



ISU KEGANASAN DAN CABARAN DALAM MENANGANINYA



NUCLEAR ARMS PROLIFERATION- CAN A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD BE A REALITY?



STRATEGI LAUTAN BIRU KEBANGSAAN TRANSFORMASI TENTERA DARAT DI DALAM PELAKSANAAN HASRAT KERAJAAN

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THIS MEANS WAR

DARI MEJA EDITOR

Dengan Nama Allah Yang Maha Pengasih Lagi Maha Penyayang.
Salam Sejahtera,

Syukur Alhamdulillah, Jurnal Sorotan Darat Bil 60 dapat diterbitkan sebagaimana yang dihasratkan. Ucapan setinggi-tinggi penghargaan dan terima kasih dirakamkan kepada semua penulis artikel yang telah menyumbangkan hasil penulisan masing-masing untuk edisi kali ini. Diharapkan idea-idea bernas yang telah dipaparkan melalui penulisan kali ini dapat memacu Tentera Darat dalam mencapai prestasi yang lebih membanggakan di masa-masa mendatang, insya-Allah.

Sidang pembaca yang dihormati, edisi kali ini telah memberi ruang dan penghormatan kepada Gerup Gerak Khas sebagai penyumbang artikel utama. Artikel yang bertajuk 'Isu Keganasan dan Cabaran dalam Menanganinya' amat sinonim dengan peranan Gerup Gerak Khas sebagai satu pasukan khas Tentera Darat yang akan diatur gerakan untuk menangani keganasan dan pencerobohan. Isu keganasan ini sering dibicarakan diperingkat antarabangsa kerana ianya berkait rapat dengan isu pertahanan global, amnya dan keselamatan nasional, khususnya. Peristiwa 11 Sep 2001 telah menyemarakkan lagi perbincangan tentang isu yang penuh kontroversi ini sehingga jika diperincikan dengan jelas, setiap bicara dan olahan telah memaparkan prejudis dari sudut agama, budaya dan bangsa. Pada kali ini, para pembaca akan 'dihidangkan' dengan hasil penulisan dari sudut pandangan seorang pegawai Gerup Gerak Khas.

Selain daripada artikel tersebut, artikel-artikel yang turut diterbitkan kali ini akan menyentuh berbagai aspek penting dalam organisasi Tentera Darat Malaysia (TDM) dan global. Artikel-artikel merupakan sumbangan daripada para penulis yang terdiri daripada kalangan seluruh warga Tentera Darat. Sebahagian daripada mereka menulis berdasarkan pengalaman sendiri dan hasil pembacaan masing-masing dan yang lebih membanggakan terdapat daripada kalangan mereka merupakan penulis rutin untuk jurnal ini. Syabas diucapkan dan mohon pembaca lain mengikut jejak langkah penulis-penulis sebegini demi menyokong usaha ke arah melahirkan warga Tentera Darat yang berilmu dan cemerlang.

Akhir kata, pihak Sidang Redaksi sentiasa mengalu-alukan sumbangan artikel-artikel daripada kalangan seluruh warga Tentera Darat untuk dimuatkan dalam Jurnal Sorotan Darat yang akan datang. Di samping itu, bagi meningkatkan kualiti serta mutu penerbitan Sorotan Darat, sebarang pendapat, komen yang membina dan idea-idea yang bernas boleh dikemukakan dari semasa ke semasa.

Selamat Membaca. Sekian, terima kasih.

ISU KEGANASAN DAN CABARAN DALAM MENANGANINYA

oleh Mej Ahmad Huzaini bin Zainudin

-SINOPSIS-

Esei ini membincangkan tentang isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan insiden keganasan dan kemungkinan kaedah yang boleh digunakan untuk menanganinya. Bagi membincangkan isu global ini, penulis berusaha untuk mengupas beberapa perkara yang berkaitan iaitu definisi keganasan, kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas, faktor-faktor yang mendorong wujudnya aktiviti keganasan dan sebagainya. Penelitian yang telah diambil oleh penulis membuktikan bahawa keganasan boleh berlaku di seluruh dunia tanpa mengira status ekonomi dan status sosial negara berkenaan. Di samping itu, penulis turut mengetengah pandangan bahawa kebanyakan insiden yang berlaku adalah berkait secara langsung dengan faktor kemanusiaan. Sekiranya, faktor ini dapat ditangani dengan baik, perasaan prejudis dapat dibendung dan dunia pasti akan terpelihara daripada aktiviti pengganas.

PENDAHULUAN

Ancaman keganasan seringkali dikaitkan dengan berlakunya suatu tindakan yang kejam serta mengancam keselamatan sesebuah negara. Keganasan yang melibatkan kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas sama ada yang memperjuangkan sesuatu fahaman, ideologi, agama, keadilan, maruah dan sebagainya adalah di antara punca-punca sesuatu keganasan tersebut berlaku pada sesebuah negara.

Terdapat pelbagai perspektif yang mengaitkan tentang perkembangan ancaman keganasan di dunia pada masa kini dan kenapa keganasan tersebut terus berlaku. Sepertimana kita semua sedia maklum, negara-negara di dunia pada hari ini melihat ancaman keganasan mulai diberi perhatian serius selepas berlakunya kejadian serangan 11 September 2001 ke atas sasaran bangunan *World Trade Centre (WTC)* dan juga bangunan Pentagon di Amerika Syarikat. Kejadian tersebut telah menjadikan dunia pada masa kini melihat ancaman keganasan sebagai satu bentuk ancaman global yang perlu ditangani dan dimusnahkan secara menyeluruh serta memerlukan komitmen yang tinggi oleh semua negara dunia disebabkan kuasa besar Amerika Syarikat itu sendiri mendapat impak secara langsung keatas negaranya semasa peristiwa 911.

Walaupun kejadian serangan 11 September 2001 sehingga kini masih menjadi tanda tanya masyarakat dunia samada ia benar dilakukan oleh pihak pengganas dari kumpulan Al-Qaeda atau ia merupakan satu tindakan jahat oleh aktor negara atau aktor bukan negara sebagai satu konspirasi bagi meyakinkan dunia bahawa ia perbuatan kumpulan pengganas untuk menghalalkan kuasa besar melakukan penjajahan alaf baru ke atas negara lemah yang dikatakan menaja keganasan atas alasan menghapuskan keganasan. Namun begitu, kebanyakan negara telah menjadikan peristiwa serangan 11 September 2001 tersebut sebagai contoh ancaman keganasan yang mungkin boleh berlaku pada mana-mana negara lain tanpa mengira masa. Namun, di dalam konteks perbincangan ini tidak perlulah dijelaskan tentang kejadian serangan 11 September 2001 secara terperinci, kita semua sedia maklum bahawa kegiatan kumpulan pengganas adalah satu kegiatan yang begitu kompleks. Ianya melibatkan aktor negara dan aktor bukan negara untuk pelaksanaan konspirasi berskala besar bagi memberi lesen penuh kepada kuasa besar seperti Amerika Syarikat bertindak sebagai polis dunia untuk melakukan penjajahan dan kemusnahan pada sesebuah negara lain seperti mana yang telah berlaku pada masa kini atas dasar memerangi keganasan global (war on terrorism).

Ancaman keganasan bukan lagi satu perkara baru untuk dibincangkan dari aspek punca kewujudan kumpulan pengganas dan sebabnya, juga bagaimana cara untuk mengatasi sesuatu ancaman keganasan tersebut serta cabaran dalam menangani ancaman keganasan.

DEFINISI KEGANASAN

Keganasan boleh didefinisikan dalam pelbagai makna yang berkait rapat dengan satu bentuk tindakan oleh individu atau kumpulan yang membawa kepada ancaman penculikan, kemusnahan, pembunuhan dan sebagainya. Sumber dari Wikipedia telah mentakrifkan bahawa “keganasan sebagai manipulasi ketakutan secara sistematik terutamanya sebagai cara paksaan. Tiadanya satu takrifan tentang keganasan yang dipersetujui sejagat. Kebanyakan definisi terrorisme yang utama termasuk tindakan-tindakan yang berniat menimbulkan ketakutan, dilakukan demi mencapai matlamat ideologi (berbanding serangan secara sendirian), dan sengaja menyasarkan atau mengabaikan keselamatan orang bukan penempur”¹. Manakala definisi keganasan dalam kamus *Meriam Webster* mentakrifkan sebagai “*the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion*”². Selain itu, Amerika Syarikat mentakrifkan keganasan sebagai “*terrorism is destruction of people or property by people not acting on behalf of an established government for the purpose of redressing a real or imaginary injustice attributed to an established government and aimed directly or indirectly at an established government*”³.

Terdapat banyak lagi definisi yang mentakrifkan tentang keganasan mengikut perspektif dan pandangan yang berbeza. Namun secara ringkasnya, keganasan adalah menjurus kepada satu perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh individu atau kumpulan yang boleh memudaratkan serta membawa kemusnahan harta benda, pembunuhan, penyeksaan yang bertujuan untuk memenuhi kehendak dan matlamat mereka.

Melalui beberapa definisi yang telah diberikan, dapat ditafsirkan bahawa ancaman keganasan adalah merupakan satu tindakan yang boleh membawa bencana yang besar kepada sesebuah negara.

Ancaman keganasan menjadi semakin sukar untuk dibendung dengan wujudnya jaringan-jaringan kumpulan pengganas antarabangsa yang mempunyai ideologi dan fahaman yang berbeza tetapi saling membantu dari segi risikan dan logistik termasuk kewangan melalui pengubahan wang haram bagi membiayai aktiviti mereka. Jaringan antara kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas ini sukar dikesan dan kecanggihan teknologi telah menjadikan kegiatan mereka menjadi semakin kompleks dan sukar untuk ditangani.

FAKTOR-FAKTOR BERLAKUNYA KEGANASAN

Berdasarkan kepada sejarah dan insiden-insiden yang telah berlaku di beberapa buah Negara sebelum ini, kita dapati bahawa matlamat utama yang diperjuangkan oleh kumpulan pengganas adalah lebih menjurus kepada desakan kepada sesebuah negara agar memenuhi tuntutan mereka. Kebanyakan tindakan keganasan yang dilakukan oleh kumpulan pengganas adalah disebabkan oleh beberapa faktor seperti berikut:

a. Tidak Puas Hati Dengan Sistem Pemerintahan.

Tidak berpuas hati pada sistem pemerintahan yang tidak memihak kepada mereka adalah antara faktor yang menyebabkan berlakunya sesuatu keganasan. Ianya merujuk kepada kerajaan atau negara yang melaksanakan dasar diskriminasi dan penindasan agama serta tidak adil kepada rakyat, pencabulan hak asasi manusia dan penganiayaan kaum minoriti, pembunuhan kejam pada rakyat tanpa diadili disebabkan oleh salah guna kuasa yang ada dan sebagainya. Ianya akan menimbulkan perasaan dendam yang membara kepada pihak pemerintah. Perasaan dendam yang wujud telah menyebabkan lahirnya kumpulan-kumpulan penentang yang mahu menegakkan atau memperjuangkan sesuatu keadilan dan cuba mendapatkan perhatian dan sokongan masyarakat antarabangsa demi perjuangan mereka. Antara tindakan yang akan dilakukan oleh kumpulan ini adalah dengan mensasarkan pusat-pusat pentadbiran kerajaan, sekolah, pusat pelancongan, pejabat kedutaan asing sebagai sasaran dan menjadikan orang awam sebagai tebusan untuk menyampaikan mesej atau

¹ <http://ms.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penggunaan> dipetik pada 7 Mac 13.

² <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism> dipetik pada 7 Mac 13.

³ <http://www.truth-and-justice.info/defterror.html> dipetik pada 8 Mac 13.

menzahirkan rasa ketidakpuasan hati kumpulan mereka. Setelah menjadikan orang awam sebagai tebusan, kumpulan ini akan mula bertindak ganas dan mendesak pihak kerajaan sesebuah negara atau badan antarabangsa untuk memenuhi segala tuntutan mereka dengan menjadikan tebusan sebagai cagaran mereka. Walaupun tindakan mereka adalah untuk memperjuangkan sesuatu ketidakadilan terhadap golongan atau bangsa mereka (benar atau salah), namun menjadikan orang awam sebagai tebusan telah menjadi satu ancaman yang serius. Ini kerana kumpulan ini bersedia untuk mati bersama-sama dengan tebusan tersebut sekiranya tuntutan mereka tidak dipenuhi dalam satu tempoh masa yang ditetapkan oleh mereka.

b. **Menuntut Keadilan.** Menuntut keadilan juga merupakan faktor yang menyumbang kepada berlakunya keganasan. Keadilan yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti membebaskan rakan seperjuangan termasuk ahli politik berhaluan kiri yang dipenjarakan. Selain itu terdapat juga negara yang mengamalkan diskriminasi pada agama juga telah menyebabkan berlakunya tindakan keganasan bagi tuntutan keadilan oleh kumpulan ini. Penangkapan anggota atau ahli-ahli kumpulan mereka tanpa dibicarakan dengan adil dan ditempatkan di dalam penjara “rahsia” telah menyebabkan kumpulan ini melihat ianya merupakan satu bentuk penindasan yang kejam kepada mereka. Sebagai contoh, tindakan Israel yang menjadikan rakyat Palestin yang disyaki sebagai penganas Islam dan ditempatkan dalam penjara mereka serta disiksa dengan kejam telah menjadikan kumpulan ini bertindak ganas menuntut keadilan bagi mendapat perhatian dan sokongan dari masyarakat dunia. Akibatnya wujudnya satu kumpulan penganas yang dikenali sebagai *Black September* yang menjadikan ahli sukan rakyat Israel sebagai tebusan sehingga membawa kepada kematian pada semua tebusan semasa Sukan Olimpik Musim Sejuk di Munich pada 1972. Tuntutan mereka kepada kerajaan Israel membebaskan ahli kumpulan mereka seramai 200 orang yang ditangkap dan dipenjarakan⁴. Ini adalah salah satu contoh yang menunjukkan bahawa faktor menuntut keadilan adalah salah satu punca berlakunya keganasan.

c. **Balas Dendam.** Ancaman keganasan juga boleh berlaku disebabkan oleh faktor membalas dendam. Ini disebabkan oleh terdapat kerajaan atau negara yang mengamalkan dasar diskriminasi agama seperti penindasan, pembunuhan dan sebagainya. Sebagai contoh, tangkapan terhadap orang-orang Islam oleh Amerika Syarikat di Iraq dan Afghanistan. Sekumpulan golongan muslim ini telah ditangkap dan dipenjarakan di Penjara Abu Ghraib tanpa mempunyai bukti kukuh bahawa mereka adalah kumpulan penganas.

Tindakan seumpama ini telah membangkitkan amarah dalam kalangan golongan Muslim lain dan ianya telah menjadi pemangkin wujudnya aktiviti keganasan.⁵ Demi menjaga kepentingan negara, tindakan yang berbentuk dikriminasi agama ini telah diambil dan seterusnya ianya telah menimbulkan prejudis yang berpanjangan. Sikap negatif sebegini seterusnya mendesak seseorang individu untuk bersatu dengan individu yang lain membentuk sebuah kumpulan untuk membalas dendam. Misi perjuangan jelas untuk menuntut keadilan namun dalam usaha untuk mencapainya, perasaan balas dendam yang membelenggu diri berkemungkinan telah menukar konsep perjuangan asal.

Di samping itu, peristiwa penangkapan pihak Israel terhadap penduduk-penduduk Palestin yang menentang kerajaan Israel dan dipenjarakan juga di antara faktor wujudnya kumpulan-kumpulan ini. Kumpulan ini juga mahu menuntut bela atas ketidakadilan oleh kuasa-kuasa besar dunia seperti Amerika Syarikat yang menyokong tindakan Israel yang pada pandangan mereka sebagai berat sebelah dan tidak adil. Sebagai contoh, tindakan tentera-tentera Israel yang memasuki negara Palestin secara haram serta menangkap ahli-ahli keluarga yang dianggap oleh mereka sebagai kumpulan penganas tanpa bukti yang kukuh serta tidak diketahui kemana mereka dibawa (sama ada masih hidup atau mati) serta pengeboman oleh pesawat-pesawat pejuang Israel ke atas penempatan penduduk awam Palestin telah menjadikan kumpulan ini akan terus wujud dan bertindak untuk membalas dendam atas kekejaman yang telah terjadi kepada ahli keluarga mereka.

⁴ <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/27/sport/olympics-2012-munich-shaul-ladany-survivor> dipetik pada 11 Mac 13.

⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8155084.stm> dipetik pada 11 Mac 13.

Ekoran dari peristiwa itu mereka telah menjadikan pihak Barat dan kepentingannya sebagai sasaran untuk membalas dendam. Akibatnya berlakulah kejadian pengeboman oleh kumpulan pengganas di Hotel JW Marriot di Indonesia pada 5 Ogos 2003 yang telah mengorbankan 9 orang awam dan 2 pengganas. Kejadian serangan ini telah mensasarkan orang awam dari negara barat yang didendami oleh mereka (Amerika Syarikat dan sekutunya) disebabkan berlakunya ketidakadilan pada penduduk Islam di Iraq, Afghanistan dan Palestin.

d. Menarik Perhatian Dunia. Tindakan keganasan juga dilakukan untuk mendapat perhatian dan sokongan dari masyarakat dunia. Harapan mereka perhatian masyarakat dunia akan lebih mengetahui penindasan dan kekejaman yang dihadapi oleh mereka serta menyokong perjuangan mereka. Mereka akan menjadikan tindakan menawan tebusan sebagai cagaran mereka demi menyampaikan mesej kepada dunia termasuk pihak Pertubuhan Bangsa Bersatu (PBB) bahawa mereka serius dalam perjuangan menuntut kebenaran dan keadilan. Melalui liputan yang luas khususnya dari media-media antarabangsa, secara tidak langsung mesej yang akan disampaikan oleh kumpulan ini kepada masyarakat dunia akan tercapai. Melalui tindakan ini juga, mereka mampu untuk mendesak sesebuah negara untuk mengikuti segala arahan mereka dan menjadikan tebusan yang ditawan sebagai syarat untuk berunding (samada hidup atau mati). Sebagai contoh, pada 30 April 1980 seramai enam orang pengganas lengkap bersenjata dari kumpulan pengganas yang dikenali sebagai *Iraqi-backed Democratic Revolutionary of Arabistan* telah menawan kedutaan Iran di *London Prince Gate*⁶. Tindakan pengganas ini telah mendapat perhatian dan liputan media seluruh dunia betapa kumpulan ini sanggup untuk melakukan apa sahaja demi kepentingan perjuangan mereka. Hasilnya masyarakat dunia mengetahui kesengsaraan penduduk Palestin dan Gaza sehingga wujud kumpulan NGO pada 2012 yang membawa bahan logistik untuk membantu membangunkan semula kemudahan awam yang musnah dibom oleh pihak Israel melalui sempadan darat dan kapal laut dengan slogan “Free Gaza”.

e. Sumber Kewangan. Tindakan keganasan juga berlaku disebabkan oleh faktor kemiskinan yang mana mereka akan bertindak menubuhkan kumpulan pengganas untuk mendapatkan sumber kewangan melalui cara menjadikan tebusan sebagai cagaran mereka. Kemiskinan bermaksud negara tersebut melaksanakan penindasan pada golongan miskin manakala golongan kaya hidup dalam keadaan mewah. Penindasan pada golongan miskin ini telah mewujudkan kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas yang ingin mendapatkan sumber kewangan melalui cara menawan tebusan. Tindakan keganasan seperti ini biasanya berlaku pada negara-negara dunia ketiga seperti Somalia, Sudan, Afrika dan sebagainya. Sebagai contoh, tindakan kumpulan pengganas militan Somalia melakukan aktiviti perlanunan di Teluk Aden yang menawan kapal-kapal dagang dan anak kapal milik Malaysia serta negara lain sebagai tebusan. Setelah itu mereka akan mendesak pemilik kapal negara tersebut untuk memenuhi tuntutan ransom bernilai jutaan ringgit sebagai pampasan bagi membebaskan kapal bersama anak kapal. Ini merupakan bukti yang jelas betapa faktor kemiskinan dan ketidak stabilan politik pemerintahan Somalia telah mewujudkan kumpulan pengganas dan mengancam keselamatan kapal di Teluk Aden.

f. Perjuangan Ideologi. Perjuangan ideologi juga merupakan faktor wujudnya kumpulan pengganas. Perjuangan ideologi yang dimaksudkan adalah merujuk kepada individu atau kumpulan pengganas yang memperjuangkan kepentingan ideologi, organisasi, budaya, bangsa, agama dan sebagainya untuk kepuasan dan kepentingan diri mereka. Perjuangan yang dilakukan oleh mereka kebiasaannya adalah menjurus lebih kepada perjuangan ideologi dan agama. Terdapat juga perjuangan yang dilakukan oleh kumpulan ini disebabkan oleh penindasan terhadap kaum minoriti. Perjuangan sebegini biasanya akan berlaku apabila sesebuah kerajaan atau negara yang memerintah melakukan kekejaman kepada rakyat dan membuat mereka menderita sehingga mereka bangkit untuk menentang dengan cara melakukan keganasan dan sanggup untuk menggadaikan nyawa mereka demi memperjuangkan ketidakadilan yang telah berlaku kepada mereka. Sebagai contoh, perjuangan oleh kumpulan Abu Sayyaf di selatan Filipina yang mana mereka memperjuangkan hak mereka untuk mendapat kuasa autonomi dari kerajaan Filipina.

⁶ Hugh McManners, *Ultimate Special Forces*, Darling Kinersley Limited, London 2008, m.s 50.

TINDAKAN KEGANASAN OLEH KUMPULAN PENGGANAS

Tindakan keganasan biasanya adalah melibatkan kemusnahan harta benda dan kematian tebusan dan orang awam yang tidak berdosa. Terdapat berbagai kes yang melibatkan tindakan keganasan yang berlaku di seluruh dunia yang perubahan bentuk ancaman tersebut adalah mengikut peredaran masa. Walau bagaimanapun, kemuncak atau pengakhiran kepada sesuatu krisis tersebut biasanya akan membawa kepada kemusnahan dan kematian yang amat dahsyat. Contohnya seperti kejadian serangan pengganas di Hotel JW Marriot pada tahun 2003 di Indonesia yang menyebabkan kemusnahan harta benda dan kematian orang awam yang tidak berdosa.

Kebiasaannya, tindakan awal yang akan dilakukan oleh kumpulan pengganas sebelum melakukan sesuatu keganasan adalah mengenal pasti sasaran untuk dimusnahkan dan menawan orang awam untuk dijadikan sebagai tebusan mereka. Sasaran pengganas kebiasaannya mempunyai nilai yang tinggi kepada sesebuah kerajaan atau negara tersebut seperti pusat-pusat pentadbiran, sekolah, universiti, hotel di pusat-pusat pelancongan utama yang sering dikunjungi pelancong asing, pejabat kedutaan asing, pejabat kerajaan, hospital, rumah orang kenamaan, pesawat komersial, keretapi/bas, kapal pelancong dan dagang, stesyen Radio dan TV dan sebagainya. Kemusnahan atau penawanan sasaran penting ini mampu untuk memberi kesan yang efektif dan bernilai tinggi kepada mereka untuk melakukan sesuatu tuntutan kepada kerajaan sesebuah negara. Apabila sasaran tersebut berjaya ditawan dan orang awam atau individu penting akan dijadikan sebagai tebusan, tindakan seterusnya mereka akan memasang bahan-bahan letupan pada bangunan dan juga pada tebusan dengan menggunakan bahan letupan. Mereka seterusnya akan mula mengancam kerajaan atau pasukan keselamatan untuk membunuh tebusan sekiranya tuntutan mereka tidak dipenuhi dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan serta mengancam untuk membunuh diri dan mati bersama-sama dengan tebusan yang ditawan. Kesemua ini adalah antara ancaman yang seringkali akan dilakukan oleh kumpulan pengganas pada masa kini setelah mereka berjaya melakukan tawanan pada tebusan.

