerr J. Micheal, Desert Storm : The Gulf War And What We Learnt., San Francisco , Western Press, 1993, p 57.

against Iraq in response. Israel's intervention would have had an adverse effect on the Arab members of the Coalition who would have objected to Israel's participation in the coalition against another Arab state. Both the US and the international political intervention managed to keep Israel out of the war with promise by the US to provide Israel with satellite warning of Scud launches and deployment of PATRIOT batteries in Israel.

In contrast Saddam was politically and diplomatically hallmarked by failure. He failed to prevent the UN resolutions and embargo, halt the deployment of the Coalition forces to Saudi Arabia, secure an active commitment of any nation to support him against the Coalition, link Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to Israel's occupation of West Bank and Gaza and finally to convince the Arab world that the Coalition deployment was an intrusion of infidels into the Islamic world.¹⁰ In a final attempt he called for a Jihad or holy war. In response on 10th August 1990 the Arab League in Cairo voted to send troops to Saudi Arabia to join the Coalition. Besides, when 400, leading Islamic figures met in Mecca on 13th September 1990, they not only refused to support Saddam but authorised Kuwait to proclaim a holy war against Saddam.¹¹

TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

Although Clausewitz in his trinity of war discounted technological dimension to influence war, technology as an independent and significant dimension cannot be kept out due to its immense impact in modern warfare. With all dimensions equal, technology tilts in favour of the beholder of advanced technology. In retrospect, this was experienced in the American Civil War, World War 1 and World War 2. In World War 2, possession of the technology in the atomic bomb decided the victor of the Pacific War which made the Japanese emperor to accept defeat and surrender. Technological dimensions of strategy had certainly become of predominant importance in the Gulf War. It made its greatest contribution to

strategy by improving weapon and communication system. By using advance technology and using air power to reduce the Iraqi resistance, the US and the coalition reduced their casualty rate which was a major concern of the American public and a legacy of the Vietnam War.

No military operation can be successful without intelligence and Operation Desert Storm was no exception. Information was gathered using very sophisticated technology from 3 sources – PHOTINT, the photographic and image gathering capability of satellites and spy planes, COMINT, communication interception intelligence and finally HUMINT, human intelligence. These 3 sources gave General Schwarzkopf the total picture and possibly a plan. By means of intelligence, the Iraqi Army's "eyes and ears" were located, and then systematically eliminated. Because of the allied coalition's ability to use intelligence and the Iraqi inability to do the same, Saddam Hussein suffered from a dilemma aptly described more than 140 years earlier by none other than Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, when he said "I have spent all my life in trying to guess what lay on the other side of the hill". General Schwarzkopf did not have to guess, he knew. The possession of superior technology lifted the fog of war for him.

Smart weaponry were also used during the Gulf War which made it possible for the system to aim unguided projectiles and bombs with near guided accuracy and effect. To this effect, intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from submarines, ships and aircraft from thousand of miles away were programmed with computer memory of the contour of the terrain in them, to fly unguided at low altitude below radar detection on programmed routes to hit with surgical accuracy and deadly results. These aircraft and surface vehicles were able to hit moving targets while moving at high speed themselves. At the onset of the Air War on 17th January 1991, eight American Apache helicopters escorted by MH53 Pave Low special operations helicopters crossed Iraqi border flying low at high speed. Using laser guided missiles and gunfire they destroyed early warning radar installations and created a 'RADAR BLACKOUT CORRIDOR' in the Iraqi air defence network. Eight F-15 Fighter Bombers and

¹⁰ Watson W. Bruce, George Bruck, Tsouras Peter & CYB B.L., *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*, London, Published by BCA, 1991, p 31.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p 49.

thirty F-117 Stealth aircrafts immediately began bombing Baghdad and southern Iraq, the Iraqi centre of gravity. Iraq was further struck by cruise missiles launched from US Navy ships. During the first 24 hours, US air force fired 151 cruise missiles.¹²

The Iraqis too had stocked up a variety of guided weapons during the years leading to the war. However unlike her coalition counterparts, her weapons were almost totally ineffective. The reason from this lack of effectiveness is simple: the complete destruction of the Iraqi command and control network as well as the supporting sensor system at the onset of the war, made it impossible to effectively employ them.

The Gulf War was the most massive application of the US military power and the coalition forces were backed up by the most technologically sophisticated hardware in military history. Application of advanced technology in modern weapon system has dispelled the fog of war and tilted the balance of power towards the coalition forces.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR

In the operational dimension the political and military objectives must be distinguished. Once distinguished there should be no political interference in operational matters as had happened in Vietnam where the Secretary of Defence and the President picked target acquisition. In the operational dimension, leadership qualities of the likes of General Collin Powel and General Schwarzkopf, rapid deployment forces, quality personnel and equipment will be significant in future wars. Leadership, both political and the military should complement one another. In the same way, land, air and sea strategies should support one another. Joint-exercises between the three services should be increased and upgraded. Since no war will be fought unilaterally, combined exercises among nations should be encouraged to increase inter-operability.

