



A CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACH IN IMPROVING ENGLISH AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS



MOREL DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP MOTIVASI DAN KOMITMEN DALAM KALANGAN ANGGOTA TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA (TDM)



THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES (MAF) EFFORTS IN PROMOTING DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

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DARI MEJA EDITOR

Dengan Nama Allah Yang Maha Pengasih Lagi Maha Penyayang.
Salam Sejahtera,

Syukur Alhamdulillah, Edisi ke-58 Jurnal Sorotan Darat dapat dikeluarkan seperti mana yang dihasratkan. Sidang Redaksi merakamkan setinggi-tinggi penghargaan kepada semua penulis artikel yang telah menyumbang hasil penulisan masing-masing bagi Edisi ini. Pastinya artikel-artikel tersebut akan menjana minda para pembaca dalam usaha kami untuk mencungkil idea-idea bernalas yang dapat memacu Tentera Darat untuk mencapai tahap prestasi yang lebih cemerlang di masa hadapan.

Penerbitan edisi ini memberi fokus kepada Kor Jurutera Elektrik Dan Jentera Diraja sebagai penyumbang artikel muka depan. Artikel yang bertajuk "Evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan pemangkin kecemerlangan Kor jurutera Elektrik Jentera Diraja" Membincangkan cabaran yang ditempuh di dalam mempersiapkan Tentera Darat sebagai sebuah angkatan yang kredibel dan sentiasa bersedia menghadapi segala kemungkinan.

Artikel-artikel lain yang diterbitkan pula menyentuh berbagai aspek penting dalam organisasi Tentera Darat seperti konflik/peperangan, kepimpinan, psikologi, pendidikan serta hubungan antarabangsa. Artikel-artikel ini merupakan sumbangan penulisan serta buah fikiran para pegawai Tentera Darat yang berpengalaman luas serta mempunyai pengetahuan dan kapakaran dalam bidang masing-masing. Diharapkan agar para pembaca merebut peluang untuk memanfaatkan ilmu yang dapat diperolehi dari artikel-artikel tersebut.

Akhir kata, sidang redaksi sentiasa mengalu-alukan sumbangan penulisan artikel dari kalangan warga Tentera Darat untuk dimuatkan dalam edisi-edisi Jurnal Sorotan Darat yang akan datang. Mudah-mudahan sumbangan penulisan yang berkualiti akan menyumbang kepada kemajuan Tentera Darat dalam menjadi satu organisasi yang unggul. Sebarang pendapat, komen, idea bernalas serta maklum balas dari kalangan pembaca amatlah di alu-alukan untuk meningkatkan lagi kualiti penerbitan Jurnal Sorotan Darat.

Sekian, terima kasih.

Membaca Inspirasi Pengetahuan.

EVOLUSI ILMU KEJURUTERAAN PEMANGKIN KECEMERLANGAN KOR JURUTERA ELEKTRIK JENTERA DIRAJA

Oleh Mej Mat Sahari bin Rahmat

-SINOPSIS-

KJLJD mengaplikasikan aspek kedua dalam Perintah Ulung Panglima Tentera Darat iaitu kajian berterusan mengenai Trilogi 3M iaitu Manusia, Mesin dan Method. Ia secara langsung mengambil kira peningkatan ilmu pegawai dan anggota (Man), dengan penggunaan peralatan (Machine) dan Method ketenteraan yang unggul. Penekanan kepada kepentingan membangunkan aspek-aspek berkenaan telah membawa kepada evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan yang seterusnya mendokong kepada pembangunan Kor Jurutera Letrik Jentera.

Pendahuluan

“Bacalah dengan menyebut nama Tuhanmu yang menciptakan. Dia telah menciptakan manusia daripada segumpal darah. Bacalah! Dan Tuhanmulah yang paling Pemurah, yang mengajarkan manusia dengan perantaraan kalam. Dia mengajar manusia apa yang tidak ia ketahui.”¹

Iqra’ yang bermaksud “bacalah” mengandungi istilah menelaah, meneliti dan mengetahui ciri-ciri sesuatu yang mencakupi persoalan alam, diri sendiri, masyarakat dan lain-lain. Allah telah memberi isyarat yang jelas kepada kita tentang kepentingan ilmu dengan turunnya kalimah Iqra’ “Bacalah!” bukan “Ingatlah!” atau “Sujudlah!” atau sebagainya. Kalimah iqra’ telah diulangi sebanyak dua kali sebagai bukti perhatian Allah S.W.T. tentang perlunya ilmu di dalam diri kita.

Menurut Al-Imam Ghazali, kewajiban membaca dan berilmu bergabung dalam dua keperluan iaitu maqrū’ah (Al-Quran) dan manzurah (alam dan segala ciptaan Allah) yang membentuk ilmu naqli (Al-Quran dan Hadis) dan aqli (Kejuruteraan, Sains, Matematik, Ekonomi, Teknologi dan lain-lain lagi). Gabungan dua ilmu ini sebenarnya perlu dippunyai oleh khalifah atau seorang pemimpin yang diamanahkan oleh Allah kepada manusia bagi mentadbir dunia ini.

Selaras dengan itu, Tentera Darat (TD) amnya dan Kor Jurutera Elektrik dan Jentera Diraja (KJLJD) khasnya amat memerlukan pegawai dan anggota yang

berpengetahuan dan berilmu di samping mempunyai kekuatan fizikal dan mental untuk menghadapi perubahan corak peperangan dan peralatan ketenteraan yang semakin canggih. Kecanggihan dan kemajuan teknologi pertahanan ini telah memaksa KJLJD untuk melakukan perubahan bagi melengkapkan pegawai dan anggotanya dengan ilmu kejuruteraan selaras dengan revolusi teknologi pertahanan dunia. Justeru, adalah penting untuk KJLJD melatih pegawai dan anggotanya bagi memastikan peralatan TD di bawah jagaan KJLJD berada di tahap yang paling maksimum.

Kata Imam As-Syafie, “Jika kamu inginkan dunia, hendaklah dengan ilmu. Jika kamu inginkan akhirat, hendaklah dengan ilmu. Dan jika kamu inginkan kedua-duanya juga dengan ilmu!”

Ke Arah Warga KJLJD Yang Berilmu

Tentera Darat telah mengalami revolusi peperangan dari Peperangan Melawan Insurgensi kepada peperangan yang lebih sophisticated. Sehubungan dengan itu, sebagai penyelenggara utama peralatan TD dan seiring dengan perkembangan teknologi pertahanan yang semakin pesat maka keperluan tenaga kerja mahir amat diperlukan. Dalam menyahut seruan ini maka KJLJD telah melakukan evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan bagi membuka laluan dan memberi peluang yang sistematik untuk membolehkan pegawai, anggota dan golongan juruteknik mahir dalam KJLJD memperoleh kepakaran dan pengiktirafan yang setanding dengan ilmu kejuruteraan yang dimiliki. Pengiktirafan juga dilaksanakan bagi membolehkan pegawai dan anggota mempunyai pengetahuan yang kukuh di samping memiliki ketrampilan kemahiran praktikal yang tinggi.

¹ Surah Al-‘Alaq 96: 1-5

Idea melaksanakan evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada pengalaman yang telah dilalui oleh KJLJD. Sehingga kini belum ada lagi Institusi Pengajian Tinggi Awam (IPTA) berupaya melahirkan para jurutera atau penolong jurutera yang mahir melakukan penyelenggaran terhadap peralatan TD. Idea ini juga menggalakkan para lulusan SPM yang tidak mampu memasuki program ijazah atau diploma kejuruteraan di institusi awam menceburi bidang ketenteraan dalam bidang teknikal. Ia juga membuka peluang kepada anggota baru KJLJD memperbaiki laluan kerjaya mereka, di samping menambah pengetahuan teknikal yang sedia ada dalam menyelenggara peralatan TD yang semakin canggih.

KJLJD mengaplikasikan aspek kedua dalam Perintah Ulung Panglima Tentera Darat iaitu kajian berterusan mengenai Trilogi 3M iaitu Manusia, Mesin dan *Method*. Mengambil kira peningkatan ilmu pegawai dan anggota (*Man*), dengan penggunaan peralatan (*Machine*) dan *Method* ketenteraan yang unggul.²

Officer Long Engineering Course - Evolusi Ilmu Kejuruteraan Pegawai JLJ

Bermula sejak tahun 1967 Kursus Kejuruteraan Lanjutan Pegawai atau Officer Long Engineering Course (OLE) siri 1 telah mula dilaksanakan. Kursus ini merupakan kursus kerjaya bagi pegawai-pegawai Tugas Am KJLJD. Objektif kursus adalah untuk melengkapkan setiap pegawai KJLJD dengan pengetahuan berkenaan pengurusan KJLJD, pendedahan kepada semua jenis peralatan yang disenggarakan oleh KJLJD dan juga pengetahuan asas kepada Kejuruteraan Mekanikal.

Dalam era teknologi yang semakin pesat dan perubahan kepada teknologi pertahanan, KJLJD menghadapi cabaran untuk terus menyumbang kepada kemajuan TD. Silibus OLE yang sedia ada tidak dapat menepati keperluan Profil Pegawai Jurutera Elektrik dan Jentera (JLJ) yang telah dikenal pasti. Ini adalah disebabkan kandungan silibus semasa, terlalu memberi penekanan kepada *Pure Engineering* dan hanya memberi pengenalan kepada peralatan (*Equipment Based*). Ia kurang memberi pendedahan kepada teknologi pertahanan dan hanya sesuai untuk tahap Juruteknik.³



Pegawai dan Anggota JLJ sedang melaksanakan pemeriksaan ke atas Helikopter Agusta Tentera Darat.

Bagi melengkapkan generasi pegawai-pegawai muda KJLJD dengan ilmu teknologi pertahanan yang semakin pesat membangun. Silibus OLE telah disusun semula dengan membahagikannya kepada 4 bidang teras yang utama terdiri daripada *Vehicle and Mobility Technology*, *Fire Power and Protection*, *Military Electronics* dan *Military Logistics*. Keempat-empat bidang ini perlu diserapkan ke dalam kursus OLE untuk pendedahan awal kepada pegawai KJLJD.

Pelaksanaan silibus baru ini, memerlukan tempoh pengajian kursus OLE kepada 44 minggu untuk memuatkan silibus modul teknologi pertahanan serta membolehkan penuntut melaksanakan kertas projek. Di samping itu, pembelajaran modul taktik telah diserahkan semula kepada Pusat Latihan Tempur Tentera Darat (PULADA) bagi mengurangkan tempoh pengajian silibus baru dan meningkatkan tahap pengetahuan taktik Pegawai Muda KJLJD.

Silibus baru ini bakal meningkatkan lagi ilmu pengetahuan pegawai dalam bidang teknikal dan seterusnya memenuhi profil seorang pegawai JLJ yang ideal. Jawatankuasa Latihan Tentera Darat (JKLTD) telah meluluskan silibus baru OLE ini pada tahun 2008. Evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan bagi kursus OLE ini telah dilaksanakan pada penghujung tahun 2009.

Sehingga kini sebanyak dua siri OLE telah dilaksanakan mengikut evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan yang baru di Institut Kejuruteraan Tentera Darat (IJED). Seramai 30 pegawai telah berjaya menamatkan pengajian OLE dan sedang berkhidmat di dalam pasukan JLJ dan formasi di seluruh Malaysia. Pegawai-pegawai ini seterusnya akan mengalas cabaran untuk mengaplikasikan ilmu kejuruteraan di semua markas formasi dan pasukan masing-masing.

² Perintah Ulung Panglima Tentera Darat Ke-24 pada 16 Jun 2011.

³ Laporan Sinopsis Cadangan Silibus Baru Kursus Kejuruteraan Lanjutan (OLE) KJLJD bertarikh 23 Mac 2009.

Program Diploma Teknologi - Evolusi Ilmu Kejuruteraan Anggota JLJ

KJLJD telah mengambil langkah proaktif dengan melaksanakan penstrukturkan semula bagi memastikan Sistem Operasi JLJ mampu berperanan seiring dengan perkembangan Tentera Darat (TD). Perkara ini dilaksanakan sebagai persiapan menghadapi cabaran masa depan yang begitu dinamik. Berdasarkan rancangan penstrukturkan semula menyeluruh yang dinyatakan, salah satu aspek penting yang perlu dilaksanakan adalah melatih dan membekalkan ilmu pengetahuan kejuruteraan kepada semua juruteknik KJLJD agar mereka mampu melaksanakan tugas yang diamanahkan kepada mereka dengan baik dan sempurna.

Sehubungan dengan itu KJLJD telah mengambil pendekatan dengan melaksanakan program Diploma Teknologi secara usahasama dengan Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) di Institut Kejuruteraan Tentera Darat (IJED). Program Diploma Teknologi merupakan satu usaha untuk mengiktiraf kursus-kursus yang dilaksanakan di IJED di samping meningkatkan pencapaian skill, knowledge dan attitude anggota JLJ dalam menghadapi cabaran menyelenggara peralatan TD.

Idea untuk membangunkan Program Diploma Teknologi bermula di awal tahun 1992 di mana Mej Jen Dato' Ir Mohd Salim bin Ali (ketika itu beliau berpangkat Mejjar dan bertugas di Sekretariat Kerjasama KEMENTAH-UTM) telah mencadangkan kepada pihak UTM untuk mengadakan lawatan ke Sekolah JLJ bagi mengenal pasti kesesuaian silibus kursus-kursus yang boleh diiktiraf atau boleh dijadikan asas bagi anggota JLJ melanjutkan pelajaran di UTM. Hasil lawatan pihak UTM pada Apr 1994, dua cadangan telah diberikan oleh pihak UTM iaitu:

- Cadangan pertama adalah pengecualian kredit boleh diberi kepada penuntut yang telah mengikuti kursus Juruteknik Kejuruteraan Elektronik/Instrumen Kelas 1 dan Kelas 2 sekiranya ingin meneruskan pengajian dalam pengajian Diploma Kejuruteraan Elektronik di UTM.
- Cadangan kedua adalah menggunakan konsep francais dengan mengiktiraf IJED menjalankan kursus Diploma yang dianugerah oleh UTM.

KJLJD telah bersetuju dengan cadangan pertama dari pihak UTM dan telah menghantar 12 anggota mengikuti pengajian Diploma Kejuruteraan Elektronik di UTM mulai tahun 1995 hingga tahun 2000.

Walaupun pendekatan cadangan pertama telah diambil, KJLJD dalam masa yang sama telah berusaha untuk melaksanakan cadangan kedua agar KJLJD melaksanakan kursus secara francais di IJED. Pada tahun 2000, Lt Kol Dr Shohaimi bin Abdullah selaku Komandan IJED berserta pegawai JLJ telah membuat kajian untuk mendapatkan satu kaedah yang sesuai bagi melaksanakan kursus peringkat Diploma di IJED. Proses ini telah berjalan hampir 4 tahun melalui beberapa siri perbincangan dan lawatan yang diadakan oleh Jabatan Arah JLJ, IJED dan UTM.

Berkat ketabahan dan kesungguhan yang diusahakan oleh Jabatan Arah JLJ, IJED dan UTM, perbincangan akhirnya telah membawa kepada termeterainya satu Memorandum Perjanjian atau *Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)* di antara UTM dengan Kementerian Pertahanan yang diadakan di Wisma Pertahanan pada 22 Nov 2003. MoA ini telah ditandatangani oleh Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Pertahanan Dato' Subhan bin Jasmon yang mewakili Kementerian Pertahanan dan Naib Canselor UTM Datuk Prof Ir Dr Mohd Zulkifli bin Tan Sri Mohd Ghazali.

Matlamat utama kewujudan Program Diploma Teknologi Ketenteraan di IJED adalah seperti berikut :



Anggota JLJ sedia melaksanakan tugas yang lebih mencabar dalam penyelenggaraan peralatan Tentera Darat.

- Meningkatkan tahap akademik anggota-anggota dan memberi pendedahan kepada teknologi ketenteraan yang terbaru dan canggih.

- Meningkatkan tahap pengiktirafan sijil yang diperoleh untuk diperakuan oleh IPTA supaya menjadi satu aset kepada anggota apabila menamatkan perkhidmatan untuk bersaing dengan orang awam.
- Memberi pendedahan dan mengaplikasikan idea-idea dalam teknologi terkini melalui silibus bidang yang dilaksanakan.
- Mengeratkan perhubungan dua hala di antara institusi Pengajian Tinggi Tempatan dengan pihak tentera
- Menimba kepakaran akademik untuk dikongsi bersama bagi menjana kepentingan pertahanan negara.

Program Yang Ditawarkan

Terdapat 3 bidang pengajian yang dijalankan dalam program Diploma Teknologi mengikut silibus yang telah disersetujui oleh IJED dan UTM iaitu Diploma Teknologi Automotif (Ketenteraan), Diploma Teknologi Elektronik (Ketenteraan) dan Diploma Teknologi Persenjataan.⁴

Sebanyak 8 pengambilan telah dibuat dan 6 pengambilan telah menamatkan pengajian mereka dengan jayanya. Statistik pengambilan pelajar Diploma Teknologi IJED adalah seperti Jadual 1 berikut:

Siri/ Tahun	Jumlah Asal	Jumlah Sekarang			Jumlah HBU	Jumlah
		DTV	DTW	DTL		
1/2003	196	96	34	50	16	180
2/2004	178	89	32	29	28	150
3/2005	199	95	35	57	12	187
4/2006	140	64	23	34	19	121
5/2007	200	151	19	22	8	192
6/2008	170	119	30	21	-	170
7/2010	170	130	20	20	3	167
8/2011	120	80	20	20	-	120
Jumlah	1373				86	1287

Nota: DTV - Diploma Teknologi Automotif (Ketenteraan), DTW - Diploma Teknologi Elektronik (Ketenteraan) dan DTL - Diploma Teknologi Persenjataan.

Sumber kemasukan pelajar Diploma Teknologi diambil dari lepasan Sekolah Pertukangan Perantis Tentera Darat (SPPTD) dan perajurit muda Pusat Latihan Asas Tentera Darat (PUSASDA) yang berkelayakan. Manakala syarat kemasukan ke dalam program ini adalah:

- Lulus dalam peperiksaan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia sekurang-kurangnya 5 kepujian dalam mata pelajaran Bahasa Melayu dan Matematik serta 3 mata pelajaran lain atau
- Lulus dalam peperiksaan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia atau setaraf dengannya serta mendapat sekurang-kurangnya 3 kepujian termasuk mata pelajaran Bahasa Melayu.
- Pelajar dikehendaki untuk menghadiri serta lulus 2 mata pelajaran pengukuhan yang ditentukan oleh UTM.

Struktur program Diploma Teknologi di IJED telah dirangka dengan menyatukan komponen teori dan komponen amali dengan melibatkan pelajar terhadap kerja-kerja makmal, bengkel, projek mini dan latihan industri di tempat yang terpilih di samping kuliah yang dijalankan. Pendekatan ini yang berkonsepkan kepada latihan secara *Hands-On* diharap dapat memberi pengukuhan terhadap kemahiran dan pengetahuan dalam bidang berkenaan.

Secara spesifiknya, program Diploma Teknologi ini telah dirancang dengan menitikberatkan kemahiran kejuruteraan kenderaan dan peralatan ketenteraan dengan menggunakan segala peralatan dan fasilitas yang telah dibangunkan di IJED. Segala kemudahan ini telah dibangunkan dengan secara menyeluruh untuk kemudahan pelajar. Program ini dijalankan selama 3 tahun iaitu sebanyak 6 semester seperti jadual di bawah:

Bil	Semester	Aktiviti	Catatan
1.	1, 2 dan 3	Silibus Mata Pelajaran Wajib Universiti dan Teras Bidang di Cawangan Pengajian Diploma IJED	Berterusan
2.	4 dan 5	Silibus Teras Bidang di Cawangan Pengajian Diploma IJED	Berterusan
3.	6	Menjalani Latihan Industri di Woksyop JLJ yang terpilih	5 bulan

Jadual 2: Pecahan semester dan aktiviti yang berlaku setiap semester.

⁴Laporan Audit Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia, Pengiktirafan Kelayakan, 14 Apr 2010

Latihan Industri merupakan fasa akhir pengajian seseorang pelajar. Latihan Industri dijalankan di woksyop-woksyop JLJ yang dipertanggungjawabkan menyelenggara peralatan TD dipelbagai pasukan yang berkaitan dengan bidang pengkhususan pelajar. Latihan Industri merangkumi 12 kredit dari keseluruhan kursus dan pelajar wajib menjalani Latihan Industri selama lebih kurang 14 minggu. Pada pertengahan semester, satu Tim Varifikasi Latihan Industri yang terdiri dari jurulatih-jurulatih IJED akan memantau perkembangan pelajar agar mematuhi silibus yang telah dibangunkan. Tujuan utama latihan industri ialah:

- Menyemai sikap profesional yang harus ada pada setiap pelajar.
- Menyedarkan pelajar tentang kepentingan dan kaitan yang kuat antara latihan industri, makmal/amali dan teori kejuruteraan.
- Membiasakan pelajar dengan persekitaran dan keadaan yang mengawal bagaimana teori-teori dapat diaplikasikan menurut sumber yang sedia ada.
- Memberi pendedahan awal tentang persekitaran dan keadaan di industri serta amalannya. Justeru itu, para pelajar berpeluang melengkapkan diri sebagai bekalan untuk menghadapi pengalaman akan datang, baik di dalam pengajian akademik maupun latihan-latihan seterusnya.

Tenaga pengajar yang terlibat dalam Program Diploma Teknologi ini adalah pengajar sepenuh masa yang terdiri daripada jurulatih pegawai dan Lain-lain Pangkat (LLP) yang berkelulusan Ijazah Sarjana Muda Kejuruteraan dan Diploma Kejuruteraan bagi mengajar mata pelajaran Teras dan Teras Bidang. Untuk mata pelajaran wajib Universiti, mata pelajaran ini diajar oleh Pegawai Pendidikan yang sedang mengajar di SPPTD tanpa melibatkan pensyarah dari UTM.

Bagi menjamin kualiti sistem pembelajaran, fasilitas dan pentadbiran pelajar, Program Diploma Teknologi ini telah diselia oleh Unit Pengurusan Program Kerjasama, UTMSPACE. Satu Tim Validasi UTM yang terdiri dari pensyarah-pensyarah UTM akan mengadakan satu sesi lawatan ke IJED agar pembelajaran, fasilitas dan pentadbiran pelajar menepati piawaian yang telah ditetapkan oleh Senat UTM. Semasa sesi lawatan,

panel penilaian akan dibawa melawat makmal, bengkel, perpustakaan dan peralatan latihan yang digunakan. Panel turut mengadakan pertemuan dengan pelajar dan pengajar bagi mengenal pasti sebarang permasalahan sepanjang pelaksanaan program. Satu laporan lawatan kualiti akan dikeluarkan oleh panel penilaian bagi tujuan penambahbaikan oleh IJED.

Penganugerahan Diploma Teknologi akan dianugerahkan oleh Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Setiap tahun, Majlis Konvokesyen Program Kerjasama UTM akan diadakan di Dewan Sultan Iskandar, UTM Skudai. Pelajar-pelajar perlu mendapatkan PNGK 2.00 , memperoleh Sijil Kemahiran Malaysia Tahap 3 mengikut bidang masing-masing dan melengkapkan 98 kredit bagi Kursus Diploma Teknologi Automotif, 100 kredit bagi Kursus Diploma Teknologi Elektronik dan 98 kredit bagi Kursus Diploma Teknologi Persenjataan sebelum dianugerahkan Diploma Teknologi mengikut pengkhususan masing-masing.



Majlis konvokesyen pertama Program Diploma Teknologi di UTM Skudai

Pengiktirafan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (JPA)

Pada tahun 2006, pihak UTM telah menyarankan agar IJED memohon pengiktirafan dari JPA ke atas semua Program Diploma Teknologi yang dijalankan bertujuan memberi pengiktirafan kepada graduan Diploma Teknologi IJED agar sijil yang diperoleh setaraf dengan IPTA yang lain. Oleh yang demikian, perbincangan pengiktirafan antara IJED dan UTM telah bermula seawal Disember 2007. Melalui beberapa siri perbincangan dengan UTM, IJED telah memulakan usaha membangunkan Hasil Pembelajaran (Learning Outcome) bagi setiap mata

pelajaran seawal Januari 2008 dan telah menghantar draf pertama Memorandum Pengiktirafan JPA ke UTM pada 17 Jul 2008. Setelah draf memorandum disemak 2 kali oleh UTM, pada 6 Jan 2009 IJED telah menghantar Memorandum Pengiktirafan ke Bahagian Pengiktirafan JPA.

Berikutnya dari itu, satu panel penilaian yang dilantik oleh Jawatankuasa Tetap Penilaian dan Pengiktirafan Kelayakan (JTPPK) telah melakukan lawatan ke IJED pada 10 dan 11 Feb 2010. Di antara ahli panel yang hadir ialah Dr Chong Wen Tong (Fakulti Kejuruteraan, Jabatan Kejuruteraan Mekanik UM), Prof Madya Dr Rahim bin Atan (Fakulti Kejuruteraan Mekanikal UiTM Shah Alam), En Ahmad Sabirin bin Zoolfakar (Fakulti Kejuruteraan Elektrik UiTM) dan Puan Hamimi Faziati (Fakulti Kejuruteraan Elektronik UKM). Pada 13 April 2010, JTPPK yang dipengerusikan oleh Yang Berhormat Menteri Pengajian Tinggi Malaysia dalam mesyuaratnya yang ke 105 telah bersetuju mengiktiraf kelayakan dari IJED.

Sijil Kemahiran Malaysia Anggota Lain-Lain Pangkat dan Kakitangan Awam KJLJD

Sebagai salah satu negara yang berkembang maju, keperluan tenaga pekerja yang mahir dan separuh mahir amatlah diperlukan. Dalam menyahut seruan ini maka MLVK telah berhasrat membuka laluan yang bersistem bagi membolehkan golongan *skilled workers* memperoleh Sijil Kemahiran Malaysia (SKM). Usaha untuk pengiktirafan SKM kepada anggota KJLJD dan kakitangan awam telah dilaksanakan sejak tahun 1989. Dalam perkembangan arus industri semasa serta hasrat di atas maka justifikasi untuk mewujudkan pengiktirafan SKM dalam bidang kejuruteraan adalah seperti berikut:

- Kursus kejuruteraan di Sekolah JLJ (pada masa itu) telah diolah untuk melahirkan juruteknik yang mahir bagi merekabentuk dan menganalisis sesuatu sistem atau proses. Kursus yang sedia ada, tidak dapat memberi penekanan yang cukup kepada kemahiran hands-on oleh itu dengan adanya pengiktirafan ini dapat membantu negara mengeluarkan tenaga mahir yang mempunyai kemahiran hands-on.
- Untuk menggalakkan lulusan SPM yang berkelayakkan memasuki tentera tetapi tidak dapat memasuki program diploma kejuruteraan di IJED, berkesempatan memajukan diri melalui kursus yang berdasarkan kemahiran hands-on sehingga keperingkat yang lebih tinggi iaitu SKM tahap 3 dan 4.

Projek pengiktirafan tred-tred dalam TD khususnya KJLJD ini adalah merupakan satu aktiviti menilai intisari sukanan latihan tred-tred KJLJD berbanding dengan piawaian kemahiran kebangsaan dan seturusnya menganugerahkan Sijil Kemahiran Malaysia (SKM). Ia merupakan kesinambungan kepada aktiviti pengiktirafan yang telah dijalankan pada tahun 1990, 1992 dan 1993.⁵

Aktiviti perluasan pengiktirafan tred-tred dalam KJLJD ini bermula dengan penerimaan cadangan perluasan dari KJLJD diikuti dengan kajian, penilaian dan lawatan. Seterusnya laporan mengenai aktiviti ini telah dibentangkan dalam mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Standard dan Persijilan (JSP).

Pemilihan tred-tred ini adalah berdasarkan permohonan dari KJLJD dengan berasaskan persetujuan yang dicapai dalam mesyuarat penyelaras pengiktirafan tred-tred oleh Majlis Latihan Vokasional Kebangsaan (MLVK) yang diadakan di IJED pada 16 Dis 1994. Pengiktirafan tred-tred telah disenaraikan dalam 2 kategori iaitu kategori pertama yang mengandungi kemahiran baru memohon untuk mendapatkan pengiktirafan dan kategori kedua ialah kemahiran yang memerlukan perluasan pengiktirafan iaitu memohon SKM peringkat lebih tinggi dan memohon kemahiran yang lain di mana ada berkaitan.