Berdasarkan kepada insiden-insiden keganasan serta bentuk-bentuk ancaman yang telah berlaku di beberapa buah negara, adalah jelas bahawa penggunaan cara

penawanan tebusan bersama sasaran penting sebagai cagaran merupakan satu taktik yang berkesan bagi pengganas untuk mendesak sesebuah kerajaan sesebuah negara memenuhi tuntutan mereka. Ini kerana, kumpulan pengganas tidak akan menghiraukan masa dan nyawa mereka kerana mereka sanggup untuk mati demi berjaya menyampaikan mesej dan tuntutan mereka supaya dipenuhi dengan kadar segera. Sebagai contoh, kejadian penawanan tebusan oleh kumpulan pengganas *Chechen* di Rusia pada 1 September 2004 yang mana mereka telah menjadikan murid-murid dan guru-guru Sekolah Beslan sebagai tebusan mereka⁷. Kumpulan pengganas ini juga dalam masa yang sama telah memasang bahan-bahan letupan pada bangunan yang ditawan. Keadaan yang demikian akan menjadikan sasaran tawanan bertambah sukar untuk dilepaskan dengan operasi penggempuran setelah cara rundingan gagal, melainkan memenuhi segala tuntutan yang diinginkan oleh mereka. Insiden berisiko ini berlaku ketika pasukan khas Rusia yang dikenali sebagai Spetsnaz FSB telah melaksanakan penggempuran dengan menggunakan gas nakotik. Hasil operasi ini telah mengakibatkan kematian yang ramai kepada tebusan awam dan kesemua pengganas. Penggunaan gas nakotik dalam operasi tersebut adalah bertujuan untuk mengurangkan kemusnahan yang lebih dasyat sekiranya bahan letupan yang dipasang oleh pengganas meletup ketika penggempuran dilaksanakan. Hakikatnya, walaupun operasi penggempuran tersebut berjaya memusnahkan kesemua pengganas, namun kematian yang tinggi pada tebusan juga telah berlaku akibat penggunaan gas tersebut.

Penawanan pesawat-pesawat komersial yang menjadikan penumpang sebagai tebusan juga merupakan satu tindakan yang biasanya dilakukan oleh kumpulan pengganas. Dengan menjadikan keseluruhan penumpang pesawat sebagai tebusan dan memasang bahan-bahan letupan di dalam pesawat, ianya akan memberi peluang kepada mereka untuk mendesak sesebuah kerajaan atau negara agar memenuhi tuntutan mereka. Sebagai contoh, penawanan oleh kumpulan pengganas Algeria (GIA) keatas pesawat komersial *Air France Airbus Flight 8969* di Lapangan Terbang Marseilles di selatan Perancis pada tahun 1994⁸ oleh kumpulan pengganas yang menjadikan penumpang sebagai tebusan bagi memenuhi tuntutan mereka. Kerajaan Perancis telah membuat polisi yang

⁷ <http://rt.com/news/beslan-tragedy-russia-commemorate-195/> dipetik pada 11 Mac 13.

⁸ Ibid. m.s 122

mana tidak akan melayan sebarang tuntutan pihak pengganas dan mengarahkan sasaran tersebut di gempur. Operasi penggempuran ini telah dilaksanakan oleh unit anti keganasan Perancis – GIGN, hasilnya mereka telah berjaya membunuh kesemua pengganas serta berjaya menyelamatkan kesemua tebusan awam.

KUMPULAN PENGGANAS ANTARABANGSA

Terdapat berbagai kumpulan pengganas seperti mana yang telah dikenal pasti oleh pertubuhan keselamatan dunia sebagai kumpulan pengganas antarabangsa. Kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas ini wujud disebabkan oleh pelbagai faktor seperti mana yang telah dibincangkan sebelum ini. Melalui sumber yang diperolehi dipercayai terdapat lebih daripada 100 kumpulan pengganas yang telah di daftarkan sebagai organisasi kumpulan pengganas antarabangsa. Antara kumpulan-kumpulan pengganas yang terkenal yang telah di kenalpasti sebagai organisasi pengganas dunia adalah seperti berikut:

a. ***Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)***.

Kumpulan pengganas ini ditubuhkan pada tahun 1976 di Selatan India. Kumpulan pengganas ini ditubuhkan bertujuan untuk menuntut kemerdekaan wilayah utara Semenanjung Jafna utara Sri Lanka bagi masyarakat Tamil. Mereka seringkali melakukan serangan dan sabotase pada kerajaan termasuk penculikan, pembunuhan, pengebom berani mati, tawanan dan sebagainya. Bagaimanapun kumpulan ini telah berjaya ditewaskan oleh Sri Lanka setelah bertahun-tahun memerangnya.

b. **Kumpulan Chechen**. Kumpulan Chechen merupakan kumpulan pengganas yang terdapat di Rusia yang mana kumpulan ini memperjuangkan ideologi dan kemerdekaan wilayah Chechen.

c. **Parti Komunis India (Maoist)**. Parti komunis ini ditubuhkan pada 21 September 2004 yang mana parti ini berjuang atas dasar ideologi untuk mewujudkan sebuah negara komunis melalui jalan ketenteraan, penculikan dan juga penawanan tebusan.

d. ***Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)***. MRTA merupakan sebuah organisasi pengganas yang berpusat di negara Peru. Kumpulan ini ditubuhkan pada tahun 1980 yang mana mereka membawa ideologi komunis untuk membentuk kerajaan baru.

e. ***Japanese Red Army (JRA)***. JRA adalah pertubuhan komunis yang juga didaftarkan sebagai sebuah kumpulan pengganas antarabangsa. Pertubuhan ini bertindak untuk mengambil alih kerajaan Jepun melalui tindakan ketenteraan, penculikan atau menawan tebusan. Pertubuhan ini diasaskan pada tahun 2000 oleh Fusako Shingubou.

f. ***Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)***. ETA adalah sebuah pertubuhan pengganas yang diasaskan oleh Euskadi Ta Askatasuna pada 31 July 1959. Pertubuhan ETA ini juga adalah menjurus kepada perjuangan ideologi komunis demi mencapai kemerdekaan.

g. ***Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)***. LRA merupakan sebuah kumpulan militan yang diklasifikasikan sebagai kumpulan pengganas antarabangsa. Kumpulan ini bergerak aktif di Uganda dan selatan Sudan dengan melakukan keganasan yang melibatkan pembunuhan, penculikan dan sebagainya.

h. ***United Self-defence Forces of Columbia (Autodensas Unidas de Columbia)***. AUG merupakan organisasi pengganas yang bergerak aktif secara militan. Ia ditubuhkan pada tahun 1997 di Columbia.

i. **AL- Qaeda**. Kumpulan pengganas yang diasaskan oleh Osama Bin Ladin yang aktif dalam melancarkan ancaman keganasan terhadap semua kepentingan barat termasuk Amerika Syarikat di seluruh dunia dan ia juga dikaitkan dengan peristiwa 911 iaitu pengeboman bangunan World Trade Centre di New York dan Pantagon. Pembunuhan pemimpin mereka Osama Bin Laden tidak melumpuhkan kumpulan ini yang mempunyai hubungan dengan kumpulan pengganas lain diseluruh dunia termasuk kumpulan Jemaah Islamiah Asia (JI).

MENANGANI KEGANASAN KUMPULAN PENGGANAS

Bagi menangani ancaman keganasan kumpulan pengganas bukanlah suatu perkara yang mudah. Insiden atau senario keganasan yang berlaku dari masa ke semasa melibatkan tawanan keatas tebusan serta penggunaan bahan letupan atau agen nuclear, biologi

dan kimia (NBC) merupakan satu situasi yang amat sukar untuk diselesaikan. Jika ianya tidak dilaksanakan dengan perancangan yang teliti dan pantas oleh pasukan keselamatan akan mengakibatkan kerosakan yang besar kepada harta benda dan nyawa serta alam sekitar jika melibatkan agen NBC. Kesukaran untuk menyelesaikan insiden keganasan seperti ini adalah disebabkan oleh kumpulan ini sanggup mati dan menjadikan tebusan mereka untuk mati bersama-sama mereka tanpa memerlukan satu rundingan yang panjang. Berdasarkan kepada insiden-insiden yang telah berlaku dikebanyakan negara, pendekatan untuk menangani keganasan menjadi semakin kompleks untuk diselesaikan tanpa berlakunya pertumpahan darah. Namun begitu, antara pendekatan yang sering digunakan untuk menangani situasi keganasan adalah seperti berikut:

a. **Rundingan.** Rundingan merupakan salah satu cara yang akan digunakan oleh Tim Perunding untuk berhubung terus dengan kumpulan pengganas bagi tujuan memujuk mereka menyerah diri dan melambatkan ancaman tindakan membunuh tebusan. Tim ini memanjangkan masa rundingan khususnya dalam memenuhi tuntutan oleh kumpulan pengganas, mendapatkan maklumat terperinci tentang pengganas dan memberi masa untuk pihak keselamatan untuk membuat persiapan rapi operasi menyelamatkan tebusan. Kumpulan perunding biasanya adalah daripada golongan yang bijak pandai dalam negosiasi dan mempunyai kemahiran psikologi iaitu mampu untuk meredakan keadaan dan tindakan agresif pengganas, memusnahkan inisiatif pengganas dan melambatkan tuntutan yang cuba dibuat oleh pengganas dan sebagainya. Rundingan merupakan cara yang terbaik bagi mengelakkan daripada berlakunya pertumpahan darah atau kemusnahan yang lebih besar yang mungkin akan dilakukan oleh kumpulan pengganas. Melalui cara rundingan juga, ianya dapat mencapai beberapa sasaran seperti berikut:

- 1) **Tindakan Agresif.** Ianya akan mengurangkan tindakan agresif pengganas terhadap tebusan-tebusan yang telah dijadikan tawanan memanjangkan masa rundingan dan memenuhi tuntutan kecil pengganas seperti bantuan sajian dan kemudahan asas terhad.
- 2) **Kumpulan Penggempur.** Ianya akan membantu kumpulan penggempur untuk membuat persiapan, perancangan, *rehearsal*

pada sasaran sebelum operasi menyelamatkan tebusan dilakukan.

3) **Leka dan Cuai.** Ianya akan menjadikan kumpulan pengganas tersebut leka dan cuai khususnya dalam melakukan tindakan mereka kepada tebusan dengan melanjut tempoh tuntutan dan memberikan mereka harapan untuk di penuhi tuntutan mereka.

4) **Moral.** Ianya akan melemahkan moral kumpulan pengganas melalui tindakan menutup air, letrik, talipon dan melambatkan bantuan logistik seperti bantuan perubatan kepada anggota, pakaian, makanan, minuman dan sebagainya.

5) **Menyerah Diri.** Ianya juga boleh menyebabkan kumpulan pengganas menyerah diri kerana kecewa dan tidak yakin kepada perjuangan mereka yang sia-sia dan tidak melakukan apa-apa kecederaan pada tebusan yang ditawan.

b. **Penggempuran.** Penggempuran adalah cara terakhir sekiranya rundingan yang dibuat di antara pihak keselamatan dan pihak pengganas menemui jalan buntu. Jalan buntu disini bermaksud pihak pengganas telah memutuskan rundingan dan mereka telah mula bertindak untuk membunuh kesemua tebusan yang ada bersama mereka sebagai tanda tidak percaya kepada wakil kerajaan dan pihak perunding yang dilantik. Apabila situasi seperti ini berlaku, operasi penggempuran akan dilaksanakan dengan serta merta bagi mengelakkan kesemua tebusan tersebut mati dibunuh oleh kumpulan pengganas. Operasi penggempuran biasanya akan dilakukan oleh pasukan khas yang mempunyai kepakaran khusus dalam gerakan menyelamatkan tebusan. Melalui operasi penggempuran, ianya dapat mengurangkan angka kematian tebusan atau menyelamatkan kesemua tebusan disamping mengelak dari berlakunya kemusnahan yang lebih besar pada sasaran. Kemusnahan yang dimaksudkan disini adalah merujuk kepada penggunaan bahan-bahan letupan kepada tebusan dan sasaran yang ditawan dengan memasang bahan letupan di bahagian pintu-pintu masuk, tingkap, lubang penghawa dingin dan sebagainya yang dijangkakan oleh mereka sebagai laluan yang akan digunakan oleh pasukan penggempur untuk menyelamatkan tebusan. Secara ringkasnya,

sesuatu kejayaan dalam operasi menyelamatkan tebusan adalah bergantung kepada beberapa faktor seperti berikut:

1) **Masa.** Masa persiapan tempur akan digunakan sebaik mungkin oleh kumpulan penggempur iaitu melaksanakan perancangan rapi dan raptai untuk operasi sebenar serta rancangan kontinjensi lain.

2) **Perancangan Teliti.** Perancangan yang teliti meliputi keberangkalian-keberangkalian tindakan yang akan digunakan oleh pengganas semasa operasi penggempuran perlu sentiasa dikemaskini sebilang masa berdasarkan kepada maklumat yang diterima.

3) **Maklumat Perisikan.** Maklumat perisikan yang terperinci dan tepat merupakan elemen yang penting sebelum operasi penggempuran dilakukan. Maklumat perisikan yang tepat dan terperinci pengganas serta lokasi sasaran memainkan peranan utama dalam membuat perancangan operasi penggempuran seperti *blue print* rajah pelan bangunan atau istalasi yang ditawan, bilangan dan kedudukan pengganas, jerangkap samar dan lain-lain .

4) **Kerjasama.** Kerjasama adalah elemen yang penting semasa operasi penggempuran. Kerjasama di antara semua agensi awam dan NGO yang terlibat seperti polis, bomba, bulan sabit merah, TNB, Lembaga Air, Majlis Daerah dan sebagainya perlu sentiasa berada pada tahap yang baik.

5) **Kerahsiaan.** Kerahsiaan adalah amat penting sebelum operasi penggempuran dilaksanakan. Kerahsiaan perlu dijaga bagi mengelakkan kumpulan pengganas agar tidak mengetahui bila tindakan penggempuran yang akan dilakukan oleh pasukan penggempur. Selain dari itu pihak pengganas perlu diputuskan perhubungan dari penyokong mereka pihak luar dari membantu mereka atau berhubung terus secara langsung.

6) **Komunikasi.** Komunikasi merupakan elemen yang penting dalam memastikan penggempuran berjaya dilakukan kerana ianya akan melancarkan *command and control* operasi tersebut.

7) **Tipu Helah.** Rancangan tipu helah merupakan salah satu faktor kejayaan sesuatu operasi penggempuran. Sekiranya rancangan tipu helah berjaya dilakukan, ia mampu untuk memberi kesan kejutan kepada pengganas semasa operasi penggempuran dilakukan bagi mengalih tumpuan pengganas terhadap pasukan penggempur.

8) **Kejutan.** Elemen kejutan juga merupakan faktor penting dalam operasi penggempuran. Dengan adanya elemen kejutan, ianya mampu untuk memberi kesan yang maksimum semasa penggempuran dilakukan dan memberikan kelebihan kepada pasukan penggempur dalam tindakan menewaskan pengganas.

9) **Kepantasan.** Kepantasan merupakan elemen yang penting setelah elemen kejutan dan tipu helah berjaya dilakukan. Kepantasan adalah penting bagi memastikan pihak pengganas dapat ditewaskan serta merta dan gagal untuk bertindak membunuh tebusan atau mengaktifkan bahan letupan yang telah dipasang.

Faktor-faktor yang dibincangkan di atas menyumbang kejayaan penggempuran dalam operasi menangani kumpulan pengganas serta menyelamatkan tebusan, maklumat ini bolehlah dijadikan sebagai panduan dalam menghadapi ancaman keganasan.

PENUTUP

Ancaman keganasan merupakan satu bentuk tindakan yang sukar untuk dijangkakan untuk dikenalpasti bila dan di mana ianya akan terjadi. Ianya boleh berlaku di mana-mana negara tanpa mengira fahaman, agama dan budaya. Ancaman keganasan juga adalah satu bencana yang serius jika tidak dibendung ianya akan membawa kemusnahan dan kehilangan nyawa kepada insan yang tidak berdosa. Aktiviti keganasan pastinya akan menimbulkan rasa panik dan tidak selamat bagi rakyat di sesebuah negara yang terlibat. Namun begitu, kita perlu sedar kewujudan kumpulan-kumpulan ini adalah disebabkan oleh pelbagai faktor kemanusiaan yang berkait rapat dengan soal diskriminasi, penindasan, pembunuhan yang dilakukan oleh sebuah kuasa besar ke atas negara kecil atau pemerintah kuku besi yang rakus untuk berkuasa dan zalim.

Bagi negara kuasa besar, sudah tentu tindakan yang dilakukan oleh mereka adalah dilihat sebagai mengikut undang-undang antarabangsa walaupun pada hakikatnya ia adalah sebaliknya. Jika dilihat dari sudut yang lebih telus dan luas, perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh mereka dengan jelas telah melanggar undang-undang antarabangsa dan dunia serta mencabul hak asasi manusia. Contohnya seperti mana pencerobohan kuasa Barat yang telah berlaku di Iraq, Afghanistan dan Palestin yang mana tindakan ketenteraan yang dilakukan oleh

Amerika Syarikat dan sekutunya telah meragut ramai orang awam yang tidak berdosa serta memusnahkan banyak tempat-tempat bersejarah dan juga masjid-masjid dengan berpaksikan isu menangani keganasan global. Keadaan diskriminasi dan penindasan terus berlaku kepada sesuatu bangsa atau kaum sudah tentu akan menyebabkan mereka akan melakukan ancaman keganasan kerana ianya dianggap jalan terakhir untuk menuntut bela dan keadilan.

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Meja Ahmad Huzaini bin Zainudin mula berkhidmat di dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia pada 8 Dis 1998. Beliau telah ditauliahkan ke Kor Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja. Beliau kemudian mengikuti Kursus Asas Komando dan lulus pada tahun 1999 dan seterusnya berkhidmat di dalam Gerak Khas dan telah memegang pelbagai jawatan. Memiliki Eksekutif Diploma Pengajian Strategik dan Pertahanan dari UPNM. Beliau kini menjawat jawatan sebagai Peg Staf 2 Latih di Markas 21 Gerak Khas di Kem Iskandar Mersing.

NUCLEAR ARMS PROLIFERATION – CAN A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD BE A REALITY?

by Kol Toh Choon Siang

–SYNOPSIS–

The expansion of nuclear weapon arsenals among the greater powers and the nuclear arms proliferation to other states have resulted in levels of destructive power sufficient for the destruction of the world. The hope of a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NFWF) has always been an idealist's dream but in an environment dominated by realists; this hope appears to be futile. Whilst there have been efforts by the Nuclear Weapon States (led by the US) to reduce their nuclear weapons as advocated by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, previous efforts by relevant parties are seen as merely rhetoric that is yet to be substantiated with genuine positive actions. Future trends may witness a gradual increase in vertical and horizontal proliferations that are controllable. The potential nuclear flashpoints, if any, would be bilateral in nature: India versus Pakistan; Israel versus the other Arab States; North Korea versus South Korea; China versus Taiwan; and possibly Iran in defence against a possible US attack. Given the differing views on the possibility of achieving a NFWF, this essay will analyse whether it can be achieved in the present international environment. It will finally justify that given the present and likely future environment in international politics, it is not possible to achieve a NFWF.

INTRODUCTION

“Even in this post - cold war period today, there are about 40,000 nuclear warheads around the world. Nuclear arms invented in the 20th Century and carried over to the 21st Century, are the most important problems that will affect the future of the entire human race.”¹

Brig. (Rtd) Dr. Vijai K.Nair

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the military arsenals of the world is regarded as the greatest threat to the survival of humanity. The expansion of nuclear weapon arsenals among the greater powers and the Nuclear Arms Proliferation (NAP) to other states have resulted in levels of destructive power sufficient for the destruction of the world. Realising the catastrophic dangers posed by these nuclear weapons, numerous efforts were made by interested parties to contain, reduce and (with the hope of) eventually abolishing them. The ultimate goal is to realise a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NFWF).

The hope of a NFWF has always been an idealist's dream but in an environment dominated by realists, this hope appears to be futile. It can be argued that previous efforts by relevant parties are merely rhetoric that is yet to be substantiated with genuine positive actions. Notwithstanding that, on 8 Apr 2010, President Obama signed a new START² treaty with Russia entailing a further reduction in strategic nuclear weapons in both countries. A few days later, an international summit meeting took place at the invitation of the US President, attended by almost all nuclear nations, mostly with their heads of state or heads of government. He had earlier acknowledged his aim of a NFWF during his speech in Prague in April 2009.³

² Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I visited on 23 April 2013. **START** (for **S**trategic **A**rms **R**eduction **T**reaty) was a bilateral treaty between the US and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994. The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more

than 6,000 nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers.

³ KAS International Reports http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20011-544-2-30.pdf?100630121828 visited on 23 April 2013. In September, this objective was reinforced by a resolution by the United Nations Security Council, which had met specifically for this purpose on Obama's initiative at a head of state and government level.

¹ V. K. Nair, Nuclear Disarmament, Intractable Differences: Intent, Concept and Capabilities, IDFR, Occasional Papers 2/2000, p. 1.

Given the differing views on the possibility of achieving a NFWF, this essay will analyse whether it can be achieved in the present international environment. In the discourse, this essay will explain: the types of NAP and their debates; the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); the prospect of a NFWF - can we achieve it?; the concepts of deterrence and disarmament and the future trends. The hypothesis of this essay is that given the present and likely future environment in international politics, it is not possible to achieve a NFWF.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

There are two categories of NAP- vertical and horizontal. Vertical proliferation occurs where a nuclear weapon state (NWS) increases the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal.⁴ During the Cold War, vertical proliferation referred to the Soviet-US nuclear weapons race only. Now, it encompasses a broader context referring to all states possessing nuclear weapons. There are eight confirmed NWS; three suspected and five potential nuclear states.⁵ It was during the Cold War that in an environment of mutual distrust, the superpowers developed nuclear war fighting strategies involving various components of deterrence: first strike, second strike and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).⁶ These strategies are still applicable today.

Horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons among Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Some of these states seek to possess their own nuclear weapons as a means to enhance their survival and security by providing deterrence against would be aggressors. The primary reason for this horizontal independent deterrents. It is argued that the seeds of

proliferation lie with the NWS and are fertilised by their example.⁷ Another reason for horizontal proliferation is the global inability to formalise a universal, unbiased and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime to enforce nuclear disarmament.

Realist's ideology justifies that States resort to NAP as a means of striving to increase their military power (hence nuclear power) in order to ensure their survival in an anarchical world of realism. Hence, for NNWS, procuring nuclear capabilities is regarded to be the best option for states to gain the advantage over other NNWS and at the same time narrows the gap between them and the NWS. Correspondingly, NWS would naturally enhance their 'unfair' advantage over NNWS by either expanding their nuclear arsenals or seek ways to improve existing warheads. In a way, this can be considered as some form of an arms race among the NWS (vertical proliferation) and within the NNWS (horizontal proliferation).

One debate that has sparked considerable controversy since the early 1980s asserts that horizontal proliferation is to be welcomed rather than feared. It was based on the proposition that just as nuclear deterrence maintained stability between the East and West during the Cold War, so it can induce similar stabilising effects on other conflicting situations.⁸ Waltz argued that "more is better" because the likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase.⁹ This assumption did not receive much support; however, as the conventional wisdom has been that more will be worse not better and that measures to prevent nuclear proliferation represent the best way forward. What then are the measures taken by the international community to curb this proliferation? Until today, one of the most prominent control measures is the NPT.

⁴ G. Evans, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. Penguin Books Ltd. 1998. p.390. Under Article IX of the NPT, a NWS is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device.

⁵ V. K. Nair, *Nuclear Disarmament, Intractable Difference*, P.5. Known NWS are US, Russia, China, Britain and France (1st Level NWS) and India, Pakistan and Israel (2nd Level NWS). Suspected NWS are Iran, Iraq and North Korea whereas potential NWS are Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Germany and Canada.

⁶ G. Evans, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relation*, p. 312. MAD is a term used by strategic analysts during the Cold War era with particular reference to US policies of nuclear deterrence. It implied a situation of parity between the superpowers where both possessed such offensive capabilities as to be able to credibly threaten each other's homelands with devastation levels that would be rationally unacceptable. First Strike refers to the attempt to achieve strategic surprise by attacking the adversary first. Second Strike refers to the capability of an actor to retaliate violently against an adversary having sustained, in the mean time, a first strike.

⁷ V. K. Nair, *Nuclear Disarmament, Intractable Difference: Intent, Concept and Capabilities*. P.4. Nair argued that more than a decade after the ending of the Cold War, none of the nuclear powers display any willingness to give up their nuclear arsenals. Instead, they are consolidating their nuclear forces at lower levels, adjusting their nuclear strategies to new post-Cold War missions.

⁸ J. Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 1998, p. 340.

⁹ L. Freedman, *War*, Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 1994, p. 355.

THE NUCLEAR ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology; to promote cooperation in the peaceful usage of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament¹⁰ - hence, a NWS. Since its inception in 1970, the treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the NWS.