The War demonstrated that an adequate logistical effort is indispensable to victory. To

this end the Gulf coalition enjoyed incredible advantage in terms of time available to deploy and the facilities available in Saudi Arabia. It had made the US realize that in future wars, the US will depend on allies for logistical support in terms of infrastructure, ports and airfields when it is operating in far flung locations. A high degree in strategic mobility is needed to respond quickly and effectively.



Bilateral and multilateral security arrangement was also significant in this war. To this end collective security comes to the forefront. The dramatic deployment of military power by the Coalition states against Iraq in 1990 was regarded by many as evidence that collective security had come of age in international relations and that in the post cold war period the obstacle that had prevented the UN from achieving its objective in the field of peace and security had been removed. The widespread solidarity of the condemnation of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and the speed with which the UN Security Council responded was after all precisely the kind of scenario envisaged by the founding fathers in 1945. Only on two occasions since 1945 had collective security been activated - during the Korean War and the Gulf War. It has assured that the security of states can best be overcome not through national self-help and the balance of power, but through the institution of communal commitments whereby each state undertakes to join in common actions against those which threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others.¹³

¹² Lt Col Mc Causland Jeffrey, Adelphi Paper 282, The Gulf War Conflict : A Military Analysis. Great Britain, Holstone and Co, 1992, p 25.

¹³ Evans Graham, Newsman Jeffrey, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London : Penguin Group, 1998, p 78.

The significance of technological advantages during the war contributed immensely in reducing casualties. The preceding air campaign with its sophisticated aircraft and precision ballistic inter-continental missiles reduced the enemy capabilities considerably. As a result, close combat during the land battle was reduced. This uplifted the morale of troops and their confidence level boosted. Significantly the US has increased Research and Development in weapons and has now developed the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for bombing and reconnaissance task to further reduce casualty.

The war has brought about some significance politically and socially. Politically, the war had balanced the power Iraq held in the Middle East. The significance of this is that the US interest over oil import is safeguarded in the Middle East. Political cohesiveness in the international arena too makes it easy for administration to gain social support in the domestic front. Winning over the permanent members in the Security Council is of utmost importance in this aspect. One of the great lessons of the war therefore relates to the means by which national leaders can create support for intervention by a sense of shared purpose and perception of a common goal by the world community.

It can also be argued that to a certain extent the US planned the Gulf War as a limited war. Her political goal was to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait and their military objective was to crush the Iraqi military might in the region but at the same time they wanted to preserve Saddam in power in Iraq. Preserving Saddam in power justifies future US presence in the region which will safeguard US interest in the region. However after the 9/11 incident at the World trade Center, Saddam was seen as a source of supporting terrorism and a threat to the US. Hence the second Gulf War was initiated to remove Saddam. This fact was reiterated by Condoleezza Rice the US Secretary of State during her visit to UK on 31st March 2006.

CONCLUSION

The inability of the US to win the war in Vietnam undermined the US military confidence in winning wars which prompted them to examine why despite her greater military strength, advance technology

and predominant economic power, she had not been able to prevent her defeat. After a lengthy soul searching process, it made both their military and political leadership realise that war and politics cannot be separated and that military victory does not automatically translate to political victory.

With these realisations, the US undertook the Gulf War with emphasis on the social, political, logistical, operational and technological dimensions in their planning and conduct of war. They won the war with immense political and social support, advance sophisticated weapons and good operational planning. Their success was also due to effective leadership, better cooperation with allies and greater economic strength. Its greatest strength was being able to put up a coalition force to support its war effort and win over the UN to legitimise the war. It had set a precedence and the US again adopted the same strategy in the war in Afghanistan.

The significance of the war was that although Clausewitz had discounted technology in his writing on war and separated logistics from operations, both logistics and technology played a crucial role. Logistics was kept as an aspect of the operational plan and technology shifted the war plan emphasis from land battle to air battle.

Whichever dimension is discussed, be it, political, social, technological, and operational or logistics, the ultimate concern is about people (social) and not machines. Therefore the human factor should be considered both at the domestic and international levels. Once the social dimension supports the war, half the battle is won. All wars, in particular those prolonged wars require political support (political dimension) and consensus of the people (social dimension). The military is only one of the three elements for success in war (trinity of war – Clausewitz) and without a harmonious balance among these three elements, wars cannot be won no matter how just the cause or how great the effort.