Selaras dengan Perakuan Jawatankuasa Kabinet Mengenai Latihan (JKML) yang mengkaji pemberian pengiktirafan kepada tenaga mahir yang pakar dalam bidang masing-masing supaya mereka boleh meningkatkan kerjaya jelas memberi gambaran supaya diwujudkan satu mekanisme untuk mempersijilkan individu yang telah memiliki ketrampilan dalam bidang kemahiran tertentu.

Pada 25 Jun 1995 sebanyak 7 bidang kemahiran dari KJLJD telah diiktiraf oleh MLVK iaitu elektrik, elektronik, automotif, kimpalan, kerja logam, pemesinan dan jurugegas.⁶ Proses pengiktirafan telah dilaksanakan dalam 3 peringkat iaitu peringkat pertama, penerimaan serta kajian atau *desk study*, peringkat kedua lawatan verifikasi dan peringkat ketiga penyediaan laporan dan pembentangan. Evolusi ini turut berlaku kepada semua kakitangan awam yang bertugas secara langsung di dalam bengkel ketukangan KJLJD.

⁵ Laporan Audit Majlis Latihan Vokasional Kebangsaan (Kementerian Sumber Manusia), Pengiktirafan Tred-Tred Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, 1995.

⁶ Mesyuarat Majlis Latihan Vokasional Kebangsaan Bil 2/96 pada 25 Jun 1996.

Penutup

Tentera Darat sememangnya amat memerlukan sumber manusia yang mempunyai tahap kemahiran yang tinggi dan disegani. Corak peperangan di masa hadapan yang tidak lagi bergantung sepenuhnya kepada kekuatan fizikal tetapi lebih bergantung kepada kepintaran dan kemahiran teknikal semua anggotanya. Selain daripada itu juga, KJLJD akan sentiasa memastikan bahawa anggota yang dihasilkan boleh bertindak secara proaktif sehingga mampu membalk pulih peralatan peperangan di dalam keadaan yang terlalu kritikal semasa bertempur di

medan peperangan. Dengan adanya evolusi kejuruteraan sebegini, KJLJD khasnya dan TD amnya akan dapat melahirkan lebih ramai anggota yang berkemahiran tinggi untuk menghadapi masa depan yang lebih mencabar.

KJLJD akan sentiasa meneruskan evolusi ilmu kejuruteraan dan meletakkan harapan yang tinggi kepada Tentera Darat untuk terus menyokong kesinambungan perlaksanaan evolusi ini bagi memastikan supaya Kor JLJ sentiasa berupaya memberi perkhidmatan yang terbaik kepada Tentera Darat.

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Mej Mat Sahari bin Rahmat telah ditauliahkan ke dalam KJLJD pada 25 Nov 2000. Pernah menghadiri kursus Information Management di Kessler Air Force Base Training Centre, Mississippi USA bermula dari Feb sehingga Apr 2008. Beliau juga pernah bertugas bersama Kontingen Malaysia di Lubnan bersama MALCON WEST 1 melalui misi UNIFIL dan menjawat jawatan sebagai ketua Elemen Woksyop dan Movement Controller (MOVCON) dari Okt 2008 sehingga Sep 2009. Beliau kini bertugas sebagai Pegawai Staf 2 Sistem Maklumat Pengurusan di Jabatan Arah JLJ.

A CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACH IN IMPROVING ENGLISH AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS

By Lt Kol Inderjit Singh

-SYNOPSIS-

Over the years the English proficiency among military officers has alarmingly deteriorated and this is evident when interacting with foreign officers in attending courses and involvement in exercises with foreign forces all over the world. In the era of globalization whereby English is the main medium of communication there is a need to regroup and improve this situation in both training schools and in units. A user friendly blueprint on such improvement for short and long term must be generated at all levels. Commanders at all level must go back to basics in changing the mindset of officers from the cradle in cadets to senior officers so that the glory days of English speaking officers are brought back. A practical approach and solution from organizations and a more personal approach of improving English is suggested in this article. Forceful learning provides the push factor and the career path in the mainstream provides the pull factor for all officers. There are challenges especially in making changes and dwelling on the current government policies in English in schools but proper planning at all levels can convert these challenges into reality.

INTRODUCTION

“The illiterates of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn”- Alvin Toffler (Futuristic Author)

Learning organizations are organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together. (Senge 1990: 3). The growth of the use of English as the world's primary language for international communication has obviously been continuing for several decades. The way forward for any organization especially in the military is to seek contemporary knowledge of adversaries in lifelong learning to enhance intellectual capital, improve and shorten processes and introduce high tech equipments and systematic approaches in training for application in operations. But before we run we must be able to walk and this was clearly illustrated by the Chief of Army's desire to go back to basics in order to advocate the man, machine and methods applications which was portrayed in his *Perintah Ulung*. The need to learn, unlearn and relearn requires a vast dimension of knowledge driven human and intellectual capital which

can be obtained through the application of English as a platform and a medium of interaction and instruction. The standard of English both in Malaysian environment particularly in the military is a cause of concern and the need to change and improve the current system will be the greatest challenge for all commanders.

The push and pull factor needs to be implemented so that forceful learning can be initiated at all levels of Army hierarchy to stop the rot. The push desire is to ensure all officers are given a chance to pursue their career path through various career courses both local and overseas and the pull factor is to be able to communicate in oral and written English to complement the flow in their career.



This article will look at the current situation and problems relating to English applications in the Malaysian Army, the need to address the situation holistically and provide some practical solutions to remedy such deficiency so that a learning culture is inducted into this system.

THE APPLICATION AND NEED OF ENGLISH AS A TOOL OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

A Learning Company is an organization that facilitates the learning of all its members and continuously transforms itself. (Pedler et. al. 1991: 1). It is also a vision of what might be possible. It is not brought about simply by training individuals; it can only happen as a result of learning at the whole organization level. The military is a highly disciplinary organization which has exploited the learning organization to further rifle its way to being a professional body. The lifelong learning concept has been fed and indoctrinated into all military personnel's to be more productive and enhance professionalism in their career path. Peter Senge (1990) in his book *The Fifth Discipline* (1990) vision of a learning organization as a group of people who are continually enhancing their capabilities to create what they want to create has been deeply influential. As we move into the era of globalization knowledge and information are shared in all parts of the world and English is the main medium of communication practiced in most developing countries. In the Malaysian Army this is particularly essential as officers seeks knowledge both local and overseas from courses, seminar, workshops and through other mediums such as the books and the internet. There are many different languages in the world, and there are simply none more impactful than the English language. The English language is an amazing language, and it is beautiful. The shear amount of people who speak it are breath-taking, and there are many countries that teach the global language of communication in primary schools. With about 400 million people who speak it as their primary language, and the total of English speakers at nearly 2 billion people around the world, it is no wonder why this language is the global language of communication. English rules the Web. If you are not proficient in English, it's hard to get around the Web. Most sites are in English. Most applications are developed for English audiences, and most tutorials are in English so having a good command of English is essential.

The concept of English has been in the military mainstream since the British days but over the last 10 years this needs to be revisited as the command of English amongst officers has dropped tremendously. The days of British colonization has left Malaysians a legacy as English was used as tool of communication and interaction which include the familiarity of soldiers in this language both oral and written. During this period officers and other ranks of all races were proficient in English. But over the years the learning curve on English has deteriorated and have to be reignited so that officers will not allow their weaknesses of English as a contributing factor in low par performances in courses or activities. English is a second language in Malaysia, sadly to many, it is still a foreign language. Many programs such as English As a Second Language (ESL) studies have pointed out that the cognitive abilities developed in the first language can easily be transferred when learning a second language. In other words, the skills such as reading and writing, if already acquired in the first language, Bahasa Malaysia, will make learning English easier.

Within the context of international co-operation that now exists across borders, soldiers need to be able to communicate not only with 'the enemy' but also with partners from different national forces. With the predominance of the Malaysia in international bodies such as United Nations or other related Operations Other than War (OOTW) such as humanitarian assistance English has become the language of choice for military personnel worldwide. Being able to speak English is also highly beneficial for military personnel. It can allow soldiers to socialize with local communities where they are deployed in peacekeeping operations. Malaysian Armed Forces has always been called upon by the United Nations to provide peacekeeping forces to almost all parts of the world due to its professionalism which includes the prerequisite as an English speaking nation.

However often we have noticed that the impact of "Radio Silence" amongst officers during courses , public speaking, seminars and workshops in military and public sector environment both local and overseas which is obvious and needs to be relook and addressed accordingly. Most of them are knowledgeable but the inability to confidently converse in English is the main stumbling block. This also involves bilateral and multilateral Joint Exercises with foreign military forces such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercise with US and the Five Power Defence



Arrangement (FPDA) Exercise and other exercises whereby the medium of communication is English. Qualified Officers attending overseas course often fail in their English competency test such as the Australian Defence English Profiling System (ADFELPWS). This issue has to be addressed soonest to ensure qualified officers are able to pursue knowledge to keep the momentum of resurrecting the English language.

PRACTICAL APPROACHES THROUGH ORGANIZATION COMMITMENT

Currently most Army Training schools practice English as the medium of instruction although a bilingual method of both Bahasa Malaysia and English is inculcated to ensure transfer of knowledge is effectively conducted. The challenge is to improve English amongst Army officers by maximizing the use of current resources and assets, with no added costs in implementing this strategic plan. This may take some time as changes implemented in short time require adjustment in terms of change of mindset of people. Generally people do not like changes as they are fearful of moving out of their comfort zone and most people are frightened to leap into this paradigm shift. Furthermore results will only be seen after a period of maybe 5 years or more depending on the status of implementation and the change of leadership. Some of the practical approaches and suggestions mentioned may not be fully applicable due to protracted government and military policy changes which includes leadership changes. Nevertheless these ideas may provide a milestone for planners in thinking outside the box for future planning in improving English in the Army in general.

Since the Army Transformation plan is to enlist cadets in National Defence University Malaysia (UPNM)

therefore one of the suggestion is a credit in English as a minimum entry requirement for any Program in this university. This streamlining will encourage more potential students to understand the importance of English for their future career in the military. During the cadet recruitment exercise, besides the routine aptitude tests conducted, an English practical and theory examination can be conducted to further enhance the importance and magnitude of this language. This mandatory prerequisite ensures that future Cadets have a certain level of English so that future progress in military training is simpler and faster. During their tenure in UPNM the potential military officers will have to undertake a compulsory English Language course for each semester. This is mandatory as students will go the extra mile to beef up their Cumulative Grade Point Average (CGPA) in their overall final results. The syllabus for these courses must be carefully planned by UPNM Department of English so that by the end of their stay in UPNM they are proficient in English both writing and speaking capabilities. This will provide a readymade off the shelf English proficient officers ready to assume their duties with an array of solid English foundation both



written and oral. The following actions for implementation are suggested for meeting contemporary requirements:

Courses By Levels of Upgrading English Courses.

For the short time process the Education Corps particularly the English Department in IPDA can plan an upgrading course from basic, intermediate to higher level of English competency. The current long three months duration of functional English course is a major resistance for Commanders to send their officers to replace and accommodate the depleted officers in units. At such the syllabus must be nurtured to give an upgrading improvement at all levels. A typical example of a British Defence Schools of languages syllabus for cadets, military

officers, potential students for Advanced Command & Staff College, overseas courses, staff college prospective students can be modeled to meet our local requirement needs. A mobile team comprising of dedicated English trainers can be formed and provide short English courses according to the needs and requirements of various Divisions and Brigades.

Conduct of Courses. A suggestion is that all Army Training schools conducting career courses must have an English module with emphasis on the syllabus in listening, speaking, reading, scanning, writing and role play. This forceful learning is embedded in their early military culture of learning so that when they arrive at senior officer status they should be proficient in both writing and spoken English. Since most career course is limited in time to cater for the core military subjects there is no requirement to enhance the course timeline. Respective Army Training Schools in relation with their various Directorates and Army Human Resources Department can ensure that English courses fit into the course structure and curriculum without extending the course. English courses can be conducted after office hours or at night or even on Saturdays to ensure the seriousness of this linguistic application. Potential students attending their various career courses have to undergo and pass the English Test before they are able to attend this course. To show the seriousness of this matter, there is requirement for all students to pass this English module before being awarded their certificates.

Education Corps Trainers. At the higher level more Education officers particularly majoring in English must be attached to all Training Schools. The recruitment of more specialized English graduates in Teaching English as a Second Language (TESL) can be increased accordingly. Their strength must be beefed up at various Training Centers to assist and conduct such courses. English language must be part of the formation or unit training curriculum.

Train the Trainer Concept. At a certain high level of competency non Education Corps officers can be sent to various specialize English courses conducted in National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), Institute of Diplomacy Foreign Relations (IDFR), universities or privates courses such as Teaching English as a Second Language (TESL). In future all trainers at various Training Schools can teach English without specialized English Education officers.

E Learning English Training. e-Learning is the use of technology to enable people to learn anytime and anywhere. e-Learning can include training, the delivery of just-in-time information and guidance from experts. The concept of e learning using the current Army Net can be used as the tool to provide online portal training for officers and soldiers all over Malaysia. This portal can be initiated through the Education Corps using the e learning concept. This concept saves time and provides a useful resource to officers in all geographic location both local and overseas.

Way Forward of English From Cradle to Grave. Since Army officers have the basic English competency and skills from cadets to probably Defence College there is a need to inculcate the following to ensure the continuity of their skills especially in their working environment in units especially as staff officers.

English Day. This should be implemented not only in units but in various formations to ensure the non interruption of their English skills are continuously applied. Besides English speaking day maybe twice a week all correspondence must be made in English for letters, minutes of meetings, memos, messages etc. Telephone conversations both in house and intra calls must be made in English at all formations and units. English can also be inculcated at home for this day in speaking to family members in English progressing from one day to more frequent days.

Public Speaking English Presentation. Commanders at all level can initiate public speaking day for officers particularly in areas which require attention such as current issues or an analysis of certain matters which require and generate interest amongst military personnel's. The requirement to write an essay and presentation can involve three prongs of writing, public speaking skills and information for the audience.

Public Speaking and Social Activities. This can be conducted in training schools, formation and units to intensify officers to further improve their English. Other forms of social entertainment such as singing and karaoke competitions can be implemented at all levels but the medium must be English. This provides learning through leisure activities during selected period especially in the enhancement of social skills.

Buddy Mentor System. A mentor is a coach, guide, tutor, facilitator, counselor and trusted advisor. A mentor is someone willing to spend his or her time and expertise to guide the development of another person and to teach someone who seeks their valuable advice in order to grow personally and/or professionally. This mentorship can be a formal relationship with written goals and scheduled meeting times or it can be as informal as an occasional chat or email exchange. Commanders can designate qualified officers to assume such role for this mentor mentee relationship.

PERSONAL IMPROVEMENT IN ENGLISH

Besides the fulcrum of forceful learning which can be implemented through the change of policies and the push from all higher formations. Nevertheless each individual can improve their English applying the Do It Yourself (DIY) philosophy suggested below:

Use All Kinds of Available Free Resources to Master English. There are many kinds of free resources that you can use to improve your English. Internet is the best sources of information to find quality lessons that can enhance your English. Those resources are e-books, e-magazine, audio lessons, movies which are available in abundance. Use those free information wisely. You cannot learn all the lessons simply because you don't have enough time. Just find several useful resources and stick to them until you have significant improvement.

Practice and Apply Practice English. Practice makes perfect. You can practice to speak in English with your friends. If you don't find compatible friend within your area, you can try to find online friends who also want to improve your English. Human beings learn from mistakes and do not worry too much on the level of English spoken.

Vocabulary Improvement. More words means more understanding. English is a complex language that always evolving. There are new words being created every day. Understanding and using more vocabularies can change the way you think. And by changing the way you think you change your behavior. By changing your behavior you change the results that you get. Have a dictionary in hand to be curious in looking for meaning of words you have difficulty understanding.

Watch Quality Programs. Movies and other media programs are great ways to enhance your English mastery. If you want to speak naturally as if a native speaker, quality English movies are great tools to use. Quality movies are great tools to enhance both you speaking and listening skills. Watching movies is always a fun thing to do. In order to get the most out of your movie watching experience, if your vocabulary is limited, watch a movie in English that you are very familiar with in your own language so you always know what's going on. Try not to translate as you go because you lose blocks of conversation this way. Instead, watch the picture and listen. Hear all the words, but determine what's going on by the pictures you see and the words you're hearing that you already know. Believe it or not, other words will sink in too, and so will the accent and everything else that went with what you saw and heard. As your vocabulary grows, expand your movie selections to other movies you'd like to see but are only available in English. Try to be able to see the film more than once if possible.

Listen to Inspiring Music. Early musical training helps develop brain areas involved in language and reasoning. It is thought that brain development continues for many years after birth. Recent studies have clearly indicated that musical training physically develops the part of the left side of the brain known to be involved with processing language, and can actually wire the brain's circuits in specific ways. Linking familiar songs to new information can also help imprint information on young minds. Music can enhance both your listening skills in fun ways. Find your own favorite music and use that music as tools to enhance your English mastery.

Write Your Diary in English. A diary or a journal is a way of looking inside your mind, something you can't even admit to yourself become evident when you read over what you have written. When you write diaries you are in such a mental state where you write the truth that even you don't know. So to discover what is inside your mind you should write a diary. The more you write the more your writing improves. So always try to write something even if that might be a meaningless writing but your writing skill will definitely improve. Try to write in simple and easy to understand language.

Create Your Personal Blog. It's true that birds of a feather flock together, and those with the same interests find ways of getting in touch, either directly or by being

introduced. Blogging is a wonderful way of connecting with people who are working on similar issues or care about similar things. It's a fun way of writing in English, directly publishing what you write in your blog.

Reading. Obviously, if one in four people don't read one book per year, then there is a discipline issue. By reading more books and exposing yourself to new and more complete information, you will also be able to come up with more creative ideas besides improving your English competency. Research shows that for an English beginner reading children books will articulate their mind and provide easy access to the fundamentals of English. Furthermore reading to your children in English is a resourceful habit as children loves stories and this provides a strong bondage and relationship between children and parents.

CLOSING

Forceful learning is main ingredient in pushing officers to intensify their English competency for career progression. Initially the changes seem drastic but over a period of time this has been fitted into the Army culture and the standard of English will definitely improve. But a time line with clear objectives and action plan need to be formally accepted by all levels headed by the Chief of Army since these actions require policy changes and drafting of new guiding principles nurtured into the current system. The main fall out of this progression is the change of leadership which has different priorities in the overall strategic plan for the Army. But a vision with calculated blue print will ensure the continuity of progression in improving English in the Malaysian Army. There are challenges especially in making changes and dwelling on the current government policies in English in schools but proper planning at all levels can convert these challenges into reality.

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MOREL DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP MOTIVASI DAN KOMITMEN DALAM KALANGAN ANGGOTA TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA (TDM)

Oleh Mej Mohammad Daud bin Hj Johari

-SINOPSIS-

Dalam menghadapi alaf ke-21, Tentera Darat Malaysia (TDM) telah mengalami perubahan yang drastik dari segi pemodenan persenjataan dan juga pembangunan sumber manusia. Evolusi tersebut berkembang mengikut peredaran semasa, khususnya untuk menyediakan anggota anggota tentera yang mempunyai komitmen yang tinggi terhadap tugas. Sebagai persediaan, kepimpinan sebuah organisasi perlu memastikan anggota-anggota mereka sentiasa mempunyai morel dan bermotivasi tinggi. Bagi TDM, meskipun mempunyai perancangan sumber manusia yang jelas, namun peningkatan bilangan kes disiplin yang melibatkan morel anggota-anggotanya memungkinkan hal tersebut diperbaiki dan diperbaiki. Justeru itu perbincangan ini bertujuan untuk mengenalpasti hubungan morel di kalangan anggota TDM dan menguji sejauh mana pengaruhnya dengan motivasi dan komitmen mereka terhadap tugas. Hasil perbincangan ini diharap akan dapat memberi input kepada TDM untuk membuat penambahbaikan hal-hal berkaitan masalah morel anggota dan seterusnya mencadangkan penemuan strategik sumber manusia agar ianya selari dengan halatuju dan transformasi TDM.

PENGENALAN

Peningkatan teknologi TDM perlu diintegrasikan melalui penilaian terhadap morel dan motivasi di kalangan anggota-anggotanya. Oleh itu, keperluan untuk mengukur secara total keupayaan TDM adalah menjadi keutamaan bagi penambahbaikan organisasi menghadapi cabaran alaf ke 21 (Hashim, 1999). Dalam konteks anggota tentera, Frederick (1991), mengaitkan faktor individu yang tidak berpuas hati dengan layanan pihak atasan terhadap keperluan mereka telah mengugat ketinggian morel anggota-anggota Amerika semasa Perang Dunia Ke Dua. Teoh (2006), dalam penyelidikannya mendapati, rendahnya morel dan motivasi di kalangan responden

telah mengakibatkan prestasi kerja menurun. Ianya dibuktikan melalui pencemaran nama baik organisasi seperti lari dari tugas dan melakukan kesalahan jenayah serta kurangnya minat untuk meneruskan perkhidmatan. Selain dari itu penemuan faktor kumpulan, kepaduan (*cohesion*) dan semangat setiaawan (*esprit de corps*) mempunyai pengaruh terhadap morel anggota. Francois (2006) *Belgian Army*, mendapati setiaawan dan bekerja secara berkumpulan mampu meningkatkan motivasi mereka.

Pengaruh morel ke atas motivasi pekerja telah dikaji oleh penyelidik luar negara seperti Goyne (2004) dari *Australian Defence Forces*, (ADF). Beliau mendapati, keperluan pembinaan instrumen pengukuran morel mampu menjadi panduan kepada komander. Pimpinan perlu tahu keberkesanan faktor luaran dan dalaman serta kesan setiap corak pemerintahan di pasukan terutama yang melibatkan persekitaran, rakan sekerja, kelengkapan, pembimbing, komunikasi, keadilan layanan dan pemerintahan. Goyne telah menjadikan *Israeli Defence Force* (IDF) sebagai rujukan kajian beliau dimana pengukuran morel lebih tertumpu kepada faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi kesiagaan tempur seperti keselesaan dan material. IDF telah menggunakan *instrumen Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire* (CRMQ) bagi mengenalpasti faktor utama



tingkatan morel anggota-anggota bahagian tempurnya. Meskipun terdapat pertentangan nilai kemanusiaan di kebanyakan negara terhadap Israel, namun evolusi dan keinginan anggota tentera secara global adalah sama. Beliau telah memperkenalkan instrumen *Profile of Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness (PULSE)* yang merangkumi tekanan kerja, kepuasan kerja, motivasi tugas, komunikasi, keyakinan kepimpinan dan kerja berpasukan. Di Malaysia, beberapa penyelidik seperti Musa Dai', (1987); Meng, (1994); Abdul Aziz, (2000); Teoh, (2006) dan Kenali, (2007), telah mengkaji perhubungan morel, motivasi dan komitmen terhadap organisasi dan tugas. Kajian Kenali (2007), di kalangan anggota TDM menunjukkan bahawa terdapat hubungkait semangat juang (morel) dengan tekad terhadap organisasi, kepuasan kerja, jiwa tentera dan kepimpinan. Kepentingan semangat juang tidak boleh dinafikan dalam membina sahsiah dan jati diri anggota-anggota TDM. Kewujudan kes-kes ini menimbulkan persoalan samada binar mereka yang terlibat dalam pelanggaran disiplin ini bermorel rendah, tidak bermotivasi dan tidak komited terhadap tugas. Bukti statistik pelanggaran disiplin seperti dalam Jadual 1.1 di bawah.

mencadangkan, kelemahan dan kekuatan perlu dikenalpasti dan diukur. Keputusan pengukuran adalah penanda aras bagi mencapai misi dan objektif. Proses ini dikenali sebagai proses menganalisis kerja, Halim, (2004). Rajah 1.1 di bawah menjelaskan pendekatan yang dicadangkan.

Rajah 1.1: Ke Arah Kerja yang Berkualiti dan Berprestasi Tinggi



Sumber: Hashim, 1999

Pengukuran morel boleh diilhat dari pelbagai perspektif. Gelooven (2005), menemui dua faktor kesan daripada morel iaitu keghairahan (*enthusiasm*) dan kegigihan (*persistence*). Faktor ini mendorong anggota samada

Jadual 1.1: Statistik Pelanggaran Disiplin Anggota-anggota TDM

BIL	PERKARA	TAHUN			
		2007	2008	2009	2010
1.	Tidak Hadir Tanpa Cuti (THTC)	408	554	418	1789
2.	DADAH (DRUG)	154	224	281	523
3.	JENAYAH (CRIMINAL)	184	206	389	300

Sumber: Markas Pemerintahan Medan Tentera Darat Malaysia (2010), Cawangan Probos Marsyal TD,(2010) dan Markas 48 Cawangan Siasatan Jenayah KPTD,(2011).

MENGAPA PENGUKURAN ITU PERLU


Seiring dengan peningkatan teknologi, morel dan motivasi perlu diukur secara total sebagaimana yang dicadangkan oleh Goyne, (2004). Pengukuran terutama faktor-faktor *intangible* yang bertujuan untuk penambahbaikan secara berterusan mampu menilai prestasi individu dan kumpulan. Hashim (1999),

menjadi berdedikasi (*dedication*) atau pentingkan diri (*cynicism*). Morel anggota menjadi tinggi (*high morale*) apabila mereka memahami tanggungjawab, kefahaman tugas dan matlamat organisasi (*work engagement*) sehingga sanggup berjuang dengan penuh kekuatan (*vigor*). Keadaan sebaliknya berlaku apabila bebanan kerja yang tidak terkawal (*burn out*)

dan mengakibatkan morel mereka menjadi rendah (low morale) serta memberi kesan psikologi seperti bersikap pentingkan diri serta berada dalam kelesuan (exhaustion) dan tidak bersemangat untuk berjuang. Teoritikal petunjuk morel yang menyokong teori di atas boleh di lihat dalam Rajah 1.2.

Pihak pengurusan perlu membentuk personaliti (modal insan), mengajar memahami erti kehidupan, mengejar cita-cita atau impian serta menjaga perhubungan sesama manusia merupakan sebahagian faktor *intangible* yang perlu dititik beratkan. Teori ini selari dengan dapatan

Rajah 1.2: Teoritikal Petunjuk Morel




Sumber: Gelooven, (2005).

Menurut Abdul Halim (2004), kepentingan morel di kalangan anggota TDM perlu dibuktikan melalui satu mekanisma selaras dengan evolusi pekerja dan majikan. Rajah 1.3 di bawah menjelaskan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi morel dan menentukan kejayaan misi iaitu kepentingan budaya, etika, morel, semangat juang dan prestasi yang dibentuk oleh pihak pengurusan sebagaimana penemuan Morris, (2001).

kajian Ari Ginarga, (2003) iaitu menitikberatkan unsur-unsur kerohanian untuk membina morel anggota-anggota pekerja. Menjadikan kerja sebagai satu ibadah mampu memupuk jati diri dan menaikkan semangat untuk meneruskan khidmat.

Rajah 1.3: Model Transformasi Spritual Leadership



Sumber: Morris, 2001

PENGUKURAN DALAM KONTEKS TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

Secara amnya keupayaan TDM bergantung kepada bilangan sumber manusia dan material dalam organisasi. Salah satu instrumen untuk mengukur tahap kesiapsiagaan material (*tangible*) ialah Situational Force Scoring (SFS). Jadual 1.2 di bawah memberi gambaran keperluan instrumen pengukuran terhadap morel dan motivasi dalam TDM.

DEFINISI MOREL DAN PENGARUHNYA DALAM PERKHIDMATAN

Morel merujuk kepada istilah bahasa Inggeris ‘morale’ yang bermaksud daya juang iaitu kesanggupan untuk berkorban, semangat melawan atau fighting spirit demi mencapai objektif individu atau pasukan, Musa Dai’,(1987). Menurut istilah Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Bahagian Persuratan Melayu, morale yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti dalam Jadual 1.3 di bawah.