Although it has managed to prevent a rapid horizontal proliferation, the NPT has not succeeded in preventing the gradual spread of nuclear weapons. For as long as the NWS continue to base their security on the development of larger nuclear arsenals, other states will also seek to acquire nuclear weapons. This is because some of the more technologically advanced states would strive 'to go nuclear' as a means to enhance their sovereignty in international relations and consequently put them at par with the great powers. The NPT is often described as a bargain between the 'haves' (NWS) and the 'have nots' (NNWS) in that, in return for the 'have nots' not developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, the 'haves' are obliged under the terms of the Treaty to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. This has however proven to be ineffective.¹¹ One of the main reasons is the reluctance of a number of key States to take steps needed to ensure compliance to the Treaty. The subsequent paragraphs will elaborate further on the Treaty's ineffectiveness.

The major criticism of the NPT is that it is fundamentally discriminatory since it establishes a distinction between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. Furthermore, the long overdue fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty by a number of NWS has raised considerable concern among the majority of NWS, advocating the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. The NPT also has several shortcomings especially concerning its monitoring, verification and enforcement mechanisms. While NPT tries to prevent horizontal proliferation, it however does not address

vertical proliferation.¹² This is obvious because the US and Russia, always have the last say and they seemed to be selective in complying with nuclear disarmament as stipulated by the NPT. Hence, the NPT is seen as a tool for the US (to a lesser extent Russia), to control the spread and improvement of nuclear weapons by other states.

The NPT has also yet to become a truly international regime in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. On the one hand, some countries that presumably have developed nuclear weapons such as India and Pakistan, and Israel (which is suspected of having this capacity) have not acceded to the Treaty.¹³ On the other hand, some states, which are signatories to the NPT such as Iran and North Korea, had been known to not fully observe their obligations under the Treaty. As mentioned above, these states have signed and ratified the NPT, yet they still violate its terms blatantly and continue to seek to develop nuclear weapons. Up until now, the response of the international community has been slow and inadequate to deter such violations, thus rendering the NPT ineffective.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

*"... there is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it, between losing what someone can forcibly take and giving it up to avoid risk or damage"*¹⁴ Thomas C. Schelling

It was during the Cold War that in an environment of mutual distrust, the superpowers developed nuclear war fighting strategies involving various components of deterrence: first strike, second strike and MAD. Nuclear deterrence has always been the most well-known form of deterrence. This claim can be illustrated by the MAD policy that had been successful throughout the Cold War in deterring the outbreak of a nuclear war between the two superpowers. It can be argued that MAD ensured the security for both superpowers and hence it could be better called MAS or Mutually Assured Security.

¹⁰ Weapons of Mass Destruction, Treaty on the NPT, Peace and Security through Disarmament. <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html> visited on 15 February 2003. The NPT provides for two categories of parties: the NWS Parties and the NNWS Parties. It was opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force on 5th March, 1970. A total of 188 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five NWS. The operation of this Treaty is to be reviewed every five years. On 11 May 1995, it was extended indefinitely.

¹¹ G. H. G. Haniff, The Non-Proliferation Treaty, Paper Presented at the Seminar on Nuclear Weapons Free World, IDFR, Kuala Lumpur, 24th May 2000, p.2.

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *ibid.* Incidentally, in the midst of the seriousness of its nuclear arms buildup, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003 in blatant defiance of the US.

¹⁴ T. C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, 1996.

Nuclear deterrence, as it is commonly understood today, is the mutual standoff between two powers who have a latent or openly hostile relationship, and who both possess nuclear weapons. In such a relationship, deterrence is assumed to work at the nuclear level. The situation in India and Pakistan (categorised as “threshold” or 2nd level NWS)¹⁵ is a case in point whereby the possessions of nuclear capabilities by both states have actually prevented them from ever thinking of waging a nuclear war. This is because both states believed that the nuclear weapons capability has an inherent deterrent value via the MAD concept. After having discussed the reasons for proliferation, the ineffectiveness of the NPT and nuclear deterrence, what then are the prospects of achieving a NFWF?

PROSPECTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD (NFWF)

The ultimate objective of NPT is the creating of a NFWF. To a certain extent, the NPT has succeeded in establishing some nuclear weapons free zones¹⁶ that are construed as the forerunner or pre-requisites of achieving the NFWF. To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence building measure between state parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¹⁷ Although the IAEA provided a forum for limited but essential major powers cooperation, it also fostered the spread of nuclear power technology for peaceful purposes to NNWS. This allowed nations with limited weapon ambitions to acquire and exploit nuclear technology quickly without effective external controls or restrictions over their long-term questionable objectives.

Since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of experts and organisations in favour of rapid disarmament, as well as official proposals from Belarus and Ukraine, with Russian support, have suggested foreclosing the deployment option by, for example, establishing a nuclear weapon free zone.¹⁸ However, a key argument against a nuclear-weapon-free zone is that it would create differences in status concerning international law – as opposed to differences in political positions regarding the stationing of nuclear weapons. Hence, East Europeans do not seem welcome being included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which they interpret as a sign that they would become ‘second class’ members.¹⁹ This is because the possession of nuclear weapons is deemed as an international status symbol and hence the inherent urge to join the ‘Nuclear Club’.

Although France and the UK (who were at the forefront of the 1995 NPT talks), have greatly reduced their nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War, there is still no realistic prospect that they will give up their nuclear deterrent capabilities in the near future. This is because for the sake of France’s and Europe’s security, nuclear weapons will remain necessary for as long as general and complete disarmament is not be achieved.²⁰ For Britain and France, the sole conceivable political utility of nuclear weapons lies in the status symbol it confers. This may satisfy the urge for nostalgia of the former colonial powers. The greater political status symbol is permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. So long as the two are combined, suspicions remain that possession of nuclear weapons is an unwritten but necessary, perhaps even a sufficient, condition of permanent membership of the Security Council. Hence, neither of them is likely to join the US-Russian arms-reduction process in the near future.

¹⁵ Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2010. A threshold NWS is one that does not claim possession of nuclear weapons, has not forsworn the nuclear-weapons option, produces significant amounts of its own nuclear material or equipment, and refuses to accept international control over them. The three most commonly cited threshold NWS are Israel, Pakistan and India, p.1.

¹⁶ Arms Control Association, *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance*, September 2012: Five such zones exist today, with four of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

¹⁷ The IAEA, the official UN nuclear watchdog, was formed in 1957 with its main role as the international coordinator of anti-proliferation efforts through its safeguards program.

¹⁸ B. Tetrais, *Nuclear Policies in Europe*, Adelphi Paper No. 327, Oxford University Press, London, 1999 p. 50. Some NATO states are de facto NWS by virtue of having nuclear weapons in their territory for use by their nuclear mentors and their own military in the event of a conflict. These states are: Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Canada.

¹⁹ *ibid*, p.51.

²⁰ *ibid*, p.52.

Given all these hindrances, how then can a NWWF be possible? Dr. Manpreet Sethi charted seven steps in realising a NWWF.²¹ The seven steps are: **first**, there should a freeze of all nuclear weapons related activities. **Second**, all the NWS need to commit themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons. **Third**, serious collective efforts should be taken for systematic reduction of nuclear weapons by NWS. This would shore up global support for the non-proliferation regime and thereby contribute to greater international confidence building. **Fourth**, an International Authority for Nuclear Disarmament (IAND) should be constituted in order to effect overall conscious supervision on disarmament. **Fifth**, the IAND should establish a universal regime of international controls based on openness and transparency. **Sixth**, once the IAND is in place, it could oversee the deactivation and physical destruction of existing nuclear arsenals. **Lastly**, the formulation of an international nuclear deterrent force to deter breakout in post-nuclear environment.

All the above steps are very idealist in nature, as their success requires the total commitment of all parties. The preceding paragraphs have argued that, while NWS are reluctant to disarm totally and potential NNWS would endeavour to procure their own nuclear weapons, for reasons alluded, the possibility of implementing all the seven steps is highly improbable. Even Obama has appropriately pointed out that: “the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world can only be achieved in the long-term, possibly not even within my lifetime”, as he stressed in *Prague*.²² Thus, it will take a long time before a NWWF could be realised. This is because nuclear disarmament is a difficult and tedious process that requires total commitment from all NWS. Conversely, there is also the threat of horizontal proliferation among NNWS and this added up to the complexity of the whole issue at hand. Weighing the advantages that come with nuclear possession over the incentives that disarmament offers, it would be difficult for NWS to opt for the latter.

Another pertinent fact is that nuclear weapons have been invented and their possessions make state a power beyond its resources and position. Nuclear technology can neither be reversed nor the impact of its possession eliminated. It is therefore obvious that it is not possible to achieve a total abolishment of nuclear weapons. Based on the above explanation, it can then be said that the prospects of a NWWF is bleak. What then would be the future trends in terms of nuclear arms proliferation?

FUTURE TRENDS

The success of India and Pakistan progressing to become new NWS (from threshold NWS) and remaining as non-NPT parties may encourage other NNWS to follow suit. However, the present US relationship with the other four NWS will continue to remain favourable in the future as all subscribe to the common perception that it is far too costly to fight a nuclear war. Hence, the proliferating states would have to think many times over before even considering using their limited nuclear capabilities to settle a dispute. Therefore, there is albeit only a remote possibility of a nuclear war breaking out in the near future.

North Korea and Iran are expected to hold on dearly to their nuclear option that also serves as a means to compensate their conventional inferiority. They will continue to play the game of nuclear brinkmanship²³ when the need arises to ensure their regime survival. Despite a US call for nuclear arms reductions, North Korea and Iran continue to work on their nuclear programs and other countries may secretly be doing the same.²⁴ Hence it is obvious that North Korea and Iran are not interested in disarmament because it is part of the national legitimacy of their regimes and their rationale with the population that they can proudly claim to be nuclear powers. In essence, the future trend is obviously about regime survival and security aimed at ensuring that the US does not attempt to topple their regimes.

²¹ M. Sethi, *The prospects of, and a Road Map to, the Realisation of a Nuclear Weapons Free World*, pp. 26-27.

²² KAS International Reports http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20011-544-2-30.pdf?100630121828 visited on 23 April 2013.

²³ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: Brinkmanship is the practice of pushing dangerous events to the verge of or to the brink of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. It occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labour relations, and (in contemporary settings) military strategy involving the threatened use of nuclear weapons <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brinkmanship> visited on 3 April 2013.

²⁴ Christoph Ricking, <http://www.dw.de/the-future-of-nuclear-weapons/a-1661159> visited on 3 April 2013.

Future trends may witness a gradual increase in vertical and horizontal proliferations that are controllable. The potential nuclear flashpoints, if any, would be bilateral in nature: India versus Pakistan; Israel versus the other Arab States; North Korea versus South Korea; China versus Taiwan; and possibly Iran in defence against a possible US attack. If at all a war breaks out in one of these regions, it is highly unlikely that they would use nuclear weapons. This is because the states involved are unwilling to accept the tremendous losses that nuclear weapons would affect on either side if they were used. Furthermore, if any of the NWS were to take sides to facilitate the balance of power resulting in violent conflicts, it is highly unlikely that they would use their nuclear weapons for obvious reasons.

CONCLUSION

In drawing to a close, it is therefore obvious that nuclear weapons are not going to disappear. If they do so, the first symptom of that disappearance would manifest itself in the US, the sole superpower. The US clearly enunciate its view of the future of nuclear arsenals, which is, “our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how US military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion.”²⁵ Notwithstanding the ostensibly meek efforts by Obama and the major NWS towards reduction of their nuclear weapons, it is therefore ironical for the US to urge the other NWS to disarm, and the NNWS not to pursue a nuclear program, while they themselves are not

prepared to part with their nuclear arsenals. The reality of it all is that for as long as the “Exclusive Nuclear Club” exists, nuclear weapons will somehow proliferate, with a new member occasionally joining the club.

Like industrial strength, nuclear weapons are a major lever of power, both for political as well as military transactions, even though they may be unseeable.²⁶ This invariably implies that weaker NWS would enhance their nuclear capabilities, whilst NNWS would strive to possess their own nuclear weapons in order to enhance their deterrent capabilities and regime survivability. This gives credence to the notion that the possibility of realising a NFWF is bleak and it cannot be a reality in the near future as long as the US is not prepared to take the lead in moving towards total disarmament.

While the possibility of realising a NFWF is slim, the present environment would actually enhance greater stability against the likelihood of a nuclear war occurring. Whilst we may witness some nuclear arms reduction among the NWS, we are not likely to see major changes in the role of independent nuclear deterrent forces. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable feature of the current scene is a level of stability that was not apparent during the Cold War, given the geopolitical upheavals that have occurred and the enhanced significance of nuclear weapons deterrence in a world characterised by greater multipolarity. Hence, a NFWF would only remain the idealists’ distant dream and this proved the hypothesis that given the present and likely future environment in international relations, it is not possible to achieve a NFWF.

²⁵ R. Menon, *A Nuclear Strategy for India*, Sage Publication Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2000, p.297.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p.26.

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Kol Toh Choon Siang was commissioned to the 8th Royal Rangers Regiment in 1977 and he later returned to command the battalion (8 RRR Para) from 1999 to 2002. He is a graduate of the 1992 Australian Army Command and Staff College, Queenscliff. He graduated from the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College in 2003 with a Masters Degree in Defence Studies, UKM. He also holds a Graduate Diploma in Management Studies (Aust) and a Diploma in Psychology (Counseling) – Dean's Award, UKM. He served as the Deputy Head of Training Development in the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College from 2009 to 2012 before taking up his current appointment as the Colonel Doctrine at Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters.

REJIMEN ASKAR WATANIAH: SUATU ANUGERAH YANG TIDAK TERNILAI

oleh Lt Nurashikin Bte Yusof

-SINOPSIS-

Malaysia sentiasa bersedia dan siapsiaga dalam menghadapi pelbagai kemungkinan. Bagi terus menjaga kedaulatan bumi berdaulat ini Malaysia sentiasa mengekalkan kombinasi kesiapsiagaan modal insan dan aset tempur untuk membolehkan ianya bergerak menanggapi apa jua konflik yang membabitkan isu pencerobohan sempadan negara dan pertahanan. Jika satu daripada faktor itu tidak berada dalam keadaan siapsiaga, kemungkinan besar angkatan bersenjata tidak akan mencapai matlamat yang diinginkan untuk melawan musuh negara. Sebagai benteng pertahanan kedua negara Rejimen Askar Wataniah (RAW) akan sentiasa membantu angkatan tetap untuk terus menjaga kedaulatan bumi tercinta ini.

PENDAHULUAN

Firman Allah SWT di dalam surah al-Anfal ayat 60:

وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ
وَالْآخَرِينَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ

Bermaksud: “**dan sediakanlah untuk menentang mereka (musuh yang menceroboh) segala jenis kekuatan yang dapat kamu sediakan dan dari pasukan-pasukan berkuda yang lengkap sedia, untuk menggerunkan dengan persediaan itu musuh Allah dan musuh kamu serta musuh-musuh yang lain dari mereka yang kamu tidak mengetahuinya, sedang Allah mengetahuinya**”.

Allah SWT berfirman di dalam al-Quran melalui surah at-Taubah ayat 20:

الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَهَجَرُوا وَجْهَهُمْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يَأْتِيهِمُ اللَّهُ بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ أَكْثَرُ دَرَجَةً عِنْدَ اللَّهِ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْفَائِزُونَ

Maksudnya: “**(sesungguhnya) orang-orang yang beriman dan berhijrah serta berjihad pada jalan Allah dengan harta benda dan jiwa mereka, adalah lebih besar dan tinggi darjatnya di sisi Allah; dan mereka itulah orang-orang yang berjaya**”.

Daripada Zaid bin Khalid al-Juhani r.a katanya : Rasulullah SAW bersabda yang maksudnya : Sesiapa yang mempersiapkan seorang tentera penyerang di jalan Allah untuk menjaga keluarganya maka sesungguhnya ia juga telah berperang.

Merujuk kepada ayat Al-Quran dan hadis di atas, jelas bahawa walaupun Agama Islam cintakan keamanan, persiapan dan siapsiaga bala tentera adalah dituntut demi menjaga kepentingan agama, bangsa dan negara. Ibarat pepatah Melayu, “air yang tenang jangan disangka tiada buaya”, dalam situasi aman pelbagai ‘kemungkinan’ yang akan berlaku.

Menyedari akan berlakunya kemungkinan dan keadaan yang tidak menentu, Malaysia sentiasa bersedia dan siapsiaga dalam menghadapi pelbagai situasi yang akan berlaku. Kekacauan yang mungkin menjadi ‘musuh dalam selimut’ atau musuh yang sememangnya nampak nyata menjadikan kesiapseragaan sumber manusia dan aset tempur pada sebilang masa adalah amat penting ibarat “menjolak sarang tebusan”. Selama ini walau dalam keadaan aman sekalipun Malaysia sebagai sebuah negara berdaulat mempunyai kombinasi kesiapsiagaan modal insan dan juga aset tempur amat penting untuk membolehkan ianya bergerak menanggapi apa jua konflik yang membabitkan isu pencerobohan sempadan negara

dan pertahanan bumi tercinta ini. Jika satu daripada faktor itu tidak berada dalam keadaan siapsiaga, kemungkinan besar pergerakan angkatan bersenjata tidak akan mencapai matlamat yang diinginkan untuk melawan musuh negara.

Oleh yang demikian, Askar Wataniah adalah salah sebuah ketumbukan yang membantu pasukan Tentera Darat tetap serta pasukan keselamatan negara yang lain untuk memusnahkan musuh sewaktu perang dunia kedua dahulu dan sehingga kini ianya telah menjadi benteng pertahanan kedua negara selepas angkatan tetap. Ianya juga merupakan salah satu pasukan di dalam Angkatan Sukarela Persekutuan yang berfungsi sebagai Pasukan Simpanan Tentera Darat (TD). Terdapat pelbagai Rejimen dan Kor di dalam Askar Wataniah yang mempunyai peranan dan tugas tersendiri. Pasukan-pasukan ini diletakkan di bawah pentadbiran Briged setempat dan di bawah kawalan teknikal Bahagian Pasukan Simpanan (BPS).

SEJARAH RINGKAS PENUBUHAN

Mengimbas kembali sejarah dan peranan angkatan sukarela di Malaysia, Pasukan sukarela telah pun wujud di Tanah Melayu sejak tahun 1861 dengan penubuhan pasukan sukarela yang dinamakan Penang Volunteer. Pada tahun 1902, Negeri-Negeri Melayu Bersekutu (FMS) yang terdiri daripada Negeri Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan dan Pahang telah mula menubuhkan unit sukarelanya yang dikenali sebagai Malay State Volunteer Rifles (MSVR). Pasukan sukarela tersebut terus berkembang dan beberapa pasukan baru telah ditubuhkan dengan gelaran Malay Federated Malay States Volunteer Force' (FMSVF), Unfederated Malay States Volunteer Force (UFMSVF) dan Straits Settlement Volunteer Force (SSVF).

Apabila tercetusnya Perang Dunia Kedua, semua pasukan sukarela yang wujud telah sama-sama berganding bahu dengan angkatan tetap menentang tentera Jepun di Malaya. Selepas Perang Dunia Kedua pasukan-pasukan sukarela yang telah wujud telah dihidupkan semula. Apabila tercetus darurat di tanah air pada tahun 1948, satu pasukan sukarela iaitu Pasukan Kawalan Kampung (*Home Guard*) telah ditubuhkan. *Home Guard* ini telah memainkan peranan yang penting sepanjang masa darurat tersebut.

Pada tahun 1958, apabila keadaan keselamatan dalam negeri telah dapat dikawal semula Home Guard telah dibubarkan. Memandangkan ramai daripada kalangan anggota Home Guard mahu terus menyumbang perkhidmatan sukarela mereka, Kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu telah mengambil keputusan untuk menghidupkan serta menyusun pasukan sukarela supaya ianya lebih berkesan dan tersusun rapi, sesuai dengan tujuan penubuhan pasukan sukarela tersebut. The *Territorial Army Ordinance* 1958 telah digubal. Dengan kuasa Ordinan ini pasukan sukarela yang baru dikenali dengan nama Askar wataniah telah ditubuhkan pada 1 Jun 1958.

Mengimbas kembali saat kegemilangan bagi anggota Askar Wataniah suatu ketika dahulu semasa zaman komunis misalnya, Prebet Alias bin Ibrahim, berusia 21 tahun daripada Pasukan Pertahanan Tempatan Perak telah dikurniakan pingat P.G.B oleh Duli Yang Maha Mulia Seri Paduka Baginda Yang Di-Pertuan Agong pada tahun 1977 di atas jasa bakti dan keperwiraannya yang sejati semasa bertugas di sebuah Pos di Hulu Perak di sepanjang Lebuhraya Timur- Barat, dan berjaya menembak serta membunuh tiga orang pengganas Komunis dan menawan tiga pucuk senjata termasuk dua senjata M-16 dan senapang carbine dengan beratus butir peluru, di samping dapat menyelamatkan nyawa dua orang rakannya yang telah tercedera.

Kehandalan dan keperwiraan yang luar biasa yang telah ditunjukkan oleh Prebet Alias bin Ibrahim ini adalah menjadi satu teladan yang cemerlang dan berkesan kepada anggota-anggota pasukan tentera umumnya dan anggota-anggota sukarela Askar Wataniah khususnya.

Semasa Konfrontasi Malaysia dan Indonesia , Batalion-batalion Askar Wataniah yang telah dikerah untuk berkhidmat sepenuh masa, anggota-anggota tersebut telah berpeluang untuk berbakti kepada negara dengan menyertai dalam beberapa operasi besar-besaran untuk menentang pengganas, bertempur dengan musuh, dan mereka juga telah berjaya mengesan beberapa tempat-tempat rehat serta membongkar tempat-tempat simpanan makanan musuh.

PERANAN, TUGAS, AMANAH DAN TANGGUNGJAWAB

Peranan, tugas, amanah dan tanggungjawab Askar Wataniah tidak dapat dinafikan lagi sebagai barisan kedua pertahanan Negara. Pasukan ini berfungsi sebagai 'moving agent' dalam menggerakkan elemen penting dan sasaran utama serta berkepentingan awam ketika negara di saat genting atau darurat. Dengan organisasi yang kukuh dan mantap, pasukan ini mampu menjadi cegah rintang atau 'prevent resist' kepada sasaran utama.

Memakai pelbagai jenis pakaian tentera bukan untuk membangga diri, malah ia adalah signifikan kepada peranan, tugas, amanah dan tanggungjawab yang harus digalas. Sebagai seorang Askar Wataniah, peranan, tugas, amanah dan tanggungjawab bukan hanya terhad dalam kem atau ketika menjalani latihan, malahan ianya menyeluruh dan perlu sentiasa bersiap siaga. Ini kerana musuh sentiasa berada di mana-mana dan akan menyerupai pelbagai bentuk dan keadaan. Menyedari tentang situasi berkenaan, aspek terpenting adalah komitmen individu yang telah menyahut cabaran ini jujur dan ikhlas serta rela hati ingin berbakti kepada ibu pertiwi. Bukan disebabkan faktor lain seperti ingin menambahkan pendapatan atau keistimewaan-keistimewaan tertentu sebagai seorang tentera. Mungkin ada beberapa pihak yang mengatakan anggota-anggota seperti Askar Wataniah ini menceburi badan beruniform ini hanyalah kerana inginkan elaun semata-mata, namun ianya tidak akan dapat mematahkan semangat anggota sukarela untuk terus berkhidmat demi negara walaupun masing-masing mempunyai tugas hakiki.

Tidak dapat disangkal dakwaan untuk memberi khidmat terbaik dalam pasukan Askar Wataniah memerlukan komitmen yang tinggi dari segi masa, keluarga dan pengorbanan komitmen kerja. Halangan dan kerenah birokrasi di dalam institusi dan organisasi serta oleh majikan adalah penyumbang utama yang membantutkan hasrat dan semangat seseorang anggota Askar Wataniah untuk bergiat aktif dan mengikuti latihan dan kursus yang telah dirancang. Walaupun pihak kerajaan telah memberikan peruntukan undang-undang kepada anggota Askar Wataniah yang ingin menjalani latihan, namun masih terdapat lagi majikan yang tidak ambil peduli terhadap undang-undang tersebut kerana menganggap akta tersebut seperti tidak diberi penekanan daripada pihak yang berkuasa.

Mengambil kira masih ramai lagi rakyat negara ini masih tidak mendapat pendedahan secara langsung mengenai Askar Wataniah, pihak kerajaan telah berusaha untuk mempromosikan Askar Wataniah ini keada semua melalui pelancaran Askar Wataniah di setiap daerah dan negeri di dalam Malaysia. Usaha giat daripada kerajaan Malaysia untuk mempromosikan Askar Wataniah pada masa kini telah mendorong dan membuka minda rakyat mengenai kepentingan pasukan sukarela ini. Rakyat juga kini telah sedar bahawa mereka perlu mempelajari ilmu-ilmu ketenteraan walaupun mereka terdiri dariada petani, pelajar, golongan profesional ataupun tidak. Dengan adanya peluang menceburkan diri di dalam Askar Wataniah ini, mereka dapat mempertahankan agama bangsa dan negara, keluarga daripada sesuatu ancaman sekiranya berlaku peperangan di negara ini kelak.