To sum up, the Gulf War was a display of collective security, balance of power and interaction of political, social, technological, operational and logistical dimensions of war. It brought about rapid victory to the coalition but more significantly

it disproved pundits and annalists who predicted before the war that there will be thousands of allied casualties during the war and the war will last a long time.

In comparison to the Second Gulf War the US lacked international political will, hence it took a unilateral stand being the only super power today. Operationally it lacked a clear exit plan out of Iraq

hence its casualties are rising and receiving much international criticism. Again Condoleezza Rice the US Secretary of State has stated during her visit to UK on 31st March 2006 that the US has made some tactical errors during the Second Gulf War. Significantly this reduces domestic support. In the final analysis strategic dimensions are fluid and are shaped by individual leadership, domestic determinants and the external environment.

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Security Council Resolution 678 provides for the provision of resolution 660 – to use all possible means to compel Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait.



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MALAYSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: HOW SOURCES OF MALAYSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY CONTRIBUTING TO BILATERAL TENSIONS BETWEEN MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA

By : Mej Razali bin Mohd Awi

INTRODUCTION

According to J. Saravanamuthu in his study of Malaysia's foreign policy from 1957 to 1977, he identifies four sets of mutual foreign policy sources term as eco-historical, internal, idiosyncratic, and external sources. Eco-historical refers to the relatively permanent features of the state such as her history, culture or cultures, geography, natural endowments and the like. Secondly, internal sources refer to the domestic influences of actors and factors operating within a state's national boundaries, such as those stemming from societal, political, economic, and governmental-bureaucratic factors. Thirdly, the idiosyncratic sources refer to the influences that stem specifically from the individual or personality traits of policy makers. Fourthly, the external sources refer to those that originate from the state's external environment

that incorporate both the global and inter-state components.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how eco-historical and external sources contributing to the bilateral tension between Malaysia and her neighboring countries. The discussion will be based on case studies of bilateral tension between Malaysia and two ASEAN countries namely Indonesia and Singapore.

Bilateral Tension between Malaysia and Indonesia

There are numerous factors arose from eco-historical and external sources that causing the bilateral tension between Malaysia and Indonesia. These issues can be summarized as at *Figure 1*.

Issues	Cause	Impact
Confrontation (eco-historical)	a. Sukarno anti Federation of Malaya b. Malaysia anti communism and formed Federation of Malaya	Infiltrated Indonesia troops into landed in Malaysia. Political instability in Malaysia
Illegal Immigrant (external)	a. Social and economic problems in Indonesia b. Economic growth in Malaysia	Massive Indonesia, illegal immigrants. They create social problems in Malaysia
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (external)	Acehnese refugees fled to Malaysia. Recognized as illegal immigrants	Indonesia suspicious Malaysia to support the GAM. Indonesian government unhappy on Malaysia treat to the refugees

Figure 1. Eco – Historical and External Sources Contributed to Bilateral Tension between Malaysia and Indonesia

Indonesia's confrontation on Malaysia in 1965 could be viewed as sign of bilateral tension between the two countries as a result of Sukarno's opposition towards the formation of Malaysia. Although the formation of Malaysia was aimed to build up a political and economic cooperation, Sukarno perceived it as a neo colonialist move since it meant annexing Kalimantan (Borneo), which is adjacent to Indonesia. The infiltration of Indonesian, military troops in Malaysia has violated the state's sovereignty and affected the domestic and political stability of the latter. Indeed, these factors have greatly contributed to the bilateral tension between the two countries.

The economic growth in Malaysia in comparison with the economic problems in Indonesia has

attracted massive illegal immigrants from Indonesia to Malaysia for cheap labors. The issue of illegal immigrants could be viewed as external factor that has affected the social problems, as numbers of criminal activities such as robbery, murder, rapes and endemic diseases and gangsterism were alarming. For example, in 1992 the involvement of Indonesia immigrants' armed robber was 114 cases and murder 38 cases. According to the Malaysian government record, 886,000 foreign workers entered Malaysia illegally between 1991 and 1994. Some of those illegal immigrants alleged the Malaysia's employers were denying their wages. The ill treatment of Indonesia maid by the Malaysian's employers have also received a strong criticize from the Non Governmental Organization (NGO) in Indonesia and this has