Jadual 1.2 Pengukuran Keupayaan Tempur (Combat Readiness)

Bil	Keperluan	Hak (Establishment)	Pegangan (Holding)	Boleh Guna (Serviceability)	Kesiap Siagaan %
1.	Kuasa Tembakan (<i>Fire Power</i>)	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
2.	Bilangan Sumber manusia	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
3.	Alat Perhubungan (<i>Radio Set</i>)	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
4.	Kenderaan	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
5.	Logistik a. Perumahan / Peralatan	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
6.	Latihan / <i>Fitness</i>	Ada	Ada	Ada	Ada
7.	Morel / Motivasi	Tiada	Tiada	Tiada	Tiada

Sumber : Penulis, 2011

Dimensi dan faktor morel perlu diterjemahkan kepada satu model statistikal supaya ianya dapat diukur bersama keupayaan tempur (*tangible factor*). Jika kedua-dua data dan dimensi tersebut dapat digabungkan, ianya boleh dijadikan statistikal model yang berguna kepada TDM. Oleh yang demikian, trilogi di antara sumber manusia, mesin dan *method* dapat dilihat dengan jelas melalui satu instrumen khas bagi mengenalpasti tahap morel dan keupayaan tempur secara keseluruhanya.

Jadual 1.3: Istilah Sumber

Istilah Sumber	Indonesia	Brunei	Malaysia	Bidang
Morale	Morel/ Ghairah	Morel/ semangat	Morel/ semangat	Pendidikan
Morale	Morel	Morel	Morel	Sosiologi

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Morel adalah satu unsur yang intangible serta abstrak dan perlu diterjemahkan dan disahkan secara emperikal melalui pemerhatian yang sistematis untuk mencapai objektif, Duan, (1999). Kepentingan morel di kalangan anggota tentera mendapat perhatian ramai penyelidik luar negara. Sebagai contoh William B. & Keith Davis

(1993), menghubungkan morel kerja dengan quality of work life effort. Bob Galvin, (1986) berpendapat, matlamat organisasi adalah untuk menjadikan setiap pekerja bernilai tinggi dan boleh berkomunikasi melalui latihan dan pembangunan sumber manusia. Galvin percaya faktor untuk meningkatkan semangat pekerja adalah dengan memberi mereka upah, insentif yang adil, menghormati kekanan mereka, dan memberi peluang serta tindakan yang sama rata. Ringkasan definisi morel menurut pengkaji adalah seperti di Jadual 1.4 di bawah:

Jadual 1.4: Definisi Morel

Pengkaji	Fighting Sprit/ Daya juang	Keghairahan	Kegigihan	Esprit de corp/ Setia Kawan	Kesanggupan Untuk berjuang / semangat	Bersedia Berkhidmat/ Dedikasi	Kerohaniah
Musa Da'ia (1987)	/	/	/		/	/	
Kenali (2007)	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Gonzales-Roma,V. Schaufeli, (2006),	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Manning (1991)	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Gelooven (2005)	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Hashim (1999)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Ary Ginarja (2003)		/			/	/	/

Istilah morel pada pandangan pengkaji dan sasterawan lebih kepada isu-isu ketenteraan seperti semangat juang, rela berkorban, setia kepada negara dan jati diri sebagai seorang pejuang. Chris Traynor, (2008), mengakui bahawa morel adalah berasal dari istilah ketenteraan sebagaimana kenyataan berikut: *since morale is so intangible, let's nail down the meaning of it so that we're sure to have the same starting point. First, morale has nothing to do with "morality." Morale is one of your company's vital signs -- it is a very unscientific and yet totally critical measurement of group attitude and engagement. The concept of morale has military roots; in that respect, it is a gauge of a unit's cohesion or its fighting spirit. It compares well to taking the temperature of every single employee (including owners and managers) at the exact same time. Like body temperature, you're looking for a reading within a certain range that will indicate your company's organizational health'*. Faktor-faktor dan dimensi yang terkandung dalam definisi morel perlu diambil kira dalam pengurusan agar kesimbangan teknologi dan sumber manusia bergerak seiring mengikut perkembangan semasa.

DEFINISI, KOMPONEN DAN KEPENTINGAN MOTIVASI DALAM PERKHIDMATAN

Meng (1994), mentakrifkan motivasi adalah satu usaha menggerakkan seseorang individu untuk melakukan sesuatu. Maksud motivasi berasal dari 'motif' yang merupakan harapan samada menyakitkan atau mengembirakan. Keadaan ini menimbulkan usaha untuk bertindak bagi mencapai maksud yang dihajatkan.

Tindakan inilah yang menyebabkan timbulnya desakan. Desakan dapat dikurangkan dengan memenuhi keperluan mereka. Keperluan pula merupakan satu kekurangan yang harus diisi bagi mendorong seseorang individu berfungsi dengan berkesan. Ia berbentuk insentif atau ganjaran. Motivasi yang dibincangkan dalam kajian ini berasal dari motivasi kognitif (mental). Istilah ini boleh disifatkan sebagai pemikiran. Dalam melaksanakan sesuatu tugas, motivasi menjadi penting bagaimana majikan memotivasi pekerjanya untuk melakukan kerja yang terbaik. Insentif berupa bonus, penghargaan, percutian, kenaikan pangkat dan pujian merupakan tindakan motivasi yang mampu meningkatkan morel pekerja untuk menjadikan organisasi lebih produktif, (Halonen & Santrock, 1999). Ringkasan definisi motivasi menurut dapatan pengkaji lepas adalah dalam Jadual 1.5 di bawah:

Jadual 1.5: Definisi Motivasi

Pengkaji	Move/Pindah dari satu keadaan kepada keadaan yang lain	Semangat yang Kuat	Dorongan untuk melakukan sesuatu/Desakan	Hala Tuju	Kesanggupan Untuk berubah kapad yang lebih baik	Bersedia Berkhidmat dengan lebih dedikasi	Keadaan yang menimbulkan harapan dan semangat baru
Robbins (2000)	/	/	/		/	/	/
Pinder, dalam Donovan, (2001)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Meng (1994),	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Morgan (dalam Soemanto, (1987)	/	/	/		/	/	/
Donovan (2001),	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Koontz (1980),	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

Covey, (1996) berpendapat motivasi dan organisasi yang baik mengandungi empat dimensi iaitu, **ekonomik (fizikal), cara orang dilayan (sosial), cara orang diperkembangkan dan digunakan (mental), serta perkhidmatan, pekerjaan dan sumbangan yang diberi oleh organisasi (rohani)**. Setiap individu perlu mengetahui bahawa diri adalah merupakan alat prestasi itu sendiri yang perlu digilap untuk menjadikan ia lebih berkesan. Terdapat lima pendekatan utama untuk memahami teori motivasi yang diasaskan beberapa pengkaji iaitu, *Maslow's need-hierarchy theory, Herzberg's two-factor theory, Vroom's expectancy theory, Adams' equity theory, dan Skinner's reinforcement theory*. Terdapat kenyataan yang jelas dalam dimensi dan faktor motivasi yang dipraktikkan di sektor awam untuk meningkatkan prestasi pekerja secara sukarela. Keadaan ini berbeza dengan teori kepimpinan ketenteraan yang terlalu autokratik yang membuatkan anggota bawahan terpaksa menurut kehendak pemimpin atasan seolah-olah mereka dilayan sebagai makhluk yang lebih rendah. Gardner, (1984). Sebagai contoh denda atau hukuman dalam tentera kadang-kadang dilihat seperti satu deraan dan paksaan, namun sebaliknya ia adalah satu pengajaran untuk membina semangat yang kental dan fizikal yang kuat untuk berjuang. Berdasarkan kepada perubahan sejagat, evolusi pekerja perlu ditransformasikan dengan mengambil kira komponen yang lebih seimbang dengan keperluan kerohanian dan material. Komponen ini merupakan motivasi rangsangan untuk memahami kehendak anggota bawahan berdasarkan kerjaya seseorang seperti berikut:

- Faktor Luaran (pengurusan, tugas, rakan setugas, ganjaran, tempat tinggal serta keluarga).
- Faktor dalaman (kemahiran dan sikap).

Untuk memperolehi indeks ramalan motivasi, Robbin (2000), telah mengenalpasti dimensi motivasi yang mana skil, tugas, kesesuaian tugas, kebebasan dan maklumbalas yang diterima perlu diterjemahkan secara imperikal dan saintifik sebelum mengetahui skor sebenar. Ini membuktikan kepentingan motivasi dalam perkhidmatan menjadi teras dalam menentukan kejayaan sesebuah organisasi. Faktor dalaman (kemahiran dan sikap).

DEFINISI KOMITMEN, KOMPONEN DAN KEPENTINGANNYA DARI PRESPEKTIF KETENTERAAN

Erti komitmen menurut kamus Oxford ialah sikap bertanggung jawab dan memainkan sepenuh peranan dalam melakukan sesuatu tugas. Lazimnya, komitmen dikaitkan dengan corak kepimpinan di mana ikatan psikologi dan taat setia saling berkait di antara majikan dan pekerja di dalam sesebuah organisasi. Kepimpinan yang mahir dalam pengurusan mampu melahirkan pekerja yang baik. Pekerja pula perlu memiliki komitmen yang tinggi supaya kerja-kerja organisasi dapat dilaksanakan dengan teratur sehingga mereka merasa sebatи dan sayang untuk meninggalkan organisasi. Definisi komitmen menurut pengkaji yang lepas adalah seperti di Jadual 1.6:

Jadual 1.6: Definisi Komitmen Menurut Pengkaji

Pengkaji	Ikatan Psikologi	Berusaha kekalkan keahlian	Taat Setia	Keyakinan pada organisasi	Pengaruh dan dorongan kepimpinan
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Wan Azmi, (1991)	/	/	/	/	/
Blau and Boal, 1987 dalam Peter Lok, (1997)	/	/	/	/	/
Alwi, (2001)	/	/	/	/	/
Cook dan Wall, (1980)	/	/	/		/
Porter (1974) dalam Lily (2004),	/	/	/	/	/
Kenali, 2007	/	/	/	/	/

Sesebuah organisasi akan menghadapi masalah untuk mencapai matlamat operasi jika anggotanya tidak memahami aspirasi dan misi organisasi itu. Dari sudut ketenteraan, sejarah telah membuktikan bahawa keruntuhan daulah Islamiah yang pada mulanya berjaya menakluk barat dan timur, akhirnya menjadi lemah hanya kerana tiadanya komitmen di kalangan pemimpin dan orang yang dipimpin, Halim Uwais (1982). Menurut Abu Ilzam, (1989) komitmen yang tinggi dalam latihan dan selok belok peperangan mampu menyumbang kepada konsep bimbingan rohani. Teori asas untuk memahami konsep bimbingan rohani bagi mewujudkan perasaan komited dan tanggungjawab terhadap penyediaan morel bagi anggota-anggota tentera di semua peringkat menurut Abu Ilzam, (1989) adalah bertujuan untuk memenuhi matlamat-matlamat berik

- Komit melaksanakan latihan peperangan dan apa juga tugas dengan baik dan berjaya melepas tahap dan halangan yang ditetapkan.
- Menguatkan disiplin ketenteraan melalui penerapan nilai-nilai regimental agar anggota-anggota dapat memberikan komitmen yang jelas dan ikhlas terhadap organisasi.
- Meninggikan komitmen dan kekuatan rohani (morel) anggota-anggota Tentera agar matlamat dan objektif organisasi tercapai sebagaimana yang di rancangkan. Kajian Steers (1977) dalam Lily, (2004), mendapat,

komitmen pekerja terhadap organisasi lebih tinggi apabila pekerja terus berkhidmat dalam organisasi yang sama apabila faktor-faktor berikut mempengaruhi pekerja mereka:

- Umur dan Jantina.** Peringkat umur yang sudah matang kepada organisasi selalunya akan mencatatkan tahap komitmen yang tinggi. Manakala faktor jantina pula menunjukkan bahawa pekerja wanita lebih cenderung menunjukkan tingkat komitmen berdasarkan kesesuaian tugas.
- Taraf Pendidikan.** Pekerja yang berkelulusan tinggi lebih cenderung menunjukkan sifat yang kurang komited terhadap organisasi berbanding dengan pekerja yang berkelulusan rendah.
- Struktur Organisasi.** Pekerja akan lebih komited jika pihak organisasi memberi kebebasan kuasa dalam membuat keputusan sendiri serta diberi tanggungjawab dan kepercayaan terhadap tugas yang diberikan.
- Peranan Tugas.** Faktor ini adalah berkaitan dengan skop tugas yang diperkayakan melalui pengkayaan kerja. Kaedah ini dapat mendorong para pekerja menunjukkan tahap komitmen yang lebih tinggi terhadap organisasi. Melalui pengkayaan kerja juga dapat membantu penghapusan kawalan dengan :

- (1) Memberikan kuasa tambahan.
- (2) Meningkatkan tanggungjawab terhadap tugas yang dilakukannya.
- (3) Menjadikan tugas yang lebih berat.
- (4) Menjadikan pekerja supaya lebih berkemahiran dan pakar dalam sesuatu bidang kerja.
- (5) Kebajikan.




Pihak pekerja akan menunjukkan tahap komitmen yang tinggi jika pihak organisasi mengambil berat kebajikan mereka dan menjadi lebih bertanggung jawab kerana mereka beranggapan organisasi boleh diharapkan dan dapat memberikan kepentingan kepada mereka sebagai mana pendapat Cook dan Wall, (1980). Komitmen berkait rapat dengan pembinaan sahsiah diri bagi mencorak organisasi agar mempunyai semangat untuk mencapai matlamat organisasi tanpa mengorbankan integriti. Pengurusan dan komitmen merupakan satu perkara yang berhubungan dengan keyakinan, kepercayaan dan penerimaan yang kuat terhadap tujuan dan nilai-nilai organisasi, kemauan yang kuat untuk bekerja demi organisasi dan keinginan yang kuat untuk kekal dalam organisasi serta bertanggungjawab dan bersedia bersama-sama menghadapi sebarang cabaran.

HUBUNGAN DI ANTARA MOREL, MOTIVASI DAN KOMITMEN

Berdasarkan teori Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) dan Carl Roger (1902-1987) secara logiknya morel pekerja akan meningkat jika terdapat dua bentuk dorongan motivasi iaitu, motivasi dalaman (*Intrinsic*) dan motivasi

luaran (*Extrinsic*). Motivasi dalaman merangkumi minat, kepuasan diri, kegemaran dan keseronokan bekerja manakala motivasi luaran pula adalah pujian, hadiah, ganjaran, penghargaan dan pengiktirafan. Menjadi fitrah manusia memerlukan pakaian, keselesaan dan kepentingan diri serta keluarga diberi perhatian yang memungkinkan pekerja akan berkerja lebih tekun dan sabar mengikut bidang yang diceburinya. Jika segala keperluan diri dan keluarga diberi perhatian sudah pasti morel, motivasi dan komitmen terhadap tugas dan organisasi menjadi tinggi. Rajah 1.4 memberi penjelasan terhadap teoritikal korelasi yang dimaksudkan.

Rajah 1.4: Model Korelasi Di antara Morel, Motivasi dan Komitmen



Sumber: Meng, 1994

Pengambilan dan pemilihan pekerja untuk berkhidmat bukanlah satu masalah, namun untuk mengekalkan pekerja agar terus komited dan setia kepada organisasi merupakan satu cabaran bagi setiap pemimpin di sesebuah organisasi. Sekiranya seseorang pemimpin itu berjaya menerapkan nilai taat setia dan keyakinan anggotanya, maka pusing ganti (*turn over*) anggota tidak lagi menjadi masalah. Cook dan Wall, (1980) mengaitkan komitmen dengan tiga komponen yang saling berhubungan seperti berikut:

- a. Mengenalpasti keorganisasian sejauh mana pekerja merasa bangga dengan organisasi tempat ia bekerja dan merasa bangga dalam menghayati nilai dan matlamat organisasi.
- b. Penglibatan keorganisasian iaitu darjah penglibatan diri secara langsung dalam aktiviti atau peranan seseorang individu yang lain dalam sesebuah organisasi.


- c. Kesetiaan terhadap organisasi yang merujuk kepada perasaan kejelekitan (*cohesiveness*) terhadap organisasi serta rasa dipunyai yang dimanifestasikan dengan keinginan untuk kekal dalam organisasi.



Dapatan Cook dan Wall ini boleh disimpulkan bahawa semakin tinggi motivasi dan komitmen anggota, maka semakin tinggilah morel mereka. Begitu juga dengan jangkamasa berkhidmat, ia juga dipengaruhi oleh tahap morel. Jika tinggi tahap morel mereka, maka jangkamasa perkhidmatan akan berpanjangan dan menunjukkan bahawa keserasian dengan organisasi telah terbina samada melalui pendekatan secara sukarela (sektor awam) ataupun paksaan (tentera). Ternyata ketiga-tiga unsur ini mempunyai hubungkait yang nyata dan mengandungi dimensi tersendiri berdasarkan teori dan pendekatan yang ditemui melalui sorotan kajian lepas. Terdapat 7 dimensi khusus dalam kajian yang dikenalpasti iaitu keghairahan, kegigihan, dedikasi, semangat/kuatan, kerohanian, motivasi dan komitmen. Model dimensi dan faktor seperti yang di tunjukkan dalam Rajah 1.5 di bawah.

Rajah 1.5: Model Dimensi dan faktor morel, motivasi dan komitmen (*Sumber; Penulis, 2011*).

Morel




Namun demikian, dalam konteks kajian ini, faktor-faktor dan dimensi yang disokong oleh teori-teori di atas perlu disahkan secara saintifik iaitu melalui kaedah empikal dan pemerhatian yang sistematik dan menepati persekitaran TDM sebelum disahkan dengan tepat. Setelah faktor-faktor dan dimensi tersebut menepati persekitaran TDM, ianya akan diselaraskan dengan strategi untuk mendapatkan nilai pengukuran sebenar.

RUMUSAN

Semua penyelidik bersetuju bahawa morel dan motivasi adalah dua istilah yang berhubungkait. Masyarakat awam menyebut motivasi, manakala pihak tentera menyebutnya sebagai morel atau semangat juang. Suasana ini berlaku adalah disebabkan oleh perbezaan budaya kerja. Kewujudan morel adalah bergantung kepada bentuk motivasi yang diberi kepada anggota atau pekerja samada morel mereka akan menjadi rendah ataupun tinggi. Dua elemen tersebut menjadi lengkap apabila faktor komitmen diwujudkan khusus kepada anggota pelaksana kerana tanpa komitmen dari pelaku, sebuah organisasi tidak mungkin dapat mencapai objektif yang diharapkan. Begitu juga dengan komitmen yang tinggi daripada majikan terhadap pekerjanya. Kewujudan keghairahan, kegigihan, dedikasi dan semangat serta kekuatan diri adalah momentum motivasi yang perlu diterapkan kepada anggota-anggota samada secara paksaan atau sekarella. Paksaan yang biasanya lebih sinonim dengan budaya tentera ada kebenarannya sehingga anggota-anggota sanggup berkorban demi organisasi serta memiliki tahap spiritual dan fizikal yang tinggi di samping pengaruh para pemimpin sebagaimana contoh-contoh pejuang dan panglima perang terdahulu. Manakala sukarella, kebiasaanya diterapkan dalam sektor-sektor awam yang kebanyakannya para pentadbir memainkan sumber emosi untuk mempengaruhi para pekerjanya dan menjanjikan pelbagai imbuhan berharga demi masa depan yang lebih terjamin. Secara teoritikalnya hubungkait morel dan motivasi serta komitmen adalah dipengaruhi oleh corak kepimpinan di dalam mendorong ahli sesebuah organisasi mencapai tujuan dan misi yang disasarkan. Rajah 1.6 mencadangkan teoritikal model hubungkait dan pengaruh morel dan motivasi serta komitmen terhadap misi dan matlamat organisasi.

Rajah 1.6: MD Model (Mohammad Daud Model) - Hubungkait Peranan Kepimpinan terhadap Morel, Motivasi dan Komitmen



Sumber: Penulis, 2011

Terdapat tiga kepentingan yang signifikan terhadap penemuan penyelidikan ini iaitu:

- Kepentingan terhadap Tentera Darat Malaysia. Ianya dapat memberi maklumat dan membantu pemerintah TDM menilai kedudukan morel anggota-anggota mereka secara seragam, konsisten dan berobjektif.
- Kepentingan kepada kesarjanaan Ilmu. Memudahkan para penyelidik (*Research & Development*) membuat kajian lanjutan serta mempraktikkan penemuan kajian dikalangan pengamal sumber manusia dan pembuat polisi/dasar.
- Kepentingan Kepada Negara. Memastikan negara sentiasa berwaspada dan berada didalam kedudukan kesiapsiagaan di paras yang tertinggi.

PENUTUP

Secara keseluruhan, penemuan di atas jelas menunjukkan bahawa morel merupakan aspek penting yang perlu diberi perhatian khusus selain penyelenggaraan material yang berterusan. Dalam bidang industri, morel dan motivasi kerja merupakan sebahagian dari tugas pengurusan untuk meningkatkan kuantiti (*output industry*) dan kualiti kerja berdasarkan komitmen pekerja mereka. Dari sudut ketenteraan, morel atau semangat

juang yang didorong oleh motivasi yang tinggi dari segi mental, spiritual, fizikal dan material merupakan salah satu faktor pentru kepada kejayaan dalam perang.

Konsep ini telah dibuktikan dalam sejarah tamadun Islam, iaitu persiapan spiritual, morel dan motivasi serta komitmen Sultan Muhammad Al Fatih bersama-sama para tenteranya sebelum menawan Kota Konstantinopel pada 29 Mei 1453. Baginda binar-binar komited dan bersedia dengan dimensi dan faktor morel selepas mengkaji mengapa 8 kempen pemimpin sebelumnya menemui kegagalan, Abdul Latif (2008). Peristiwa bersejarah dan kebaikan kepimpinan serta tenteranya telah disabdakan oleh Rasulullah S. A. W. ketika peperangan Khandak (Parit Khandaq) iaitu sebelum penawanan Kota Konstantinopel berlaku:

"Constantinople akan jatuh ke tangan tentera Islam. Rajanya adalah sebaik-baik raja, tenteranya adalah sebaik-baik tentera....."

Hadis Nabi S.A.W

Sebaik-baik raja dan sebaik-baik tentera di sini secara jelas menghimpunkan kepentingan pemimpin dan orang yang dipimpin. Hal ini memperlihatkan bahawa setiap kerja dilakukan oleh setiap manusia dan iaanya bergantung bagaimana manusia itu melaksanakan tanggungjawab berdasarkan objektif yang ingin dicapai. Hal ini sesuai dengan amanah sebagai hamba dan khalifah Allah seperti firman-Nya:

"Sesungguhnya Kami telah menciptakan segala yang di bumi ini sebagai perhiasan bagi mereka (manusia), kerana kami hendak menguji siapakah di antara mereka yang paling baik pekerjaannya. Kemudian setiap orang akan diberi balasan yang sempurna sesuai dengan apa yang dilakukannya, mereka tidak dizalimi."

Surah Ali Imran, ayat 161

Dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawab dan peranan ini, pemimpin dan orang yang dipimpin hendaklah kembali kepada fitrah serta menjaga dan mewujudkan hubungan yang baik terutama dengan Allah dan juga sesama manusia. Situasi ini menguatkan lagi hujah bahawa setiap pekerjaan adalah amanah dan perlukan persiapan samada bersedia untuk mendapat ganjaran baik atau buruk, bersedia untuk menang atau kalah dan bersedia untuk mendapat pujian atau celaan di dunia maupun di akhirat.

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Mej Mohammad Daud bin Hj Johari ditauliahkan dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja pada tahun 1986. Beliau telah berkhidmat dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia selama 25 tahun dan telah memegang pelbagai jawatan di pasukan 10 RAMD, 11 RAMD, 20 RAMD, Markas Formasi dan Pusat Latihan TD. Pernah berkhidmat di Bosnia Herzegovina dan Filipina. Berkelulusan Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera pada tahun 2004, memiliki Diploma Lanjutan Pengajian Strategi dan Pertahanan (UM) dan Ijazah Sarjana Pengurusan (UM). Ketika ini beliau sedang mengikuti pengajian sepenuh masa dalam bidang Ijazah Doktor Falsafah (PhD) Pengurusan Teknologi di UTHM.



MALAYSIAN NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATION

By Brig Jen Dato' M. Zaki Wan Mahmood (Rtd)

-SYNOPSIS-

NCO brings efficiency to C2 functions. NCO efficiency is through integration of existing operational systems, which enhances quality and sharing ability of information and situational awareness. Military progression towards NCO is expected, owing to availability of technology, technical ability of military planners and demands from commanders, as well as strong local industry support. Implementing an NCO for a peace time military operation in Malaysian environment is an example that shows how NCO can be effectively done.

INTRODUCTION

The most challenging responsibility on shoulders of military commanders is the function of command and control (C2), especially in the face of the enemy. C2 is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.¹ In combat a commander main C2 function is managing resources, having early and accurate intelligence, and conducting battles efficiently. When confronted by an enemy a commander has only one chance to perform his functions; that is to do it right and do it right the first time. If he fails he loses everything, ground, equipment, and above all, he sends his men to their death. A brilliant commander with brilliant staff may have the best men and equipment, but to succeed he needs the best C2 system to support him.

Battles are won by commanders that are effective in managing their combat resources, supported by efficient C2 systems. Commanders realise the need for efficient C2 systems. They keep demanding for better and more efficient systems. They are now more exposed

to information and communications technology (ICT) and these technologies have revolutionised military C2 systems. In the last four decades C2 systems have improved, parallel with advancement of technologies. Since the new millennium the military has introduced a

new C2 concept, the network centric warfare. Adapting the new concept, military forces have formulated a new C2 system, called network centric operations (NCO).

Military forces of many nations have adapted and are using such systems. NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other forces elsewhere engaged in active operations are using NCO for their C2 functions. They all believe NCO is about harnessing networks and networked forces to create military advantages and capabilities.²

Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has always been involved in peacetime military operations. The forces need C2 systems, and their commanders keep demanding for more efficient systems. It will be more so when they are in combat, facing life and death situations. This paper describes a possible peace time Malaysian NCO.

¹ From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, on the Internet.

² Eric E Silbaugh Major USAF, Network-centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls, Centre for Strategy and Technology Air War College Air University, pg 49.

CONCEPT OF NCO

Military System Development. History shows that military C2 facilities started after the invention of telegraph in 1843 and telephones in 1876. The use of radios was introduced into the military after the wireless invention in 1895. The radio-wire integration was introduced in 1950. In 70s and 80s there were the grid area network systems of Ptarmigan (British) and RITA (French), integrating multi-channel line-of-sight radios to terminal equipment. In the 80s emerged the C3 (command, control and communications) systems, and later “computer” and “intelligence” were added to become C4I. Later “surveillance” and “reconnaissance” (SR) systems were integrated into the C2 systems creating the C4ISR systems, used by the US and the NATO in Iraq and in Afghanistan, until replaced by the NCO systems. These developments as shown in Table 1³ took place to bring efficient information sharing and situational awareness to commanders in combat.

at RM 1.2 billion, through a contract signed in 1990 and delivered in 1997. In this new millennium the MAF may be thinking of introducing NCO systems, in line with the development done by other military forces.

Advancement in military C2 systems has always been a natural progression. They are driven by the availability of new technologies which support the C2 functions. The other factor is that demand to use these technologies is being made by commanders. In combat it is proven that military forces which take advantage of technologies will be better than those that do not.

NCO Definition. The NCO is all about deriving combat power from distributed interacting entities with significantly improved access to information.⁴ It may be defined as the employment of three *mission* capable packages incorporating NCW tenets in operations. The packages are the C4I (information) systems, the sensor

Year	Military C2 System	Facilities			Remarks
		Wire	Wireless	Comp	
1850-1900	Lines	X			1843 telegraph lines, 1876 telephones.
1900-1950	Radio single ch, lines	X	X		1895 wireless by Marconi.
1950-1970	Radio wire integration	X	X		Radio multi-channel & terminals. DOR Comd Net (HF/VHF in FFR).
1970-1980	Grid area network	X	X		Multi-ch, network, Ptarmigan, RITA.
1980-1990	C3I	X	X	X	Comp (mainframe) for network mgt. Comms: fax, tptr & voice (MAF C3I study in 1983, sys cost RM200m).
1990-2000	C4I	X	X	X	Comp for comms. (MAFC3(-I) in 1997 from GEC Marconi, cost RM 1.2b).
2000-2005	C4ISR	X	X	X	Integration of surveillance & reconnaissance systems, (MAFC4I by local industry in 2002).
2005-2020	NCW/NCO	X	X	X	Same systems, change in C2 concept.