PERUNTUKAN AKTA UNTUK ASKAR WATANIAH

Kerajaan telah mengambil inisiatif bagi menggalakkan penyertaan Askar Wataniah. Pindaan terhadap Akta Angkatan Tentera 1972 telah dilaksanakan. Pindaan terhadap seksyen 201B dan seksyen 201C telah dikuatkuasakan pada 15 Ogos 2005 yang mewajibkan majikan memberi pelepasan kepada pekerja-pekerja mereka menghadiri latihan dan penugasan Angkatan Sukarela.

Seksyen 201B Akta ATM 1972 menerangkan mana-mana majikan yang menghalang pekerjaanya menjalani latihan Angkatan Sukarela boleh, apabila disabitkan, didenda tidak melebihi RM 6000.00 atau penjara tidak melebihi 6 bulan atau kedua-duanya sekali.

Seksyen 201C Akta ATM 1972 menerangkan mana-mana majikan yang menamatkan pekerjaanya yang merupakan Angkatan Sukarela semata-mata kerana pekerja itu mengikuti latihan atau pertugasan, jika disabitkan kesalahan boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 6000.00 atau penjara tidak melebihi 6 bulan atau kedua-duanya sekali.

Selain itu, Perintah Am 1974 Bab C perkara 41, telah memperuntukan cuti tanpa rekod selama 30 hari oleh Ketua Jabatan kepada seseorang pegawai atau kakitangan kerajaan yang dikehendaki menghadiri latihan atau khemah tahunan pasukan-pasukan sukarela.

Melihat kepada peruntukan undang-undang yang telah ditetapkan oleh kerajaan, ianya adalah satu peluang keemasan kepada anggota sukarela yang bekerja untuk menjalani latihan yang telah ditetapkan. Latihan ini akan menjadi satu titik tolak untuk anggota Askar Wataniah meningkatkan ilmu ketenteraan supaya dapat digunapakai pada masa akan datang.

LATIHAN

Rejimen Askar Wataniah (RAW) merupakan Rejimen yang di tugaskan sebagai barisan kedua dalam mempertahankan kedudukan negara dari sebarang ancaman musuh negara. Rejimen ini dilatih sepenuhnya oleh pegawai dan anggota Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) yang bertugas sebagai anggota tetap. Segala bentuk latihan yang di berikan adalah berdasarkan pada latihan yang diberikan kepada anggota tetap.

Matlamat latihan Askar Wataniah adalah untuk menyediakan satu Angkatan Sukarela Tentera Darat yang mampu dikerah tenaga dan diaturgerakkan dalam masa yang singkat serta berupaya menjalankan tugas operasi tanpa memberikan banyak gangguan kepada ekonomi dan penghidupan sosial negara. Berlanjutan pendekatan latihan adalah bertujuan untuk melatih pegawai dan anggota Sukarela dengan pengetahuan ilmu ketenteraan supaya mempunyai kemahiran dan sikap positif untuk melaksanakan tugas-tugas yang ditetapkan sesuai dengan peranan Kor masing-masing. Dalam konteks perkembangan Askar Wataniah di era millenium, peranan dan tugas Askar Wataniah adalah selari dengan peranan Angkatan Tetap.

Oleh kerana perkembangan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, Askar Wataniah juga turut berkembang. Pada tahun 1981 Askar Wataniah telah dikenali dengan nama Pasukan Simpanan Tentera Darat (PSTD). Pusat latihan untuk pasukan ini masih dikenali dengan nama Pusat Latihan Askar Wataniah (PLAW) sehingga pada 21 Disember 1995 PLAW telah ditukar designasi (nama) kepada PUSWATAN.

Waktu latihan yang telah ditetapkan pada masa kini iaitu latihan tempatan di setiap hari Sabtu dan Ahad kecuali pada cuti umum, telah memberi peluang kepada anggota sukarela untuk menghadiri latihan mengikut keluangan masa mereka. Ini kerana, setiap anggota tentera tetap mahupun sukarela, perlulah sentiasa menjalani latihan agar kita sentiasa bersiap siaga untuk mengharungi sesuatu yang tidak diduga. Selain daripada

Latihan Tempatan, Latihan Berterusan dan Latihan Tahunan juga dilaksanakan oleh anggota sukarela agar mereka lebih terdedah dengan suasana ketenteraan serta mempertingkatkan lagi ilmu pengetahuan.

BENTENG PERTAHANAN KEDUA NEGARA

Memang tidak dapat dinafikan, Askar Wataniah telah berganding bahu bersama-sama anggota tetap bagi memperkukuhkan lagi kekuatan pertahanan bumi Malaysia yang tercinta ini. Walaupun mereka terdiri masyarakat awam yang bertugas secara sukarela, namun tenaga mereka amat diperlukan sekiranya sesuatu terjadi kepada negara ini khususnya sebagai benteng kedua pertahanan negara. Hal ini telah dibuktikan semasa peperangan untuk menentang komunis dahulu.

Masakini, dalam Era globalisasi dan millennium berkemungkinan kita tidak terlihat musuh-musuh kita di dalam hutan. Di zaman teknologi yang serba canggih ini, musuh bergerak dengan menyebarkan ideologi - ideologi mereka kepada umum secara halus dan menular ke dalam minda rakyat negara ini sedikit demi sedikit. Kebanyakan anggota-anggota Askar Wataniah yang terdapat di pelbagai daerah dan negeri, sedikit sebanyak ianya dapat membantu pihak keselamatan negara dengan memberi maklumat sekiranya terdapat sesuatu perkara yang luar biasa berlaku di kawasan mereka. Ini kerana anggota sukarela ini juga telah dilatih untuk mendapatkan maklumat dan menyalurkan kepada yang sepatutnya sekiranya terdapat sebarang aktiviti yang mencurigakan berlaku di kawasan mereka.

Bagi mendapatkan ilmu setara dengan anggota yang tetap, anggota Askar Wataniah juga sanggup mengorbankan hari cuti pada Sabtu dan Ahad mereka untuk datang ke kem masing-masing untuk menjalani latihan yang telah disediakan. Walaupun ianya atas dasar, namun disebabkan keinginan untuk turut dan berkhidmat untuk negara, mereka tetap hadir dan meninggalkan keluarga demi negara. Tanpa mengira latar belakang pekerjaan kebanyakan anggota Askar Wataniah sentiasa bersedia untuk berkerjasama dan menyumbang jaa bakti memberi perkhidmatan sekiranya diperlukan. Semangat setiakawan dan cinta kepada negara sebagai masyarakat awam sebeginilah yang amat negara perlukan. Pegawai-pegawai dan anggota sukarela ini juga sentiasa bekerjasama untuk memberikan idea-idea yang membina kepada pasukan keselamatan bagi kejayaan bersama.

Selain daripada itu, Anggota Sukarela yang aktif adalah layak untuk menjadi seorang anggota kerahan sepenuh masa setelah diuji nilai daripada Bahagian Pasukan simpanan dan memenuhi syarat-syarat serta kriteria semasa. Kebanyakan daripada anggota kerahan ini secara tidak langsung telah membantu pasukan tetap bagi melengkapkan keanggotaan untuk mengawal sempadan-sempadan negara (secara tidak langsung pengiktirafantelah diberikan kepada RAW sehingga tertubuhnya Rejimen Sempadan), sasaran-sasaran 7 Infantri Malaysia serta operasi-operasi tertentu. Walaupun anggota kerahan yang hanya terdiri daripada Askar Wataniah, namun anggota kerahan yang telah terpilih adalah terdiri daripada mereka yang cepat belajar atau mudah memahami mengenai sesuatu perkara bagi meletakkan mereka setaraf dengan anggota tetap yang sedia ada. Komitmen daripada anggota kerahan ini juga amat jitu kerana semangat dan keinginan untuk menjadi sebahagian daripada anggota tetap adalah tinggi. Ini dapat dilihat apabila seseorang sukarela Askar Wataniah yang telah mempunyai pekerjaan yang tetap serta gaji yang tinggi dan ditawarkan untuk menyertai kerahan, mereka sanggup berhenti daripada pekerjaan tetap mereka bagi menyemai budi dan tenaga ke alam ketenteraan.

Selain daripada Askar Wataniah yang terdiri daripada siri 500 (infantri) terdapat juga Askar Wataniah daripada kor-kor yang lain seperti Jurutera, Semboyan, Ordnan, Polis Tentera dan lain-lain kepakaran. Dewasa ini, pihak kerajaan telah mewartakan supaya kesemua kakitangan kerajaan serta rakyat perlu sedar mengenai kepentingan Askar Wataniah pada negara ini. Bukan sahaja ilmu-ilmu ketenteraan ini dapat membantu kita ketika berlakunya peperangan sahaja malah ianya dapat membantu ketika melaksanakan tugas harian. Sebagai contohnya, sesebuah syarikat tidak perlu mengeluarkan perbelanjaan yang besar untuk merancang, menempah konsultan dan menghantar para pekerjaanya untuk kursus-kursus jatidiri bagi meningkatkan disiplin mereka. Ini kerana apabila seseorang itu telah menyertai pasukan ketenteraan seperti Askar Wataniah, salah satu yang amat dititikberatkan adalah disiplin. Bukan itu sahaja, malah pelbagai lagi pelajaran dan ilmu ketenteraan yang boleh dikaitkan dengan kehidupan seharian jika kita sentiasa berfikir positif.

Askar Wataniah daripada unit-unit pakar juga secara tidak langsung dapat membantu anggota tetap bagi sesuatu tugas. Sebagai contohnya pihak Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor (SYABAS) telah menggalakkan

para pekerjaanya untuk menyertai Askar Wataniah dan mereka diletakkan dibawah unit pakar jurutera. Kerjasama sebegini amat penting kerana kepakaran-kepakaran mereka amat diperlukan bagi membantu pasukan tetap untuk melaksanakan sesuatu aktiviti atau perkara samada semasa aman mahupun perang.

Pihak kerajaan juga semakin ingin meningkatkan penglibatan rakyat Malaysia di dalam Askar Wataniah ini kerana kepentingannya sebagai barisan kedua pertahanan negara amat diperlukan. Justeru, kerajaan telah mengalu-alukan penglibatan artis-artis tempatan sebagai satu ikon kepada golongan-golongan muda di Malaysia untuk turut sama menyertai Askar Wataniah. Oleh yang demikian, Platun kesenian telah ditubuhkan dan secara tidak langsungnya platun seni yang dianggotai oleh sukarela-sukarela yang terdiri daripada artis-artis, wartawan-wartawan dan mereka yang terlibat dengan dunia kesenian akan dapat turut mempromosikan bidang ketenteraan dengan cara mereka yang tersendiri. Ianya adalah sesuatu perkara yang amat positif untuk diteruskan dan mereka yang menyertai Askar Wataniah ini juga tidak terlepas peluang untuk mempelajari ilmu-ilmu ketenteraan. Sebagai contohnya, Datuk Siti Nurhaliza, walaupun beliau seorang artis dan lemah lembut, namun setelah beliau menyertai Askar Wataniah dan memakai pakaian seragam tentera celoreng beliau kelihatan lebih tegas serta berpeluang untuk mengikuti latihan menembak bersama-sama rakan artis yang lain. Selain daripada latihan menembak, latihan-latihan taktikal juga turut dipelajari oleh mereka bagi meningkatkan ilmu pengetahuan dalam konteks ketenteraan.

Selain daripada ikon, ianya juga salah satu cara yang unik untuk mempromosikan bidang ketenteraan kepada umum. Pihak kementerian pada dasarnya ingin menonjolkan bahawa ketenteraan itu bukanlah hanya terikat pada satu bidang sahaja. Malah dalam institusi tentera ini mempunyai pelbagai bidang yang luas. Ilmu-ilmu teknologi maklumat, perkeranian dan pentadbiran, kejuruteraan, dan pelbagai lagi yang berkaitan dengan pekerjaan di sekeliling kita. Mungkin masyarakat tidak mengenali institusi ketenteraan dengan lebih dekat dan tidak mengetahui apakah tugas harian tentera yang mereka laksanakan ketika aman. Maka Askar Wataniah merupakan satu platform terbaik untuk rakyat mengenali tentera dan tentera mendekati rakyat mengenai dunia ketenteraan. Bak kata pepatah 'tak kenal makan tak cinta'. Setelah mengenali dunia ketenteraan, tidak mustahil semangat cintakan negara akan terus mekar ke dalam jiwa masyarakat Malaysia hingga ke akhir hayat.

Selain daripada itu, sebilangan anggota tetap sedia ada adalah lahirnya daripada pegawai-pegawai dan anggota lain-lain pangkat Askar Wataniah. Ini kerana kebanyakan pegawai-pegawai telah dilahirkan daripada Pasukan Latihan Pegawai Simpanan atau lebih dikenali sebagai PALAPES di universiti-universiti tempatan. Setelah menamatkan pengajian mereka, pegawai-pegawai simpanan ini mempunyai pilihan sama ada untuk meneruskan didalam dunia ketenteraan ataupun tidak. Kebanyakan daripada mereka telah memilih dunia ketenteraan sebagai kerjaya melalui kemasukan Pegawai Graduan dan Kerahan sepenuh masa seterusnya diserap ke Kor-kor yang ditawarkan sekiranya memenuhi kriteria-kriteria semasa yang telah ditetapkan.

Pegawai-pegawai dan anggota lain-lain pangkat daripada Askar Wataniah ini masing-masing mempunyai latar belakang pendidikan mereka yang berbeza. Ada yang mempunyai tahap pendidikan sehingga profesor, ada yang ijazah, diploma dan sebagainya. Berlatar belakangkan ilmu yang berbeza-beza, anggota Askar Wataniah ini akan berpeluang untuk berkongsi ilmu pengetahuan bersama-sama anggota tetap yang lain serta dapat bekerjasama dalam segala hal. Sebagai contohnya di dalam Askar Wataniah mempunyai pegawai-pegawai kerajaan dan swasta dari jabatan yang berbeza-beza. Sekiranya sesebuah pasukan ingin melaksanakan latihan atau apa-apa sahaja aktiviti, mereka boleh bekerjasama untuk melaksanakan latihan tersebut mungkin dari segi kelulusan kawasan latihan atau kemudahan latihan yang diperlukan bantuan daripada jabatan kerajaan yang lain. Anugerah sebegini tidak dapat dicari dan dilihat oleh mana-mana pasukan keselamatan yang lain kecuali Askar Wataniah. Ilmu-ilmu yang dipelajari sedikit sebanyak dapat memberi kesan yang positif dalam jiwa rakyat (masyarakat awal) dan dapat menjadikan seseorang rakyat lebih berdisiplin, hormat menghormati antara satu sama lain, serta dapat membawa mereka memahami dan pelajari erti sebuah pengorbanan. Askar Wataniah adalah salah satu aset negara yang amat bernilai kerana keunikannya yang pelbagai dapat menyumbang kepada pembangunan institusi tentera di masa hadapan.

PENUTUP

Masyarakat umum telah mengetahui bahawa Askar Wataniah adalah satu pasukan sukarela yang berlainan daripada badan-badan sukarela yang lain. Telah termaktub dalam akta bahawa gerombolan Askar Wataniah ini merupakan Pasukan Simpanan Tentera yang menjadi benteng kedua dalam mempertahankan negara kita yang tercinta. Penyertaan rakyat dalam Askar Wataniah merupakan satu sumbangan murni bagi menyahut seruan pertiwi yang amat bersesuaian dengan konsep HANRUH (Pertahanan Menyeluruh) yang ditetapkan dalam Dasar Pertahanan Negara. Sebagai sebuah negara yang pesat membangun dan berwawasan, penglibatan rakyat dan semua pihak adalah amat diperlukan bagi memainkan peranan dalam pembangunan serta pertahanan negara. HANRUH antaranya menetapkan bantuan nasional termasuk penggembelangan semua sumber yang terdapat dalam negara di samping penglibatan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.

Rakyat Malaysia tanpa mengira kaum juga digesa untuk menjadikan Askar Wataniah sebagai satu medan dan saluran bagi meningkatkan dan mengenal potensi diri di samping mewujudkan jaringan kerja di antara satu sama lain di dalam masyarakat. Menyertai Askar Wataniah adalah sesuatu keputusan yang terbaik dan ia juga memberi makna iaitu kesanggupan individu memikul tanggungjawab bersama membantu mempertahankan negara dengan berbekalkan semangat, ilmu ketenteraan, disiplin dan komitmen yang telah ada dalam diri masing-masing sekali gus menyumbang kepada keharmonian dan kestabilan negara.

Justeru dengan semangat dan komponen jati diri seumpama itu sepatutnya dijadikan sebagai satu warisan dan kesinambungan untuk generasi yang akan datang kerana mempertahankan negara bukanlah hanya terletak di atas bahu pihak keselamatan negara sahaja tetapi ianya adalah tanggungjawab semua rakyat Malaysia.

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Lt Siti Norashikin bte Yusof telah dilahirkan pada 11 November 1984. Beliau memiliki ijazah Sarjana Muda Teknologi Seni Reka Grafik dari Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS) pada tahun 2008. Mempunyai pelbagai pengalaman kerja dalam institusi awam, namun memandangkan minat yang mendalam dalam bidang ketenteraan beliau telah menyertai Rejimen Askar Wataniah sebagai pegawai kerahan sepenuh masa mulai tahun 2008. Beliau kini bertugas sebagai Peg Tadbir di Rejimen 502 AW, yang berpangkalan di Kem Sg Buloh, Selangor.

MAINTAINING THE EDGE IN PERFORMANCE THROUGH TRAINING AND SKILL RETENTION

by Lt Kol Kwong Fook Wen

-SYNOPSIS-

The central idea of this essay is that the training conducted and amount of skills retained by trainees determine their performances. The essay provides an overview of training in the Malaysian Army and an explanation of performance and skill retention. It examines the difficulties faced in training and outlines the relationship of performance, training and skill retention. The essay offers some thoughts on possible ways to maintain the performance edge of our officers and soldiers. The essay concludes that maintaining the edge in performance requires effective training and good skill retention and these three aspects are intertwined and correlated.

INTRODUCTION

The performances and contributions by the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Malaysian Army in the local and international arenas have gained recognitions and acclaims. For instance, Malaysia stands proud as a country that has fought a successful Counter Insurgency War. The Malaysian Armed Forces and the Malaysian Army have also gained much acknowledgement for its involvement in several peace keeping and peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations.¹ For example, the involvement of the Malaysian troops in the rescue operation at Barkara Market in Somalia had received a letter of commendation from the United States Army. In the local front, the Malaysian Armed Forces' participations in the National Blue Ocean Strategy and strategic cooperation with the Royal Malaysia Police had won the Prime Minister Innovation Awards 2010. All these achievements indicate effective performance on the part of the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Malaysian Army.

Contrary to the positive indications above, there have been allegations that the performance of some of our soldiers are declining. There were observations that trainings in some of the Army's training institutions were not conducted thoroughly.² Additionally, several after-action reviews and exercise evaluation feedbacks reported that performances of some soldiers in the units were lacking.³ They were unable to perform certain tasks that they were previously trained for. For example, some soldiers who were unable to perform the tactics, techniques and procedures required of them during field exercises.⁴ These shortcomings raise the following questions: Are these shortfalls in performance due to ineffective training by the Army Training Institutions, units or formations? Are these shortfalls attributable to the inability of the trainees to retain their skills obtained during training? Is there a possible relationship between training and skill retention that contribute towards effective performance?

¹ Headquarters Malaysian Army, Malaysian Army Transformation Plan, 91 Central Ordnance Depots, Kuala Lumpur, June 2011, p. 1.

² Inspections report by The Army Inspectorate Division, MK TD/G10/10107 dated 23 December 2011.

³ Exercise Rhino Serial 1/2012 Report by the Exercise Evaluation Team, MK TD/R & P/3/01 dated 14 December 2011.

⁴ Ibid.

Confronted with the stated grey areas, this essay will examine how performance is affected by training and skill retention. It will first provide an overview of training in the Malaysian Army and the aspects of performance and skill retention. It will then examine the difficulties faced in training and performance. After which, it will expound on the relationship of performance, training and skill retention. The essay will end by attempting to provide some thoughts on the possible ways to maintain the performance edge of our soldiers.

TRAINING IN THE ARMY

An Army has to maintain optimum performance in carrying its roles and tasks in order to support the aspirations of its Defence Force and its nation. Undeniably, training is the key to maintain the edge in performance of our soldiers and leaders. Training is listed as one of the fundamentals of the Malaysian Army Operations from which the Malaysian Army prepares and builds its capability to perform its given roles.⁵ The ultimate aim of training in the Malaysian Army is to prepare the land forces to execute the Army's likely tasks effectively and efficiently under all operational conditions in order to achieve the Army's mission.⁶ The end-state of training in the Army is to have a force that has the performance edge and is highly mobile, combat ready, versatile and multi capable.⁷

Foremost, the performance of our soldiers is the outcome derived from training in the Malaysian Army. As such, the importance of training cannot be understated. General Douglas Macarthur once said, "In no other profession are penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as the military".⁸ Hence, the main pre-occupation in the Army has to focus on training so as to prepare for the possibility of real operations and anticipating their outcomes. Training will ensure the army is geared towards improvement of job performance and every soldier required to perform a job is equipped with the necessary knowledge, skill and attitude (KSA).⁹ Standards are set for the KSA in the training

management plan as the basis to gauge the performance of our soldiers whether they are well trained.

To train for war, the fundamentals of training in the Malaysian Army are: train as combined arms and service team, train as you fight, use appropriate doctrine, use performance oriented training, train to challenge, train to sustain proficiency, train using multi-echelon techniques and train to maintain equipment. The formal training in the Malaysian Army progresses from basic combat training, advanced individual training, basic unit training, advanced unit training, field exercise, manoeuvre training and operational readiness training.¹⁰ These trainings encompass the aspects of physical, intellectual and spiritual domain. If these trainings are conducted successfully, our soldiers will be producing effective performances and exhibiting strong military discipline, technical proficiency, teamwork, tactical proficiency as well as good health, strength and endurance. Rightly, our soldiers should be demonstrating all these virtues of training in their performance. However, the ability to produce the right performance is only possible if they are able to recall and execute the KSA obtained during training. Hence, it would appear that performance has a correlation with training and skill retention.

PERFORMANCE AND SKILL RETENTION

To examine the relationship of performance with training and skill retention, it is paramount to understand the meanings of performance and skill retention. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "performance" as a person's achievement under test conditions.¹¹ It is the accomplishment of a given task measured against preset known standards.¹² As KSA forms the basis of setting the standard and measurement of performance in the Malaysian Army, how well the soldiers perform their tasks would rely on the knowledge and skills they obtained in training. In turn, these performances hinge on how much they remember or forget (which is skill retention). Most literature refers to skill retention as the maintenance of acquired skill levels through time.¹³ Interestingly, there

⁵ Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Operation, MD .1 TD, Kuala Lumpur, 2005, p. 4-15.

⁶ Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Training, MD 7.0 TD, Kuala Lumpur, 2005, p. 1-3.

⁷ Headquarters Malaysian Army, Malaysian Army Transformation Plan, 91 Central Ordnance Depots, Kuala Lumpur, June 2011, p. v.

⁸ Brig Gen Dato' Ismail Ahmad Khan, Book of selected quotations, axioms, maxims, proverbs and words of wisdom, Laris Resources, 2006, p. 41.

⁹ Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Training, MD 7.0 TD, Kuala Lumpur, 2005, p. 1-3.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ R.E.Allen; The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford, University Press, 1992, p. 840.