Issues	Cause	Impact
Separation of Singapore from Malaysia (eco-historical)	Ethnicity problem	Singapore emerged as independence country
Overlapping claim (eco-historical)	Malaysia and Singapore claim over Pulau Batu Putih	Criticized by the local political party. Refer to ICJ
Malayan Railway Land, Tanjong Pagar Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Complex Issues (CIQ) (external)	Involves issue of Singapore sovereignty. Malaysia reluctant to commit with the joint development	Joint development Tanjung Pagar railway and CIQ shifted from Tanjung Pagar to Keranji
Water Supply Issue (eco-historical)	Disagreement on water price	Complicated other outstanding issues
Air Space Restrictions (eco – historical)	Malaysia revoked permission for Singapore military aircraft to use her airspace	Singapore military aircraft to use alternative path
Land Reclamations (eco – historical)	Singapore reclamation project near Pulau Tekong	Narrower the shipping lane and damage the marine environment
Central Provident Fund Issues (external)	Employees from West Malaysia not permitted to draw their provident fund	Amount of \$S 3 billions Malaysia employees fund withheld by Singapore's EFP Board

Figure 2. Eco – Historical and External Sources Contributed to Bilateral Tensions Between Malaysia and Singapore

contributed to the bilateral tension between the two governments.

Another external source that caused the bilateral tension between Malaysia was the problem created by the Gerakan Aceh Malaysia (GAM). Malaysia was dragged into this issue when thousand of Acehnese fled to Malaysia as refugees after the clash between GAM and the Indonesia soldiers. It is estimated that the number of refugees could easily exceed over 30,000. Tension arose when Indonesia government alleged Malaysia's government discreetly supported GAM by giving asylum status to the Acehnese although Malaysia holds the policy of non – intervention and respects the sovereignty of other nation state. On top of that, the Indonesia were not voluntarily but the real reason for them agreeing to deportation was due to the harsh conditions of detention. Thus, one can say the issue of Acehnese, that is external in nature, could creates social problem in Malaysia, and the failure to resolve the matter wisely has contributed to bilateral tension between the two countries.

Bilateral Tension between Malaysia and Singapore

As Malaysia and Singapore share common border and history, the bilateral tension between these two countries could be viewed as greatly influenced by the eco – historical factors that can be traced back since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. In fact, the ethnic clashes between Chinese and Malays in Singapore have brought to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. This was the turning point for the bilateral tension between the two countries although it is not physically exposed. Some influential eco – historical and external sources that affected the bilateral tension can be summarized as at *Figure 2*.

Although both governments have been trying hard to solve all outstanding issues al listed in *Figure 2*, they always end up with a stalemate. The water issues that always left unresolved with the disagreement of the water price has been complicated other bilateral issues. Currently, Malaysia sells raw water to Singapore at 3 cents per 1000 gallons and buys treated water from the

Republic at 50 cents per 1000 gallons. On Malaysia side, the present agreement that was drawn during the colonials time is in favour to Singapore, thus need to be reviewed. While on Singapore side, she clearly dismisses the Malaysia government's perception that she is profiteering from the sale of treated water to Johor. Singapore argued that it cost the republic RM 2.40 to treat 1000 gallons of water that she sells to Johor at 50 cents per 1000 gallons.

If Prime Minister Mahathir has always maintained that water issue must resolved together with other outstanding issues as a comprehensive package, Singapore was also prefer to deal the Central Provident Fund (CPF) of Malaysian employees as part of an overall package that includes water supply and CIQ problems. To date, more than S\$ 3 billions of peninsular Malaysia employees' pension funds being withheld by Singapore's CPF Board. Hence, during the 1980s all those issues became a political emotive that deteriorating the bilateral tension between Malaysia and Singapore. Because of the worsening relations, on September 1998, Malaysia used the advantage of her airspace by limiting the accessibility of the airspace for Singapore's military aircraft. The bilateral tensions was then getting more severe as Malaysia accused that Singapore land reclamation project will eventually narrower the shipping lane of Johor Straits, thus Pasir Gudang port stand to lose its competitiveness. On top of that the project would damage the marine environment of the sea area. Based on those outstanding issues, one could observe that each party is using their advantages to pressure the other party. This has creates a stumbling bloc for the prospect of the settlement, hence issues are left without resolved. Although the current governments have taken a new approach of handling the issues in which issues will be solved in case basis, still the outcome is yet to be seen.

CONCLUSION

All sources of Malaysia's foreign policy are comparatively important and mutually supportive of one another. However, since Malaysia shares common borders and history with Singapore

and Indonesia, the bilateral tension between these countries could be viewed as greatly influenced by firstly the eco-historical sources and secondly the external sources. The impact of these two sources is stronger and greatly influences the action taken by Malaysia's policy maker.

Any bilateral issues or differences should be settled harmoniously, through consultation and negotiation. Mediation and arbitration are the best tools for any disputes settlement as in the case of overlapping claims on Pulau Sipadan and Ligitan between Malaysia and Indonesia as well as overlapping claims on Pulau Batu Putih between Malaysia and Singapore.

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