Table 1. Historical Development of Military Command & Control System

Similar development of C2 system took place in the MAF. The MAF initially did a study to develop locally its own C3I, but the system was acquired from GEC-Marconi

systems of SR radars, still and video cameras, infra-red sensors and electronic warfare (EW) intelligence gathering systems, and lastly the weapon systems, which include

³ Author's own perception, derived from experience and information gained while in military service.

⁴ Alberts, Garstka, and Stein Network Centric Warfare Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, CCRP Publication Series, pg 93.

all weapons, combat platforms, troops and combat headquarters.

NCW Tenets. The strength of the three mentioned packages is the integration of forces assigned to the commander employed in a network incorporating NCW tenets. The NCW tenets create a robustly networked force that improves management of information and enhancing awareness. The NCW tenets⁵ are discussed below:

Information Sharing and Collaboration. Sharing and collaboration require an efficient network supported by efficient and willing information providers. The network and facilities must be able to accept, process and keep information in desired manners that easily assessable to users. Information providers must be willing to share information immediately and totally.

Enhancing Information Quality. Effective intelligence, SR systems will perform information acquisition and coverage. Multi systems will enhance information quality and efficient intelligence cycle will enhance intelligence quality.

Enhancing Awareness Quality. Enhanced intelligence will be the source for enhancement of awareness quality, which can be further improved with the use of multimedia and presentation formats.

Improve Situational Awareness. Situational awareness can be improved with timeliness, accuracy and completeness of intelligence. A high quality situational awareness can produce effective battle plan and combat management.

NCO Desired Effects. The NCO purpose of effective C2 by providing facilities for sharing of quality and timely information and situational awareness is towards achieving a set of desired effects. These effects are as follows:

Integration of Systems. All systems of C4I, sensors (ISR) and weapons (formations and units) within a given command are integrated.

Sharing of Information. A NCO network within a command is seamless. All headquarters within the command are connected to each other linking superior headquarters to all subordinate headquarters and subordinates to each other. Information from one headquarters is available to others.

Quality and Timely Intelligence. All information of interest is readily available and efficiently converted to valuable intelligence. The intelligent is then readily assessable by all commanders and staff in the network.

Efficient C2 Functions. Latest relevant technology and technique are made available in the NCO, for it to be more efficient with simple man-machine interface and an easy to operate system.

Situational Awareness. Battlefield situational picture is an essential planning element to commanders and staff. Accurate and timely data from C4I, intelligence and sensor systems will provide effective situational awareness.

Mission Effectiveness. Efficient NCO will provide speed and secrecy to the function of C2, which will bring mission effectiveness, resulting in victory.

Latest Technology. NCO has to be relevant at all times. This condition is only achieved through regular enhancement.

Secure Network. The network will have the best security protections to guarantee availability of service and that it is free from enemy interferences.

The expected results of NCO are an increased operational tempo and speed of command, which will increase the lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of our forces. NCO concepts are expected to produce dramatic increases in military effectiveness.⁶

Facilities. For a NCO system to effectively support C2 functions and to achieve the above mentioned desired effects it must have suitable facilities within the system. These facilities are discussed below.

⁵ Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework Version 1.0 Prepared by: Based Research Inc, pg 2.

⁶ Network-centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls, by Eric E Silbaugh Major USAF, Centre for Strategy and Technology Air War College Air University, pg 54

Sensors. A NCO will need to have in it sensors for the purpose of intelligence gathering. They are in the form of SR systems of radars and cameras as well as EW intelligence systems.

Intelligence. Information gathered by sensors is processed into intelligence and is made available within the network accurately and timely.

Decision Making. The NCO is supported by decision making facilities of the C4I. These facilities within the NCO will assist commanders and staff to do operation planning, issue of orders, as well as monitor and supervise operations.

Weapon Systems. Headquarters of assigned troops and their weapons are linked into the NCO network. The arrangement provides sharing of situational awareness, delivery of operational orders and execution of operations.

Activities. Each NCO network will facilitate activities that will produce optimum tempo and maximum effect. These activities are as discussed below.

Intelligence. Intelligence gathering activities have to be efficient and effective to support the functions of C2. Information is mainly gathered by EW and SR systems, on ground or on combat platforms. Information is also obtained from photographs, videos, troops and from prisoners of war.

Information Transmission and Storage. NCO needs communications and data storage facilities. Efficient secure communications and information storage are essential elements of NCO.

Analyse and Translate Information. Efficient and effective intelligence cycle is necessary to support the functions of the NCO. Information gathered by EW and SR systems is sent to appropriate intelligence analysis centres for analysis, compilation and dissemination through the NCO network. NCO provides means for information to be transmitted and transformed into intelligence and situational picture.

Plan Synchronised Military Effect. Having current relevant intelligence and situational picture operational planning can be efficiently done. Properly synchronised operations for maximum effect could then be planned.

C2 of Forces. NCO allows commanders and staff to perform effectively functions of C2 of forces and resources, which are essential in combat.

NCO Characteristics. In developing NCO military forces will be guided by some standard characteristics that they need to acquire. These characteristics are derived from wanting to achieve the desired effects, to have the essential NCO facilities and to enable to perform the necessary C2 activities. The possible NCO characteristics⁷ are discussed below.

Satisfy Commander's Needs. Each NCO is made to support a specific military operation in a given theatre for a defined mission. The NCO must be able to fully satisfy the commander who controls the operation.

Network Covers Operational Area. The wide area network of the NCO has to fully cover the area of operation and linking all troops in the area. The NCO has links to superior command and flanking commands.

Has All Systems. A NCO consists of all systems of C4, intelligence, SR and weapons. Its information, functions and facilities are available and are assessable by all headquarters and units within the network.

Support All Missions. NCO must be able to support the commander for all likely missions; offensive, defensive, joint, amphibious, airborne, etc.

Capabilities in EW and Information Warfare (IW). NCO must have defensive and offensive capabilities of EW and IW, for security protection as well as to perform intelligence operations.

Secure, Reliable and Efficient. The network and all equipment within it must be secure, reliable and efficient, to provide continuous reliable service.

⁷ Author's own proposals, derived from experience gained while in military service and in industry.

NCW Principles. The NCW principles of having quality and sharing of information and enhancing situational awareness must be adhered to, so that the desired results are achieved.

Communications Principles. NCO communications network must abide by the communications principles of reliable, speed, economy, survival, flexible, simple, secure and upgradeable.

Results. From facilities, activities and characteristics mentioned above NCO is expected to provide positive results. Possible desired results are as mentioned below.

Improved Information Sharing. A NCO will improve situational picture, information and intelligence sharing which are vital to commanders in combat.

Enhanced Collaboration. Troops satisfied with C2 effectiveness willingly will share information and collaborate between them.

Enables Self-Synchronisation. Improved information sharing and collaboration will enable self-synchronisation of forces. All troops will be equally kept informed and be ready for action.

Improved sustainability. Effective NCO that brings about self-synchronisation will make forces more sustainable in combating the enemy.

Increased Speed of Command. Effective NCO with efficient and secure communications, coupled with effective situational awareness will result in an increase in speed of command.

Increased Mission Effectiveness. An effective command over efficient troops, resulting from efficient NCO, will increase mission effectiveness and bring about victory.

Summary. NCO is not a product that can be purchased. It is a new military C2 concept, wanting the C2 functions to be assisted by latest ICT, and introducing information and situational awareness sharing. Changing in C2 concepts are not new. C2 networks have been repackaged and enhanced before, in line with advancement of technology. The earlier systems of radio-wire integration have advanced in stages, to include computers and sensors. In

this new millennium the NCW concept sees the inclusion of weapons into the network. Each NCO is established for a specific operational need in a specific area of operation, encompassing an identified force level.

NCO DEVELOPMENT

Initiatives by Militaries. Some military forces have initiated to implement the NCO. Their initiatives are similar to one another. The militaries do think alike and their needs and worries are no different from one another. Their NCO initiatives take the following steps:⁸

Study. Study teams would recommend ways forward for strategic and operational C2 systems that would need the new concepts.

Project Team. Joint project teams are established with their own selected local industries, to formulate specifications and implementation milestone.

Implementation. NCOs are done by phases of numerous pilot projects, developed by local industries. Implementations are not done by one huge purchase, but are in phases of 15 to 20 years, mostly focused on army needs.

Transformation. Implementations of NCO are through transformation of existing systems, by integrating existing systems of information, sensors and weapons.

Protection. NCO would need the best security protection. A successful intruder will have access to all information, weapon and sensor systems within the network, causing a commander to lose control of his vital assets.

Pilots. Pilot projects are done according to agreed phases.

Enhance. NCO networks are system enhancement, customization and integration of existing systems to satisfy new specifications, doctrines, concepts and specific operational plans. No one NCO fits all.

⁸ Information from Battle-space Information 2003, Annual Information Dominance Forum at Brussels, March 2003.

Communications. NCO networks are multi-layered using different means of communications for different levels of command. Some are commercial and some are military dedicated links.

Security. NCO networks are priority targets for attacks by opponents. Security is therefore a major consideration during implementation.

Electronic Warfare. EW attacks will be for intelligence and disruption. Enemy will intercept communications and radar transmissions for intelligence and data for development of measures to counter our radars and weapon systems. Enemy combat electronic support measures will do intercepts to detect, identify and counter our weapons and radars, as well as to obtain situational picture of battle fields. Enemy will also apply jamming and deception to disrupt our NCO facilities.

Information Warfare. Computer networks are prone to cyber attacks. Networks are most vulnerable during development and maintenance, when interested parties will attempt to insert clandestinely cyber attack chips into our systems. Embedded chips and intrusions could affect communications, storage and processing activities. Main objective of these attacks is intelligence gathering by intercepting transmissions and extracting information from data bases. Second objective is to disrupt systems, networks, links, transmissions, messages and data bases. Third objective is manipulation, by inserting false information.

Counter Threats. An early consideration for protection is necessary. The first consideration is to have qualified military and local industry personnel in the subject of security. Plans to counter EW and IW threat for each NCO have to be developed. Networks using lines will be a good protection against EW, but not against IW attacks. Radios have been the main mean of communications for the military. Plans are therefore needed to counter enemy EW threats on radio networks. These plans are in the form of own electric protective measures and tactics as well as having own encryption. Protections against enemy counter measures of jamming, manipulation and deception will be to use line of sight radios and using suitable antennae in proper sites.

IW is the main threat to a NCO network. The main task of defence against IW threats is therefore to prevent

intrusion by having intrusion detection, protections and counter-measures. Distributed and duplicated data bases will avoid a complete destruction of information caused by a cyber attack. With an effective recovery plan an affected site can be restored and back in operation without serious data loss or damaging delay. Locally developed encryption and electronic protective measures will provide better protection. Without foreign industry involvement in development or maintenance will avoid NCO system from being embedded with illegal chips.

IMPLEMENTING NCO

Integration. NCO implementation is integration of diversified existing combat networks involved in specified operations. Normally sensor and shooter networks are integrated into information (C4I) networks, and converge to operations rooms at command headquarters (see figure 1).

C4I. The C4I system is the information grid that support in the functions of C2.

Sensors. Varieties of land-based, ship-borne or airborne sensors with their own networks are normally allocated to an operation. Troops supported by cameras, radars and infra-red devices are also used to do observation. Naval vessels carry radars and cameras. Surveillance aircrafts are fitted with radars, forward looking infra-red (FLIR) sensors and cameras. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used for surveillance may carry cameras and FLIR. EW receivers for detecting and intercepting radio wave transmissions are either land-based, ship borne or airborne.




Figure 1: Integration of Networks

Shooters. Shooters are combat troops and weapons organised in formations and units with their own communications networks, assigned to a commander in an operation. Anti aircraft units are with missiles and guns and the army artillery are with missiles, guns and rocket launchers. Naval supports are with guns and missiles. Air supports are with missiles, rockets, bombs and machine guns.

Operational Scenario. Detection and surveillance operations against illegal activities are done through sensors of radars, FLIR, cameras, UAV, army units, naval vessels and aircrafts. Information on intrusions is channeled to all headquarters within the NCO network. Detection is first by the equipment with the longest range, then by those of the shorter ranges, in the order

No	Types	Reliability	Flexibility	Speed	Security	Suitability
1.	Lines	Very reliable	Inflexible	Slow to install, good b/ width	Secure	Fixed sites only
2.	Radio HF	Atmospheric dependence	Flexible	Fast to deploy, narrow b/ width	Jamming, intercept	Small tact HQ
3.	Radio VHF/ UHF	Reliable	Flexible	Fast to deploy, limited b/ width	Jamming, intercept	Small & med tact HQ
4.	Radio Relay	Reliable	Some flexibility	Slow to deploy, good b/ width	Limited jamming	Med & large tact HQ
5.	GSM, GIRN, Tetra	Reliable	Inflexible	Slow to install, good b/ width	Limited jamming	Fixed sites, vehicles
6.	Satellite	Good peace time only	Flexible	Fast to deploy, good b/ width	Insecure, easy to intercept	Med & large tact HQ

Figure 2: Communications Technology for Comparison

Communications. NCO is integrating those systems within a command into a single network, using communications facilities. Suitable communications will be those that satisfy military criteria and provide sufficient band-width. Below at figure 2 is a chart showing an example of what benefits different communications media may offer.⁹

Sample NCO. In a given scenario of peacetime environment military forces may require to perform duties for homeland security, guarding national waters and airspace. For such operations networks and systems of sensors and shooters of assigned forces are integrated to form NCOs. Such an integration of networks and systems may require to be done by a local company, to ensure its security, relevancy and maintainability. The mentioned integration may be in a form as shown in the diagram at figure 3 below. One such system is currently operational in east coast of Sabah.¹⁰

of aircrafts, UAV, ships, radars, FLIR, UAV, cameras and ground radars. The commander will issue orders through the NCO. Nominated troops will execute orders to arrest the identified intrusion. Situational awareness in the form of photographs or video captures being monitored by UAV, are transmitted in real-time to all headquarters in the network. Other relevant headquarters will be kept informed at all times in real-time, through the strategic C4I system.

Acid Test. Tests can be made to ascertain whether the above-mentioned C2 system has the necessary criteria of an NCO. The mentioned system has integrated mission capable packages of C4I, weapons and sensors. It abides by the NCW tenet of information quality enhancement, sharing and collaboration, as well as the tenet of improving and enhancing quality of situational awareness. The mentioned NCO network

has satisfied commander's needs to perform C2 functions in operation. Its objective is to elevate C2 by improving C2 facilities of acquisition and sharing of information. It incorporates latest technology and security devices. It has the NCO characteristics of meeting commander's needs, coverage, security, reliability, efficient, speed, flexible, upgradeable and ability to survive from enemy actions.

⁹ Author's own analytical study, derived from experience and knowledge gained from military service and industry.

¹⁰ Op Pasir Bukti Kecekapan ATM Jaga Perairan Negara, Mohd Ason, Utusan Malaysia 3 Aug 11, Mega pg 32.




Figure 3: Sample NCO

Roles of Local Industry. Implementation of defence systems, especially those systems of C2, encryption, EW and IW, it is wise to be done by reliable and dedicated local companies. These companies must have knowledge and technology, as well as training and R&D facilities, and ability to transfer technology to the military. NCO implementation is with the participation of local industry, in study, specification formulation, designing, development, pilot projects, customisation and integration to operational systems. System security is better assured by local industry developing security packages. Local industry will ensure long term relevancy and support by regularly enhancing to keep up with advancement of technology and developing threats. Cost of development, maintenance and enhancement will be low. Local industries are national assets; they have knowledge and experience, and are ever ready to support the military.

CONCLUSION

NCO is the military response to ICT technology, satisfying military needs for operations and contingency plans. The main objective of NCO is to improve C2, to achieve superior combat power. NCO enhances C2 facilities by transforming and integrating C4I, sensors and weapons. NCO will improve implementation of security operations and other operational duties, and strengthen the functions of C2, sensors, EW, IW and weapons. NCO is formulated by integrating systems to support commanders, in line with national defence plans and military doctrine. It is not a product but a concept of transformation by integrating existing systems. No one NCO will satisfy different military commanders with different operational needs.

NCO is done through consolidated efforts of the military and local industry. NCO implementation is through joint development by the military and its own local industry. It evolves from existing systems to full functionality. The military's clear perception will be converted into reality by the local industry. Development of NCO is through transformation, integrating and enhancing existing C4I, sensor and weapon systems. The military decides shape, size and cost and the local industry will deliver the products.

NCO networks require regular enhancement and customisation and they are also priority targets for enemy EW and IW attacks. Joint development with local industry will ensure security and relevancy of the system. The military will have success in NCO transformation if it is supported by capable local industry. Local industry will ensure full realisation with appropriate technology and security measures. The military will not be able to acquire NCO off-the-shelf nor an industry on its own to develop it.



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PERJANJIAN PERTAHANAN ANTARA NEGARA ASEAN

- MUNGKINKAH MENJADI KENYATAAN

Oleh Lt Kol Noor Sazali bin Puteh

-SINOPSIS-

ASEAN pada awalnya ditubuhkan untuk membangunkan perkembangan ekonomi, pembangunan sosial, pertukaran budaya serta peluang-peluang kerjasama dalam bidang yang menguntungkan negara-negara anggota. Sebagai sebuah organisasi yang mewakili rantau Asia Tenggara, ia telah berjaya meningkatkan kerjasama dalam aspek-aspek yang dinyatakan tadi. Walaubagaimanapun, ASEAN bukan merupakan satu pakatan ketenteraan seperti mana yang dimeterai dalam ZOPFAN, TAC dan SEANWFZ. Dengan perkembangan hubungan strategik dan pergolakan dunia sedarwasa, ASEAN mula menunjukkan kesediaan untuk memainkan peranan ketenteraan seperti yang dibuktikan dengan kejayaan membubarkan Khmer Rouge di Kemboja pada 1998 serta memungkin kemerdekaan Timor Leste daripada Indonesia. Namun begitu, kerana kepentingan ketenteraan yang berbeza antara negara anggota, penglibatan negara anggota secara individu dengan perjanjian ketenteraan yang lain, pembiayaan kewangan, aset, doktrin dan infrastruktur serta tiadanya ancaman nyata dari musuh yang sama menyebabkan ASEAN kini fokus kepada operasi pengurusan bencana alam, pengurusan melawan keganasan, keselamatan maritim, kawalan sempadan dan operasi keamanan.

PENDAHULUAN

Pertubuhan negara-negara Asia Tenggara, ataupun nama inggerisnya *Association of South East Asia Nation* (ASEAN) telah ditubuhkan pada 8 Ogos 1967 oleh inisiatif lima buah negara iaitu Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina, Singapura dan Thailand. Tujuan utama penubuhan ASEAN pada masa tersebut ialah sebagai langkah kerjasama untuk membincangkan soal keselamatan dan keamanan serantau bagi menghadapi ancaman sekiranya perperangan sedang berlaku di antara Vietnam Utara yang berideologi komunis dengan Vietnam Selatan yang dibantu oleh kuasa dunia, Amerika Syarikat merebak sehingga mengganggu keamanan dan stabiliti rantau ini. Di samping itu negara-negara anggota juga mahu menjadikan ASEAN sebagai pertubuhan serantau untuk membangunkan perkembangan ekonomi, pembangunan sosial, pertukaran budaya serta menyediakan peluang untuk negara-negara anggota untuk saling berkerjasama di dalam bidang-bidang yang dapat menguntungkan kepada negara anggotanya (*win-win situation*).¹ Kewujudan ASEAN ternyata telah berjaya memainkan peranan di dalam politik serantau dan sebagai satu badan

yang dapat bersuara untuk seluruh anggota-anggotanya di samping telah berjaya mempertingkat kerjasama ekonomi, sosial, budaya dan kerjasama keselamatan. Sejak penubuhannya ASEAN mula dikenali dan relevan sebagai satu pertubuhan yang mewakili rantau Asia Tenggara dan ini menyebabkan negara-negara lain yang berada di rantau ini turut berminat untuk sama-sama berada di dalam ASEAN.



Brunei telah menjadi anggota ASEAN ke-6 pada tahun 8 Januari 1984 seminggu selepas negara tersebut mencapai kemerdekaan daripada British dan seterusnya Vietnam yang pada suatu masa dahulu menjadi musuh,

¹ Carolyn L Gates, Myn Than, ASEAN enlargement: Impact and Implications. Institute of SEA Studies. 2001.

yang menjadi duri dalam daging kepada ASEAN telah bermohon untuk menjadi negara anggota. Vietnam dengan rasminya menjadi anggota ASEAN yang ke-7 pada 28 Julai 1995. Laos dan Myammar pula diterima menjadi anggota ASEAN ke 8 dan ke 9 pada 23 Julai 1997.² Ini tinggalah Kemboja yang telah ditolak permohonannya kerana masalah politik dan negara tersebut telah diterima pada 30 April 1999. Negara yang terakhir menyertai ASEAN adalah Timur Leste awal 2011 dan kini lengkaplah keanggotaan ASEAN sebanyak 11 buah negara di Asia Tenggara.

ASEAN yang mempunyai keluasan 4.46 juta km² yang meliputi 3 % keluasan tanah didiami diduduki oleh 600 juta penduduk ataupun lebih kurang 9 % penduduk dunia.³ Dengan pendapatan perkapita RM 5.4 trillion ianya merupakan kuasa ke-9 ekonomi dunia. ASEAN juga merupakan pengeluar utama getah, timah dan minyak sawit dunia di samping Selat Melaka dan Laut China Selatan merupakan garisan perhubungan laut yang sangat penting di dunia.

SEJARAH AWAL PAKATAN NEGARA-NEGARA ASIA TENGGARA

Pakatan negara-negara Asia Tenggara bermula seawal tahun 1954, apabila Presiden Filipina Ferdinand Marcos menjadi tuan rumah Perjanjian Pertahanan Kolektif Asia Tenggara ataupun dikenali sebagai Manila Pact ditandatangani di Manila pada 8 September 1954. Perjanjian ini kemudiannya dinamakan sebagai Perjanjian Pertubuhan Asia Tenggara atau *Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation* (SEATO). Ibu pejabatnya telah ditubuhkan di Bangkok Thailand.⁴ Walau bagaimanapun keanggotaan SEATO bukan hanya terikat kepada negara-negara Asia Tenggara sahaja bahkan ianya meliputi Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom dan diterajui oleh Amerika Syarikat.

Tujuan utama SEATO ditubuhkan ialah untuk menyekat kemasukan pengaruh dan taklukkan komunis di Asia Tenggara. SEATO adalah sebahagian daripada Doktrin Truman yang pada dasarnya adalah untuk Amerika Syarikat mengadakan hubungan bilateral secara kolektif dengan semua negara-negara bukan komunis di Asia Tenggara. Doktrin ini dibangunkan oleh Presiden J.F. Kennedy dan Presiden Dwight D Eisenhower adalah inisiatif Amerika Syarikat untuk mengekang pengaruh komunis daripada negara China dan Kesatuan Soviet di Asia Tenggara.⁵



Pada mula penubuhannya SEATO dirancang sebagai satu ikatan penjanjian pertahanan ala Perjanjian Atlantik Utara (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)) di mana semua anggota yang terlibat akan mempertahankan negara mereka secara kolektif. Perbezaan ketara di antara NATO dan SEATO ialah SEATO tidak ada Pemerintahan Bersama di antara angkatan tentera negara-negara anggota yang mengkoordinasikan perintah dan kawalan⁶. Secara amnya penubuhan SEATO adalah sebagai batu loncatan dan lampu hijau untuk Amerika Syarikat memasuki Indochina pada tahun 1955 sehingga 1975 di atas pakatan yang dipersetujui oleh negara-negara anggota dan Vietnam sendiri.

Manila Pact ataupun SEATO merupakan polisi luar negara yang gagal di mana sebelum tamat perperangan Indochina lagi Pakistan telah keluar dari SEATO pada tahun 1972 dan seterusnya diikuti Perancis yang selama ini telah memberikan bantuan kewangan pada tahun 1975. Pada 30 Jun 1977, SEATO dengan rasminya dibubarkan.

Pembubaran SEATO merupakan kegagalan Amerika Syarikat untuk membawa negara-negara di Asia Tenggara mempunyai satu ikatan ketenteraan untuk mempertahankan diri daripada ancaman komunis pada masa tersebut.

² Vietnam in ASEAN, Toward Co-operations for Mutual Benefit ASEAN Secretariat 2007.

³ [Http://www.delidn.ec.europa.eu](http://www.delidn.ec.europa.eu). European Union Realtion wtih ASEAN. 20 Oct 2010.

⁴ Leifer, Micheal, Chin Kan Wah, Leo Suryandird. Selected Work on SEA. ISBN 978-981-232-270-0

⁵ John K Franklin: The Hollow Pact, Security and SEA Treaty Organization (2006) pg 1.

⁶ Ibid pg 184.

Pada ketika itu, teori domino yang telah hampir pasti menjadi kenyataan di mana kekuatan komunis telah bertambah kuat dengan kekalahan Amerika Syarikat di Vietnam Selatan menjadi seluruh Vietnam diperintah oleh komunis dan diikuti oleh Kemboja yang ditakluki pada tahun 1978.

Kini negara-negara bukan komunis terpaksa berdepan dengan komunis secara sendiri ataupun mengadakan perjanjian pertahanan secara bilateral ataupun multilateral tanpa melibatkan ASEAN secara kolektif. Contohnya Thailand yang mempunyai perjanjian pertahanan dengan Amerika Syarikat terus mengekalkan kehadiran Tentera Udara Amerika Syarikat di bumi Thailand sebagai langkah mempertahankan diri. Malaysia dan Singapura telahpun mempunyai perjanjian pertahanan dengan United Kingdom, Australia dan New Zealand iaitu Perjanjian Pertahanan Lima Kuasa (*Five Power Defense Agreements (FPDA)*) yang telah ditandatangani pada tahun 1971 berikut dengan pengunduran tentera British daripada semua tanah jajahannya ditimur Terusan Suez⁷. Tujuan penubuhan FPDA adalah untuk mengadakan satu pakatan ketenteraan mempertahankan Malaysia dan Singapura daripada kemungkinan ancaman yang sama (common threats). Filipina pula pada masa tersebut mengekalkan kehadiran Angkatan Tentera Udara Amerika Syarikat di Pengkalan Udara Clark bagi menjamin keselamatannya dilindungi oleh Amerika Syarikat.



⁷ Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Five Power Defence Agreements 1971.

PENUBUHAN ASEAN

Asia Tenggara telah dijajah sekian lama oleh penjajah Barat iaitu daripada 11 buah negara anggota ASEAN hanya Thailand sahaja berjaya mempertahankan diri daripada dijajah. ASEAN ditubuhkan dengan cara yang tersendiri dan unik, ini berkemungkinan mengambil kira kegagalan SEATO yang lebih menitik beratkan dasar-dasar kerjasama pertahanan dan keselamatan daripada sosio-ekonomi, sosial dan kebudayaan. ASEAN lebih menitik beratkan persahabatan dan diplomasi untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan jika terdapat sebarang pertelingkahan di antara negara-negara anggota. Bekas Menteri Luar Thailand Prachaub Chaiyasan pada tahun 1997 telah menyatakan “ASEAN telah belajar bagaimana untuk mengukur kekuatannya daripada bersatu bukan sahaja melalui kerajaan dengan kerajaan tetapi melalui penduduknya yang terdiri daripada pelbagai bangsa dan budaya. Pengalaman dan proses ini harus sampai kepada seluruh pelusuk ASEAN dan masyarakatnya. Hubungan antara negara ASEAN di rantau ini akan menjadikan penduduk akan bertambah rapat bukan sahaja berkongsi kepertinggan yang sama malah mereka juga berkongsi nilai, identiti dan inspirasi”.⁸

Di awal penubuhan ASEAN pada tahun 1967, deklarasi ASEAN telah mengariskan tujuannya adalah untuk mempertingkat perkembangan ekonomi, sosial dan pembangunan budaya di kalangan negara anggota di samping mempertingkatkan kerjasama di bidang pendidikan, pertanian dan industri. ASEAN juga mempromosikan perdagangan di antara negara anggota dan seterusnya mempertingkatkan taraf hidup rakyatnya. Di dalam kesemua 7 perkara yang digaris hanya satu perkara sahaja di para 2 di mana ASEAN bersetuju untuk mempromosikan keamanan dan stabiliti serantau dengan menghormati keadilan dan undang-undang di dalam mengadakan hubungan di antara negara-negara di rantau Asia Tenggara dan sentiasa menghormati prinsip-prinsip yang terdapat di dalam Charter Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu.