¹² What is Performance? Definition and meaning. Available from <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/performance.html#ixzz1nkHi1pDA>. (19 March 2011)

¹³ Col Peter Murphy, Maj James Kehoe and Lt Andrew Butcher, Preventing Skill Erosion in Murphy, Peter; Focus on Human Performance in Land Operations, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 36.

is a considerable amount of research and literature on skill retention. For instance, the Human Dimension of Operations Project in Australia reveals that the longer the Australian soldiers are deployed for operation in peace support duties in East Timor, the more likely they report on erosion of basic military skills.¹⁴ Similarly, the study of the performance of helicopter pilots shows a critical decline in flight skills after six months without flying.¹⁵

There is also another report comprising researches conducted by the United States Army Research Institute that includes related works performed by the Air Force, Navy and leading academic institutions.¹⁶ This report reviews what is known about forgetting as it applies to military tasks. It identifies memory for knowledge and skill related tasks that could be distinguished in accordance with knowledge tasks, cognitive tasks, and perceptual-motor tasks. This report establishes that memory for knowledge (procedural) task has demonstrated greatest decay over time. Whilst memory for cognitive skills that involved analysis, problem solving and decision has indicated a moderate rate of decay in the first 12 months after training. On the other hand, memory for psychomotor skills has shown variation; depending on whether the task is continuous, such as riding a bicycle, or discrete (procedural), such as executing the separate performance steps involved in disassembling a rifle. It shows that continuous task suffers less skill decay as compared to that of discrete task. This report reveals that the research done confirms the relative sustainment or decay of a skill. It also agrees with other researches done that discrete task involving step by step actions are more vulnerable to forgetting (Rose 1985 and Annett 1989).¹⁷ Additionally, it confirms that perceptual-motor tasks require less practice time and show very little skill decay over long periods than procedural tasks; although this appears to be true only of those that require continuous control (Patrick 1992; Swezey and Llaneras 1997).¹⁸

Other studies on skill retention have explored whether retention differs for different types of knowledge. The study done by Semb, Ellis, and Aranjó (1993) define four types of knowledge—recall, recognition, comprehension, and cognition.¹⁹ In their study, retention of recall knowledge was significantly lower than the other three. Semb and Ellis (1994) argue that there are two dimensions of the retention interval that can affect retention—length, and what occurred during the interval.²⁰ There are consistent findings that the amount retained declines in a non-linear manner (Bahrick 1984; Glasnapp, Poggio and Ory 1978; Bahrick and Hall 1991).²¹ Based on this finding, an inference can be made that training has to be repeated at regular intervals in order to prevent memory erosion and skill decadence.

On the aspects of knowledge and skill retention, Farr (1987) suggests that the degree of original learning is the most important variable to long-term retention. Additionally, Bahrick and Hall (1991), in a study of Spanish and Mathematics students, found a strong correlation between the level of original learning and long-term retention.²² Specifically they studied the relationship between the number and level of courses completed and retention.²³ The students who completed more and higher level courses retained more. Therefore, this study shows the need of solid foundation training for our soldiers. Their subsequent trainings to the highest level must be attained in order to aid long term retention.

¹⁴ Col Peter Murphy, Maj James Kehoe and Lt Andrew Butcher, Preventing Skill Erosion. In: Peter Murphy, Focus on Human Performance in Land Operations, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 36.

¹⁵ John Ruffner and W. Bickley, Retention of helicopter flights skills: Is there a critical period for proficiency loss? Paper presented at the Human Factors Society 28th Annual Meeting, Santa Monica, California, 1984.

¹⁶ Robert A. Wisher, Mark A. Sabol, John Ellis, K. Ellis, Staying sharp: Retention of military knowledge and skills, Human resources research organization, Alexandria Va, 1999.

¹⁷ A.M. Rose, P. Radtke, H. Shettel, & J.D. Hagman, User's manual for predicting military task retention (Research Product 85-26), Alexandria, Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, 1985. J. Annett, Trained skilled performance. In: A. M. Colley and J. R. Beech (eds), Acquisition and Performance of Cognitive Skills, Wiley, Chichester, 1989.

¹⁸ J. Patrick, Training: Research and Practice, Academic Press, London 1992. R. W. Swezey and R. E. Llaneras, Models in training and instruction. In G. Salvendy (ed.), Handbook of Human Factors Wiley, New York, 1997, p. 514 - 577.

¹⁹ G. B. Semb, J. A. Ellis and J. Aranjó, Long-term retention of knowledge learned in school. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1993, p.305-316.

²⁰ G. B. Semb, J. A. Ellis, and W. E. Montague, Long-term memory for knowledge taught in school, (Tech. Rep. No. NPRDC TR-91-1, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, 1990.

²¹ H. P. Bahrick, and L. K. Hall, Lifetime maintenance of high school mathematics content. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 1991, p.20-33.

²² M. J. Farr, The Long-term Retention of Knowledge and Skills: A Cognitive and Instructional Perspective, Springer, New York, 1987.

²³ H. P. Bahrick, and L. K. Hall, Lifetime maintenance of high school mathematics content. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 1991, p.20-33.

The above findings coincide with the view of neuroscience that most tasks involve three component skills or abilities i.e. relevant knowledge, cognition (thinking) and execution that are controlled by different regions of the brain. Remarkably, literature on skill retention by Arthur et al (1998) identifies seven factors that affect degree of retention namely: length of retention interval, task characteristics, instructional strategies or training method, individual differences, degree of over-learning, conditions of retrieval, and testing methods.²⁴ Interestingly, these factors are also some of the challenges faced by the Malaysian Army in its training and performance.

DIFFICULTIES FACED IN TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE

The Malaysian Army faced some difficulties in training. The Malaysian Army's training philosophy states that the training needs of units/organisations are based on the "way we fight". Identification and the understanding of the way we fight go a long way towards determining what needs to be trained. However, one cannot deny the difficulties that are faced in training and skill retention. With the challenging peace time soldiering faced by the Army and the need to carry out multiple tasks and simultaneously conduct training for war, it is widely recognised within the Army that there is insufficient time to train individuals and conduct collective trainings (for example a team, crew, section, platoon, company, etc.) on every mission requirement and organisational standard (Wong, 2002).²⁵ Leaders at all echelons have to make tough decisions as to what directed training they will conduct. Therefore, identifying mission essential task lists would help to scope training requirements based on current individual and collective performance. However, it is difficult for unit trainers to systematically schedule their training based on expected performance as there are too many tasks and expectations involved.

The difficulty of conducting the right training is made more difficult by the fact that standardised training programmes and techniques, fixed tactical solutions, and common doctrine - though efficient in teaching the "book solution" and easy to evaluate—are often not effective in preparing leaders or soldiers to deal with new missions, unique environmental conditions, and the uncertainties of combat.²⁶ To meet this challenge, operational doctrine and training techniques require continuous revisions so as to formulate the right training methodology. It is with this complexity that training has to be effective in order that soldiers could retain their skills and perform their tasks efficiently and effectively; despite a lapse of time after training. In highly complex work environments that involve interfacing of Man, Machine and Method, there has been a strong interest in the question of what might be the most effective training method to provide operators with the necessary skills and how these skills could be retained over a period of time. Exacerbating the difficulties is the need to determine how, what and who to train in order to enhance skill retention and attain optimum performance in the units and formations. Noting the fundamentals, objectives and types of training in the Malaysian Army; it could be surmised that the two goals of training to overcome difficulties in training are: First, it should produce rapid skill acquisition among trainees. Second, the training should lead to high skill retention during periods of non-practice.

IDENTIFYING TRAINING METHODOLOGY

For quick skill acquisition and high skill retention, identifying and adopting the right training methodology is important. Nevertheless, there is limited literature on systematic assessment carried out on the effect of training methods on skill retention and performance. Arthur et al (1998) acknowledges that training method influences skill retention. One kind of training may be more beneficial in a short-term retention test and another over a more extended interval. This is especially important in the context of complex tasks, such as process control, where many critical actions need to be carried out infrequently or during emergencies. In the context of process control, operators trained under different regimes (e.g. diagnostic heuristics versus system knowledge) might differ in long-term skill retention (even if acquisition performance and immediate operational effectiveness was identical). Alternatively, any short-term advantage for one kind of training may be lost when skills are retested some months later.

²⁴ W.Arthur, W.Bennett, P.Stanush and T.McNelly, Factors that influence skill decay and retention: A quantitative review and analysis. *Human Performance*, 1998, 11(1), 57-101.

²⁵ L. Wong, Stifling innovation: Developing tomorrow's leaders today, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.

²⁶ Australian Army Headquarters, Foundation Warfighting – Training concept and environment, 2009, p. B-1.

The training methods adopted by the Malaysian Army's training institutions and Corps Schools include formal instruction, lecture, tactical exercise without troops, field exercise, war game and practical training. Presentation and testing are two basic methods of instruction. Presentational method is better at promoting the acquisition of knowledge while the testing method is better for enhancing retention of skills and knowledge over extended periods.²⁷ Hence, these two methods of instruction must be alternated with feedback in order to optimize retention.

Other studies have advocated increasing retention by the use of time interval between task repetitions. Progressively introducing a time interval (or additional new material) between task repetition increases retention. Similarly, the use of varied equipment during training can enhance performance. It was also pointed out that the amount of over-learning during training could be the best method of skill retention. Over-learning involves learning beyond basic proficiency that will significantly improve task retention over an extended period. It is the desire to learn more in over-learning that enhances learning and promote retention. In the Malaysian Army Training System (MATS), training beyond proficiency level (to level 5) involves safety matters/tasks whilst other tasks are trained to proficiency level only. This approach is used as there are time and cost associated with training beyond basic proficiency.

It must be noted that task characteristics determine how best training could be done in accordance with the training methodology adopted to enhance retention and improve the performance of our soldiers. An example of task characteristics is the number of performance steps needed to perform the task. Task with greater complexity involves more steps and thus the likelihood of retention will be reduced. Other tasks that are subjected to decay are those that are more cognitive demanding. Often, soldiers find the beginning and ending sequences of a cognitive demanding complex task sequences difficult to remember. In order to assist retention on complex tasks that have many task sequences, job-aids or better equipment could be used. Another task characteristic is avoidance of imposing time limits in the early part of training. Imposing time limitation is found to be detrimental

to the learning of a skill as trainees are exposed to a lot of procedures and they have a tendency to short-cut procedures to catch up with others. This will degrade the learning process. Therefore, time limitation should only be introduced in training if the task is time dependent and the soldiers have already attained a certain level of proficiency.

Another aspect in identifying effective training methodology that allows skill retention is the trainee characteristics. Most trainers would agree that different individuals will need different amounts and methods of training to attain proficiency. Therefore, stringent selection and allocation of personnel to tasks in accordance with their most suited capabilities will facilitate effective training. Retention level could be standardised among trainees of varying ability by ensuring a common level of acquisition during training. Similar training for trainees will ensure the achievement of the same level of proficiency; although the higher aptitude trainees will attain greater proficiency.

WAYS TO MAINTAIN THE PERFORMANCE EDGE

The preceding discussions suggest that performance is an outcome of training received and skill retained from training. Consequently, the ways to achieve the performance edge of our soldiers would be through implementation of the right training, application of appropriate training methodology and maintaining skill through retention of KSA.

To implement the right training, the MATS has to be reemphasised to ensure our soldiers received appropriate knowledge and skill to perform their tasks. Effective training will only be possible if the employment and training needs are correctly identified. Job and task analysis will have to be done in order that appropriate trainees undergo the right training and they are trained at the appropriate level at the right place.

For appropriate training methodology, identification of tasks that are inclined to skill decadence will allow allocation of enough training resources and utilisation of appropriate training management. As identified by researchers, developing and designing training have

²⁷ Col Peter Murphy, Maj James Kehoe and Lt Andrew Butcher, Preventing Skill Erosion. In: Peter Murphy, Focus on Human Performance in Land Operations, Department of Defence, 2009, p 37.

significant impact on skill retention. Therefore, training design should consider critical factors that could help achieve the required proficiency and to ensure skill levels do not fall below the performance standard. As such, units and formations must ensure an appropriate interval between training for various tasks and skills so that their soldiers continuously maintain the performance edge. To attain this, refresher trainings have to be conducted at the appropriate intervals for individual, section, platoon to that at formation level. This is easier said than done as units and formations are multi-tasked. Therefore, a systematic approach to coordinate training activities with operations, administrations and other duties has to be designed. This requires the design of a suitable Training Cycle involving all the units in the Malaysian Army. It should allow time for unit training and at the same time allow units to be programmed ahead for units to know its operational and administrative needs and requirement. This would then allow unit commanders to plan its unit training accordingly. Higher formation could also plan and allocate training areas and ranges accordingly and at the same time monitor progress of unit training more effectively. The cycle should also allow administration and specialist inspections, sporting activities, block and annual leave, decentralised courses and annual shooting classification. It will also enable units to conduct individual and collective training progressively.

The other way to improve performance is by improving skill retention. Units and formations should adopt presentation and testing instruction method continuously to promote long-term retention. At the same time, they must develop a feedback system that could reinforce learning and retention. Though the internal and external validation system are implemented to improve courses conducted in Army's training establishments, feedback whereby instructors/trainers provide trainees with observations/feedbacks to enhance learning and retention are not well practiced during unit trainings or formation exercises. Units and formations should also consider over-learning by increasing task repetitions during training as a mean to improve retention. Based on the theory of memory retention, these task repetitions training, if spaced, are effective in maintaining performances. Units and formations should use field exercise trainings frequently as task oriented training in the field could teach both factual knowledge and cognitive skills for better skill retention and soldiers' performances. Taking into consideration the different learning ability of

trainees, units and formations must be able to capitalise on higher ability personnel to mentor and assist the lower-ability personnel. If training is hampered by difficulties of recalling multiple sequences of task performance, they should look into providing appropriate job-aids such as computerised system; or soldiers provided with better equipment whereby tasks could be done easier with lesser sequences.

CONCLUSION

There are indeed shortfalls in the conduct of training in the Malaysian Army Training Institutions, units and formations. Based on the observations of current training practices and analysis in the perspective of skill retention, these shortfalls could be attributable to the soldiers' inability to retain their skills after a period of time. There is a clear relationship between training and skill retention that contribute towards the performance of our soldiers in the units and formations. Effective training coupled with good skill retention is the key to good performance.

Units and formations face difficulties in training, performance and skill retention. They have insufficient time to train individuals and collectively on every task requirement. Hence, a training cycle is needed to delineate operational and administrative tasks. Additionally, a clear understanding of the relationship between performance, training and skill retention is the key towards possible ways to maintain the performance edge of our soldiers. Units and formations have to address the aspects of improvement in training by reemphasizing the MATS and that of skill retention as the possible approach towards better performance. Improvement of training could be possibly overcome with appropriate job and task analysis as well as proper training development and design. The conduct of training should be monitored and trainees provided with constant feedbacks so that skills obtained are retained. Over-learning, spaced and repetitive training are also good skill retention techniques that ensure proficiency are kept at the appropriate level.

Finally, maintaining the edge in performance requires effective training and good skill retention. These three aspects are intertwined and correlated with each other. Importantly, when the need arises, it is important that our soldiers are able to carry out its task with the added performance edge.

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Lt Kol Kwong Fook Wen (3002662) was commissioned into the Royal Armoured Corps on 6 March 1982. He was the Staff Officer Grade 3 Training in the Armoured Directorate and was an instructor for Driving & Maintenance and Tactics in PULAMOR. He was also a Directing Staff in PULADA, the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College and the Australian Command and Staff College. Complementing this training experience was the basic and advance armour courses that he attended in Australia. He graduated from the Philippines Command and General Staff College and he holds two Master degrees. Lt Kol Kwong Fook Wen is currently serving as Staff Officer 1 Technical at the Army Reserve and Evaluation Division.

PEMBENTUKAN KECERDASAN EMOSI DALAM KEPIMPINAN ANGKATAN TENTERA

oleh Mej Mohd Hisham Bin Yunus

-SINOPSIS-

Bagi menjamin kejayaan institusi ketenteraan langkah perlu diambil untuk memupuk konsep Kecerdasan Emosi dalam kalangan seluruh peringkat pegawai dan anggota. Penekanan konsep Kecerdasan Emosi ini akan melahirkan pemimpin yang bersedia menerima pandangan anggota lain, berempati, bekerjasama dan memotivasikan anggota. Keadaan ini secara tidak langsung akan meningkatkan prestasi kerja, produktiviti dan kepuasan kerja di tempat kerja. Melalui perkembangan positif sebegini, akan terbentuk satu suasana kepimpinan organisasi Angkatan Tentera Malaysia yang cemerlang yang mampu menghadapi cabaran globalisasi dan liberalisasi dunia kini.

PENDAHULUAN

Kecerdasan Emosi adalah keupayaan untuk mengiktiraf perasaan kita sendiri dan orang lain, untuk memotivasi diri kita dan untuk menguruskan emosi baik dalam diri kita dan hubungan kita. Secara umumnya, Kecerdasan Emosi adalah berkisar kepada aspek menangani emosi, peribadi, sosial dan *survival*, yang lebih kepada fungsi harian daripada aspek kognitif yang lebih kepintaran tradisional. Kecerdasan Emosi adalah berkaitan dengan memahami diri sendiri dan lain-lain, yang berhubungan dengan orang ramai, dan menyesuaikan diri dengan dan menangani dengan segera persekitaran untuk menjadi lebih berjaya dalam berurusan dengan persekitaran¹.

Adakah peranan Kecerdasan Emosi dalam Kepimpinan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia? Apakah kepimpinan tentera tidak serasi dengan konsep Kecerdasan Emosi? Adakah Kecerdasan Emosi terlalu lembut? Adakah pemimpin dalam Angkatan Tentera terlalu keras? Adakah kepimpinan dalam Angkatan Tentera yang terlalu mekanikal, dilatih khas untuk memberi dan menerima arahan dalam gaya kepimpinan, proses pengurusan dan mengkaji teknik memimpin seseorang

organisasi tentera yang kuat dan besar? Adakah terdapat keperluan bagi pemimpin tentera mempunyai Kecerdasan Emosi? Jawapan yang terakhir soalan-soalan ini adalah membanggakan iaitu - ya! Unsur yang paling berharga dalam membina dan mengekalkan hubungan yang berjaya antara individu atau pasukan adalah Kecerdasan Emosi.

DEFINISI KEPIMPINAN DALAM KONTEKS ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA

Kepimpinan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia adalah lebih kepada emosi berstruktur, program pembangunan pemimpin, kajian dan analisis terhadap kepimpinan, atau motivasi secara paksaan. Menurut Doktrin Kepimpinan Ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat, *US Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22*, Kepimpinan Tentera ialah "proses mempengaruhi anggota tentera dengan menetapkan tujuan, hala tuju, dan motivasi semasa mengendalikan atau untuk mencapai misi dan memperbaiki organisasi"². *US Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22*, menggariskan sifat-sifat dan kecekapan yang perlu bagi seseorang pemimpin Tentera. Manual ini menjelaskan bahawa kita sebagai seorang pemimpin tentera menurut kuasa yang diberikan,

¹ Reuven BarOn, Ph.D. in the BarOn EQ-I Technical Manual, 2004.

² U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2006.), 1-2.

mempunyai peranan atau tanggungjawab untuk memberi inspirasi dan mempengaruhi orang bawahan untuk mencapai matlamat organisasi. Pemimpin-pemimpin tentera hendaklah memotivasikan anggota samada di dalam atau di luar rantai arahan untuk meneruskan tindakan, menumpukan pemikiran dan membuat keputusan dalam bentuk yang lebih besar kepada organisasi. Walau bagaimanapun, berdasarkan takrif Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, pemimpin adalah orang yang memikul tanggungjawab dalam definisi itu, iaitu, seorang anggota tentera, Pegawai, Pegawai Waran, Pegawai Tidak Tauliah (PTT) Kanan atau Rendah. Angkatan Tentera Malaysia mengiktiraf bahawa setiap orang dalam hireki kepimpinan mempunyai kebolehan dan potensi untuk menjadi pemimpin yang baik. Semua pemimpin-pemimpin Tentera harus mendapat manfaat dari pemahaman terhadap kepimpinan mereka yang lebih terarah kepada Kecerdasan emosi mereka dan juga emosi anggota yang berada dibawah pimpinan mereka.

Menurut pengarang Daniel Goleman, untuk berjaya, pemimpin mesti memahami pengaruh dalam mempengaruhi cara dia memimpin dan kesan kepada pengikutnya³.

CONTOH DOKTRIN KECERDASAN EMOSI DAN KEPIMPINAN DALAM KONTEKS ANGKATAN TENTERA AMERIKA SYARIKAT

Tentera Amerika Syarikat (US Army) telah lama menyedari bahawa kejayaan mereka banyak bergantung kepada rakyatnya. *US Army* memperuntukan jumlah masa dan peruntukan kewangan yang banyak untuk menekankan tahap kepentingan hubungan pemimpin dan anggota, kerja berpasukan, semangat esprit de corps, dan kesetiaan terhadap organisasi. Penerapan konsep dan komponen Kecerdasan Emosi diterapkan dalam modul latihan kepada pemimpin serta anggota bawahan. *US Army* tidak menghadkan hanya perbincangan terhadap aspek-aspek model emosi kepimpinan sahaja malah ianya didoktrinkan untuk memenuhi kehendak asas bagi melahirkan nilai-nilai kepimpinan dalam organisasi.

Doktrin kepimpinan *US Army* memupuk kesedaran terhadap diri sendiri, penyesuaian kepada pemimpin, *fleksibel* dan tangkas. Setiap elemen-elemen ini adalah kecekapan dan kepintaran emosi. Doktrin kepimpinan *US Army* juga menerangkan pemimpin semestinya mempunyai kesedaran, inovatif dan mengenal pasti kepentingan kesedaran terhadap diri sendiri: "Kesedaran sendiri mempunyai potensi untuk membantu semua pemimpin menjadi lebih baik, bijak dan lebih berkesan. *Self awareness* ini adalah relevan untuk operasi kontemporari yang memerlukan sensitiviti budaya dan bagi seseorang pemimpin penyesuaian kepada perubahan alam sekitar yang tidak dapat dielakkan.⁴ Dengan meneruskan langkah-langkah ini akan meningkatkan kesedaran kepimpinan dan menyediakan bantuan bernilai kepada pemimpin tentera agar memiliki emosi pintar dan lebih berkesan.

Pada Jun 2008, *US Army* menerbitkan hasil kajian ke atas (*Human Dimension In Full Spectrum Operation, 2015-2024*). Walaupun dalam tajuknya, penulis tidak membincangkan aspek-aspek emosi anggota dan pemimpin dalam keadaan aman atau dalam pertempuran di mana kemahiran emosi didahulukan oleh Kecerdasan Emosi. Konsep adalah untuk memahami bagaimana anggota tentera bertindak balas dan bagaimana mereka membangunkan daya tahan diri. Kajian tersebut telah mengenal pasti dimensi manusia sebagai moral, kognitif, dan komponen-komponen fizikal untuk meningkatkan, menyediakan, dan mengkaji anggota tentera dalam *Human Dimension In Full Spectrum Operation*.⁵ Ia mengenal pasti keperluan untuk kesedaran diri kepada pemimpin dan dalam diri anggota lain.

Langkah seterusnya perlu untuk menyediakan elemen-elemen holistik dan lain-lain di bawah payung kecerdasan emosi. Kajian ini meneruskan pendekatan luas *US Army FM 6-22* dalam menangani aspek emosi anggota dan pemimpin. Dalam bab 10 *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC)* menyentuh kepada kesedaran sendiri dan empati, yang membincangkan keperluan dan tanggungjawab kepimpinan. Malangnya, perbincangan berkenaan dimensi manusia tidak melakukan dan tidak

³ Daniel Goleman, "What Makes a Leader," Harvard Business Review (November-December 1998): 93-102.

⁴ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2006.), 8-8.

⁵ Ibid, iii.

bertujuan untuk menangani seluruh orang, tetapi ia adalah berdasarkan pandangan menyeluruh bagaimana manusia berfungsi dalam sistem.⁶ Sistem ini termasuk alam sekitar, budaya, komuniti, politik, dan masyarakat, antara others.⁷ Risalah *US Army FM 6-22* terhadap kesan kepimpinan dimensi manusia, menyatakan, "Kepimpinan menyusuri sepanjang konsep ini kedua-dua jelas dan tersirat. *US Army FM 6-22* menjelaskan kepimpinan secara terperinci dan dari banyak perspektif. Bab ini mengandaikan bahawa intipati kepimpinan tidak berubah, dan bahawa ciri-ciri Angkatan Tentera ingin membangunkan pemimpin di semua peringkat tidak akan berubah dengan ketara." Ia mengenal pasti dalam sebagai sifat-sifat dan kecekapan, ciri-ciri unsur-unsur yang memegang kunci untuk menggunakan Kecerdasan Emosi dalam doktrin kepimpinan Tentera.