⁸ Prachaub Chaiyasan. Former Foreign Minister of Thailand, ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok. 1997

Pada tahun 1976, Deklarasi Perjanjian Persahabatan dan Kerjasama (*Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)*) di Summit ASEAN di Bali, Indonesia telah mendaraskan prinsip asas negara-negara ASEAN yang mana setiap negara ASEAN mestilah mengikutinya:⁹

- a. Saling menghormati kemerdekaan, kedaulatan, kesaksamaan, kedaulatan wilayah dan identiti setiap negara anggota.
- b. Adalah menjadi hak setiap negara untuk bebas dari sebarang campurtangan, subversif atau sebarang paksaan daripada pihak luar.
- c. Tidak ada sebarang campurtangan di dalam hal ehwal dalaman oleh negara-negara anggota.
- d. Menyelesaikan sebarang perbezaan dan pertingkahan dengan cara aman.
- e. Menolak sebarang ancaman ataupun menggunakan kekuatan ketenteraan
- f. Menjalankan kerjasama yang efektif di antara negara anggota.

PENOLAKAN MENJADI PAKATAN KETENTERAAN

Pada dasarnya deklarasi tahun 1976 bukan titik mula ASEAN menolak sebarang kerjasama ketenteraan, tetapi deklarasi ini dibuat pada masa yang sesuai kerana pada tahun 1975 Amerika Syarikat dengan rasminya telah berundur daripada Vietnam Selatan setelah kekalahan yang memalukan. Negara-negara ASEAN pada masa tersebut mungkin mengambil iktibar daripada jatuhnya Vietnam Selatan kepada kerajaan komunis Vietnam Utara. Kekalahan itu bukan disebabkan oleh kekuatan tentera yang kuat tetapi semangat patriotisme rakyatnya yang tidak mahu lagi negara mereka dijajah oleh bangsa asing. Walaupun negara-negara berjiran dengan Vietnam risau dengan Teori Domino akan terjadi jika komunis mengembangkan ideologinya di negara-negara Asia Tenggara, ASEAN tetap mengambil langkah yang berani untuk tidak menubuhan pakatan ketenteraan secara kolektif.

⁹ Overview Association in SEA Nations, <http://www.ASEAN.org/64htm> Retrieved 27 July 09.

Bagi menghadapi ancaman komunis negara-negara anggota telah bersetuju untuk mengadakan perjanjian persahabatan dan kerjasama ketenteraan secara bilateral dan juga multilateral dengan negara-negara anggota yang berjiran serta negara-negara sahabat masing-masing.

Sebagai langkah menolak sebarang campurtangan ketenteraan asing di rantau ini perjanjian telah ditandatangani untuk menetapkan Asia Tenggara sebagai Zon Aman, Bebas dan Berkecuali (*Zon of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)*) pada 27 November 1971 di perjumpaan di Kuala Lumpur. ZOPFAN secara langsung menggariskan yang setiap negara tidak kira kecil ataupun besar mempunyai hak bebas daripada sebarang campurtangan asing di dalam hal ehwal dalaman kerana ini akan menyebabkan kesukaran kepada kebebasan, kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan negara tersebut.¹⁰ Seterusnya pada tahun 1995, ASEAN sekali lagi melalui Summit di Bangkok, Thailand, di mana kesemua 10 ketua negara-negara ASEAN telah bersetuju dan menandatangani deklarasi bahawa Asia Tenggara adalah Zon Bebas Senjata Nuklear (*Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)*).¹¹



SEANWFZ Executive Committee Meeting 2011

ASEAN mempunyai sebab-sebab tersendiri mengapa pakatan ketenteraan ala NATO ataupun WARSAW Pact tidak dapat diadakan di rantau ini. Di antaranya negara-negara ASEAN tidak mempunyai musuh yang nyata (*permanent threat*) seperti yang dihadapi oleh NATO dan WARSAW Pact semasa perperangan dingin di mana Eropah telah terbahagi kepada dua blok (*bipolar*).

¹⁰ Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration Malaysia, 27 November 1971. [Asean.org/1215html](http://www.Asean.org/1215html)

¹¹ Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Bangkok, Thailand 15 December, 1995 [Aseansec.org/2082html](http://www.Aseansec.org/2082html)

Juga tidak seperti NATO, negara-negara ASEAN mempunyai perbezaan yang cukup nyata bukan sahaja dari bangsa bahkan juga budaya dan agama. Oleh yang demikian sensitiviti ini perlu dijaga dengan penuh kehormanian dan tolenensi supaya bukan sahaja perkara-perkara berkenaan kedaulatan sempadan sahaja perlu diatasi bahkan perkara berkaitan sosial, kebudayaan dan keagamaan juga perlu diambil kira. Pada keseluruhannya kesemua anggota-anggota ASEAN masih belum berbincang untuk mewujudkan sebarang pakatan ketenteraan di peringkat kolektif.

SEMANGAT KEJIRANAN NEGARA-NEGARA ASEAN



Asia Tenggara telah dijajah oleh banyak negara-negara Barat dimana Malaysia, Brunei, Myammar dan Singapura dijajah oleh British, Indonesia dijajah oleh Belanda, Filipina dijajah oleh Sepanyol kemudiannya menjadi salah sebuah negeri Amerika Syarikat dan Indochina dijajah oleh Perancis dan kemudiannya menerapkan ideologi komunis berkiblatkan Soviet Union. Hanya yang berjaya mempertahankan kedaulatan negara ialah Thailand. Penjajahan ini telah meninggalkan kesan yang mendalam sehingga cara pengurusan pentadbiran negara baik dari segi politik, pengurusan kerajaan, sosio-ekonomi dan ketenteraan adalah mirip negara penjajah. Oleh yang demikian doktrin angkatan tentera negara-negara ASEAN adalah berlainan di antara satu sama lain yang semestinya menjadi kesukaran apabila kerjasama ketenteraan diwujudkan.

Penjajahan juga telah mewujudkan pertindihan sempadan di antara negara-negara anggota yang berkemungkinan berlakunya krisis. Di antaranya tuntutan bertindih Pulau Batu Putih, Pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan, Kepulauan Spratly dan perebutan kawasan Berhala Preah Vihear menjadikan rantau ini walaupun merupakan kawasan yang sangat aman tetapi amat rapuh. Walaupun pertikaian kepulauan Sipadan dan Ligitan dan Pulau Batu Putih telah diselesaikan melalui

semangat ASEAN yang membawa perkara ini kepada Mahkamah Keadilan Antarabangsa ianya masih lagi merupakan sesuatu permasalahan yang sangat kritikal kerana persempadanan lautnya belum betul-betul dikenalpasti.

Krisis Berhala Preah Vihear bermula apabila UNESCO mengistiharkan tapak berhala Hindu yang dibina pada kurun ke-10 tersebut sebagai Khazanah Sejarah Dunia kepada Kemboja pada tahun 7 Julai 2008¹². Pertindihan tuntutan ke atas berhala ini sebenar telah berakhir pada tahun 1962, di mana Mahkamah Keadilan Antarabangsa telah membuat keputusan tapak bersejarah tersebut adalah hak milik Kemboja. Kesan daripada pengistiharan tersebut Thailand dan Kemboja mula membuat tuntutan bertindih kembali. Pada Oktober dan April 2009, berlaku krisis di mana kedua-dua trup dari Tentera Darat Thailand dan Kemboja telah berbalas tembakan untuk merebut hak ke atas berhala dan kawasan di sekelilingnya. Ini kerana kawasan tersebut berpotensi untuk menarik pelancong asing seterusnya mempertingkatkan ekonomi penduduk setempat.

Terdapat beberapa kenyataan menyatakan krisis ini adalah kesan daripada permasalahan dalam kerajaan Thailand pada masa tersebut yang gagal memaklumkan penduduknya tentang keadaan sebenar tapak bersejarah di mana keputusan Mahkamah Keadilan Antarabangsa yang meyebelahi Kemboja. Sekali lagi di atas semangat ASEAN kedua-dua pihak berjaya mengekang pertempuran ini di mana ianya hanya berlaku di persekitaran Berhala itu sahaja. Thailand telah memulakan inisiatif supaya perbincangan dua hala diadakan untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan ini. Ini menyebabkan Perdana Menteri Thailand Abhisit Vejjajiva telah dituduh oleh musuh politik dari *People's Alliance for Democracy* dan mendesaknya supaya letak jawatan kerana gagal di dalam mempertahankan kedaulatan wilayah negara Thailand. Walau bagaimanapun semangat ASEAN menyebabkan pertempuran ini berjaya dilenturkan ketegangannya.¹³

¹² En.wikipedia.org/Preah_vihhear Temple. Retrieved 10 Jun 2011.

¹³ Wikipedia.org/Alliance for Democracy.

PERLUKAH PERPAKATAN KETENTERAAN DITUBUHKAN OLEH ASEAN

ASEAN yang telah ditubuhkan sejak 44 tahun yang lalu telah mengalami banyak pengalaman yang sangat unik dibandingkan dengan pertubuhan-pertubuhan yang lain di dunia ini. ASEAN telah berjaya bermaafakat serta berkerjasama dan di atas semangatnya telah menyatakan 600 juta penduduknya yang berlainan bangsa dan ugama. Di antara kerjasama yang berjaya dalam menentukan keamanan dan kestabilan serantau ialah menyelesaikan penaklukan Vietnam pada tahun 1978 sehingga 1989 dan dalam masa yang menamatkan perperangan saudara di Kemboja. Dengan bantuan Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu, Vietnam telah bersetuju keluar daripada Kemboja secara aman. Pada bulan Julai sehingga Ogos 1989, Pesidangan Antarabangsa telah diadakan di Paris untuk membincangkan masa depan Kemboja dan ianya berlarutan sehingga bulan Oktober 1991. Perjanjian Paris telah membincangkan langkah-langlah yang perlu diambil untuk menjadikan Kemboja sebuah negara yang demokrasi, mengamalkan hak-hak kemanusiaan dan bebas. Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu telah menubuhkan UNTAC yang berada di Kemboja dari tahun Februari 1992 sehingga September 1993 untuk menguatkuasakan resolusi di dalam Perjanjian Paris.



Peranan UNTAC adalah untuk mengembalikan keamanan dan stabiliti Kemboja. Setelah mengambil masa kira-kira 7 tahun, Kemboja telah kembali aman pada tahun 1998 setelah Khmer Rouge berjaya dibubarkan. Walaupun secara rasmi keamanan di Kemboja adalah hasil usaha Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu, tetapi boleh dikatakan semua negara-negara ASEAN pada masa tersebut terlibat seperti Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia,

Singapura, Thailand dan Filipina menjadi anggota UNTAC. Peranan yang sama dimainkan oleh ASEAN semasa Timur Leste mencapai kemerdekaan daripada Indonesia di mana negara-negara anggota ASEAN telah sama-sama mengembalikan keamanan di Timur Leste di bawah panji-panji PBB iaitu *United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor* (UNMISET). Ini menunjukkan ASEAN telah bersedia untuk memainkan peranan di dalam mana-mana misi ketenteraan di rantau ini tetapi ianya mestilah dibiayai oleh Pertubuhan yang kuat dan mempunyai sumber kewangan yang kukuh. Kekangan besar yang dihadapi oleh ASEAN di dalam membentuk pakatan tentera secara ad-hoc mahupun tetap adalah pembiayaan kewangan, aset, doktrin dan infrastruktur.

Negara-negara ASEAN pada asasnya tidak mempunyai musuh yang nyata yang mungkin menjadi ancaman kepada keselamatan serantau. Kebanyakan kekuatan ketenteraan negara-negara ASEAN dibangunkan adalah untuk menghadapi tanggapan musuh (*perceive enemy*) yang dilihat akan memberikan ancaman berdasarkan keupayaan pembangunan ketenteraan negara tersebut. Sebagai langkah pencegahan (*deterrent*) Angkatan Tentera anggota-anggota ASEAN diperkuatkan untuk menghadapi *perceive enemy* tersebut. Jika ini berlaku di antara negara ASEAN perlumbaan perolehan senjata di antara negara ASEAN akan berlaku walaupun rantau ini adalah rantau yang aman.

Oleh kerana ketiadaan musuh yang nyata seperti yang dihadapi oleh NATO dan negara-negara ASEAN juga tidak mempunyai musuh yang sama (*common enemy*) adalah sukar untuk negara-negara anggota mempunyai pakatan ketenteraan yang sudah tentunya ditubuhkan untuk menghadapi ancaman yang nyata. Pengalaman SEATO juga telah dijadikan iktibar di mana kegagalan negara-negara di Asia Tenggara untuk mengekal pakatan ketenteraan walaupun ianya disokong kuat oleh kuasa besar dunia Amerika Syarikat. Negara-negara ASEAN juga dilihat mempunyai kepentingan ketenteraan yang berbeza dan setengah daripada anggotanya telahpun mempunyai pakatan ketenteraan mereka sendiri contohnya Malaysia dan Singapura. Negara-negara ASEAN lebih selesa mengwujudkan perjanjian pertahanan secara bilateral dan multilateral dengan anggota-anggota ASEAN mahupun Angkatan Tentera Pasukan sahabat masing-masing yang difikirkan dapat menjamin keselamatan negara mereka.

Deklarasi Perjanjian Persahabatan dan Kerjasama (*Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)*) sendiri telah sedikit sebanyak menyekat kerjasama ketenteraan diantara negara ASEAN kerana ASEAN lebih mementingkan penyelesaian perbezaan dan pertelingkahan secara aman dan mengelakkan sebarang campurtangan asing dalam hal ehwal negara-negara anggota. Ini telah terbukti dengan penyelesaian pertingkahan dengan menggunakan Mahkamah Keadilan Antarabangsa dan juga diplomasi di dalam beberapa perkara yang mungkin menyebabkan konflik.

PERSEFAHAMAN KETENTERAAN ANTARA NEGARA ASEAN

Peranan Angkatan Tentera pada masa ini bukan hanya terhad kepada peperangan sahaja tetapi tugas Operasi Selain Daripada Peperangan (*Operations Other Than War*) telah menjadikan Tentera lebih relevan dan turut membantu pembangunan sesebuah negara. Di antara tugasan yang diberikan oleh Angkatan Tentera pada masa ini ialah bantuan kemanusiaan bagi membantu sesebuah negara menghadapi sebarang bencana alam mahupun pun bencana yang lakukan oleh pertubuhan pengganas. Di antara contoh bantuan-bantuan kemanusiaan yang telah melibatkan anggota ASEAN semasa Pasca Tsunami, di mana trup daripada Angkatan Tentera Malaysia dan Singapura bersama-sama dengan Tentera Nasionalis Indonesia ASEAN telah berada di Banda Aceh bagi membantu mangsa-mangsa Tsunami. Pakatan juga boleh diadakan berdasarkan kerjasama di dalam membantu mengawal keselamatan perairan di dalam membentras kegiatan lanun yang mengganggu pelayaran kapal dagang antarabangsa di Selat Melaka dan Laut China Selatan.

Memandangkan tren baru ancaman keselamatan adalah melawan keganasan, negara-negara ASEAN telah mengorak langkah berkerjasama untuk mengatasi ancaman ini. Antaranya ialah perjanjian untuk mengawal sempadan secara bersama yang telah lama diadakan dengan mengadakan perjanjian bilateral oleh negara-negara ASEAN yang berkongsi sempadan. Dengan cara ini kawalan terhadap aktiviti-aktiviti menyeberangi sempadan secara haram dapat dibentras. Negara ASEAN juga bersedia untuk bertukar-tukar maklumat perisikan mengenai pergerakan pengganas yang mungkin bergerak melepas sempadan di dalam tujuan mereka mengadakan subversif dan sabotaj.

Menteri Luar Indonesia semasa perjumpaan Ketua-Ketua Angkatan Tentera ASEAN di Padang Merdeka, Jakarta pada 1 Apr 2011 berkata ASEAN tidak pernah berbincang mengenai pakatan yang melibatkan operasi ketenteraan dalam peperangan dan Indonesia tidak akan komited di dalam membentuk pakatan ketenteraan di rantau ini, tetapi kerjasama boleh diwujudkan dalam Operasi Selain Daripada Peperangan (*Operations Other Than War (OOTW)*) seperti mengurus bencana alam, operasi keamanan (seperti di Aceh, Indonesia dan Mindanao (Filipina) , pengurusan melawan keganasan dan keselamatan maritim¹⁴ . Berlanjutan dengan kenyataan itu Laksamana Agus Suhartono, Panglima Tentera Nasionalis Indonesia di dalam forum yang sama berkata adalah perlu untuk membangunkan Prosedur Tetap Operasi yang dapat memberi panduan kepada negara-negara ASEAN untuk melaksanakan bantuan kemanusian jika sesebuah negara anggota dilanda oleh bencana. Sebagai langkah pertama Tentera Nasionalis Indonesia dan Angkatan Tentera Singapura akan melaksanakan langkah susulan pada tahun ini untuk mengkaji kerjasama ketenteraan di dalam operasi kemanusian membantu bencana alam.

KESIMPULAN

Pada asalnya, ASEAN ditubuhkan untuk menyatukan negara-negara Asia Tenggara menjalinkan kerjasama keselamatan yang dapat menjamin keamanan dan stabiliti di rantau Asia Tenggara. Ini memandangkan pada masa tersebut ancaman teori domino bahawa kejatuhan negara-negara demokrasi kepada negara-negara komunis mungkin terjadi. Walau bagaimanapun kejatuhan Vietnam Selatan pada 1975, telah merebak ke Kemboja dengan penaklukan oleh Vietnam pada 1978, komunis tidak merebak sehingga Thailand apabila Vietnam berundur pada tahun 1991. Seperti rantau lain di dunia, Asia Tenggara juga tidak bebas daripada krisis di mana perebutan pertindihan sempadan darat dan laut diantara negara anggota.

Deklarasi seperti TAC, ZOPFAN dan SEANWFZ telah menampakkan persefahaman ASEAN di dalam menolak pakatan ketenteraan di rantau Asia Tenggara mahupun membenarkan mana-mana kuasa tentera asing daripada beroperasi.

¹⁴ ASEAN Chief of Armed Forces Meeting in Jakarta, 1 April 2011. Jakarta News. 9 May 2011.

Walau bagaimanapun ASEAN tidak menghalang negara anggota daripada mengadakan perjanjian bersama secara bilateral mahupun multilateral dengan negara anggota ASEAN yang lain dan juga dengan negara sahabat masing-masing.

Dalam menjadikan ASEAN lebih relevan di dalam menjamin keselamatan dan stabiliti di rantau ini pakatan ketenteraan bukan hanya terlibat di dalam operasi berkaitan ketenteraan sahaja. Bahkan boleh dikatakan pada masa aman sebegini semua pakatan ketenteraan telah mengalih fokus kepada OOTW. Perjumpaan Ketua-Ketua Tentera ASEAN pada 1 April 2011 telah

membincangkan kerjasama ketenteraan melibatkan OOTW yang mana ianya melibatkan bantuan kemanusian semasa bencana alam, operasi keamanan, membenteraisan di dalam operasi maritim, melawan keganasan dan membanteras kegiatan jenayah merentasi sempadan. Di dalam membentuk pakatan ini Perintah Tetap Operasi dan Doktrin yang sama perlu dikeluarkan supaya semua pihak dapat memahami persetujuan dan limitasi sesebuah negara anggota sebelum melintasi sempadan negara tuan rumah. ASEAN perlulah memikirkan bahawa Pakatan Ketenteraan juga dapat membangunkan ASEAN seperti mana perjanjian yang lain di samping ianya menjadikan organisasi ketenteraan lebih relevan di masa akan datang.

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Lt Kol Noor Sazali bin Puteh telah dinauliahkan dalam Rejimen Artilleri Diraja pada 18 Disember 1982 dan telah menghadiri kursus Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera pada 1999. Beliau juga terpilih untuk menghadiri kursus Regimental Gunnery Officer di Sekolah Artilleri di Australia pada 1992 dan Artillery in Peace Support Operations di Sekolah Artilleri di United Kingdom pada 2003. Pernah bertugas sebagai pemerhati PBB di Liberia (UNMIL) pada Mei 2008 hingga Mei 2009, Lt Kol Noor Sazali berkelulusan Diploma Pengajian Strategi dan Pertahanan (UM) dan Ijazah Sarjana Pengurusan (UM). Perjawatan yang pernah disandang beliau adalah Jurulatih Meriam di Pusat Latihan Artilleri (PUSARTI), Pegawai Staf Gred 2 Teknikal dan Kerjaya Pegawai di Jabatan Arah Artilleri, Pegawai Memerintah Rejimen ke 4 Artilleri DiRaja, Komandan PUSARTI dan sekarang beliau merupakan Pegawai Staf Gred 1 Latih di Markas Latihan Tentera Darat.

ARE VIOLENT STREET GANGS THE SAME AS INSURGENTS?

By Kapt Hafez Shabril bin Hussin

-SYNOPSIS-

The violent street gangs and insurgents are two main non-state actors capable of undermining various aspects of country's security. This paper tries to highlight the differences and similarities between both actors and their evolution to Third Generation Gang and Fourth Generation Insurgency. This aims to facilitate the government in drawing a clear demarcation line when it should intensify the efforts in combating the two whether to employ law enforcement agencies or the military. It also seeks to illuminate on their relationships or links so as to enable the government to monitor, observe and react on any minor social disturbances escalating into bigger threat to the security and sovereignty of the country and to take appropriate precautionary measures to curb it.

Introduction

The violent street gangs and insurgents are two non-state actors who are actively involved in shaping the political, economic, social and security climate of a country to the extent of destabilising the ruling governments. This paper tries to highlight the differences and similarities between the violent street gangs and insurgencies and the evolution of street gangs to Third Generation Gang and of insurgents to Fourth Generation Insurgency. It also seeks to illuminate on the relationships or links between the two and the significance of determining the similarities and differences between both of them.

Definition of Violent Street Gangs and Insurgencies

Violent street gangs can be characterized as a group of people who, with their own leadership are continuously involved in criminal enterprise with a gang name and identifiable symbols, besides having a certain degree of control over certain area or sphere of influence and a frequent meeting method.¹

Gangs are usually lawbreaking organisation involved in a wide range of acts of criminality extending from graffiti, vandalism, burglary and physical attacks to more severe criminal acts like drug and human trafficking, money laundering, murder and blackmail.² On the other hand, insurgencies can be described as a prolonged struggle, unbalanced firepower and capabilities on the part of the insurgents, the use of deception and psychological methods by the insurgents and also the use of political intimidation to safeguard them and therefore gaining success over the government's forces.³ Thus, an insurgency is a confrontation between a governing power and non-governing group where the latter actively employs political resources and acts of brutality to demolish, reconstruct or bolsters the legality of one or more features of politics.⁴

¹ Carolyn Rebecca Block and Richard Block, "Street Gang Crime in Chicago", Research in Brief, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 1993, p. 3.

² Clare M. Ribando, CRS Report for Congress – Gangs in Central America, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 2.

³ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 2004, p. 2.

⁴ Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (2nd ed.), Rev. Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005, p. 15.

Differences Between Violent Street Gangs and Insurgents

The street gangs phenomenon develops as a result of criminal tendencies, desire to achieve glory and prestige of their own group and also, mainly due to financial pressure and family breakdown.

Social rejection, unfair treatment, uncontrolled cache of weapons in open market and adverse traumatic experiences of war, are also other contributing factors to this problem.⁵ Other causal factors are youth joblessness, lack of educational and public benefits, inefficient and bribable enforcement agencies and legal system and prevalence of violence among the neighbourhoods or in the family.⁶ Street gangs are therefore closely associated with the consequences resulting from modernisation and urbanisation and are predominantly ‘money-driven’. The violent street groups have to maintain and protect their ‘economic gain’ through gang affiliation in which they share common characteristics and certain kind of behaviours distinctive to their organisations. Thus, they incline towards monetary benefit and the desire to acquire wealth.⁷

Conversely, insurgencies are fought by armed rebels in furtherance of their ‘political aims’ to overthrow and replace the existing government with a new government or to force the government to fulfil their needs and aspirations. The insurgents incline towards separation, self-governance or change of policy.⁸ The insurgency emerges when a group decides that the gap between political expectations and the chances obtainable to them are unsatisfactory and can only be resolved by force.⁹ It arises out of dissatisfaction or discontent towards the ruling power as a result of political persecution, economic grievances and social injustice.

The street gangs are different from insurgents because they gradually control an area or territory, one street or neighbourhood at a time known as coup d’street or one single business or governmental department at a time whereas the insurgents attempt to depose the government in a coup or protracted rebellion.¹⁰ Some street gangs also lack hierarchical command structure which is more horizontally organised with lots of small cliques with their own leadership replaceable by other gang member, unlike the insurgencies which possess strong leadership and steady command and control of their members.¹¹

Similarities between Violent Street Gangs and Insurgencies

One similarity between the insurgents and street gangs is that both have limited firepower superiority and scarce human resources resulting in the employment of evasion techniques. Since the insurgents have limited firepower capabilities and they are in smaller number, they tend to prevent themselves from encountering the government’s forces.¹² Thus, they have an inclination to operate in rough terrain and employ ‘hit and run’ tactics to inflict casualties to the opponents and to delay their decisive actions without having to confront them in order to carry out the continuous struggle.¹³ So the insurgents are easily adaptable to the changing environments to take advantage over the enemy’s shortcomings to avoid defeat.¹⁴ This is also applicable to violent street gangs, armed with basic weapons and small-calibre guns and of small gang members, who tend to evade police and other law enforcement agencies. So, both of them would prefer to use secret network of information.¹⁵

⁵ Dennis Rodgers and Robert Muggah, “Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case” in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2009, p. 304.

⁶ Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 14.

⁷ Edward R. Evans and James R. Spies, Insurgency in the Hood: Understanding Insurgencies Through Urban Gangs. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006, p. 3.

⁸ Metz and Millen, p. 2.

⁹ Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 1.

¹⁰ Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty, p. 2.

¹¹ Celinda Franco, The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service (RL 34233), 2007, p. 7.

¹² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, p. 80.

¹³ Ian Beckett, “The Future of Insurgency” in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, p. 24.

¹⁴ 5, p. 24.
John D. Manning, Dark Networks. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010, p. 4.

¹⁵ Evans and Spies, p. 6.

Another similarity between them is the need for support and assistance from local populace or neighbourhood through coercion and intimidation. The insurgents need support from the local population ranging from money, food, weapon, information, new members and psychological support.

As in the case of Malayan Emergency, the Communist insurgents deployed their underground organisation or Min Yuen to obtain all these from their sympathisers especially Chinese community, mostly by extortion and intimidation.¹⁶

Likewise, criminal street gangs operate within underdeveloped communities and obtain financial and non-financial support from them, also by coercion and victimisation of innocent citizens.¹⁷ For most insurgent groups, they usually use propaganda to win 'the hearts and minds' of the people and conduct subversion to intimidate the government thus gaining local support. Thus, both of them use compulsion and terrorisation to manipulate the communities and their perceptions.¹⁸

Both are involved in illicit activities such as kidnapping, killing, robbery, assault, extortion, illegal funding, weapon smuggling and drug trafficking in furtherance of their ultimate goals i.e. economic gains and political aims. As criminal entities, modus operandi of the gangs is the violation of rules and regulations by committing various kinds of criminal activities, to include gangsterism and brigandage, within their 'controlled territory' and incline towards exerting their power to the local community to obtain pecuniary benefits and gang popularity. As for the insurgents, their modus operandi includes ambush and sabotage on the military troops and government's installations, destruction of civilian facilities and killing and causing injuries to the people to create violence and fear among them and to discourage those who supported the government. One salient example can be drawn from the insurgency occurred in southern Muslim-majority provinces of Thailand where the insurgents committed indiscriminate killings of civilians and assassinations of the officials to intimidate and disgrace the government and to create chaos in the country.

¹⁶ R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort - R-957-ARPA, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972, p. 8.

¹⁷ Jennifer M. Hazen, "Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups" in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 878, 2010, p. 371.

¹⁸ Evans and Spies, p. 4.

Both have tendency and potential of being vicious and aggressive so as to warrant reactionary actions by the ruling power.¹⁹ This is particularly true in the case of Communist insurgents in Malaya where they committed various acts of atrocities for the sake of their political agenda such as the assassinations of the British High Commissioner in Malaya, the late Sir Henry Gurney in 1951 and the Inspector-General of the Royal Malaysia Police, the late Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Hashim in 1974.²⁰ With regard to violent street gangs, for example the Chicago Police Department in the U.S., they issued a set of data which revealed that 17,085 criminal offences which occurred from 1987 to 1990 were classified as street gang-related.²¹

Both of them also act in groups to further their cause rather than an individual job. This is particularly evident in almost street gangs such as *Black Gangster Disciples Nation* (BGDN) and Vice Lords in the U.S.A. and insurgent groups like *The New People's Army* (NPA) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines. Similarly, maras criminal gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are engaged in joint acts of criminality such as blackmailing of local businesses and vehicles theft.²² Uniformity of actions among members of these two groups is crucial because both are relatively weaker and ill-equipped to encounter massive number of troops and huge firepower capability of the adversaries.

Similarly, both are involved with the indoctrination of their members to ensure pride, loyalty and 'selfless sacrifice' to the organisation. Street gangs normally train, equip and test their members' loyalty to prevent betrayal or commission of any acts detrimental to the survival of their organisations. Similarly, insurgent groups conduct the same procedure in the form of an oath of allegiance where violation or breach of conduct may result in any member being summarily executed for treason.

¹⁹ Wayne A. Robinson, Eradicating Organized Criminal Gangs in Jamaica: Can Lessons be Learnt From A Successful Counterinsurgency? Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008, p. 11.

²⁰ Abdul Aziz Ahmad, "The Unsettled Bloodshed" in The Malaysian Army News, Vol. 147, May 2009, pp. 18-19 (English Translation).

²¹ Block and Block, p. 2.

²² Rodgers and Muggah, p. 307

Other similarity is that certain kind of gangs and insurgents' ultimate goal is to oust the governing powers to achieve their economic gains and political aims.²³ Both of them also depend on non-participation and passivity by local community to prevent the authorities from obtaining information on their illegal activities thus achieving their goal.²⁴ They also share 'localised control' of the neighbourhoods or communities to obtain political aim or economic gain.²⁵

Certain type of gangs and insurgents also have freedom of movements and actions in ungoverned territories or places which lack governmental administration as depicted by Taliban insurgents with safe haven in Pakistan to conduct their activities in Afghanistan and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang who operate between California and Central America of Honduras and El Salvador.²⁶ The freedom of movements ensures commercial market share and profit-making and to gain political control over the territory or people.²⁷ These two groups also draw their membership from the local communities or citizens themselves due to non-existence of permanent groups of individuals unlike conventional military forces.²⁸

Conclusion

Despite the differences and similarities of them, criminal street gangs have developed from First Generation Gangs to Third Generation Gangs that is from traditional gangs of disorganized leadership and loyalty with their immediate neighbourhood concentrating on gaining money profit, involving in opportunistic and individual local crimes to advanced transnational criminal venture concentrating on political as well as economic aims.²⁹

The Third Generation Gangs are even capable of undermining the government to achieve their economic goals as well as ensuring total liberty in their course of actions.³⁰ The resemblance lies between violent street gangs and insurgencies and how the gangs' sophistication and transnational sphere of activities will enable them to overthrow the government in power like the insurgent groups.

The Second Generation Gangs are advanced criminal organisations which tend to focus on commercial gains through drug trafficking and market protection by violence to safeguard their markets and to quell enforcement efforts against them.³¹ They begin to exert their 'political influence' in certain areas of the country and to wage an 'intrastate war' against the government.³² The correlation between violent street gangs, which in the end turning into an insurgency after undergoing a series of transformation over time is very crucial since it links between the two in a parallel platform of 'political agenda'. The effects of this transformation is evident from an incident in Colombia in 1989 where Medellin Cartel, a major international criminal organisation was involved in the assassination of the leading candidate for the Colombian presidency and the subsequent major terrorist attack against the Colombian state to compel the government for power sharing with the drug traffickers.³³

As for the insurgency, it has shifted into the next level of 'Fourth Generation Warfare' which exploits political, social, economic and technical advantages to fulfil the insurgents' strategic goals and to challenge the fragility of the superior military and economic powers.³⁴ This is true in the case of anti-coalition campaign by the Iraqi insurgents who conducted bomb attacks on the United Nation's Headquarters in Baghdad and the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim (leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq).³⁵

²³ Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 2.

²⁴ Evans and Spies, p. 5.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 4.

²⁶ Manning, p. 13.

²⁷ Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty, p. 1.

²⁸ Evans and Spies, p. 6.

²⁹ Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, pp. 9-10.

³⁰ Manwaring, p. 2.

³¹ Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty, p. 5.

³² Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, pp. 10-1.

³³ Roy Godson and William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime" in Society, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1995, p. 18.

³⁴ Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation" in Strategic Forum, No. 214, p. 2.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 1.

The attack on and threat against oil pipelines and facilities is another indication of the insurgents' strategic action to express their political determination against the U.S.-supported Interim Iraqi Government to create political paralysis by using materials made available by the society. Similarly, al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan employed strategic methods to undermine and demolish the U.S.-supported Hamid Kharzai government such as Taliban's attempt to obstruct presidential elections.

The most important element of the 'Fourth Generation Insurgency' is the insurgents' attempt at attacking the psychology of the adversary's policymakers to make it in parallel with their ambitions and aspirations. For example, the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan sent different messages to their target groups to urge or to persuade them to fulfil the insurgents' ultimate goals and strategic aims. Another crucial point is the extensive use of the internet and computer networks for indoctrination, communication, fund-raising and to conduct cyber-attacks on selected military and civilian facilities. Given

the complexity of the insurgents' operations, it proves that they have transcended beyond the traditional idea of insurgency and moving towards what is now called 'terrorism' or 'international terrorism'.

The significance of determining the similitude and variance between both the street gangs and insurgencies is thus to facilitate the government in drawing a clear demarcation line when it should intensify the efforts in combating the two whether to employ law enforcement agencies or the military based on the degree of proportionality in using force according to the Law of Armed Conflict. This also enables the government to monitor, observe and react on any minor social disturbances escalating into bigger threat to the security and sovereignty of the country and to take appropriate precautionary measures to curb it. It also allows the authorities to disconnect any links between the gangs and insurgents and focuses on socio-economic uplifts to suppress opposition besides promoting rehabilitation and reintegration of both groups into the society.

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JIWA TENTERA (MILITARY MIND) DAN HUBUNGANNYA DENGAN DAYA JUANG KETENTERAAN

Oleh Kol Dr Kenali Basiron

-SINOPSIS-


Apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan military mind?. Adakah military mind merupakan jiwa tentera yang berorientasikan akal budi sempit dan autoritatif? Atau ia merupakan suatu struktur sistem kognitif, emosi dan psikomotor perlakuan profesional yang meningkatkan prestasi ketenteraan. Pendek kata, makna istilah jiwa tentera tertakluk kepada sudut mana dan apakah jenis kanta yang digunakan dalam mendefinisikan istilah tersebut. Esei ini berusaha mengupas, membincang dan menjelaskan kefahaman makna jiwa tentera dan seterusnya meneroka hubungannya dengan elemen ketiga kuasa tempur iaitu daya juang ketenteraan (military morale). Harapan semoga esei ini dapat mencetus idea bagi memandu arah, merancang dan melaksanakan program asas ketenteraan (Back to Basic) bagi menyemai, menyubur dan mengurus pembangunan jiwa tentera di semua pasukan Tentera Darat.

PENDAHULUAN

Era globalisasi nampaknya telah membelaangkan unsur-unsur kejiwaan TD . Unsur-unsur kejiwaan (khususnya Jiwa Tentera) yang suatu ketika dahulu menjadi tonggak kecemerlangan TD kian dilupakan. Menyedari, jika TD mahu terus menjadi sebuah Angkatan Darat yang Gagah Setia, Panglima Tentera Darat yang ke-23, Jeneral Dato' Seri Zulkifeli bin Mohd Zin, melalui perintah ulungnya pada 24 Mei 2010 telah menekankan lima teras unsur kejiwaan yang perlu diterapkan sebagai akal budi TD pada setiap sanubari warganya.

JIWA TENTERA

Unsur-unsur jiwa tentera (lihat Rajah 1) yang dimaksudkan adalah Kesetiaan, Integriti, Kesatuan, Pengorbanan dan Keunggulan yang mana ia merupakan pendokong utama kepada dua dimensi kecemerlangan prestasi TD - Kesiapsiagaan Tempur dan Kualiti Hidup. Falsafah kembali kepada asas ketenteraan (back to basic), *learn, relearn and unlearn serta keseimbangan yang padu di antara manusia, mesin/peralatan dan metod/kaedah (man, machine and method)* adalah latar asas kepada kesinambungan kewujudan TD sebagai sebuah Angkatan Darat yang Gagah Setia. Apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan unsur kejiwaan atau jiwa tentera?



Rajah 1: Carta Intipati Perintah Ulung PTD

Harre dan Lamb (1983) mengatakan istilah jiwa sangat luas maknanya. Ia merangkumi fenomena mental, sistem metabolisme, penyuburan serta pertumbuhan dan lokomotif seseorang. Rangkuman aspek yang luas inilah yang membentuk jiwa seseorang dan kecenderungan jiwa seseorang dapat dilihat melalui refleksi cara berfikir, perasaan, emosi, persepsi, sensasi, suasana hati dan pembawaan seseorang. Menyokong definisi ini, Chaplin (1989) juga mendefinisikan istilah jiwa sebagai struktur psikologi yang tersusun dalam diri seseorang untuk berinteraksi dengan alam sekelilingnya. Secara tidak langsung struktur psikologi ini juga menjadi asas pandu

arah cara mana inividu berinteraksi (berfikir dan beraksi) dengan alam sekelilingnya.

Abrahamsson (1972) mengusulkan nilai profesi tentera (pengalaman latihan, tugas, tanggungjawab dan misi ketenteraan) akan membentuk 'military mind', iaitu satu kumpulan sikap yang relevan yang dimiliki oleh anggota-anggota tentera itu lebih daripada pada orang yang berada dalam kelompok pekerjaan lain. Antara sikap relevan hasil daripada 'military mind' ialah; (1) nasionalisme (2) kepercayaan pesimis kepada tabii manusia (3) kewaspadaan (alarmism) iaitu penilaian tentang kemungkinan perang (4) konsevertisme politik dan (5) autoritarianism. 'Military mind' juga disebut sebagai sebagai akal budi tentera (Kenali, 2007). Akal budi tentera terbentuk kerana seluruh kehidupan tentera adalah kehidupan institusi, di mana struktur sistem kognitif dan perlakuan terbina dari orientasi/pengalaman ketenteraan yang memperkembang dan membentuk akal budi tentera.

Pembentukan jiwa yang sesuai dengan nilai masyarakat atau organisasi dapat menghalakan sistem berfikir dan perlakuan kerja yang produktif ke arah pencapaian matlamat organisasi. Menurut Rahman (1980), tumpuan utama yang paling berkesan untuk mempengaruhi tingkah laku anggota tentera ialah dengan mempengaruhi jiwnya kerana jiwa merupakan pusat jana kuasa kepada keseluruhan tubuh manusia. Jiwa dapat mempengaruhi psikik seseorang dan melalui jiwa inilah kita dapat mengawal dan membentuk tingkah lakunya.

PEMBANGUNAN JIWA TENTERA

Kanter (1972) dan Buchanan (1974) pula melihat pembentukan jiwa sebagai hasil daripada pembudayaan sistem kerja. Individu yang mempunyai jiwa berorganisasi mempunyai perasaan keterikatan psikologi terhadap organisasinya. Bagi membentuk budaya kerja ke arah pembentukan jiwa yang positif terhadap organisasi, peranan pemimpin adalah amat penting. Schein (1980) mengatakan apabila sesuatu budaya kerja telah menjadi sebat dalam jiwa individu, maka budaya kerja pula yang mempengaruhi seluruh warga organisasi, termasuk gaya kepemimpinan pemimpin itu sendiri. Berdasarkan definisi ini, jiwa tentera boleh didefinisikan sebagai penerimaan atau penghayatan nilai dan amalan tentera, iaitu sebagai tatacara yang sesuai dan perlu bagi mengatur perlakuan setiap anggota tentera. Adalah dijangkakan semakin tinggi tingkat penerimaan budaya tentera dalam diri seseorang

maka semakin positif jiwa, keterikatan perasaan atau akal budi seseorang anggota terhadap organisasinya. Secara tidak sedar nilai dan amalan organisasi atau tatacara dan peraturan yang telah diterima oleh individu akan digunakan sebagai sumber mengawal tingkah laku individu sesuai dengan kehendak organisasi.

Meyer & Rowan (1977) mendefinisikan penjiwaan sesuatu budaya sebagai proses penginstitusian (institutionalization). Penginstitusian merupakan proses sosialisasi dan obligasi. Proses ini berperanan sebagai status peraturan di dalam pemikiran dan perlakuan seseorang individu. Seterusnya, apabila budaya telah dijiwai, ciri-ciri budaya (contohnya, ciri-ciri keperwiraan ketenteraan) akan terpamer melalui tingkah laku individu. Tolbert & Zucker (1983) pula berpendapat penginstitusian merupakan proses penerimaan warga terhadap struktur formal organisasi mereka, sebagai sesuatu yang sesuai dan perlu serta berperanan melahirkan kesefahaman di kalangan ahli organisasi mengenai apa yang sesuai dan tingkah laku yang bermakna. Daripada satu sudut lain yang lebih ringkas ia merupakan proses penginstitusian nilai ke arah membentuk identiti diri yang sepunya dengan organisasi yang dijiwai.

Proses membudayakan jiwa tentera bukan sahaja memerlukan ideologi dan falsafah yang berkesan semata-mata, tetapi bagaimana pelaksanaan penerapan jiwa tentera dilakukan melalui budaya kerja, khususnya dalam konteks ketenteraan. Aronzon (1988) berpendapat pembudayaan kerja ke arah jiwa tentera boleh dilakukan melalui tiga tahap iaitu (1) tahap pematuhan, (2) identifikasi dan (3) penghayatan . Pada asasnya tahap pematuhan merupakan tahap pembinaan jiwa tentera ke arah kejelektenan secara mendatar (sesama rakan sekerja) . Tahap kedua pula merupakan peningkatan pembinaan kepada kejelektenan menegak (dengan ketua atau pihak atasannya). Tahap terakhir ialah perkembangan jiwa tentera ke arah setiakawan, iaitu suatu tahap jiwa tentera yang telah matang bagi melaksanakan misi ketenteraan.

HUBUNGAN JIWA TENTERA DENGAN DAYA JUANG KETENTERAAN

Kepentingan faktor jiwa tentera ini adalah sangat signifikan dalam mempersiap dan menggerakkan sumber manusia sebagai angkatan yang disegani kawan dan digeruni lawan. Sejarah telah berulang kali memberi pengajaran dan peringatan bahawa pasukan-

pasukan yang sempurna persiapan tempurnya dari segi persenjataan dan latihan sering kali tewas dan mengalami kesengsaraan perang jika tidak berjiwa tentera (Baynes 1967). Di sebaliknya pasukan yang serba kekurangan dari segi peralatan tempur dan logistik, tetapi mempunyai kejelekhan jiwa tentera sebagai satu pasukan mampu menewaskan pasukan yang lebih besar kekuatannya. Anggota yang berjiwa tentera mempunyai daya tekad dan keterlibatan diri terhadap pasukannya di mana ia akan mencurahkan tenaga dan kesetiaannya (Kenali, 2007). Semakin tinggi jiwa tentera seseorang anggota itu maka semakin tinggilah daya juangnya. Justeru jika piaawai perlakuan yang digariskan oleh TD dalam melatih dan membentuk anggota yang berdaya juang telah diterima sebagai nilai diri anggota, maka daya juang TD akan juga meningkat.

Apabila pembudayaan jiwa tentera telah berlaku melalui sistem kerja dan sistem latihan maka tingkah laku daya juang akan terpamer secara spontan oleh warga pasukan. Antara indikasi-indikasi perlakuan daya juang yang boleh terhasil dari pembudayaan jiwa tentera ialah: (1) penampilan diri sebagai pahlawan diri, (2) kelakuan peribadi yang jelas, (3) mempunyai piaawai kesopanan ketenteraan, (4) mengambil berat terhadap penjagaan kesihatan peribadi, (5) bertanggungjawab terhadap penjagaan peralatan, (6) peningkatan bidang kemahiran kerja, (7) bermotivasi semasa latihan, (8) kurangnya kes-cederakan diri atau menipu sakit dan (9) kurangnya kes-kes pertengkar serta pergaduhan dalam sesebuah pasukan.

Pembentukan jiwa berlaku mengikut tiga peringkat proses sosialisasi (Aronzon, 1988). Pada peringkat pertama ialah proses sosialisasi pematuhan/keterpakaan , peringkat kedua ialah sosialisasi identifikasi dan peringkat ketiga ialah penghayatan nilai organisasi agar selari dengan nilai diri sendiri . Menggunakan konsep ini pembudayaan suasana kerja ke arah jiwa tentera yang berdaya juang dapat dijelaskan. Proses sosialisasi tahap pertama soldadu muda yang baru mencebur diri dalam Tentera Darat Malaysia adalah berunsurkan tingkah laku keterpakaan. Pada tahap ini perlakuan anggota bermotivasiikan keinginan ganjaran atau untuk mengelakkkan dendaan. Dalam tahap ini pembudayaan jiwa tentera dihalakan ke arah kejelekhan mendatar. Kejelekhan mendatar berkembang apabila anggota yang sama taraf dari segi pangkat membuat tugas yang serupa secara berkumpulan. Perhubungan rakan setaraf ini juga penting bagi mengatasi perasaan keceluaran

dan ketidaktentuan anggota baru dalam TD, kerana bagi anggota baru segala tugas adalah asing dan mencabar.

Jika tahap pertama membincangkan bagaimana budaya kerja tentera mengalakan perkembangan jiwa tentera ke arah pembentukan kejelekhan rakan setaraf, maka pembudayaan tahap kedua adalah terarah bagi membentuk kejelekhan menegak antara anggota dengan pegawai atasan terdekat. Kejelekhan menegak adalah keakraban perhubungan yang membawa kepada keyakinan anggota rakan setaraf secara individu dan/ atau kumpulan dengan ketua atasannya. Pembudayaan jiwa tentera yang jelekset secara menegak berlaku apabila kumpulan anggota mempamerkan suatu bentuk identiti perlakuan kepada ketua atasan terdekatnya. Hasil daripada latihan atas kesoldaduan (latihan senjata, kawad dan ilmu medan perang) di tahap pertama, di tahap kedua ini anggota tentera mula menunjukkan perilaku etos keperwiraan. Di peringkat ini perlakuan yang dipamerkan oleh anggota bukan lagi berkonseptan mendapatkan ganjaran atau mengelak dendaan, tetapi untuk diterima menjadi ahli warga kumpulan atau pasukan. Kumpulan bermaksud kumpulan kecil seperti sistem berpasangan (buddy system - setiap anggota dimestikan mempunyai seorang rakan karib), kumpulan senjata bantuan, kumpulan senjata repal dan kumpulan tinjau. Pasukan pula merujuk kepada pasukan kecil peringkat sekysen, platon, kompeni hingga ke peringkat batalion.

Proses sosialisasi tahap tiga bagi anggota tentera ialah proses penghayatan tingkah laku individu agar selari menyokong nilai dan kepercayaan kumpulan dan/ atau TD. Anggota-anggota TD yang telah melalui proses pembudayaan jiwa tentera ke arah kejelekhan mendatar sesama rakan setaraf (tahap 1) dan kejelekhan menegak antara anggota dengan ketua atasan terdekat (tahap 2) terus berkembang ke arah ‘esprit de corps’. ‘Esprit de corps’ merujuk kepada semangat setiakawan peringkat pasukan yang lebih besar seperti peringkat formasi briged, divisyen dan ke atas hingga kepada semangat setiakawan tahap kor dan TD . Ia bukan lagi kejelekhan yang hanya merujuk kepada semangat setiakawan antara buddy system , platon atau peringkat batalion (Manning & Ingraham 1987). Pada tahap ‘esprit de corps’ ini, adalah dijangkakan juga bahawa anggota-anggota telah menyatu diri dengan nilai bercirikan etos keperwiraan (pembela dan pejuang bangsa dan negara) yang bersendikan patriotisme, pengorbanan, taat setia, pemberani dan boleh di harap. Anggota atau pasukan sebegini telah matang yang bukan sahaja mampu menjalankan gerakan

inter batalion tetapi intra batalion dengan formasi atasan hingga ke peringkat Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu. Rumusan contoh model konsep teoritikal pembangunan kretirium Jiwa Tentera adalah seperti di Jadual 1 di bawah:

bawahan merupakan dua faktor utama pembentukan dan pengukuhan jiwa tentera. Perbincangan menjelaskan bagaimana faktor budaya kerja rejimental membentuk jiwa tentera yang berkejelekatan, berdaya usaha (motivasi),

Jadual 1: Model Panduan Konsep Teoritikal Pengurusan Jiwa Tentera Ke Arah Pembangunan Daya Juang Ketenteraan

Tahap Perkembangan Jiwa Tentera	Kretirium Jiwa Tentera ke arah Daya Juang Ketenteraan			
	Kejelekatan	Keyakinan	Kemampuan bertempur	Tingkah laku Sosialisasi
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Tahap 1	Mendatar sesama rakan setaraf	Yakin terhadap diri sendiri, senjata persendirian dan Rakan Setaraf (dalam buddy system)	Asas Kesoldaduan (senjata, kawad, IMP)	Pematuhan/ Pemaksaan
Tahap 2	Menegak antara pihak anggota dengan pegawai atasan terdekat	Pemimpin atasan terdekat	Kumpulan (buddy, skuad atau seksyen)	Identifikasi
Tahap 3	Setiakawan dalam konteks Tentera Darat Malaysia yang lebih luas	Nilai Ketenteraan di terima sebagai asas kehidupan	Pasukan (platon, kompeni atau batalion peringkat inter atau intra pasukan/formasi)	Penghayatan

Dibangunkan dari konsep sosialisasi Aronzon (1988)

RUMUSAN DAN IMPLIKASI KEPENTINGAN JIWA TENTERA

Jiwa tentera mempunyai kepentingan sebagai peramal dan faktor anteseden yang mempengaruhi daya juang. Semua tahap kepimpinan perlu sentiasa membayangkan satu model teoritikal bagi reka bentuk budaya kerja yang membangunkan jiwa tentera. Budaya tentera yang sebatik sebagai akal budi ketenteraan akan menjadi elemen spiritual yang mengawal psikomotor perlakuan warga TD. Perbincangan menunjukkan semakin meningkat tahap jiwa tentera seseorang anggota maka semakin tinggi juga tahap daya juangnya. Begitulah sebaliknya, semakin menurun tahap jiwa tentera seseorang anggota itu maka semakin rendahlah juga tahap daya juangnya.

Budaya kerja bersistemkan regimental dan sistem mendeligasikan kuasa kepada pemimpin-pemimpin

berkesiapsiagaan dan rendah kerisauan (ketidakrisauan). Justeru perkara-perkara berikut perlu diberi perhatian:

- (i) Pemupukan sesuatu budaya kerja yang positif ke arah membentuk dan mengukuhkan lagi jiwa tentera perlu diteruskan. Pihak pengurusan (pemimpin) jangan terlalu mudah mengambil keputusan mengatakan bahawa sesuatu budaya kerja itu sudah ketinggalan zaman dan perlu dihentikan tanpa/sebelum kajian terperinci dilakukan.
- (ii) Kelancaran dan kemurnian perjalanan pentadbiran pertubuhan-pertubuhan separuh formal dalam sistem regimental pasukan seperti Wisma Perwira (pegawai), Wisma Bintara (Sarjan Staf Sarjan dan Pegawai Waren), Wisma Petanda (Lans Koperal/Koperal) dan Wisma Astaka (soldadu) serta Badan Kebajikan Angkatan Tentera (BAKAT badan kebajikan untuk isteri-isteri tentera') perlu diberi perhatian.
- (iii) Mengadakan sistem kerja dan sistem penempatan yang mampu menyuburkan pertumbuhan dan pengukuhan

jiwa tentera yang berdaya juang perlu diberi perhatian. Ini termasuk menentukan anggota sentiasa berada dalam satu kumpulan asal mereka (sama ada mengikut sistem buddy, sebagai satu seksyen, platun, kompeni dan pasukan) dalam satu jangka masa yang panjang. Bagi tujuan ini, sebaik-baiknya elakan penugasan jangka panjang yang memecahbelahkan perhubungan mereka sebagai satu kumpulan.

(iv) Faktor jiwa tentera perlu diambil kira dalam sistem perkembangan kerjaya seperti kenaikan pangkat dan penempatan (terutamanya kepada pemilihan jurulatih). Prihatin terhadap budaya negatif, terutamanya budaya niaga yang menjerumuskan anggota kepada permasalahan kewangan dan keterampilan pasukan. Pendek kata para pemimpin perlu peka dan mengurus pembangunan ilmu dengan perubahannya (management of change) agar ia sentiasa seiringan sesuai dengan jiwa tentera agar peranan TD tidak tergugat.

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Kol Dr Mohd Kenali bin Basiron telah menyertai Maktab Tentera Diraja pada Jun 1980 dan telah ditauliahkan sebagai Lt Muda dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu Diraja pada Jun 1982. Beliau telah menyandang pelbagai perjawatan dalam tempoh perkhidmatan beliau termasuk Pegawai Memerintah Batalion ke 5 Rejimen Sempadan. Beliau juga telah menghadiri pelbagai kursus ketenteraan dan mempunyai kelulusan Ijazah Sarjana Psikologi (UKM) di samping beberapa kelulusan akademik lain seperti Ijazah Ijazah Sarjana Sains Pengajian Pertahanan (UKM), Diploma Siswazah Analisis Perniagaan dari Lancaster University, Diploma Siswazah Psikologi (Kaunseling) dari UKM dan Diploma Siswazah Pengajian Strategik dan Pertahanan (UM). Dengan kepakaran beliau dalam morale tentera, Kol Dr Mohd Kenali sekarang bertugas sebagai Pengarah Sel Psikologi dan Kaunseling Tentera Darat, KEMENTAH.



ARMY DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

By Lt Kol Mohd Zaki bin Hamzah

-SYNOPSIS-

Ever since the existence of Gog and Magog, countries were ravaged, plumaged and replaced with a new type of civilisation. Nations of the world are not spared of this barbaric act until today, but it comes in different forms. The purpose is not so much to that of ancient times when dwellings and civilisations were plumaged to obtain food for survival and grazing fields for the steed. Today, the attacks are launched with the aim of expansionism, political hegemony and control of oil which is becoming more scarce. This Gog and Magog business seems not diminishing and keeps continuing. The Malaysian Army must be formidably poised to possess the Fighting Power which is represented by Intellectual, Physical and Moral components. Intellectual component or doctrine should take precedence than the rest as it remains the main ingredient that builds and binds physical and moral component. Promulgation of doctrine is a dynamic process, it must take into cognizance the ever changing threats of the future. A clear direction in the writing of doctrine must thus be formulated.

INTRODUCTION

The development of strategic policy is influenced by three interdependent factors namely the external strategic environment confronting a nation-state, the internal strategic characteristics of the nation-state and the nation-state's historical experience of military strategy and conflict. Other internal characteristics such as the size of its population, the nature of its political system and its economic capacity arise legacy capabilities, doctrinal preferences, organizational and cultural traditions. These influences will eventually shape the range of viable military strategic approaches available to promote national security and sovereignty.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

Definition. Military doctrine encapsulates the way the Armed Forces conceptualize and conduct warfare. Military doctrine is generally defined as “**fundamental principles by which military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in its application**”.

In the manual **MD 1 TD**, doctrine is defined as “**formal expression of military knowledge and thought that the**

Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging them to achieve success. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application”.

Rightfully, military doctrine evolves in response to changes in political, strategic, economic, environmental, societal and technological circumstances. It allows the development of concepts for operations and guides the adoption of new technology, tactics, techniques and procedures. Properly applied, military doctrine is a force multiplier. Clausewitz equates military doctrine as a source for the accumulation of knowledge as “**theories exist so that one does not have to start afresh every time sorting out the raw material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or more accurately, to guide him in his self education; not accompany him to the battlefield**”.

Function. The function of military doctrine is to establish the framework of understanding on the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application. As war is a clash of wills, ambiguity and confusion, doctrine is more concerned with conveying understanding, not instruction. An opponent's will must be subdued and his courage killed. To succeed, the military

needs to be able to create order during the chaos of war. For this simple reason, clear doctrine and all the stems of doctrine are important ingredients towards success. Military doctrine must be able to influence the way how officers and NCOs think and provides the framework of common understanding on the approach to warfare. It must be developed in peacetime, focusing on the sense of purpose and the spectrum of conflict the Armed Forces will be involved, taking into consideration other range of peacetime operations.