KEPERLUAN DAN MODEL KEPIMPINAN ANGKATAN TENTERA

Model kepimpinan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia masih lagi pada peringkat asas dalam mentakrif, menggaris, dan menggambarkan doktrin kepimpinan. Falsafah kepada pemahaman ini diserlahkan dalam modul-modul kursus ataupun seminar yang diadakan dari masa kesemasa. Model Kepimpinan Tentera, membincangkan tentang keperluan bagi mengenal pasti sifat dan kecekapan yang diperlukan untuk berjaya sebagai seorang pemimpin. Sifat dan kecekapan selari dengan konstruk kecerdasan emosi daripada Goleman dan Baron. Modul atau pelajaran baru dan berdasarkan di atas asas sejarah Kepimpinan Angkatan Tentera, ciri-ciri yang menghuraikan seorang pemimpin Angkatan Tentera perlu menanam sikap "Jadi, Tahu dan Lakukan." Walaupun Angkatan Tentera mentakrifkan pemimpin perlu menghormati dan dihormati, ciri-ciri yang tersirat dan sifat-sifat seorang pemimpin mesti mempunyai kemahiran dan pengetahuan untuk membangunkan, dan seterusnya beroperasi dengan sifat tersebut. Dalam penulisan doktrin berkenaan kepimpinan pada 2006 yang ditulis semula, Tentera Darat telah memutuskan bahawa ianya lebih penting untuk meletakkan penekanan doktrin pada semua peringkat pemimpin, dari segi ciri-ciri pemimpin dan dalam kemahiran pemimpin dalam kecekapan bahawa seorang pemimpin mesti mempunyai kemahiran terhadap Kecerdasan dan Pengurusan Emosi.

Modul kepimpinan mencatatkan komponen asas model pusat kepada pemimpin dan yang dipimpin. Pemimpin yang mempunyai watak dan intelek yang tinggi membolehkan pemimpin itu untuk menguasai kecekapan Kecerdasan Emosi teras melalui pembelajaran sepanjang hayat. Sistem ini termasuk kesedaran terhadap persekitaran, budaya, komuniti, politik, dan masyarakat. Ia juga mewujudkan iklim organisasi yang positif, membolehkan pembelajaran individu dan pasukan dan empati untuk semua ahli pasukan, Askar, orang awam, dan keluarga.

Kecerdasan Emosi adalah mengenai memahami emosi sendiri dan orang lain untuk menjadi orang yang lebih berjaya. Pemimpin atasan yang cekap dan berwawasan dapat membantu para pemimpin bawahan untuk menjadi pemimpin yang lebih baik dengan memahami diri dan orang lain juga kerana hubungan mereka kepada orang lain.

Tentera Darat masih dalam merangka dalam modul asas kepimpinan. Walaubagaimanapun, sifat dan ciri-ciri pemimpin yang sedia wujud dalam diri setiap anggota tentera menunjukkan kepentingan Kecerdasan Emosi kepada segenap pemimpin Tentera Darat. Hubungan unsur-unsur emosi kepintaran dan Keperluan Model Kepimpinan Tentera adalah jelas: sifat yang wujud secara dalaman dan kecekapan merupakan aspek emosi yang membawa kepada keberkesanan kepimpinan apabila ia memahami proses dalam situasi bekerja. Langkah seterusnya untuk Tentera Darat adalah untuk menggabungkan emosi perisikan dalam modul kepimpinan dan pembangunan program Kecerdasan Emosi. Jika pemimpin Tentera mengkaji dan memiliki Kecerdasan Emosi, mereka akan menjadi lebih berkesan dan berjaya dalam membina organisasi yang kukuh dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.

HASIL KAJIAN DAN PERBINCANGAN

Seorang pemimpin dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera perlu menggunakan Kecerdasan Emosi dan kecekapan sosial untuk melaksanakan tugas dan amanah yang telah diberikan. Penggunaan kedua-dua aspek berkenaan adalah penting untuk menjadikan seseorang pemimpin itu lebih efektif terutamanya menghadapi situasi peperangan dan konflik masa kini.

⁶ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-7-01, Human Dimension in the Future 2015-2024 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 9.

⁷ Human dimension defined at AUSA, <<http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/>>

Persoalannya, bagaimanakah cara dan kaedah untuk melatih pegawai-pegawai dan anggota ini untuk menggunakan Kecerdasan Emosi ini. Dalam konteks ini, latihan tidak boleh diperolehi sepertimana latihan dan kecekapan yang dipelajari dari sekolah tetapi latihan ini perlu sepenuhnya berkembang daripada pengalaman hidup yang berbeza-beza. Memang diakui, setiap pegawai selalunya mengikuti, menerima dan menjalankan kursus yang berbeza. Kecerdasan Emosi biasanya sebahagian daripada input latihan dan hasilnya boleh ditentukan melalui persembahan atau tingkah laku yang ditunjukkan oleh pegawai atau anggota tersebut. Oleh itu, tindakan yang boleh digunakan untuk melihat hasilnya adalah membentuk satu situasi yang boleh mengenepikan Kecerdasan Emosi mereka. Lebih lama mereka mendapat latihan Kecerdasan Emosi dan kecekapan sosial dalam kerjaya akan meningkat. Oleh itu, suasana persekitaran yang berbeza perlu dicipta bagi memberi satu latihan pendedahan kepada mereka.

Membentuk Kecerdasan Emosi dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera adalah tidak berbeza dengan membentuk Kecerdasan Emosi terhadap organisasi yang lain. Ini kerana kedua-duanya memerlukan sumber kemanusiaan tidak kira sama ada mereka adalah unit beruniform atau orang awam. Tetapi yang membezakan mereka adalah, pasukan Angkatan Tentera memerlukan disiplin yang tinggi berbanding orang awam yang hanya memerlukan kebebasan.

SOKONGAN DALAM MEMBENTUK KECERDASAN EMOSI DAN KECEKAPAN DALAM PASUKAN ANGKATAN TENTERA

Pegawai dan anggota Angkatan Tentera boleh mendalami modul Kecerdasan Emosi dan kecekapan sosial persekitaran jika diberi pendedahan melalui seminar atau kursus untuk belajar tentang keupayaan diri mereka sendiri. Keupayaan yang diperlukan dalam mempelajari perkembangan Kecerdasan Emosi dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera adalah:

- a. Perspektif mengenai dunia boleh membantu pasukan Angkatan Tentera berfikir seperti tentera.
- b. Keyakinan diri terhadap kritikan dan teguran dapat membantu seseorang berjaya mengatasi masalah. Berusaha untuk memperbaiki diri dan persekitaran adalah perkara yang paling penting.
- c. Keputusan membentuk pengurusan kerjaya yang berkesan. Sesuatu pekerjaan perlu diukur terhadap nilai seseorang.

Program bagi meningkatkan Kecerdasan Emosi perlu dibina, dilaksanakan dan dinilai secara sempurna bagi menunjukkan kesan kepada keefektifan seseorang. Oleh itu, panduan-panduan yang dilaksanakan perlu dikaji secara spesifik bagi memastikan kecekapan dan latihan yang dilaksanakan mencapai tujuan perancangannya.

Matlamat menggunakan pemahaman baru terhadap latihan yang sempurna. Bagi memantapkan lagi Kecerdasan Emosi. Perhubungan Kecerdasan Emosi dengan kerja diperlukan dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera. Pegawai atau individu dalam pasukan ini memerlukan bukan hanya melakukan perkara yang terbaik bagi membolehkan seseorang berasa selesa, penting dan berpuasa hati atas kerja yang dilakukan.

Sokongan dari pegawai atasan atau yang lebih berpengalaman juga adalah penting sebagai inisiatif non-konvensional seperti latihan dalam Kecerdasan Emosi. Sokongan yang kuat ini akan memantapkan lagi penguasaan serta membantu mereka untuk membezakan antara kejayaan ataupun kegagalan.

Kecerdasan Emosi merupakan satu inovasi dan pendapat non-konvensional dalam dunia berorganisasi. Usaha dalam mempromosikan beberapa organisasi tradisional seperti dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera adalah mudah jika tiada amalan birokrasi dilakukan. Ia juga perlu diperkembangkan dan dilaksanakan melalui pengurusan diri berpasukan yang boleh menyumbang kepada inovasi bebas, fleksible, kurang formal dan bermatlamat yang lebih terbuka.

Menggunakan kajian bagi menilai program dan demonstrasi bagi menilai aktiviti-aktiviti perkembangan Kecerdasan Emosi. Ini kerana, kajian ini lebih bermutu dan memberi keputusan dan keyakinan terhadap latihan yang berasaskan analisis yang objektif.

Kesan atau hasil latihan Kecerdasan Emosi dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera bukan satu tradisional kerana ia akan membuka asas kepada kritikan. Ini adalah penting bagi memastikan usaha untuk melakukan latihan ini mencapai satu standard yang lebih tinggi.

Pemimpin yang mempunyai Kecerdasan Emosi adalah amat diperlukan bagi mengimplimentasikan inisiatif bagi program ini. Inisiatif Implimentasi Kecerdasan Emosi dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera adalah sama sukar dengan implimentasi ke atas organisasi lain. Walaupun galakan ke atas sokongan dan masa

yang betul, membolehkan program ini menumpukan keputusan terhadap hasilnya. Kejayaannya bergantung kepada Kecerdasan Emosi seseorang yang mengatur implimentasi ini.

Hasil Kecerdasan Emosi dalam organisasi adalah berbeza. Dalam konteks yang membawa Kecerdasan Emosi dan perkembangannya melalui peralihan sumber manusia dalam pasukan Angkatan Tentera, ia menjadi serbaguna dalam mencari perbezaan kedudukan dan persembahan terhadap organisasi tersebut. *Infuse emotional intelligence into the organization in different ways*⁸. Sebagai contoh, perbezaan versi dalam program boleh diperkembangkan daripada pegawai-pegawai yang berbeza. Kecerdasan Emosi juga boleh membentuk budaya yang mana manusia boleh mengingat sesuatu yang mereka pelajari dan ia boleh diaplikasikan dalam pekerjaan mereka.

Masa latihan adalah sangat penting bagi pasukan Angkatan Tentera seperti mana organisasi lain. Ini kerana masa diperlukan bagi menjayakan implimentasi terhadap latihan dan perkembangan aktiviti Kecerdasan Emosi. Persoalannya, sama ada masa yang digunakan adalah betul atau tidak kerana peringatan kadang-kadang adalah perlu dilaksanakan sehingga keperluan mencukupi.

PENUTUP

Konflik boleh berlaku di tempat kerja mungkin kerana berlakunya tekanan atau stress yang melampau. Pemimpin yang mempunyai Kecerdasan Emosi harus tahu mengenalpasti dan menguruskan keperluan emosi anggota agar mereka berasa dihormati, disokong, dihargai, dipercayai dan bernilai kepada organisasi. Sekiranya keperluan emosi anggota dipenuhi, mereka

akan menjadi lebih produktif, bermotivasi, kreatif dan saling memahami antara satu sama lain kerana mereka berpuas hati terhadap profesion masing masing.

Dewasa ini, memandangkan organisasi semakin beralih kepada pendekatan cara kerja berasaskan pasukan, komitmen dan kesungguhan bekerja di kalangan anggota amat diperlukan. Justeru itu, kejayaan organisasi pada zaman ini amat bergantung kepada keberkesanan kerja berpasukan dalam organisasi. Sesuatu pasukan kerja yang berjaya dapat menumpukan kepada keperluan untuk bekerjasama, berinteraksi dan penglibatan semua ahli, komitmen terhadap matlamat, mempercayai antara ahli dan sebagainya. Oleh yang demikian, pemimpin perlu memahami kebaikan dalam menjalin hubungan antara manusia, bersosialisasi dan semangat kerja berpasukan.

Kesimpulannya, dengan memupuk konsep Kecerdasan Emosi oleh kepimpinan dalam Angkatan Tentera merupakan usaha yang penting dalam menjamin kejayaan kepada organisasi. Kecerdasan Emosi seharusnya dipraktikkan oleh setiap individu, pegawai mahupun anggota dan organisasi terutama dalam menghadapi cabaran globalisasi dan liberalisasi dunia kini. Setiap individu dalam organisasi sama ada berpangkat tinggi atau rendah haruslah diberi pengiktirafan yang sewajarnya dari segi pengalaman, pendekatan dan kemahiran yang dimiliki masing-masing. Penekanan konsep Kecerdasan Emosi di tempat kerja atau persekitaran akan melahirkan pemimpin yang bersedia menerima pandangan anggota lain, berempati, bekerjasama dan memotivasikan anggota. Keadaan ini secara tidak langsung akan meningkatkan prestasi kerja di samping menambah produktiviti dan kepuasan kerja di tempat kerja. Fenomena ini nescaya akan membentuk satu suasana Pemimpinan organisasi Angkatan Tentera Malaysia yang cemerlang.

⁸ Goleman, D. (1998). Working with emotional intelligence. London: Bloomsbury.

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Mejar Mohd Hisham bin Yunus (3006303) telah ditauliahkan sebagai Leftenan Muda pada 17 Julai 1995 dalam Kor Armor Diraja dari Maktab Tentera Diraja, Kem Sungai Besi. Sepanjang 18 tahun perkhidmatan beliau telah memegang pelbagai jawatan dari Pemimpin Terup dan kini menjawat jawatan Ketua Batalion Lekiu, Akedemi Latihan Ketenteraan, Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia. Beliau telah menghadiri pelbagai kursus karier dan functional dan antaranya adalah kursus Asas, Pertengahan dan Train For Trainers dalam bidang Pengurusan Emosi (Emotional Intelligence) yang dianjurkan oleh Cawangan Perisikan, Markas Tentera Darat. Beliau telah menghadiri kursus di Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera dan memegang *Executive Diploma in Defence and Strategic Studies* dari Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia.

KNOWLEDGE AMONG MILITARY COMMANDERS IN MOTIVATING NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN THE INFANTRY

by Kol Dr A. Endry Nixon

-SYNOPSIS-

Motivation is taken seriously by most military forces as it is a crucial for success in military missions. As much as motivation is an important factor in the military, knowledge in motivation is equally pertinent for military commanders as part of their human resource management function. Knowledge conceptualized as conceptual, contextual and operational are pertinent as it emphasis not only knowing what to do but rather how to interpret what to do into practical implications. This paper aims to establish how satisfied are the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with their military commanders in motivating them and the level of knowledge among military commanders in motivating NCOs in the infantry regiments. The paper will be able to contribute an understanding to motivating NCOs among military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry for subsequent measures in enhancing human resource management in the organization. In addition, from a practical perspective, the study proposes knowledge elicitation of relevant knowledge in motivating NCOs for the purpose of training potential military commanders.

INTRODUCTION

Motivation has always been an emphasis in human resource management, where organizations are eager not only wanting to know what motivates their employees but most importantly how to motivate them. Studies illustrate that motivation from the organization or employer perspective is to seek to meet the needs, goals and desires of their human resource (Cole, 2004; Srinivasan, 2008). Wright and McMahan (1992) advocate that motivated workers are a critical resource in an organization. Since management is the prime factor in motivating people, it is pertinent that organizational leaders are continuously reviewing the means and approaches to sustain motivation among their employees (Dingley, 1986). Likewise in the military, motivation plays an important role as a highly motivated force is essential to succeed in military missions (Primortz, 2002; Sergio, 2004; MacCoun, Kier and Belkin, 2005; Blocq, 2010). History illustrate those quantitatively inferior armies have been able to win battles and conflicts because of their fighting spirit, aggressiveness and high morale brought about by motivation (Sergio, 2004). Studies in the military also indicate that motivation among soldiers is a critical factor in managing human resource in the military (MacCoun et al, 2005; Lewin, 2006; Ben-Dor et al, 2008).

According to Greger and Peterson (2000), "A Leader must have a broad knowledge of the field which comes from experience as well as from reading, listening and talking to people". In the profile of a leader: the Wallenberg effect also depicts that success is largely based on knowledge (Kunich and Lester, 1994). Similarly in the military, efforts have been taken to capture knowledge that is experience-based, practically relevant, insights, and beliefs that are able to enhance military professionalism (Sternberg, 2000; Hedlund et al, 2003). Other studies such as Mumford et al, 2000; Zaccaro et al, 2003 and Helund et al, 2003 have too established the need for acquiring knowledge to improve the ability of organizational leaders in performing their responsibilities in managing human resource. As the military commander's role in motivation is to understand the needs and desires of his subordinates and subsequently align them towards the organizational goals, it is of utmost important to have a sound knowledge on what was needed and the manner to influence them. In this perspective, knowledge becomes a key resource that enables a military commander to be capable in motivating their subordinates (Alonderienne, 2006; Shahwanaz, 2008; Samiolis, 2003) Knowledge is pertinent as it relates to the domain of action that needs to be undertaken to motivate people towards accomplishing a task (Tsoukos, 2000; Weick, 1995). The importance of knowledge was also echoed by Guzman (2009) as practical knowledge

that emphasizes on actions in specific context and by other literatures (Handley et al, 2006; Moch, 1990; Yahya and Goh, 2002). Although it is essential to have knowledge in motivating NCOs, it is also pertinent to view knowledge from the perspectives of conceptual, contextual and operational where they provide the military commanders a mental model in pursuing to motivate NCOs (Shahwanaz et al, 2008).

Specifically in the Malaysian Infantry, the Malaysian soldiers have displayed high spirit, comradeship and desire to fight against the communist in defending their country during the Malayan emergency (Ghows, 2006; Noel, 1987). Soldiers were highly motivated and willing to sacrifice in performing their military tasks against the communist insurgents (Sharom, 2006). With the laying down of arms by the communist insurgents in 1989, the Malaysian Infantry is still responsible in safeguarding the nation's sovereignty that requires the same spirit, comradeship and willingness to perform their military role but in a different environment. In this perspective, it necessitates to examine whether the NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry are still motivated in pursuing their military tasks. Subsequently, it is also important to note that the success in military mission does not only depend on the motivation of the soldiers but also lies on the effectiveness of military commanders in motivating them (US Army, 1973). In this aspect, the need to examine the level of knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commanders in the current era is necessary. Furthermore, empirical studies on motivation in the Malaysian Infantry are limited which makes this paper pertinent to provide a fundamental understanding in motivating NCOs for the organization and military commanders in their function of human resource management.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Understanding the means to influence people to work towards organizational goals is the basic challenge faced by most organizations and the key factor for long-term success is much dependent on how organizational leaders are able to motivate their employees (Simon, 1997; Pfeffer, 1998). As influencing people is the leading function of management, motivation plays an important role of that function (Rafikul and Ahmad, 2008). In this viewpoint, it is essential to understand how to motivate people for organizations to succeed (Amar, 1998). Although knowledge on motivation has much been developed since Aldefer (1972), Herzberg et al (1959), Maslow (1970), McClelland (1985) and Vroom (1964), the

need to continue the study on how motivation is influenced in the rapidly growing environment still prevails. The term motivation is often associated with the measures taken to influence a person to act in a certain way (Bartol and Martin, 1998). To make people to act in a certain way, it is necessary to understand the minds of the people on what will make them act in a certain way and then establish how to influence them. In the context of this paper, a working definition for motivation is described as a process to seek the state of motivation among NCOs that drives their desire in performing military tasks. Various motivational theories provide multiple definition of motivation. However, Roussel (2000) summarizes the concept of motivation to individual behavior that stipulates as a process which activates, orientates and sustains behavior towards the set objectives. Ryan and Deci (2000a) also support the notion of motivation being a process-oriented, which is motivation *to be moved to do something*. Generally, motivation theories are categorized in two approaches; content theories and process theories. Content theories explain the specific thing that motivates employees in the organization (Mullins, 1985). It emphasizes on employee's needs, their strength and the goals they desire to pursue. Content theories tend to explain the reason for people to be motivated by different ways and by different work environments. In short, it explains the factors within the individual that motivate them. Among the models associated with content theories are the rational-economic model, the social model and the self-actualizing model. On the other hand, process theories are more concerned with the manner a behavior is initiated, directed or sustained (Mullins, 1985). It emphasizes on determining how motivation can be instilled, directed and sustained among individuals. Among the models associated with process theories are the complex model, expectancy-based model and equity theory of motivation.

According to Sternberg (1985), individuals are more prone to learn from experience and applying it to new problems. Tacit knowledge is not formally taught but learnt through situational experience (Sternberg et al, 2000). Tacit knowledge or knowledge-experience could be categorized into three perspective; namely; first, interpersonal knowledge which is the knowledge about how to interact effectively with others; second, intrapersonal knowledge which is the knowledge where one learns about oneself and; third, organizational knowledge which is about how to act within the organization (Hedlund et al, 1999c; Donnithorne, 1993; Horvath et al, 1998, 1999). Knowledge is also viewed from an objectivist and subjectivist approach. From an objectivist approach, Hedlund (1994) views knowledge as

objects to be discovered and in identifying it, technology is used to codify such knowledge (Hansen et al, 1999). On the other hand, the subjectivist approach refers to knowledge as inherently identified and associates with human experience and social practice of knowing (Brown and Duguid, 1998; Tenkasi and Bolland, 1996). In this perspective, knowledge is continuously shaped by the social practice of communities (Voralkulpipat and Rezgui, 2008). Knowledge has been viewed differently and argued by several theorists, such as knowledge is used as information to make decisions (Fernandez et al., 2004; Kanter, 1999; Tiwana, 2002); Alonderienne et al., 2006), and that information that can be made actionable (Vail, 1999). Knowledge has been contended as the experience, beliefs and values with an understanding of how to use it (Davenport and Prusak, 1998); Schubert et al., 1998; Brown and Duguid, 1998). Others have viewed knowledge as merely an individual's perception and intention (Samiotis, 2003; Hedlund, 1999; Donnithorne, 1993; Chatzkel, 2002; Shahwanaz, 2008).

In the context of military, military commanders are expected to be capable of performing leader's responsibilities with a high degree of expertise in a variety of skills. Military commanders assigned to leader's position must be able to demonstrate their knowledge and leadership skills in a constantly changing situation in the battlefield and in base camp. Although military officers are taught what to do in their military training, it is assumed that they gain experience during their operational duties on how to do the tasks learned in formal military training. If organizations are able to capture the experience gained and make it explicit, it could assist in the development of military and organizational leaders to be effective in their responsibilities of leadership. Relating to individual task, Shahwanaz et al (2008) illustrate that individual knowledge can be conceptualize as conceptual, contextual and operational based on Yoshioka et al (2001) knowledge framework for communicative actions. Conceptual knowledge relates to an in-depth understanding of why a person has to engage in a specific task described in a manner it has to be performed. It refers to basic principles, procedures or laws of the nature embedded in a human mind and in the society on how the particular task must be executed (Johnson et al, 2002). According to Kim (1993), conceptual knowledge of know-why implies to an understanding of experience. Contextual knowledge is the knowledge that surrounds the implementation of a specific task. More often than not, it relates to knowledge regarding the location of the task performed and the need of resources to accomplish the task, and knowledge that are temporary relating to when

the task should be done (Pomeral et al, 2002). Operational knowledge is the core of the knowledge that completes the execution of the task. It is also referred to a problem-solving knowledge or domain knowledge (Dhaliwal and Benbasat, 1996). Operational knowledge relates to know-how which at times referred as declarative or procedural knowledge (Schultze and Leidner, 2002). It is the practical aspect of knowing how to implement the tasks with the resources made available. Fernandez et al (2004) illustrates that human knowledge is divided in two forms; tacit knowledge which is experiential, intuitive, insights and gut-feelings. It is the subjective and experience-based knowledge that is not able to be expressed formally and therefore it is difficult to share. On the other hand, explicit knowledge refers to one that can be expressed openly and be shared systematically in the form of data, specifications, manuals, drawings, audio, video and others alike. Even though there is a distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) believe that tacit and explicit knowledge are mutually complementary entities, interact with and interchange into each other in the creative activities of human beings (Kathuri, 2002).

ORGANIZATION SETTING

The Malaysian Infantry constitutes of three infantry regiments; the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR), Royal Ranger Regiment (RRR) and the Border Regiment (BR). The Malaysian infantry is the backbone of the Malaysian Army where the prime role is to deny any form of threat or intrusion by land or from the sea. The infantry Corp consists of thirty-nine regiments.

METHODS

To examine the knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry (RMR, RRR and BR), a survey was conducted in which 36 military commanders participated. The number of respondents was based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table for determining sample size where the respondents consists of 23 military commanders from the RMR, 8 from RRR and 5 from BR. The respondents were asked to describe their knowledge in motivating NCOs that was conceptualized as conceptual, contextual and operational knowledge (Yoshioka et al, 2001) with a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not very well) to 5 (Very well). For the purpose of this study, a guideline in the level of knowledge illustrated in Table 1 was used to establish the level of knowledge among military commanders in motivating

NCOs. Yoshioka et al (2001) concept was used as it provides a better understanding in knowledge among individuals. To examine motivating NCOs among military commanders, a general question was asked to rate how satisfied were the NCOs motivated by their military commanders in the infantry regiments with a Likert scale

ranging from 1 (Not very satisfied) to 5 (Very satisfied). The respondents were the NCOs (lower ranks who are not commissioned as officers in the military) in the Malaysian Infantry. A total of 379 respondents, based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample size table participated in the survey.