THE ARMY DOCTRINE

In concert with the promulgation of the Malaysian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine Publications and the Army Transformation Plan (ATP), doctrine or intellectual component development is never the less as important as the physical and moral component development. The whole process of transformation is within the ambit of establishing an Objective Force (OF) from the present Intermediate Force (CF). This effort is imperatively undertaken in line with the Government's Transformation Programme (GTP) to cope with the current and ever complex emerging security threats. The demise of traditional security threats has given way to other non-traditional threats which trespass national boundaries and the traditional ways of fighting. The ATP will eventually transform the Army into a modern land force, ready to conduct a wide spectrum of conflict including Asymmetric Warfare, Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and other nation building tasks under the National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS) based on Deception, Survive and Strike, Protracted (DSSP) strategy.

Levels of Army Doctrine. In some cases doctrine will be written to put across straightforward instruction, in others it will aim to impart understanding or elsewhere it may do both. In the Malaysian Army there are three levels at which doctrine is written as depicted in **Annex A** as follows:

- Philosophical Level.** A Philosophical Level Doctrine is the highest level of Army doctrine. Doctrine at this level must address the questions of: why we have an Army? What is the nature of the war the Army may be called upon to fight and how does it succeed in such a war. It is represented by the **M 1 TD –The Army**.
- Application Level.** This level of doctrine is concerned with the principles that govern the conduct of operations

especially at the operational levels of conflict. It seeks to impart both understanding and instruction, although the emphasis is on understanding. It will be based upon the **MD-TD** series of publications.

- Procedural Level.** Tactical doctrine provides the main body of doctrinal instruction within the Army. It is essential to ensure that all commanders, whatever their specialization, have a common foundation on which to base their plans. Most commonly it appears in the **MP-TD** series of manuals together with the **MM-TD** and SOPs, which represent the core of this procedural level.

ARMY EFFECTIVENESS

Army effectiveness is judged by the standard it performs in peace and war. It is explained by using the concept of Fighting Power, which is the ability to fight and win. It provides the intellectual justification for the restructure of the OF that the Army is being transformed. The Army generates Fighting Power through the combination of these three components:

- Intellectual Component.** The intellectual component provides the knowledge and a common understanding of how to fight (Training and Doctrine).
- Physical Component.** The physical component provides the means to fight (People, Organisation, Infrastructure, Logistics, Equipment, Weapons etc).
- Moral Component.** The moral component provides the intangible strength to fight (Believe and Will Power).

The promulgation of Army doctrine should be undertaken within the definition of this Fighting Power (Capability to Fight). Intellectual component should take precedence than the rest because it remains as the main ingredient that builds and binds both the physical and moral component. These components of fighting power need to be constantly debated, tested and modernized as they are dynamic in nature and ever changing with time and space. The building blocks of Fighting Power as illustrated in **Annex B**, also need to be constantly revisited to commensurate with the present and future development requirements.

ARMY STRATEGY

Role. As the backbone of the Armed Forces, the Army is to protect Malaysia's land territorial integrity and national interests. The strategic environment, the clamour for natural resources, the political and economic hegemony issues have put the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca as hot spots of future conflicts as more than half of world oil transits through these waterways. Malaysia as an oil producing country herself has national interests off shore. It is the Army's role to provide land forces to protect Malaysia's territorial sovereignty. In doing so credible doctrine has to be promulgated to reinforce this stratagem in line with the Army's DSSP strategy that has been recently introduced.

Multi-Layered Defence. The concept of multi-layered defence is viable through the utilization of all military and civilian resources. The concept of NBOS will come into force where all the civilian agencies and the military will have to integrate to form a total defense alongside the mass population as the pillar to defend the nation. As a pre-emptive measure the multi-layered defense of Malaysia can be enforced consisting of a three-layered national defense. The primary role of the Army is to safeguard Layer 1 and layer 2 within the effort of joint and combined operations with other sister services, TUDM and TLDM. Layer 3 is the area of interest which needs further collaboration and multilateral understanding with other neighbouring countries within the ambit of international cooperation and combined effort. The areas are designated as follows:

- a. **Layer 1** - Both the land masses of West and East Malaysia.
- b. **Layer 2** - Area of Influence - The islands and small isles within the Malaysian territory including Terumbu Layang-layang and its affiliates.
- c. **Layer 3** - Area of Interest encompassing the surrounding nations including Singapore, part of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and the surrounding territories.

Two Theatre Defence. Malaysia being a sovereign nation has a distinct geographical nature having two land masses separated to each other by the South China Sea. The Malaysian territory is divided into two namely the West and East Malaysia. With such a geographical

posture, the defence of these land masses has to take into cognizance the availability of the Army to safe guard both its territories and her surrounding islands divided into two theatre operations. Thus the Army strategy should also be adopting to two regional commands capable of fighting their own distinct war independently. In a low level conflict, when either East or West Malaysia is under sieged, either or both of these theatres should be able to defend their own Area of Responsibilities. Reinforcement of troops and logistics to support each other has to come from either of these theatres. However in a regional or general war, where both East and West Malaysia are under sieged, each of theatre East and West Malaysia has to fight within its own resources to dislodge any encroachment into the Malaysian territories. Support in any sort to and from each of this territory is very limited taking into consideration the fluid situation and the need for self reinforcement within the theatre of operations. Command and control during this situation is becoming more complex as the Army Field Command has to concentrate its resources within the Peninsular leaving the East Malaysia Command within its own. In this situation, then, both Army Field command and the designated East Malaysia Command are answerable straight to the Chief of Army during a regional and general war scenario.

Capabilities. To circumnavigate the physical threats, promulgation of doctrine must be able to cover all aspects of Army Capabilities in a wide spectrum and variety of conflicts. The preparation of combat power which comprises of manpower, equipment, logistics, training and readiness is time consuming and costly. However, no matter how long it takes and how costly it is, it's the Army's responsibility to provide these capabilities to be able to carry out its role and tasks in upholding the national security and sovereignty from ever present threats.

Threats. As modern land conflict involves both symmetric and asymmetric threats. Both of these threats either launched simultaneously or in parallel must be taken into consideration.

- a. **Symmetric.** Symmetric warfare may be viewed as the clash of two conventional adversaries in intense and violent battles and involves the engagement of similar military forces in force-on-force warfare in a traditional manner. As much has been so far written about the traditional Symmetric Warfare, more discussion should be focused on protracted low and medium-intensity military campaign on the employment of symmetric threats.
- b. **Asymmetric.** Asymmetric threats are the opposite of

symmetric threats which involve the use of unconventional or irregular means to circumvent an adversary's strengths. Asymmetric warfare describes military actions against an adversary to which he may have no effective response, which pit strength against weakness, sometimes in a non-traditional and unconventional manner. In terms of the application of land power, it is important to draw a distinction between asymmetric warfare as employed by the militaries of modern liberal states and asymmetric warfare as employed by real and potential opponents of non state actors. In the context of military operations by modern super power democratic states, the aim of asymmetry is to achieve disproportionate effects and not to afford an effective counter to the forces used against him. Asymmetric threats have no known fronts and therefore represent a potent means to achieve strategic objectives. They are difficult to counter and responses are often perceived as disproportionate. Mechanisms to counter asymmetric threats are attracting increased attention, will impact upon future Army capabilities and should be given more emphasis. Amongst the issues of asymmetric threats are:

(1) **Terrorism.** The use of violence to intimidate the population or a government for political ends. The 9/11 incident was the pivotal point in the history of mankind strategically created to launch global anti terrorism campaign, which unfortunately brings to the fore most the Muslim nations as the target of the campaign. It is believed to be a part of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) plotted by American Institution of Public Relations American Committee (AIPAC) represented by the Zionist-Jewish community to change the demography of the Muslim countries and the treat is real.

(2) **Armed Insurgencies and Subversion.** Embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with national or international political aims. The use of it is to foment revolutions and civil war within a country. The use of mercenaries are widely employed, where young operatives who are specially trained in terrorism and special operations are often deployed. They receive a large share of payment from actor states who employ them to augment certain political causes into other countries abroad.

(3) **Usage of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical).** A type of propaganda war to undermine the image of a country, used as a pretext to justify military intervention. Launched

by the adversaries in collaboration with a group of *like-minded countries* of their choice towards weaker countries. Classical example was the Iraq War and would be next Iran War. This type of threat can be amplified or real.

(4) **Cyber Attacks.** An act of sending computer viruses, such as trojan horses and other forms of computer attack to jeopardise the communications, infrastructure and computer system and capable of crippling the industry, economic and the governing system of a country. Cyber technology is also widely used as a propaganda tool to negate the image of a country to the eyes of international community.

(5) **Capitalism.** The uncontrolled mechanism of economic system by oppressing the 99% working class for the purpose of unscrupulous profit making by the 1% bourgeoisie class, thus broadening the gap between the rich and the poor which creates instability and friction within the society.



c. **Internal Security.** The changing nature of internal security in an increasingly globalise and borderless world today are largely non-military in nature. Forms of known internal security threats which if not controlled at the early stage will threaten national security and destabilise a country. The source of it is either locally or from abroad and staged by state or non state actors such as:

(1) **Racism.** The use of racial and religious issues to create dissatisfaction and disunity among the various ethnic races with the purpose of fomenting conflict amongst the indigenous races.

(2) **Drug, Human and Arms Cartels.** Illegal measures employed to destabilise the population or government. Usually done through the network of criminal cross border organizations to destroy the fabrics of the society by flooding a country with drug, illegal immigrants and small arms to create an external and

anarchic environment which threatens the security of an internal and domestic society.

(3) **Lumpenization.** Lumpenization is a process that reduces the adequacy and social participation of an individual, as characterized by the atomization of the individual, social alienation, and loss of a sense of community. It is a Marxist-Leninist theory of creating fear and incredibility in the fabrics of domestic society which encompasses all the destabilising factors to destroy the fabrics of society from the smallest family unit up to the government institutions. A strategic and systematic process adopted to destroy the stability and security of its people, the credibility of the legitimate government by installing fear socially, economically and culturally. The effects are far reaching and time is of essence. Amongst the approaches are as follows:

(a) **Social.** Social attack by the following means:

- aa. Corruption.
- bb. Gangsterisme
- cc. Criminalisme.
- dd. Religious and Racial Fanatics.
- ee. Illegal Gambling.
- ff. Prostitution and Phonograph.
- gg. Drug Cartels.
- hh. Cross border Human Migration.
- ii. Zionism.

(b) **Economy.** Economic attack by the following means:

- aa. Capitalism.
- bb. Currency Manipulation.
- cc. Sanctions.
- dd. Money Laundering.
- ee. Psychological Operation in Information Warfare.
- ff. Sabotage of the National Industry.

The Trend. Latest geo-political trend is witnessed by the presence of efforts from abroad in trying to destabilise a country by targeting the mass population as an agent to overthrow the established government. It is waged by the adversaries for their political and economic hegemony by intimidating a population and fomenting a people's revolution through the use of violence or force people to revolt against the legitimate government. In this context insurgency warfare is often waged with the aim of not only to overthrow the government but also the reversal of the social and cultural systems of a country. In the process they use the pretext of using sosial justices and humanitarian causes to warrant a legitimacy of intervention to protect

culminating in an invasion of a nation and eventually jockeyed with 'like-minded' government of their choice. Insurgency warfare embraces forms of violence, sources of which is either from within or abroad or combination of both. The aim is to ignite a civil war within the country and ultimately change the government. Most recent example is the Arab Spring which topples the governments in Africa, the Middle East and may later expand to non like-minded countries in Latin America, China, Russia and perhaps the whole world. Looking at this scenario, the role of the Special Forces to launch and counter special operations will most likely increase in the near future.

Covering the Gaps. Doctrine establishes the framework of understanding on the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application. Ideally, the development of Man, Machine and Method (3M) of the Army should commensurate with written doctrine or doctrinally driven. However, doctrine development depends largely on the way in which the Army is organized and equipped taking into consideration the budget allocated. The speed of change in modern technology and the ever changing threats environment means that organizations and equipment do not always follow directly from doctrine as theoretically as they should. During this development all the three components of Fighting Power (Intellectual, Physical and Moral) are closely inter-dependent and must be able to bind and support each other. Any capability gap within this three Physical, Intellectual and Moral components must be quickly addressed, covered and bridged promptly or otherwise it will render to a lesser degree of Army Fighting Power. An example of the Army Capabilities is illustrated in **Annex C**.

ARMY DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Since 2002 the Army has promulgated the Doctrine Master Plan until 2012. This was done in line with the transformation of the Army from the era of CIW into the new century of Conventional Warfare, since the demise of the Communist Insurgency in 1990. The new doctrine is based on the concept of Manoeuvre Warfare, to cater for the wide range of operations in modern warfare in line with the DSSP strategy. The Army doctrine development should also take into cognizance the trilogy of Man, Machine and Method (3M) encompassing all the components of Physical, Intellectual and Moral. It is aimed at educating the officers and men to have a common understanding of fighting in all spectrum of war.

TIME LINE

Review of Master Plan 2002. By 2012 all Army manuals are published, distributed and assimilated. The present Master Plan 2002-2012 needs be reviewed to holistically ensure that all manuals are sufficiently produced for the Army to be able to fight using Conventional (Symmetry), Unconventional (Asymmetry) and OOTW, not forgetting the peacetime tasks of nation building as outlined in NBOS. Subsequently, all published manuals need to be reviewed every 5 years as to ascertain its credibility and relevancy with current defence commitment and resources, threat and technology, taking into consideration the emerging doctrine in the near future. The reviewed manuals should then be formalized and reissued every 10 years. During the process of reviewing attention should also be given to revise the conceptual aspects pertaining to inter-agency roles of the Army as regards to internal security and the capability for inter-operability with other security agencies such as the PDRM, Maritime Agency, RELA, Civil Defence, Customs, Immigration Department, UPP and other related government security agencies.

Plan 2025. The development and publication of Army doctrine until 2012 has well achieved the target set forth in the doctrinal Master Plan, with more than 90% of its publications been published. The next phase of development is to embark on producing the series of doctrine to strengthen and complement the present doctrine in line with the emerging threats and future doctrine. The proposed overall time line in developing the Army doctrine is as depicted in **Table 1** below:

DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENT

The written provisional manuals produced by Doctrine Cell, Army Training Command are subjected to undergo comprehensive trial and evaluation process to test for standardization, adaptability, reliability, wide utility and ease of use. Other requirement for doctrine development should be done in line with the following:

a. **Realignment.** The current written doctrine seems to be too conventional like or too rigid in nature. It is ideally suited to open space war fighting as most of it is templated from the doctrines of western countries. Lately the trend, design and threat pattern has completely

Year	2002 - 2012	2013	2014 – 2018	2019	2020 - 2025
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Primary Tasks	Writing, Publication, Validation of manuals	Consolidate & Review of Master Plan 2012 to suit DSSP	Evaluation & Trial, Writing of Emerging Threats and Doctrine	Review of Manuals For Future Doctrine	
Secondary Tasks	Distribution Provisional Manuals	Research on development of FSS, Network Centric, OOTW, Asymmetric, Internal Security & NBOS	Formalize & Reissue Manuals	Joint & Coalition Op, OOTW, Electromagnetic Spectrum	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Focus	Svc Centric		Joint / Inter-Agencies / Coalition		
User	Consolidated Force		Intermediate Force	Objective Force	
Strategy	Detection, Survive & Strike, Protracted Warfare (DSSP)/NBOS				
Method	Symmetric & Asymmetric (Simultaneous/Parallel)				
Environment	Jungle, Urban & NBC				
Influencing Factors	Political, Strategic, Economic, Environmental, Societal and Technological				

Table 1: Proposed Time Line of the Army Doctrine Development

changed its course in this new decade and the application of asymmetric warfare is clearly seen to be more widely executed. To perceive the changing threats, the way forward is to realign the writing of doctrine taking into consideration the following aspects:

(1) **Application of DSSP Strategy.** The writing of doctrine should be more flexible to suit a more contemporary war fighting concept taking into consideration the application of asymmetric or unconventional approach towards war fighting. As Malaysia is a nation embracing the doctrine of non-aggression and in defensive in posture, we should take into cognizance the doctrine of present war fighting of the perceived threats, most likely from abroad, from a state or non-state actors with force projection capabilities. Thus, as a measure in countering the enemy doctrine, the application of DSSP strategy is seen as prudent to meet the onslaught of future adversary. The commonly known doctrine of a hostile country adopting offensive and pre-emptive capability, having the credible force projection of inserting troops into foreign countries, adopts the conventional application of Shaping, Attacking, Protecting and Exploiting (SAPE). It is expected that no country has the opportunity to stand the first onslaught of simultaneous attacks. Thus it is only prudent for the Army to apply the doctrine of the opposites by executing Deception, Survive and Strike and Protraction (DSSP), as a counter strategy to survive the initial enemy onslaught. However, as DSSP is a new strategy more effort should be taken to study this subject matter to ascertain that its applicability fulfills the combat requirement in every aspect of war fighting. The DSSP counter stratagem is as illustrated in **Diagram 1.** (2)

future are mostly joint, coalition or bloc in nature. Except for the super power, no one country can afford to launch an attack or military intervention into another country unilaterally without the set backs from the international community. Interventions need to be consented by the international community through the United Nations and they are often launched through collaboration with a group of *like minded* countries, multilaterally either in a regional or general war. The tendency of the United States and the United Nations in determining the democracies of nations would be challenged since the emergence of a new international political organisation of leading emerging economies in 2011 comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and Latin America bloc countries. With this momentum, the uni-polarity of the US dominance in shaping the world politics will probably be lessen even though the impact played by these BRICS countries is yet to be seen in the near future. Throughout history, the role played in controlling the world had changed hands from the *Scythian* barbarians of ancient to modern Britain which later to present day United States. The future may remain unchanged or probably changes hands either to BRICS or likely to Jerusalem. History is yet to unfold itself.

(4) **Environment.** Another aspect which is worth mentioning is the environment in which the Army is going to fight in future wars. Malaysia is becoming more urbanised with modern networks of fast corridor of highways and more jungle areas have given way for development. It is only imperative to note that future battles will not only be fought in dense forest, but most of it in urbanized built up area throughout the country. Therefore, doctrine should be written to be flexible enough to suit the environment in which we are going to fight merging together the requirements of fulfilling both jungle and urban environment, through the application of both symmetric and asymmetric warfare, in conventional and unconventional settings for parallel or simultaneous warfare, in a regional or total war.




Diagram 1: The DSSP Stratagem

(3) **Joint/Coalition/Bloc.** Military operations in the



Photo 2: The Urban Environment in Malaysia

b. **Mind Set.** Professional armies shun complacency as they value forthright and robust intellectual and professional debate, especially in the discussion of doctrine and the development of future capabilities. This debate can only occur when professional mastery is achieved throughout the Army. In order to achieve this, the Army needs knowledgeable, experience, dedicated critical thinkers with the right security conscious mind sets as to position the Army to face the challenges in writing the future doctrine.

c. **Evaluation Programme.** The provisional doctrine which have been written and published needs to be validated through comprehensive trials and evaluation to ascertain its credibility and reliability. It can be accomplished through proper evaluation and can be achieved using the following platforms:

- (1) Combined/Bilateral/Multilateral MAF exercises with foreign forces.
- (2) Combined/Bilateral/Multilateral exercises with other foreign armies.

- (3) Joint exercises with the other sister services (TUDM and TLDM).
- (4) Combined exercises with other government agencies.
- (5) War game driven simulation exercises with JSIB and POP TD.
- (6) Corp, Formation and tactical level exercises.
- (7) Specific exercises designed to test certain aspects of operations such as Sustainability Op (Combat Support and Service Support), Command & Control, Airborne Operations (Para Brigade), Rear Area Security Operations (RASO), Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations (MIB), Special Forces Operations (GGK), OOTW, OBUA, etc when and as required.


d. **Evaluation Teams.** For this evaluation purpose, more concerted effort should be taken from time to time to form up dedicated teams comprising of all subject matter experts (SME) to evaluate the assimilation, common understanding and application of doctrine through participation in field and war game driven exercises. The members of the evaluation team can be sourced from the Army units and staff from MPLDTD. Besides the purpose of reviewing the doctrine, evaluation reports are also useful assessment to be used by the Army Training Committee as a tool for planning future exercises.

CLOSING


Doctrine should be regarded as neither infallible nor dogmatic but has certain degree of authority that needs to be followed. The knowledge must be developed and assimilated in peacetime. Doctrine is enduring yet dynamic in nature in order to drive the development of both sciences and art of war. Doctrine is not to teach **what to think**, but to deliver the understanding of **how to think** amongst officers and men alike. So paramount and devastating is the effect of doctrine, **that the Army will be at standstill and not knowing what to do during the chaos of war, if the knowledge and understanding of doctrine is not effectively acquired during peacetime.**

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THE ARMY CAPABILITIES



Lt Kol Mohd Zaki bin Hamzah joined the Service in 1980 and was commissioned in RMC, Sungai Besi into the Special Forces Regiment in 1982. He had served numerous command and staff appointments at various levels including as UN military observer in Sierra Leone in 2003. Had been actively involved in doctrine development since the promulgation of the new doctrine in 2001. A graduate of MTAT in 1997, he is currently SO 2 Doctrine (Special Forces) at Bhg Pembangunan Doktrin, MK Latihan TD.

THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES (MAF) EFFORTS IN PROMOTING DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

By Lt Kol Johnny Lim Eng Seng

-SYNOPSIS-

The role of the Armed Forces has traditionally been defined by the functional imperative of the use or threat of force; whether for purposes of defence, deterrence, compellance or intervention. Defence Diplomacy in contrast involves the peacetime cooperative use of the Armed Forces and the related infrastructures as a tool of foreign and security policy. Since her early formation in 1933, The MAF has undertaken facets of defence diplomacy means in its 79 year history. This essay will discuss the efforts taken by the MAF in promoting defence diplomacy. It will first look at Malaysia's defence policy and then discuss the MAF engagement in its defence diplomacy initiatives which include regional, global as well as other strategic engagements. These have contributed to the good relations of the MAF and the nation with its counterparts worldwide.

INTRODUCTION

“...I cannot emphasise enough the importance of the long standing bonds and friendship that we have between Sandhurst and Malaysia-and between Malaysia and the United Kingdom. ... I have followed closely the tragic events in London. As the ruler of an Islamic country, I strongly condemn the terrorist attacks last month...I extend my deepest condolences to the families of those who have lost their loved ones...”¹

Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Syed Putra Jamallulail, Former Yang DiPertuan Agong at The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – August 2005.

When His Majesty Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Syed Putra Jamallulail the then Yang DiPertuan Agong represented Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II at the Sovereign’s Parade in Sandhurst in August 2005, it was a significant moment for many reasons. First, after a lapse of almost six years, a Malaysian was graduating from this famous academy which had trained 302 Malaysians since 1950.²



Then King of Malaysia, Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin inspecting the Sovereign's Parade in Sandhurst in August 2005. Institutions of such stature provide the platform for officers of the MAF to gain valuable training and establish good networking with their counterparts from around the world.

¹ Sovereign's Parade Speech by His Majesty, Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Syed Putra Jamallulail, 2005 The Wish Stream, Journal of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst , Summer 2005 Vol 59, p. 82.

² Lim Johnny Major, 2002. The Malaysian Wish Stream, Malaysian Army Headquarters, p. 8.

Secondly, it was barely a month after the tragic London terrorist bombings and the King extended his condolences which were appreciated by all on that memorable summer afternoon. Above all, there were a total of 439 cadets on parade of which 27 were from 22 different countries. The King, himself a former graduate had an audience which comprised royalties and dignitaries from some 37 countries.³ This was Defence Diplomacy at its best in view of the circumstances and the manner in which the King carried out his duties as the Queen's representative.

The role of the Armed Forces has traditionally been defined by the functional imperative of the use or threat of force-whether for purposes of defence, deterrence, compellance or intervention.⁴ Defence Diplomacy in contrast involves the peacetime cooperative use of Armed forces and the related infrastructures as a tool of foreign and security policy.⁵ It encompasses a wide range of activities such as military cooperation and assistance with the aim of improving relationships between nations or diffuse tension between allies. This process may involve politicians, military personnel as well as society at large.

Since her early formation in 1933, the MAF has played a pivotal role in the implementation of Malaysia's Foreign and Defence polices. The MAF has undertaken many facets of Defence Diplomacy means in its 79 year history. They include Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief as well as other bilateral and multi-lateral military engagements. Such means not only raised the profile of the MAF but have nurtured and fostered the good relationships between the MAF and her allies.

The aim of this essay is to discuss the efforts taken by the MAF in promoting Defence Diplomacy. It will first look at Malaysia's defence policy and then discuss the MAF's engagement in training matters which have been central in its Defence Diplomacy outlook. This paper will then discuss the MAF participation in regional and global activities as well as other strategic engagements which have contributed to the good relations of the MAF and its counterparts worldwide.

³ 148th Sovereign's Parade. Available through <http://www.sandhurst.mod.uk> (12 July 2010)

⁴ Cottee,A & Forster A, 2004. Reshaping Defence Diplomacy:New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p 6.

⁵ Ibid.

MALAYSIA'S DEFENCE POLICY

As highlighted by K S Balakrishnan in 2009, Malaysia did not have a defence policy despite her regional and global engagement on defence matters.⁶ This changed in the year 2010 when it published its first defence policy (MDP 2010) which is a 54 page document highlighting the strategic interest, defence engagements as well as the capability development of her defence assets. Malaysia's defence policy hovers around the idea of protecting Malaysia's strategic interests and key national principles adhered to by the nation where its focus has been both regional and global.⁷ The MDP 2010 echoes a publication by the MAF HQ in 1999, where it highlighted Malaysia's Defence Policy as a manifestation of its goal for the protection of its national strategic interests and the preservation of national security.⁸

The defence policy outlines three basic fundamentals, namely national strategic interests, principles of defence and the concept of defence.⁹ This document emphasises on the need for the maintenance of a stable and peaceful environment of the immediate areas of its strategic interests. The MAF has been a central pillar in the formulation of Malaysia's foreign and defence policy and has played a pivotal role in the implementation of these policies since Malaysia's independence including Defence Diplomacy.¹⁰ The MDP 2010 emphasised defence diplomacy in both bilateral and multiple cooperation amongst Malaysia's regional and global partners. It looks not only in maintaining peace but as a vital tool to assist each other in facing non-traditional threats as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations. This was very much stressed by Defence Minister Dato' Dr Zahid Hamidi during the Singapore Air Show 2012¹¹ and remains his constant emphasis when dealing with regional and global leaders.

⁶ K.S Balakrishnan, 2009. Malaysia's Defence Policy, Military Modernisation and National Security in Abdul Razak Baginda (ed) Malaysia's Defence & Security Since 1957, Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, Kuala Lumpur, p.116.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ministry of Defence 1999. Malaysian Defence-Towards Defence Self-Reliance,p.21.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Kementerian Pertahanan 2010, Dasar Pertahanan Negara, Kuala Lumpur.

¹¹ Malaysia Digest.com, 2012. *Defence Diplomacy between Malaysia and Singapore Increasing* Avail through: <http://malaysiadigest.com>, 19 March.



Defence Minister Dato' Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi with his Singapore counterpart, Admiral Teo Chee Hean during the Singapore Air Show in Feb 2012. Dato' Seri Zahid has always maintained the nation and the MAF commitment in promoting Defence Diplomacy when dealing with regional and global leaders.

Malaysia gained its independence due to the training institutions established here, this practice continued thus allowing MAF officers to continue a long standing bond and friendship with their UK counterparts. Similarly, MAF officers and men also enjoy such privileges in many other countries where Malaysia have good diplomatic relationships. To date, MAF officers and men are still being sent overseas in a variety of courses and at different levels of seniority. These range from the junior NCO level such as those who attended the Dog Handler Course in Australia¹² to a Brigadier equivalent attending War College in Pennsylvania in the United States. The majority of these officers and men not only gathered useful training in their career progression but will have established good contacts amongst their peers in the countries in which they attended the courses. This invaluable experiences and friendships in what can be described as the 'old boys' network could play a vital role in future instances where Defence Diplomacy activities are concerned.

THE TRAINING ASPECTS

As an instrument for building cooperation and preventing conflict, Defence Diplomacy works in a number of different ways and operates on a number of different levels. The MAF has been involved in a multitude of engagements and Defence Diplomacy activities since her early formation and well before Malaysia gained independence in 1957. In concert with her foreign policy orientation, The MAF defence engagement could be examined by the priority of her foreign policy orientations which are within ASEAN, the region and as a responsible global citizen. In a peace time environment, the MAF, under the auspices of the MAF HQ Operations and Training Branch (BOLP) has been coordinating the various aspects of defence engagement activities particularly training which continue to improve the profile of the MAF as well as relationships with its exchange partners. Such a mechanism has shown vast improvement from the early years and is without doubt a useful means of displaying its approach towards Defence Diplomacy. Training activities could be examined further from a variety of angles.

Individual Training-Old Boys Network

Before Malaysia gained its independence in 1957, MAF officer cadets from the three services were sent to the United Kingdom (UK) for training in institutions like Sandhurst (Army), Dartmouth (Navy) and Cranwell (Air force). Although the numbers dwindled gradually after

As highlighted by former MAF Chief of Defence Force, Admiral Tan Sri Anwar Mohd Nor,¹³ in situations where political leaders of countries remain vigilant in their stand on certain issues, military leaders could play a role in diffusing tense situations. In this case, military leaders who have had the privileged of knowing their peers in another country beforehand in a course would certainly have the added advantage. As an example, of the 302 Malaysian cadets trained in Sandhurst (as at 2002), six made it to the rank of CDF whilst four made it to service chiefs (including two Air Force Chiefs).¹⁴ These also include three royalties where two of them became the King of Malaysia.¹⁵ With these positive developments, it is therefore imperative that the MAF continue to send officers and men overseas not only to gain first hand exposure to the quality of training but extending and preserving the existing bonds and friendships that have been embedded in the hierarchy for such a long time.

¹² In 2008, two personnel from the War Dog Wing, PULADA attended the Dog Handler Course at the Royal Engineer School in Robertson Barracks, Sydney, Australia. As stated in PULADA-LAT/G/3/546/1 dated 7 Jan 2009.

¹³ In his lecture to the MAFDC on 29 June 2010, Admiral Tan Sri Anwar highlighted his numerous experiences when he was CDF in such situations where he successfully managed to diffuse tense situations through his good relationship with his counterpart of equivalent position.

¹⁴ Lim Johnny Major, 2002, The Malaysian Wish Stream, Malaysian Army HQ, pp.126-128.

¹⁵ Ibid.

The MAF must ensure that it continues to preserve and nurture the existing bilateral cooperation between the countries such as the Malaysian Australian Joint Defence Force Programme (MAJDP), the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) as well as the host of other programmes in place.

Defence Cooperation Programme

As the MAF progressed and became a credible force, it began to accept foreign participants at all levels from the three services in the variety of courses at its military institutions. Such reciprocal gestures were very much appreciated by the military personnel of the nations to whom the MAF institutions had successfully trained. In 2002, an initiative called the Defence Cooperation Programme (DCP) was established to assist foreign military personnel where the MAF would bear the costs and training allowances for them.¹⁶ This programme would need an allocation of RM 5 million a year and for that year, military personnel from 13 countries benefited from this.¹⁷ Gradually, the countries grew to 17 in 2008 and in 2010, there were a total of 40 countries under this programme. Although the costs of maintaining the DCP have spiralled, the ability of the MAF to extend military training to the personnel of these countries would have an enduring effect in fostering the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and the countries involved. As such, the MAF must continue to look for ways of offering this programme to other nations in need of such a programme and at the same have reciprocal arrangements to those concerned.



Foreign military forces conducting a river crossing activity in the rugged Malaysian terrain as part of the highly sought after Survival Course which the MAF is famed for. Courses offered by the MAF under the DCP programmes of all three services certainly enhance inter-operability which in turn assists in future Defence Diplomacy activities.

¹⁶ KP/DASAR(S)805/180 Jil 10 (48) bertarikh 30 April 2002.

¹⁷ MATM/BOLP/CLP/3188 JIL 21 bertarikh 2 Julai 2010.

Collective Training

In 2009 as stated in the annual report,¹⁸ the MAF JFHQ supervised a total of eight exercises involving joint elements with foreign forces in Malaysia.¹⁹ There were also numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted at the services level in Malaysian territory as well as on foreign soil under the variety of bilateral collective training arrangements with the countries concerned. The MAF is now engaged in bilateral military training exercises with most of her ASEAN neighbours, the FPDA members as well as the US Forces. With the successful conduct of these exercises, the MAF is given the opportunity to experience valuable operational procedures which could be vital for future inter-operability tasks that it could undertake.

As the focus and central themes of joint bilateral exercises evolve to meet the current security threats and challenges, the ability to perform and successful completion of such exercises have strengthened the bonds between the participants. At the same time, it portrays the seriousness of the MAF in addressing current threats and challenges. A good example is the Ex MALINDO DARSASA in April 2010 where the Malaysian Defence Minister said "*The people's involvement is crucial in combating terrorism, be it at sea, on land, in the air or in buildings.*"²⁰ For the first time ever, the bilateral exercise codename "Malindo Latgabma Darsasa 7AB/2010" focused on anti-terrorist operations. It was also an important feature that civilian components and infrastructures²¹ were involved for the success of the exercise which includes hostage operations as well. This is a sound example where the MAF has been seen as being serious in combating the global war on terrorism. This in turn would go down well and gain the trust of the global community who will see Malaysia as being serious in addressing this issue. As such, the MAF must continue to undertake such major exercises constantly with a variety of scenarios such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.

¹⁸ MK AB, 2010, Laporan Tahunan MK AB 2009, MK AB, May, pg 34.

¹⁹ The Exercises include EX Taurus with the UK Amphibious Task group which was conducted for the first time and traditional ones such as EX CARAT, BERSAMA LIMA and BERSAMA SHIELD.

²⁰ Adrian David, 2010. Public's role vital in terror fight, The New Straits Times, 10 April, p.14.

²¹ There were instances of hostage rescue and anti-terrorist drills at the Everly Hotel Malacca during this exercise.

At the same time, the MAF must also not shirk from any opportunity to train with foreign forces when there is an opportunity. For example in 2009, the UK Amphibious Task Group (ATG) had a 'one-off' military exercise named EX TAURUS involving all three services with the MAF.²² This formidable force not only extended valuable experience but goodwill as many community projects were done. At the same time, the willingness of the MAF to accommodate the UK ATG went very well indeed as highlighted by the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Jonathan Band and echoed by UK High Commissioner to Malaysia, HE Boyd McCleary on their visit during this exercise.



MAF personnel on board HMS Ocean during EX TAURUS in 2009. Bilateral exercises not only improve and enhance cooperation, but is an extension of goodwill with the many projects and training activities conducted.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

*"Afghanistan's request for a military medical team to be sent to the strife-torn country to help its people shows that Malaysia's Armed Forces are internationally recognised"*²³

Dato Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi
Defence Minister-15 July 2010

Bilateral and Peacekeeping Engagements

Due to her geographical location and close proximity with her ASEAN neighbours, Malaysia has always portrayed its strong commitment to regional cooperation and integration by putting a high priority in ensuring close ties with its neighbours. ASEAN has always been the cornerstone in Malaysia's foreign policy orientations²⁴ and the MAF is now engaged bilaterally with all ASEAN members at different levels of military co-operation. On the global front, Malaysia's participation in the various peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations²⁵ the past decade, reflects on her commitment and responsibility as a nation willing to assist those in times of need. Since Malaysia's first peacekeeping mission in Congo (1960-63), she has participated in six more peacekeeping operations²⁶ (averaging battalion-strength personnel of 1000-2000 men) until the present deployment in Lebanon. It has also participated in 23 missions as UN observers in conflict areas around the globe.



²² PULADA-LAT/G3/3/546/5 EX TAURUS Control Hq Report dated 29 June 2009.

²³ Bernama, 2010. 'Request proves our forces are recognised', The New Straits Times, 16 July p.30.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing by En Saiful Azwar bin Ismail to MAFDC 30/2010 on 15 July 2010.

²⁵ Dato' Raja Mohd Affandi, Mej Jen, 2008. Tentera Darat 1933-2008, Markas Tentera Darat, p.214.

²⁶ Ibid.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

On humanitarian assistance and disaster relief alone in the past decade until 2008, MAF personnel have participated in eight missions²⁷, particularly providing medical aid in those areas. The MAF was involved when disaster struck such as the Tsunami in Bandar Aceh in Dec 2004, the earthquake in Battagram, Pakistan in 2005²⁸ and the cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in May 2008. When the Padang earthquake hit Indonesia in October 2009, Malaysia sent 34,500kg of food supplies to the affected victims as well as a 60 men – strong assistance team comprising of MAF and other Health Ministry and Red Crescent personnel. Although the quantum of aid delivered varied in view of factors such as the location, ability and effectiveness, Malaysia rendered help to those affected as soon as the need to do so arises. As an example, the Malaysian Medical Team (MALMEDTIM) has been providing medical support in Afghanistan since 2010 and also the community in Lebanon. This will continue in future, in faraway places despite the often rugged terrain and harsh wintry conditions which speaks volume of the professionalism of the MAF personnel. MAF personnel providing aid have often been praised by the manner and sensitivity in which they carry out their duties particularly where issues such as gender and religion are of concern to the local community.



The Malaysian Medical Team and security personnel providing aid after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005. The efforts of these personnel despite the harsh wintry conditions have certainly raised the profile of the MAF resulting in more requests made for the MAF to be deployed on such missions particularly when issues of religion and gender are of concern. Such contributions will develop Defence Diplomacy initiatives between Malaysia and nations across the globe.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Malaysia initially contributed aid in terms of blankets and medical supplies but later set up a field hospital in Oct 2005 for a duration of 3 months with a strength of 110 medical personnel. Facts obtained through Col (Dr) Sharifah Azlin Juliana on 11 July 2010 who participated in the mission.

The efforts of the MAF in all these missions regionally and globally is a manifestation of her ability which have been much appreciated by those affected and the global community in general. The MAF must continue to engage in such missions as well as improve its capability for such missions in future. For example, the RMAF and Medical Teams have played exemplary roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in the past decade and will continue to do so in future. It would therefore be logical for Malaysia's Defence planners to further improve the effectiveness and speed with which these two elements can further complement each other in order to expedite aid to the affected areas. As highlighted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) findings in 2008²⁹, five factors remain vital for the effectiveness of military aid mainly time, appropriateness, absorptive capacity, coordination and costs. These fundamentals can be a yardstick for the development of the MAF HADR capabilities as well as the procurement of equipment to support them.

STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

Defence Attaches

One of the major changes in patterns of defence diplomacy since the early 1990s has been the increasing use of military cooperation and assistance.³⁰ In this aspect, a country's representation is vital to the success of many aspects of defence diplomacy. Malaysia currently has a total of 105 missions overseas³¹ but there are only a total of 24 Defence Attaches (DA) incorporated in these missions³². It must be stressed that the support for defence diplomacy is an increasingly important function for many DAs and there should be an increase in DA presence particularly amongst those countries under the MDCP programmes.

²⁹ SIPRI 2008, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, Stockholm, pp 35-39.

³⁰ Cottet, A & Forster A, 2004. Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p 17.

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs-From Putrajaya to the World 2008, Wisma Putra, p.50.

³² Statistics provided by the MAF DISD Foreign Liaison Office cell on 12 July 2010.

High Profile Visits and Seminars

Defence Diplomacy has received much attention in most Defence Forces of nations in seeking stability and security through dialogues and seminars. These interactions remain a vital tool in formulating perceptions and attitudes. There are a broad range of activities which could improve and achieve 'disarmament of the mind'³³ that characterises defence diplomacy. Such military activities include visits and seminars amongst the senior hierarchy of the MAF and its counterparts. Over the years, there have been numerous such visits and seminars by MAF leaders abroad and these in turn were reciprocated by her counterparts in Malaysia. There is no doubt that such activities will develop and foster good relations amongst the MAF and her partners. As such, these activities must be supported and further enhanced by the MAF despite the budgetary cuts and constraints.

An Evolving Defence Policy

Malaysia finally published her first Defence Policy towards the end of 2010 which was well received particularly by those in the ASEAN fraternity. Whilst the publication of a Defence White Paper is not entirely the purview of the MAF, a published document of such stature would explain Malaysia's plans for defence and how it will achieve these plans. Although the mere existence of the MAF provides the Malaysian government with the option to use force, maintaining a credible defence capability is a crucial element in maintaining the sovereignty of the nation. A published Defence Policy could also portray the role of the MAF and the use of defence diplomacy as the foremost priority of the Malaysian government in the prevention of conflict. As such, the 54 page MDP 2010 must be constantly reviewed periodically to address the strategic challenges as well as state Malaysia's aspirations in addressing these challenges. In addition, it will also assist in maintaining cordial relations with other nations. With these important facets of defence diplomacy, the MAF should assist the government in reviewing the MDP 2010 periodically as a strategic policy in pursuing its strategic interests.

CONCLUSION

The concept of defence diplomacy espouse the notion that the Armed Forces of nations have the ability to contribute to international security not only by the use of force but also by promoting a more cooperative and stable international environment. Defence diplomacy is not an alternative to the more traditional role of the Armed Forces that is war fighting, but supplements it by a host of other activities that contribute to the prevention of conflict by building and maintaining trust. In Malaysia's history where diplomacy has been both a function and determinant of its foreign policy outlook, the MAF has played a pivotal role in the implementation these policies.

The MAF has undertaken a variety of Defence Diplomacy activities since her early formation which include bilateral and multilateral engagements in different facets of situations and tasks. Such activities include training, participation in UN peacekeeping as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The successful efforts of the MAF in such activities not only raised her profile but certainly improved relations as well as cement long standing bonds and friendships between the MAF and her counterparts regionally as well as globally.

In addition, other strategic engagements such as the positioning of Defence Attachés and high profile visits certainly assist in promoting defence diplomacy as it is an avenue to extend goodwill but at the same time may diffuse tense situations should it occur. As such, these are the activities which must be nurtured and pursued by the MAF in her defence diplomacy orientations. Since Malaysia had just published her Defence Policy White Paper in 2010 which succinctly explained her defence diplomacy orientations, it would be prudent for the MAF to remain at the vanguard of this orientation. Future revised editions of the Defence Policy would no doubt include defence diplomacy at the forefront of the nation's aspirations. This is because all nations practice defence diplomacy in one way or other and the MAF is no different as a vital instrument of the nation's defence.

³³ Ministry of Defence (UK) 2000, Paper no 1, Defence Diplomacy, MOD (UK)

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Lt Kol Johnny graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in December 1986 and was commissioned into the Royal Ranger Regiment (RRR). He is currently the Head of Combat Doctrine in Army Training Command. Johnny is also a graduate of the Australian Army Command and Staff College in Queenscliff in 2000 where he won the Strategic Prize as the overall best student in the Strategic Studies module. He holds a Masters Degree in Defence Studies from the University of Canberra and a Masters in Social Science from the National University of Malaysia (UKM). Lt Kol Johnny attended the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College in 2010 where he won both the best academic and best overall student awards.

REVERSE LOGISTICS IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES FOR THE MALAYSLIAN ARMY

By Lt Kol Mohamad Yusoff bin Awang

-SYNOPSIS-

The supply chain is a series of inter-related processes and activities that move supplies and services from the suppliers to the ultimate end users. The reverse supply chain contains items that are defective, damaged, or no longer serviceable by the intended user. These items must be returned to the supplier for replacement or disposal. The items in the reverse supply chain take longer to identify and process. Any unnecessary delay in any process will result in non-productive activity and for the Army the time wasted on holding of unserviceable equipment in the process will reduce the level state of readiness. The industry has recognized that by managing efficiently the items in the reverse supply chain will results in better customer service and improved profits. Thus for the Army this can be translate into improving organizations efficiency and better state of readiness. A careful look at industry practices provides the basis for recommendations on how to improve the Army reverse supply chain management. One possible solution is to maximize the use of preventive method such as proper diagnosis in repair and maintenance activities which will lead to better accuracy on maintenance follow up activities and no time wasted in the maintenance processes.

INTRODUCTION

Reverse logistics is defined by Reverse Logistics Executive Council [1] as; “*The process of planning, and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow of materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from the point of origin for the purpose of recapturing value or proper disposal*”, whereas, Kroon and Vrijens (1995)[2], Council of Logistics Management defines reverse logistics as: “*It includes reverse distribution, which causes goods and information to flow in the opposite direction from normal logistic activities*”.

Some of key dates and events in the reverse logistics industry [3] history are:

- At the end of American Civil War, General William T. Sherman’s soldiers dump tons of ammunition and weapons in the Neuse River north of Raleigh, Carolina.
- Material shortages during World War II had created a need to rebuild automobile parts and started a trend that continues today. In fact according to Rogers and Tibben-Lembke[4], this manufacturing is now a \$36 billion business that accounts for “90 to 95 percent of all starter motors and alternators sold for replacement”.
- In 2001, the EU established a goal of 50-65% recovery or recycling of packaging waste.

The size of reverse logistics is substantial. According to Stock et al (2001)[5], reverse logistics costs are as high as 4 per cent of total logistics cost. Table 1, shows the return percentages for different industries in the US [6].

Ser	Industry	Percentage
1.	Book Publishing	10-30%
2.	Magazine publishing-special interest	50%
3.	Computer manufacturers	10-20%
4.	Direct to consumer computer manufacturers	2-5%
5.	Apparel	35%
6.	Mass merchandisers	4-15%
7.	Auto industry (parts)	4-6%
8.	Internet retailers	20-80%

Source: Adapted from Olaf Schatteman [7]

Table 1: Percentage of Return by Industry

By taking the example from EU goal and the figures shown from Table 1, there is a very important requirement and need for business entity to give priority for reverse logistics. In the case of EU regulations, they will be out of EU competitive market, and soon they might be followed by other countries.

REVERSE LOGISTICS IN MALAYSIAN ARMY

Industrial sector has recognized that proper managing of items in reverse supply chain is improving their profits and better customer service. Dr Dale Rogers's findings pointed out that [8], as result of competition, education, increasing complexity, price, and quality, pricing methodologies, 3rd party logistics trends; the industry in US are increasingly employing third party logistics to manage reverse supply chain operations for more efficient management of their industry.

As part of the government organization, the army has a complete set of regulations and procedures in managing the assets starting from the procurement phase till the end of equipment life and disposal. Although the army is not a profit oriented organisation, they are very concerned about the state of readiness, proper maintenances, and compliance with the rule and regulations for managing assets and material. These concerns necessitate the army to improve its management of reverse logistics to be more systematic and efficient as said by Dr Dale Rogers [4] "Now, more than ever, reverse logistics is seen as being important". The Army reverse logistics flow charts is as shown in Figure 2.

Central Ordnance Depot is equivalent to the Centralized Return Center (CRC) in industrial sector. Although, minor items or low value items are being given to charitable body for donation in unit levels, the data on quantity and other details are still being controlled by Central Ordnance Depot for the purpose of records and inventory control level.




Figure 2: The Army Reverse Logistics Flow Charts

CHARACTERISTICS OF REVERSE LOGISTICS

Reasons for Return: According to Schatteman[7], there are many reasons for product return and this can be categorized by where the returns initiated. Table 2, shows the main reasons for the return from each of the supply chain partner.

of Logistics (1995) [8] identified six symptoms that indicate whether a company could have a problem with its reverse supply chain

- Returned merchandised or supplies arriving faster than they are processing or disposed of.
- There are large amount of returned inventory held in distribution center or warehouse.

Ser	Reasons for Return	Supply Chain Partner
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Customer not satisfied	Manufacturers and retailers allow customers to return products under money back guarantees scheme.
2.	Installation or usage problem	Common in computer industry, on complicated installation procedures.
3.	Warranty claims	Defective product sent back to retailers or manufacturers. Could happen either to the retailer or end user.
4.	Faulty order processing	Shipping problem, incomplete, missing parts, wrong quantities, wrong products, or not deliver in time, experience by end user and retailers.
5.	Retail overstock	Common practice in publications industry. Manufacturers provide resellers with returning unsold stock and retailers to make accounting figures look good.
6.	End of product life cycle or product replacement.	Manufacturers want to get out of retailers shelves to prevent sales cannibalization of new version. Manufacturers either taking back the stock, based on agreement with retailers or retailers to dump the old product version.
7.	Manufacture recall program.	Common in auto, health, and toy industry. Recall program may be as a result of safety violation or not to government regulation.

Other complications

8.	The green factor	Based on environmental laws, sometimes manufacturers are to be responsible for disposal of the product at the end of life cycle; e.g. hazardous material.
9.	Electronic commerce	This is following the emergence in selling via internet; with the feature of faster on line transaction customer overall return increase drastically.
10.	Shorter product life cycle.	Because of rapid changes and technological advancement in high technology industries, the product will be obsolete faster. Manufacturers often know this when the demand of their products decreases.

Table 2: The Main Reasons Return for Each Supply Chain Partner

Symptoms of Reverse Supply Chain: Traditionally, reverse logistics become a financial burden and pressure to retailers and manufacturers [7]. Previously they are concentrated only on distribution of their product, and they pay less attention to reverse logistics. Their supply chain is specifically designed to go forward and when this happens, they are faced with all kinds of problems which they are not prepared for. Dr R. Dawe of the Fritz Institute

- There are unidentified or unauthorized returns.
- There is a lengthy processing cycle time for returned goods.
- Unknown total cost of the returns process.
- Customers losing confidence in the repair process.

Step of Return Process: The examples given below are taken from Schatteman [7] four key steps in the return process.



Figure 1: Four Key Steps in the Return Process [7]

- o Local Screening: Products are screened at the point of collection according to manufacturer specifications.
- o Collection: It is either retailers sending the return product to suppliers or collected by supplier.
- o Sorting: Many large retailers use centralized return centers (CTCs). There are many benefits for CTCs:
 - > Increase efficiency of employees when they are focusing on handling returns only.
 - > Workers experience in sorting process makes better and quick decision.
 - > Improve cycle time.
 - > Better asset recovery.
 - > Higher customer satisfaction.
- o Disposition: Three ways to dispose of product; sell as-is, repair or reuse (part of it), and ultimately dispose the product. The activities under product disposition are listed in Table 3.

Ser	Main Activities	Sub Activities
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Sell as-is	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resale (as new). • Sell via outlet or discount store. • E-auction. • Sell to secondary market.
2.	Repair or re-use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repair. • Refurbish or remanufacture. • Modify. • Recycle.
3.	Dispose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scrap. • Donate (to charity). • Dispose in secure manner.

Table 3: The Activities under Product Disposition

IMPLICATION OF REVERSE LOGISTICS IN MALAYSIAN ARMY

The value of returned item in the Malaysian Army is considered quite substantial. Annually the returned value item of serviceable item, refurbishes, and disposable items are nearly twenty percent of annual procurement [19]. These amounts of money should not be overly concerned by the army. This is because there is a planned refurbishment, and other planned policy on used of returned item and equipment.

As stated earlier, although making profit is not the main concern for the army, there is implication resulting from backward movement of item and equipment in the army. The implications are as follows:

- Potential Decrease in State of Readiness [10]. For every serviceable part in reverse supply chain, there is a possibility of other equipment waiting for the same kind of spare parts to make the equipment operational or serviceable in other units. This will result in less operating equipment, and the units will be less effective particularly on critical equipment. This unserviceable item will remain in float for long time as studies in reverse supply chain-processing shows that it takes longer to process and restock returned merchandized than it does to process new material into distribution center [4]. This situation can be considered as an opportunity cost for industry.
- Environmental Impact. Hazardous material such as batteries, lubrication oil, electric bulb, army hospital clinical waste, army workshop waste, and other hazardous materials from other army installations pose serious impact on environmental while waiting for secure disposal.
- Increase Cost. For equipment waiting to be returned, the cost involved are:
 - o Maintenance cost. Items need to be maintained regularly, especially the serviceable equipments.
 - o Repacking cost. Repacking cost involved in equipments movements.
 - o Transportations cost. Costing will be more if item and equipments returned from far army camps, which may include the movements by train, ships, or airplane.

- Losing Values. Depending on the conditions of the item, either serviceable or not, the item will be disposed if found not serviceable and this will incur cost for replacement.
- Customer Dissatisfaction. Misdagnosis of faults in performing equipment maintenance will result in wrong parts being ordered and this will later go into reverse supply chain. This misdiagnosis will result in customer dissatisfaction and portray incompetency on the part of the maintenance personnel from the view point of other department in the army.
- Losing on Man Power. Some personnel are to take care of reverse logistics process and this will reduce the number of personnel for essential army duties.

BENEFITS TO ORGANIZATIONS

The proper management of reverse logistics will result in benefits to the organization, i.e; faster movement of returned items, effective handling, accurate data and etc. The benefits for the army are as follows:

- Reduce Storage Space. As returnable items require space to be allocated in the units, the efficient handling of reverse logistics will reduce this requirement.
- Maximise Value. The item which is still in good condition, serviceable or wrongly delivered from supplier will maintain their high value due to faster backward movement from its original point of return. This item can be sold later to 3rd party, thus reducing government expenditure.
- Reduce Deterioration. Items for programmed repair or refurbishment such as army combat vehicle, soft skin vehicle, or special items will deteriorate lesser as these items will not be too long in the storage area and require fewer vehicle parts.
- Better Inventory Turnover. The army regulations on store management at unit level is “new item will be issued only when the same unserviceable item is returned to the Quartermaster”. This is a “one to one” replacement such as personal items or barrack items. How fast or slow the item changes at unit level, will determine the level of army supply chain and the rate of army inventory turnover.

- Faster Movement in Handling Item. The handling of items on reverse supply chain such as wooden pallets and containers will return faster and this will make these items available faster.
- Faster Replacement for Non Compliance Item. This benefit is related to when the new items enter the army inventory. Quick rejection by the inspector (pre delivery team) for non compliance contract items will obtain faster replacement by supplier, thus it will result in faster usage of items in the service.
- Improve Asset Visibility. Better reverse logistics management will improve information such as assets locations and quantities thus better decision could be made on the requirement.

Better management on reverse logistics will ensure good items maintain their high value, less space requirements and remove the unnecessary requirements of handling equipments. The maintenance of the high value for good items and avoidance of unnecessary spending on public money will make the Malaysian Army a more efficient organization on management of resources; apart from its core business of war-fighting.

MOST PRACTICAL AND BENEFICIAL APPROACHES

Jim Whelan [11], the associate editor of Warehouse Management Magazine, stated that the “ultimate goal of a successful reverse supply chain programme should be to phase itself out over time through systematic process improvements”.

As stated above, there is no need for items to be retained in an inventory list for the army when the reverse movement of items and equipment arrive at their respective final reverse destinations. The slow movements of reverse items and equipments will be prone to human error and this will cause unnecessary delay or errors that result in loss of value. The most practical and beneficial approaches for the army to manage reverse logistics are:

- Preventive Method. Conduct proper diagnosis on repair and maintenance activities. This will ensure that precise items required for replacement are the one being ordered. This will avoid rejection thus reducing movement of returned items and equipment backwards.

- Central Return Center. The central return center (Return Store Group in Central Ordnance Depot) has already been established in the army, but their functions are focused more on special items such as high security items for example as weapon, telecommunication equipments and others. By reorganising this center it can give more focus on reverse logistics for the systems to be managed efficiently.
 - Proper Handling. Proper handling of items moving backwards is essential to information accuracy. This may be in the form of allocating certain personnel at the initial point of return and at every other point necessary until the items reach their final destinations.
 - Using Third Party. This might sound too ambitious, but it can be done. By using third party, the army logisticians can concentrate on forward logistics efficiently.
 - Cannibalization. This option has been practiced by the army currently. The method is to salvage serviceable parts from unserviceable vehicle and transfer the parts to required vehicles for it to be on-road. But the unserviceable parts from the on-road vehicle which has been replaced are to be fitted to the cannibalised vehicle in order to make them complete.
- This cannibalization practice is not encouraged as it will involve double handling and waste time.
- Recycling. Carter and Ellram (1998) [12], proposed that organization should reduce resource as the ultimate aim in reverse logistics is to maximize recycling. Disposal is the last resort.
 - Buy Back. This kind of items can be of high and medium valuable that involve complex supply chain. As stated by Klausner and Hendrickson (2000) [13] this kind of equipment and items should be bought back and thus give higher return for the army.

CONCLUSION

Managing reverse logistics is not a new subject for the organization particularly in the army. As in the history of reverse logistics, the difference between particular events is how they do it or handle it for particular events. By reducing the return items in the flow it can reduce and minimize the need for larger space and unnecessary maintenance. Also it will improve the possibility of increasing the army's state of readiness besides helping to promote a cleaner environment for the country.

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


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




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