Table 1: Basic Understanding in Level of Knowledge

Knowledge		Basic Understanding
Conceptual	•	Understand why motivation is important among non-commissioned human resource.
	•	Basic understanding in motivational theories, models and structures.
	•	Have a plan or strategy in mind in motivating non-commissioned human resource.
Contextual	•	Basic understanding on the various aspects on people, where and when to address measures in motivating non-commissioned human resource.
	•	Understand the means to implement measures in motivating non-commissioned human resource.
Operational	•	Basic understanding on what and how actions to be taken in motivating non-commissioned human resource.
	•	Able to specify and show a documented plan or strategy in motivating non-commissioned human resource.
	•	Able to illustrate the actions taken and feedback received on the actions in motivating non-commissioned human resource.

Adapted from Yoshioka et al (2001)

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A descriptive analysis conducted illustrated that the data obtained was normally distributed as the p value was greater than the alpha value of .05 for conceptual, contextual and operational knowledge among military commanders in the RMR, RRR and BR. The normality of the distribution of data is depicted in Table 2. Reliability and validity of the survey scale was analyzed to establish the goodness of data. The reliability and validity of knowledge scale were inspected to determine how well the items in the set are positively correlated to each other (Sekaran, 2003). To determine reliability, Cronbach's alpha

coefficient scale of 0.7 and above based on George et al (2006) and DeVellis (2003), rule of thumb was used. Since the respondents were only 36, a split-half reliability test was conducted using the same items and the same response format as it reflects the correlation between two halves of the instrument to determine the reliability of the measure. The result of the split-half reliability test is shown in Table 3. In examining the reliability test results, all items indicated positive and the Cronbach's alpha obtained was above 0.7, indicating a good internal consistency. Furthermore, the degree each item correlated with the total score was above 0.3, indicating a good measure of scale (Pallant, 2010).

Table 2: Tests of Normality for Level of Knowledge among Corp

Level of Knowledge	Corp	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
		Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
conceptual knowledge	RMR	0.196	23	0.023	0.920	23	0.066
	RRD	0.187	8	0.200*	0.877	8	0.175
	BR	0.231	5	0.200*	0.881	5	0.314
contextual knowledge	RMR	0.195	23	0.024	0.916	23	0.056
	RRD	0.228	8	0.200*	0.835	8	0.067
	BR	0.300	5	0.161	0.883	5	0.325
operational knowledge	RMR	0.211	23	0.009	0.919	23	0.064
	RRD	0.250	8	0.150	0.860	8	0.120
	BR	0.300	5	0.161	0.883	5	0.119

Table 3: Reliability Statistics for Level of Knowledge in Motivating NCOs

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	0.825
		N of Items	6a
	Part 2	Value	0.813
		N of Items	6b
		Total N of Items	12
Spearman-Brown Coefficient		Correlation Between Forms	0.958
		Equal Length	0.979
		Unequal Length	0.979
		Guttman Split-Half Coefficient	0.977

a. The items are: knowledge question 1, knowledge question 2, knowledge question 3, knowledge question 4, knowledge question 5, and knowledge question 6.

b. The question items are: knowledge question 7, knowledge question 8, knowledge question 9, knowledge question 10, knowledge question 11, and knowledge question 12.

The test of the homogeneity of variance as shown in Table 4 illustrates that there is no difference in the variance of the mean in the level of knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commander. This is because the Levene statistic obtained for conceptual knowledge was valued (F) of 1.188 and the corresponding p value of 0.318, for contextual knowledge was valued

(F) of 1.721 and the corresponding p value of 0.194 and for operational knowledge was valued (F) of 0.770 and the corresponding p value of 0.471. The corresponding p values were larger than the alpha value of 0.05 which concludes that the variance of the mean for the variable for this objective was homogeneous.

Table 4: Test of Homogeneity of Variance in Level of Knowledge in Motivating NCOs

Level of Knowledge	Levine Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Conceptual knowledge	1.188	2	33	0.318
Contextual knowledge	1.721	2	33	0.194
Operational knowledge	0.770	2	33	0.471

Since both the normality and equality of variance were met, a one-way ANOVA was used to examine the level of knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commander. The descriptive statistics of the One-Way ANOVA was examined for any difference in the level of knowledge. In the Levene's test for homogeneity of variances as shown in Table 4 indicates that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated. However, based on the ANOVA Table 5, there was no significant difference in knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commander in RMR, RRR and BR group because the corresponding p values obtained for conceptual, contextual and operational knowledge

between groups was greater than the alpha value of 0.05. This concludes that knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry were similar. Although the alpha values for contextual and operational knowledge in Table 4 is approximately 0.05, the mean difference in the multiple comparison in Table 6 did not indicate any differences among the groups; RMR, RRR and BR. This again indicates the similarity in the level of knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry. Hence, the finding concludes that the level of knowledge (conceptual, contextual and operational) in motivating NCOs among military commanders in RMR, RRR and BR were similar.

Table 5: Level of Knowledge among Military Commanders in Motivating Non-Commissioned Officers ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
conceptual knowledge	Between Groups	3.589	2	1.794	1.177	.321
	Within Groups	50.300	33	1.524		
contextual knowledge	Total	53.889	35			
	Between Groups	7.489	2	3.744	3.129	.057
	Within Groups	39.484	33	1.196		
	Total	46.972	35			
operational knowledge	Between Groups	7.599	2	3.800	3.219	.053
	Within Groups	38.957	33	1.181		
	Total	46.556	35			

Table 6: Multiple Comparison: Level of Knowledge in Motivating Non-Commissioned Officers

Level of Knowledge	(I) Corp	(J) Corp	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
conceptual knowledge	RMR	RRD	.250	.507	.875
		BR	.800	.609	.398
	RRD	RMR	.250	.507	.875
		BR	1.050	.704	.308
	BR	RMR	.800	.609	.398
		RRD	1.050	.704	.308
contextual knowledge	RMR	RRD	.995	.449	.083
		BR	.870	.540	.255
	RRD	RMR	.995	.449	.083
		BR	.125	.624	.978
	BR	RMR	.870	.540	.255
		RRD	.125	.624	.978
operational knowledge	RMR	RRD	.957	.446	.096
		BR	.957	.536	.191
	RRD	RMR	.957	.446	.096
		BR	.000	.619	1.000
	BR	RMR	.957	.536	.191
		RRD	.000	.619	1.000

For motivating NCOs, the descriptive analysis reveals that 18.7% rated their military commanders very satisfied, while 44.6% of the respondents rated satisfied, 32.2 % rated slightly satisfied and 4.5% not satisfied. Since 63.3 % of the respondents rated between very satisfied and satisfied while 36.7% rated between slightly satisfied and not satisfied for their military commanders, the findings illustrates that not all military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry are able to motivate their NCOs satisfactorily. A graphical examination on the skewness and kurtosis values, normal Q-Q plot and Z score

distribution of the data obtained in motivating NCOs indicate that the distribution was normal as most of the observed values fell close to or directly on the normality line. The test of the homogeneity of variance denotes that there is no difference in the variance of the mean in motivating NCOs by military commanders. This is because the Levene statistic obtained value (F) of 1.950 is small and the corresponding p value of 0.144 is larger than the alpha value of 0.05. Therefore, it is concluded that the variance of the mean in motivating NCOs by military commanders was homogeneous.

Preliminary assumption was conducted to verify for normality and homogeneity of variance and no violation was observed. The ANOVA test revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in the mean of motivating NCOs by military commanders at the Corp level (RMR, RRR and BR), $F(2, 376) = 4.973$, $p = 0.007$. The effect size was calculated as shown below and eta-squared obtained was $\eta^2 = 0.03$, indicating that the mean difference between regiments was small (Cohen, 1988).

$$\eta^2 = \frac{SSB}{SST}$$

Where

η^2 = Eta-squared = effect size

SSB = Sum of squared for between groups

SST = Total sum of squared

$$\eta^2 = \frac{6.234}{241.937}$$

$$\eta^2 = 0.03$$

Bonferroni Post Hoc multiple comparisons test indicate that there was a statistically significance difference in the mean of motivating NCOs by military commanders for the following pairs; RMR ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 0.830$) and BR ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 0.577$) because the mean difference, $MD = 0.371$ and the p value obtained was 0.008, which is smaller than alpha value of 0.05, and RRR ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.791$) and BR ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 0.577$) because the mean difference, $MD = 0.388$ and the p value obtained was 0.017, which is smaller than alpha value of 0.05. On the other hand, there was no statistically significant difference between RMR ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 0.830$) and RRR ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.791$) because the mean difference, $MD = 0.18$ is small and the p value obtained was 1.000, which is greater than alpha value of 0.05. The mean difference obtained in motivating NCOs by military commanders between the three regiments may be small due to factors such as similarity in command and organizational structure, or similar military training and career development among the military commanders.

DISCUSSION

First, the findings of this study indicate that there was no significant difference in the level of knowledge in motivating NCOs among military commanders in the Corp (RMR, RRR and BR) because the corresponding p values obtained for conceptual, contextual and operational knowledge between groups was greater than the alpha value of 0.05 and the mean difference in the multiple comparison table did not indicate any differences among the groups; RMR, RRR and BR. Hence, the findings concludes that the level of knowledge (conceptual, contextual and operational) in motivating NCOs among military commanders in RMR, RRR and BR were similar. The result implies that the general military courses the military commanders undergone as part of training and development are sufficient for them to have the knowledge in motivating their subordinates.

Second, the findings in motivating NCOs indicate 63.3% of the respondents rated their military commanders between very satisfied and satisfied while 36.7% rated between slightly satisfied and not satisfied. This result implies that not all military commanders in the Infantry are able to motivate their NCOs satisfactorily. An assumption is that factors relating to experience may have an influence on the difference in motivating NCOs. This assumption is supported by the studies of Hitt and Tyler (1991), Thomas et al (1991) and Moynihan and Pandey (2007a) which states that age has influence over the manner a job or task is carried out and that it reflects experience gained as one matures in an organization. In addition, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (1998) also indicate the influence of age factor over organizational leader's behavior and attitudes. The age factor is also associated with individual experience and personal knowledge accumulated which has influence over a leader's action in the organization (Wagner et al, 1984; Konrad and Hartmann, 2002; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1998; Moynihan and Pandey, 2007). These researches illustrate a relationship between age and experience gained over time (maturity), and reflects a positive view on leader's behavior and attitude in their job responsibility. Moreover, Chia and Holt (2008), Zhang et al (2010) and Zollo and Wither (2007) assert that experience reflected in age is an essential element of knowledge and thus links a relationship between age and knowledge. Length of time in organization and length of time in job position (tenure) is another factor associated with age and job attitude where length of time spent in the organization reflects the development of experience (Wiersema and Bird, 1993). This relates to the ability of

a leader in managing human resource (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Pfeffer, 1993). These studies relate that the ability of a leader lies on the experience accumulated leading to knowledge enhancement which is expressed in Moynihan and Pandey (2007), Chia and Holt (2008) and Zhang et al (2010) studies.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the results empirically illustrate that although all military commanders have a similar level of knowledge but not all are able to put the knowledge into practice in motivating their NCOs satisfactorily. Next, the difference in the ability of military commanders in motivating NCOs could be influenced by experience reflected from age, maturity and length of time in job

position (Wagner et al, 1984; Konrad and Hartmann, 2002, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1998; Moynihan and Pandey, 2007). Since studies on motivation in the Malaysian Infantry are limited, this study proposes further research to determine, i) whether experience reflected as age, maturity and length of time in job position have influence on the ability in motivating NCOs among military commanders and ii) military commanders who are able to motivate NCOs satisfactorily and elicit relevant knowledge from them for learning and training purposes. This will also assist the current and potential military commanders to enhance their human resource management function in the military.

Adapted from Yoshioka et al (2001)

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Kol Dr A. Endry Nixon earned his Master in Management degree from the Asian Institute of Management, Manila, Philippines in 1998, Master in Arts (Defence Studies) degree from University Kebangsaan Malaysia in 2006 and obtained his Doctorate in Philosophy degree from University Putra Malaysia in 2011. He joined the cadet officer training in 1979 and was commissioned to the Royal Ranger Regiment. He has attended various military courses in conjunction with his military career which includes Defence Resource Management, Monterey, California, USA. He graduated in the Commandant's list from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1994 and Armed Forces Defence College in 2005. He was the Commanding Officer of the 9th Royal Ranger Regiment and has served as military instructor at the Army Institute of Management, Army Combat Training Centre and as Directing Staff in Human Resource and Training at the Army Senior Officers Training Institute that conducts Masters in Management program in collaboration with University of Malaya. He lectures in leadership, training and conducts case studies in the military organization. He is currently serving as the Director of Innovation at the Army Inspectorate Division, Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence. He is a keen writer who has published articles in the Malaysian Army Journal, Asian Journal of Politics, Defence and Security, and Journal of Southeast Asia Research. His research interest includes human resource development, organizational learning, training and case writing.

THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS NORTH EAST ASIA

by Kol Hj Amiruddin bin Dato' Sulaiman

–SYNOPSIS–

*Northeast Asia (NEA) is a region with the most major power players in the world. Three of the five players are Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, China, Japan and South Korea are major consumers of the world's supply of energy and they are also among the world's largest economies that accounts a big slice of the world trade **other than the U.S.** The region not only has strong economies but also strong militaries. China, Russia, and North Korea currently compose three of the five largest militaries there, while Japan has the most modern military force in Asia with the ROK and Taiwan following behind. It would be interesting to see how the U.S's defense policies responds to these circumstances in this region.*

INTRODUCTION

Northeast Asia (NEA) is a region with the most major power players in the world, namely, China, Japan, South Korea (ROK), Hong Kong and Taiwan. One of the five players are permanent members of the U.N Security Council is China. This country, Japan and ROK are major consumers of the world's supply of energy and all of them also among the world's largest economies that account a big slice of the world trade¹. Additionally, these countries and North Korea (DPRK) have a combined military force that cannot be seen anywhere else in the world. These players indicate the region's importance and any destabilizing consequence would affect the rest of the world.

Based on historical fact, the Korean Peninsula has never been fully at peace. The Korean War never actually ended, it was just a truce via an armistice agreement and has yet to be concluded. The DPRK still deploys its forces along the demilitarized zone, likewise the U.S. and the ROK. The DPRK has publicly stated that the ROK has always been part of them and it never did formally

recognize its neighboring ROK. ROK and Japan has always regarded the DPRK as a threat to them, the stability in the region and also their concern over the crisis between China and Taiwan. China and Russia have ties with the DPRK with China regarding U.S. interference in the region as a threat to them especially the U.S. is assisting the increasing military capabilities of Japan and ROK. Recently, Russian actions have indicated that it is trying to project itself again as a superpower. It would be interesting to see how the U.S's defense policies responds to these circumstances in this region.

U.S. DEFENCE POLICIES AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN NEA

The US has a comprehensive defense policy in its relationship with the NEA countries.² It can be summarized as follows;³ the US will take necessary actions to meet the full range of its security and deterrent commitments to allies like ROK and Japan. Secondly, the US perceives that DPRK continues to threaten the community of nations. Therefore, the US policy is to isolate the DPRK from the benefits of participation in the

¹ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, *The Defence Policies of Nations, A Comparative Study*, Third Edition, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 331-337.

² Condoleezza Rice, US policy in Northeast Asia, lecture to Heritage foundation, 30 Oct 2006 in <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bclee11.cfm>. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

³ Ibid.

international system. The US was also instrumental in the passage of Resolution 1718.⁴ Thirdly, the US and its allies are expanding measures to defend against DPRK's proliferation efforts through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This initiative is a voluntary partnership among nations to prevent the spread by air, by sea and by land of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Finally, the US and its partners are working to strengthen the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. US threat perceptions in the region are the conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, China with Taiwan and the increasing military capabilities of China and DPRK in the region.

JAPAN

Japan is an economic superpower second only to the U.S. and among its major trading partners are the U.S., Western Europe and ASEAN.⁵ Japan, however, is not a military superpower. The legacy of the Second World War remains with the U.S. ensures that Japan will never again have a military that is able to attack another country except for the purpose of self-defense. This was done through the Peace and Security Treaty, signed in 1951. Additionally, a Status of Force Agreement was also signed, legitimizing the presence of U.S. military force in Japan. The Security Treaty was revised in 1960 to jointly meet armed attacks at either party and for the security of the Far East.⁶ This treaty was revised again in 1987 for Japan to assist in the expenses incurred in maintaining U.S. forces in Japan as what is termed as "host nation support".⁷

In 1993, changes in its government brought about changes to several key legislations that led to its Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) involving in international peacekeeping, contributing to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and non-combat support for the war in Iraq. Since 9/11, Japan has been in support of US actions by giving moral and diplomatic support. The Japanese Diet in October 2001 passed an Anti Terrorism

Special Measures Law.⁸ This Law allowed the JSDF to support US troops in the international fight against terrorism. These changes strengthen U.S. – Japan defense cooperation.

Japan's basic defense policy, as stated by Murray and Viotti, is maintaining the fundamental principles of the peace constitution and its military is for the purpose of self-defense. This policy conforms to the Security Treaty with the U.S.⁹ Despite this policy, Japan has the most modern and can be regarded as the strongest military force in the region. It is able to develop its Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) through the procurements of advanced weapons platforms from the U.S. The growing capability of the JSDF is to build a capable force for self-defense.¹⁰

According to a poll, it is viewed that Japan faces non-military threats internally and referring to the Yakuza (Japanese Mafia) as a likelihood domestic threat rather than terrorism.¹¹ The majority of the Japanese public is more concerned about economic security and their livelihood.¹² External threats for Japan include from Russia, a legacy from the Second World War, when the then USSR seized islands to the North of Japan and Russian nuclear armed troops stationed in close proximity to the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk.¹³ The dispute on the islands continues as no peace agreement was made to date. However, this dispute is viewed not as serious as that of DPRK and considered manageable. DPRK's missile crises of 1993 and 2002 and its recent internal developments are a concern for Japan. As such it has expanded its collaboration with the U.S on ballistic missile defenses.¹⁴ Then there is the emerging influence of China in the region, its conflict with Taiwan and the re-emergence of Russia. Thus, due to these perceived threats, it would only make sense that Japan continues to have a strong alliance with the U.S. to safeguard its sovereignty and interests in the region.

⁴ Resolution 1718 (2006), UN Charter Article 41 states that Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, but barring automatic military enforcement of its demands under the Charter's Article 41, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1718 (2006), which prevents a range of goods from entering or leaving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear-weapon program in <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

⁵ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, p. 351.

⁶ US Military Bases in Japan – An Overview, 2003, <mhtml:file://D:\US Military Bases in Mainland Japan and Okinawa.mht> (Accessed 22/2/2009), p.2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations. in http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html. Accessed on 13 Feb 09

⁹ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, p.372.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 368.

¹¹ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, p.352.

¹² Ibid, pp 352-353.

¹³ Ibid, p. 353.

¹⁴ David Isenberg, 2004, Japan Eyes Eased Ban On Military Exports, Asia Times: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FH04Dh01.html> (Accessed 02/02/09).

However, US – Japan relations were strained by the issues in Okinawa due to US military force behavior and criminal activities. In 1945, U.S. troops forced thousands of Okinawans off their lands to build military bases. To date not one piece of land has ever been returned. When landlords and farmers who lost their land challenged the U.S. several years ago, the Japanese courts ruled that Japan has no jurisdiction over U.S. military operations.¹⁵ This incident gave a bad impression of the US forces in Japan. The brutal rape of a twelve year old girl in 1994 by three U.S. Marines worsened the situation with Okinawans demanding the removal of U.S. bases. To subdue the situation, the U.S. and Japan agreed that 8,000 U.S. marines positioned in Okinawa to be redeployed to Guam, leaving a total of 40,000-42,000 U.S. troops in Japan. Okinawa has remained a massive U.S. military base which was a “cold war island”.¹⁶ Constituting only 0.6% of Japan’s land space, Okinawa houses 75% of the 63,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan on 39 bases, one of the largest concentrations of U.S. forces anywhere in the world. The heart of U.S. operations is Kadena Air Base, the largest U.S. military facility outside of the continental U.S., occupying 83% of the territory of Kadena, a city of 30,000.¹⁷ In addition, the U.S. and Japanese government promised to move one of the bases, the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, to the Japanese mainland.¹⁸ This relocation toned down the voices of dissent, but it did not fade away.

Despite the issues in Okinawa and the demand to remove U.S. forces in Japan, U.S. – Japan relations have remained strong. In fact, the recent visit by US Secretary of State’s Hillary Clinton in Japan voiced mutual consensus to enhance the Japan - U.S. alliance through continuing contacts.¹⁹ Both sides are in agreement over a number of international and regional issues, such as the global financial crisis, the War on Terror, the Afghan reconstruction and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. The U.S. - Japanese alliance is stronger than it has been in many years in part because Japan, faced with China’s military modernization, is looking to strengthen its security ties with the US as a countermeasure and also the concern on developments on the Korean peninsula.

¹⁵ US Military Bases in Japan – An Overview, 2003, mhtml:file://D:\US Military Bases in Mainland Japan and Okinawa.mht (Accessed 22/2/2009), pp. 12-14.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 8-14.

¹⁷ T. Barry, 2000, Okinawa and US Military in Northeast Asia, *Foreign policy in focus*, 22(5).

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁹ US Japan opts to enhance ties, *World News*, 18 Feb 09 in http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/18/content_10842457.htm. Accessed on 18 Feb 09.

These concerns could also encourage Japan to align its defense policy towards ROK closely with the U.S.’s. These developments have allowed Japan to extend its military missions, enhance its defense capabilities, and gradually modifying restrictions in its defense policy. All these developments have contributed towards a more positive U.S. – Japan alliance. However, these developments in Japan and its relations with the U.S. is causing uneasiness among its nearest neighbors.

ROK

The U.S. presence in the ROK is due to the Korean War. After the truce achieved that divided the peninsula, the US and ROK signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 and is still in effect.²⁰ This Treaty allowed U.S. forces to be stationed in the ROK. However, since 1971, there has been a reduction in U.S. forces deployed here and further reductions were planned but were postponed due to developments in DPRK.²¹ Current estimates are for a drop from 39,000 in the 1990s to 25,000 troops by the end of 2008.²² This reduction created uproar in ROK due to intelligence assessments on the increasing military capabilities of DPRK.²³ Countering the U.S. move, ROK began investing in its own defence industry to be self-sufficient in producing military equipment.²⁴ This behaviour on the part of the ROK can be deduced that they fear greatly that DPRK will continue the war to unify the peninsula by military force. Thus, to the ROK, the DPRK threat has remained unchanged. Recent developments in DPRK concerning the health of Kim Jong-Il, his succession,²⁵ the upcoming satellite launch and the hard-line policy by ROK President Lee Myung-bak²⁶ could escalate into an unwanted continuation of the war. Additionally, DPRK close ties with Russia and China, makes ROK look like a cornered cat! To balance these ties, the ROK has established relations with Russia in 1991 and with China in 1992.²⁷ ROK is also concern on the developments in JSDF’s military capabilities due to their historical past similar to what the French is to

²⁰ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, p.400.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 400-405.

²² Jason T. Shaplen, 2007, *Washington’s Eastern Sunset: The Decline of U.S. Power in Northeast Asia*, *Foreign Affairs*, 87(8).

²³ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, p.401.

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 400-401.

²⁵ The Star World, 20 Feb 2009, Kim’s Son running in elections, says report, p.W35.

²⁶ The Star World, 20 Feb 2009, N.Korea: Missile and nuke programmes no threat, p.W35.

²⁷ Murray, D.J. & Viotti, P.R., 1994, pp. 405-409.

the British. Internally, ROK do not face any terrorism threat and supports the U.S. in anti-terrorism. There is also a development in its civil society in the sense that the country is becoming more democratic with a lessen involvement of its military in government.

ROK is undergoing a fundamental realignment of its security relationship with the US as the two countries' alliance has become strained over diplomatic issues such as how to handle DPRK. There is rising public dissent towards the presence of U.S military on ROK soil and a soften stance towards DPRK. To comply with the public demand on U.S. presence, was the relocation of U.S. force's headquarters from Seoul to pass south of the Han River, freeing up valuable land in the heart of the capital. When the relocation is complete, a total of 59 U.S. military facilities covering 38,000 acres two-thirds of the land granted to the U.S. military under the existing Status of Forces Agreement will have been handed back to the ROK.²⁸ Despite this relocation, the US ability to project military power on the peninsula is unlikely to decrease because of technological advancements and strong interoperability between the US forces and its ROK counterpart. The ultimate US interest in the Korean Peninsula is stability and a process of reconciliation leading to the eventual unification of the two Koreas.²⁹ On the other hand, the ROK understands the need for U.S. troops to remain in the country not only to assist in the event of a confrontation with DPRK but also as a security trump card against China's increasing military power.³⁰

DPRK

US - DPRK relations have always been like a see saw. For years DPRK publicly pledged not to build nuclear weapons. In 1985 it signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, in 1992 DPRK and ROK agreed to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula. But shortly thereafter, it came to light that the DPRK was secretly trying to build nuclear weapons. To attempt to resolve this crisis, the US reached a bilateral agreement with DPRK in 1994 designed to freeze and ultimately eliminate its nuclear weapons programs. This approach ultimately failed.

The later events complicated the issue when DPRK resigns itself from the NPT in 2001. Additionally, the DPRK was labeled as a sponsor of international terrorism and exporting nuclear technology. Thus, the threat from the DPRK is not only its conventional forces but also its nuclear capability and its involvement in international terrorism.

For the US, DPRK's behavior poses a regional challenge and it must be addressed in a regional context. The goal of US diplomacy is to create an international environment that presses DPRK to make better decisions than before and it is fully accountable for the decisions that it takes. According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the US has no intention of attacking or invading DPRK.³¹ The US viewed that DPRK's claims on US policies as hostile were only lame excuses for the DPRK government's refusal to make positive choices and to stick with them. The US is closely collaborating on the issues of the Six Party talks. The US does not want to be seen as the party trying to eradicate DPRK's nuclear arsenal without the cooperation of other regional actors. Despite the stalemate and slow progress on the Six Party talks, the US believes that the participation of China, Japan, Russia and ROK are important in making the DPRK adhere to the requirements of the talks.

TAIWAN

There is no more sensitive issue in the Sino-American relationship than Taiwan. The Bush Administration has been quite clear about its view of Taiwan's security. Statements by senior Bush Administration officials in August 2000 stated that the US policy is based on the principle that there must be no use of force by China against Taiwan. However if China violates these principles and attacks Taiwan, then the US will respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.³² The US will help Taiwan defend itself. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his confirmation testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 2001, affirmed that: "The US will maintain the capacity to resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security of the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan". The Bush Administration believes that the US has a strong interest in the security of

²⁸ David M. Lenard, Can This Alliance Be Saved? The Future of U.S.-ROK Relations: <http://www.siu.edu/EASTASIA/Lenard-0504.html>. Accessed 02 Feb 09.

²⁹ M.J.Green, 2002, The United states and east asia in a unipolar era, Future trends in East Asean international relations, (ed) Quansheng zhao, Cornwall, Frank Cass, p 41

³⁰ Fish, T., 2009, China increases submarine patrols, Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 46, Issue 06, 11 February 2009.

³¹ Condoleezza Rice, US policy in Northeast Asia, lecture to Heritage foundation, 30 Oct 2006 in <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bclee11.cfm>. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

³² P.Brookes, 2003, US-Taiwan Defence Relations in the Bush Administration, Heritage lectures no 808 in <http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthePacific/hl808.cfm>. Accessed on 13 Feb 09

Taiwan's democracy. Taiwan, along with Japan and ROK represent Northeast Asian societies that have embraced democracy, respect for human rights and free markets. Therefore, the US believes that it is in its fundamental interest to ensure that these governments are secure and prospering.

Taiwan requires the assistance of US military capabilities since Taiwan it is not capable to defend against China. This was clearly indicated during the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995-1996 when the US sent two aircraft carriers to stop the Chinese intimidation towards Taiwan.³³ In the US, Taiwan needs to undertake fundamental reforms and to commit the necessary financial resources to maintain an equitable balance across the straits. The ability to withstand China's military intervention, at least until friendly forces can intervene is the key to Taiwan's defense. In 2006, US government again stressed that its policy on Taiwan is governed by its commitment to a "One China" policy and its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act that is to help Taiwan defend itself.³⁴ The US expects that neither side to engage in activities that would try to undermine the balance and could engage in discussions about cross-straits issues. Furthermore, the US plan to include and sell Theatre Missile Defense System (TMD)³⁵ to Taiwan can increase the uneasiness in its relationship with China and even Russia since both countries perceived that the TMD in the hands of Taiwanese can be detrimental to their national security.

CHINA

China's military modernization and power present significant challenges for the US military forces. Although the US remains the dominant military power in NEA, China is not far behind. Therefore, the US perceived that it is no longer the only player in NEA. China can now influence U.S. operations in the Taiwan Straits in a way that it could not as recently as 1996. The current modernization of the People's Liberation Army appears as a design for regional employment that could give threat to maritime and territorial disputes in the region. The US needs to

ensure its presence in the region to counterweight China's regional power. Furthermore, for the nations in East Asia, the US remains the only power capable of influencing China's behavior.³⁶ Some Chinese analysts viewed the recent emergence of the US power in East Asia region in post 9/11 as another means of containment of China.³⁷ The U.S. joint development of missile defense systems with Japan and ROK seriously threaten the strategic balance in the region. Chinese analysts argue that missile defenses will encourage the U.S. to undertake a more aggressive military policy toward China, particularly on the sensitive issue of Taiwan. On the other hand, China had emerged as a key player on the DPRK issues pertaining nuclear proliferation and unification.³⁸ It was not until a few years back, that China showed a passive stance on DPRK's nuclear ambitions. The Chinese considered U.S. assessments on DPRK's nuclear ambitions exaggerating and urged the U.S. to resolve the issues through bilateral negotiations. China's stance on this issue was speculated on DPRK's withdrawal from the nuclear NPT had quite a substantial impact. China had to worry on its neighbour which is believed to be on the brink of economic collapsed and equipped with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, China has continued providing the platform for further discussions and negotiations on the Six Party talks with related parties.

Since the 9/11 the US and China have maintained good relationship in the war against terror. China has allowed US warship to stop in Hong Kong on their way to Afghanistan, sent a team of counter terrorism expert to the US and voted for the US sponsored UN resolution condemning terrorism. China on the other hand used the war on terrorism to term the "Uighur" separatist movement in Xinjiang province as terrorist thus legitimizing its effort to eradicate and eliminate safe haven for the separatist movement.³⁹

³³ Global security, Taiwan straits issues in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

³⁴ Condoleezza Rice, US policy in Northeast Asia, lecture to Heritage foundation, 30 Oct 2006 in <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bclee11.cfm>. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

³⁵ Evan Medeiros, Senior Research Associate, 2003, Theatre Missile Defence and Northeast Asian Security in http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_3a.html. Accessed on 13 Feb 09.

³⁶ A. J. Gregor, 1996, China, the United States, and Security Policy in East Asia, Parameters, 26(3).

³⁷ J. Reilly, 2002, The U.S. "War on Terror" and East Asia, Foreign Policy In Focus.

³⁸ Byung Kwang Park, 2003, ROK-China Political Relations, Research Fellow, Research Institute for International Affairs, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/sinokorea_papers.pdf. Accessed 02 Feb 09.

³⁹ Chien-peng Chung, 2006, Confronting Terrorism and Other Evils in China: All quiet on the Western Front?, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.4 No.2 (2006), pp. 75-87.

RUSSIA

Although geographically Moscow is a distance away from NEA, its domain stretches across the Eurasian continent, a lengthy boundary with China and the Russian Far East an integral part of the NEA. Russia is seeking to re-establish its status as a major power. Russia has shown willingness to cooperate with the US with respect to its anti terrorism campaign. Russia's relationships with the DPRK is on the unification issues of unified Korea so as to reap a huge economic reward from a successful unification that could link transport networks from Korea's pacific ports to Russia and Europe while opening the Korean market for new Russian natural gas fields and also the huge debt of DPRK to be paid by unified Korea.⁴⁰ Therefore, the US must treat its relationship with Russia with care since Russia could play a role of a spoiler in the region. Russia has been selling weapons to China under the symbolic strategic partnership program since 1996. Russia also sold weapons such as surface to air missile to DPRK which had touched on US sensitivities. These moves can complicate US interests in the region.

CONCLUSION

The defense policy of US towards NEA is tailored so that it could ensure its continued presence in the region to

counter towards the increasing military capabilities and influence of countries in the region. The US perceived that strong economies and militaries possessed by China, Japan, ROK, DPRK, Russia and Taiwan could lead to damaging effects on regional stability and the global economy. The region not only has strong economies but also strong militaries. China, Japan and South Korea are among the world's biggest economies. China, Russia, and DPRK currently compose three of the five largest militaries there, while Japan has the most modern military force in Asia with the ROK and Taiwan following behind. Another factor that necessitates US Defense Policy in NEA is also because of its need to project effectively its military forces when needed in the event of any conflict in the region. The ability to project air, land, or maritime forces rapidly within the region requires a continued US force presence exercising operational reach especially that of Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China. Furthermore, the event of 9/11 had a significant impact on the US-NEA countries' relationship in the war against terror. Thus, the U.S Defense Policies in NEA, are about containing the threat from the DPRK and, the conflict between China and Taiwan by working closely with its allies; Japan, ROK and Taiwan to balance the other military powers in the region. A US Defense Policy in NEA are intertwined with its Foreign Policy through alliances with these three democracies and established relations with China and Russia.

⁴⁰ S.M.Kim, 2001, North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics, North Korea and Northeast Asia, S.M.Kim (ed), New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, p 39.

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Kol Hj Amirudin bin Dato' Sulaiman was commissioned in 1985. He holds a double Master's Degree in Defense Studies from University of Canberra and UKM. Currently he is appointed as the Chief of Staff at the Army Training Headquarters. He has held other important appointments as SO 1 Strategy/Concept at the Planning and Development Division of Army Headquarters, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion Border Regiment, Colonel Doctrine at the Army Training Headquarters. Prior to his current appointment, he was appointed as the Commandant of Royal Military College

THE WAYS TO CONTROL THE LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET

By Kol Muhammad Ariff Soo bin Abdullah

-SYNOPSIS-

The advent of Internet has caused rapid explosion of online social networking (SN) media like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and many others. These SN sites serve as an excellent means of communication for individuals and organisations. Despite its benefits, these SN sites have caused detrimental damages to organisations due to information leakage dilemmas either intentionally or inadvertently. Meanwhile, carelessness of employees' behaviour and attitudes while interacting with the user-friendly functionalities of the SN sites could allow cybercriminals to gain access and steal valuable information from the targeted individuals or organisations. Thus, this essay posits SN sites as the most challenging channel of information leakage on organisations. It discusses the SN functionalities and its corresponding potential problems as well as the implication of information leakage. Subsequently, it highlights several underlying factors contributing to information leakage before recommending a multi-layered approach that offers overlapping protection to mitigate information leakage. This approach is delivered in the form of a combination of education, training and awareness of security issues, information systems policies (ISPs) coupled with data leakage protection (DLP) technologies that can be put in place to enforce these policies.

"Great deal of information is already being gathered about each of us, by private companies as well as government agencies, and we often have no ideas how it is used or whether it is accurate."

Bill Gates, 1996.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of personal computers and the Internet has transcended into online social networking (SN). In the early days of the Internet, bulletin boards and Usenet newsgroups were the basic forms of online forums for users with similar interests to share and discuss information. However, the SN services nowadays are much more advanced as it capitalises on web-based technology to turn communication into highly accessible interactive dialogue. This latest communication phenomenon has rapidly developed from a growing concept aimed primarily at teen computer users with an effective means of communication platform in building and maintaining relationships with like-minded individuals. It has even become accepted as a business-critical tool to build partner relationships, market products and services, provide support as well as foster customer loyalty. For example, SN sites such as Facebook, Twitter,

LinkedIn, Wikipedia, YouTube and MySpace provide the communication platform for users to connect with friends, co-workers, business associates, family members and others share information, pictures, video-clips, status updates, participate in discussions and much more.

In short, online SN has quickly found its way from the living room into the corporate boardroom. Some of these SN sites have taken the Internet by storm. Both Facebook and Twitter are among the leading SN services which have millions of members from around the globe. Consequently, it has caught many Information Technology (IT) administrators off-guard and forcing them to implement policies and procedures to govern the use of SN in the workplace. Unfortunately, SN is also common with security and privacy issues which pose a challenge for organisations trying to balance off the risks it can pose to network and information security.

Hence, this essay explores the phenomenon of information leakage through the use of SN sites. It defines the term information leakage, followed by a brief discussion on the functionalities of SN and its corresponding potential problems to organisations. Subsequently, it highlights the implications of information leakage and factors contributing to such phenomenon. Finally, it suggests the steps to mitigate information leakage among employees through the use of SN application.

WHAT IS INFORMATION LEAKAGE?

With the advent of “always-connected” environment through the availability of online SN applications, it has blurred the traditional lines between work and personal life. This is particularly so as younger generations of employees use the same technologies in the office as at home. In addition, popular SN sites such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn have created a false sense of familiarity and intimacy over the cyberspace. Consequently, many people are inclined to share either confidential or work-related information resulting in information leakage or unauthorised disclosure of information.

Thus, the Information Security Forum defined information leakage as “a breach of the confidentiality of information usually originating from employees within an organisation, resulting in internal information being disclosed into the public domain (ISF, 2007).” It can be caused by both malicious and non-malicious insiders of an organisation. The latter is considered a much greater problem simply because accidental security incidents happen more often and have greater potential for harm than malicious insider attacks (Colwill, 2010).

Meanwhile, academic literatures have indicated that information can be leaked through various channels, such as, email, short messaging system, twittering, face-to-face conversation, printing facilities and even ubiquitous portable data devices. Among these channels, online SN is perceived as the most challenging channel of information leakage which is becoming increasingly difficult for organisations to control. This is due to the fact that information leakage through SN creates an opportunity for cybercriminals to do surveillance and gather intelligence, sabotage organisations’ networks using malware or utilise resources to launch attacks through the SN applications on these sites. Besides that, the moment employees post sensitive information on their

sites, the published information is almost permanent and can spread like wild-fire. It can be reached instantly by many people and possibly copied and distributed to many thousands more.

SOCIAL NETWORKING FUNCTIONALITIES AND ITS CORRESPONDING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Nowadays, it is rather common for typical SN sites having functionalities such as status updates, friends’ requests, link to other websites or third party applications, photo and video uploads. However, these user-friendly functionalities have become potential avenues of information leakage resulting in detrimental impacts on organisations. The accessibility of SN by anyone, anywhere, at anytime, using any device allows users to update their status on every occasion. As a result, confidential or work-related information may be inadvertently revealed in the public domain where by cyber criminals can collect, collate and make deductions from confidential information in order to carry out cyber espionage or sabotage on the targeted organisation.

In addition, carelessness in accepting friends’ requests could also result in potential attackers instead of “friends”. These so called “friends” will be able to constantly monitor the employees’ activities within the organisation, which will eventually allow them to obtain employees’ credentials for accessing the corporate networks and steal valuable information. On the other hand, unrestricted photograph and video uploading will allow everyone to view photos and videos that are potentially sensitive to individuals or organisations. For example, the sex videos involving local politicians like Dato’ Sri Dr Chua Soi Lek and Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim. Such insensitive actions could allow cybercriminals to collect sensitive valuable information or cause embarrassment to the individuals or organisations.

Similarly, accessing third-party applications or simply clicking on the links while using the SN sites may result in malware infecting the employee’s computer. Subsequently, this compromised computer will allow cybercriminals to gain access to monitor or steal intellectual property, confidential information or even sabotage the organisation’s networks. As many employees engage on SN as their daily Internet activities, these SN sites become the primary focus for cybercriminals to launch attacks on individuals and organisations through social engineering, spams, phishing and malware. Hence,

online SN sites have become the most challenging channel of information leakage due to the difficulty of managing organisational information that could be disclosed through employees' sites while accessing the social media applications.

IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE

In today's globalised environment, we cannot deny that online SN sites, such as, Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn have dramatically transformed the way people interact with others on a global scale. These sites are indeed very effective tools for communication. They have reshaped the way companies advertise and promote their brands, distribute their products and services as well as expanding their reach to customers. If it is used properly, it can allow individuals and organisations to stay engaged with a large number of people simultaneously. For example, a status update posted by an individual can be shared instantly with thousands of members connected to the same social network. This is certainly a great way of disseminating information. On the other hand, it also poses a detrimental risk that sensitive information or confidential data can be leaked with much greater speed and efficiency as well. As reported in the media, there have been some high profile cases of employees leaking confidential and sensitive information through SN.

The British Broadcasting Corporation reported that Israeli military personnel exposed the location and time of an upcoming raid in his Facebook status update causing the entire operation to be cancelled (BBC, 2010). Similarly, employees of the British Ministry of Defence exposed military secrets to the public via Facebook and Twitter a total of sixteen times in eighteen months (Mansfield, 2010). This leaked information will certainly benefit the adversaries but at the same time it can cause detrimental effects to the organisation concerned.

Thus, irresponsible use of online SN can have detrimental impacts on organisations in terms of putting the organisation's entire network and information systems at risk of malware, leading to loss of financial revenue and productivity as well as potential lawsuits due to defamation or copyright infringements. Additionally, it will also cause significant damages to the organisation's reputation and loss of customers' trust. Nowadays, cybercriminals are not so interested to bring down corporate networks. They prefer to remain in the network to steal information with the aim to leave the originals intact (Dorothy, 1999).

These cybercriminals will use the information available in the public domain via social media to gather as much information on some key individuals before launching spear-phishing techniques to obtain credentials for accessing the valuable information. This form of covert cyber espionage is not new, but it is growing rapidly due to the proliferation of online SN.

Hence, government agencies and private organisations need to pay particular attention to the use of online SN among their employees. During the opening ceremony of Infosecurity World Exhibition and Conference 2012, Datin Paduka Seri Rosmah stressed that the public now has to contend with concerns over information in the social media sphere, which can be used as tools to destroy reputations (The Star, 22 March 2012). She highlighted that more than 70,000 new threats are discovered daily and 25.5 million threats are found annually. She also mentioned that groups like 'Anonymous' and 'LulzSec' have also demonstrated how once highly inaccessible information can now be easily penetrated by external parties who may have economic or political agendas. As a result, government agencies and private organisations cannot rely entirely on technology controls to overcome this problem since it involves human vulnerabilities. Consequently, the organisation concerned needs to implement well-enforced information security policies, coupled with security education, training and awareness programs.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INFORMATION LEAKAGE

Meanwhile, the phenomenon of information leakage among employees through the use of online SN sites either intentionally or inadvertently is basically driven by several underlying factors. First and foremost, the attitude of individuals and organisations towards online SN is based on its perceived usefulness, ease of use and the compatibility of the use of their values, experience and needs. Everyone recognises that individuals need to maintain a close relationship and share information with their friends while organisations could use the SN media to introduce new products and enhance its reach to customers. Similarly, employees could use the SN platforms to solve work-related problems by soliciting for advice or seeking assistance from their friends. In his annual lecture series, the Chief Secretary to the Government, Tan Sri Mohd Sidek Hassan encouraged civil servants and academia to use digital media to engage people in order to serve them better (Mohd Sidek Hassan,

2012). This is because the digital media is complemented by SN technology which gives those in the fifth estate power to influence and shape many people's attitudes. Despite the usefulness of SN, it has its drawbacks of security as cybercriminals can easily launch attacks on target individuals or organisations. They can easily use social engineering techniques to befriend key employees, collect information about their organisations, invite the employees to use an application that covertly implant a worm, backdoors or Trojans to gain greater access into the organisation's network.

Another contributing factor is the pressure or social influence from peers or superiors, which plays a great role in users' participation in using SN. This is mainly due to the perceived fact that online SN is the trend today and not participating in it may be considered as outdated. However, being influenced or pressured into using the SN media could contribute to negative impacts on organisations, such as additional strain on the corporate bandwidth, loss of productivity and future revenues. More seriously, it could cause damage to an organisation's reputation and render it being exposed to cyber espionage as well as sabotage.

In addition, self-efficacy of the user and the facilitating conditions in terms of resources and technology made available by the organisation is another contributing factor. Employees will take advantage of the facilities available during working hours. This rather unethical behaviour will affect the productivity output. However, organisations can easily overcome this by placing a ban on the use of SN media during working hours by implementing preventive security systems on their corporate networks. This technological approach may address the organisational productivity issue but the employees are still able to access the SN sites using other devices such as smart phones. The "always-connected" situation allows the employees to constantly access the SN applications and inadvertently release intellectual property, work-related or private information to the public domain.

In short, the understanding these underlying factors will assist IT security managers to propose some steps to deal with the information leakage dilemmas.

STEPS TO MITIGATE INFORMATION LEAKAGE

Due to the pervasive use of ubiquitous mobile devices among employees to access SN sites, managing information is indeed a very challenging task. More so, the IT manager has to ensure that confidential or sensitive data do not find its way outside an organisation. In addition, he or she has to make sure that only the right people have access to data when and where they need it. This task of managing users' access rights will not only require well defined corporate information policies but also necessitates technology to assist.

Quite often, there have been incidents where we could see sensitive and highly confidential information removed from government or private sector organisations and spread over the Internet for the whole world to view. These information leak scandals show that the policies in place were either inadequate or the protection technology in place failed to prevent the incidents from occurring or both. However, information security can be compromised in many ways simply because many staffs use ubiquitous portable devices such as tablet PC, laptops, Universal Serial Bus drives, compact disc and other media, including paper to move information around. The situation is made worse where information can be photographed or even videoed easily using mobile phones. A classic example is the National Feedlot Corporation scandal whereby disgruntled staffs were suspected to have leaked financial information to the opposition political party (The Star, 23 Jan 2012).

Unfortunately, the sad truth is that there is no "silver bullet" solution that will solve the information leakage dilemmas. Hence, the best solution is similar to any form of security, namely, a multi-layered approach that offers levels of overlapping protection. This approach should be delivered in the form of a combination of education, training and awareness of security issues, organisational policies coupled with technology that can be put in place to enforce them.

As discussed earlier, the contributing factors leading to information leakage is centred on users' attitudes and behaviour. Therefore, organisations should focus on the human factor whereby technological preventive security systems alone are rather ineffective to address the issue. Firstly, organisations should embark on information security education, training and awareness address the information leakage issue. The rationale behind such an approach is to improve the organisational information security by providing employees with knowledge, skills and alertness respectively. Employees who are entrusted with information security responsibilities should be given security education to equip them with in-depth knowledge to help design, implement and operate information security programs within their organisations.

Meanwhile, security training should be designed to develop employees' skills to perform their job using information systems more secure. It will further enhance their perceptions of vulnerability and severity of information security threats. Additionally, security awareness programs will further strengthen employees' awareness to protect the organisation's information system resources. The awareness programs will ensure the employees' understanding of information security responsibilities, organisational policies and proper use of IT resources entrusted to them. As a result, the awareness initiatives will result in more mindful SN attitudes and behaviour while posting status updates, accepting friends' requests or clicking on links.

However, this very first step in mitigating information leakage is a continuous task whereby IT security managers must think of innovative ways to keep employees aware and alert of their responsibilities to protect the organisational information at all times. Consequently, it may require more resources to promote awareness through security talks, posters, printed reminders, newsletters and others. Besides that, in order for such an initiative to be successfully implemented, it requires support from the management and participation from all levels within the organisation. Additionally, it is also imperative that organisations must make it clear to their employees about the consequences of information leakage. If such incidents occur, organisations may suffer huge financial losses, loss of customers' trust and

damage to corporate reputations which in turn will cause employees to lose their jobs. Hopefully, by understanding the consequences of their actions, organisations will be able to mitigate information leakage from occurring either intentionally or inadvertently while using online SN.

Besides education, training and awareness, organisations must also develop a comprehensive, well-documented information security policies (ISPs) to complement the initial effort. It must clearly define the security classification of information for employees to understand how to handle the types of confidential and non-confidential information. Additionally, the ISPs must specify the rules of the acceptable use of online SN functionalities in order to ensure integrity, confidentiality and availability of information at all times. Therefore, the ISPs need to be properly designed, documented, implemented, enforced and reviewed periodically to ensure its effectiveness. On the other hand, employees' compliance to ISPs is usually very much determined by their understanding, attitudes and beliefs about the consequences and severity of the security breaches.

Hence, in order to have a successful implementation and good governance of the ISPs, it requires a comprehensive awareness program to ensure that the guidelines are well communicated to, understood and adhered by all levels of employees at all times. Additionally, the Malaysian Government has recently passed a Personal Data Protection Act which was enforced in June 2010 (Abu Bakar Munir, 2010). The act covers seven principles, namely, general, notice and choice, disclosure, security, retention, data integrity and access. This act is aimed at protecting the subject or individuals who own the data. Similar acts have also been legislated in other Asian nations, including South Korea and Taiwan.

In terms of technology, there are many aspects involved in securing information. More and more organisations are relying on data loss prevention (DLP) measures to avoid or minimise the adverse effects of end-users' carelessness. The most popular DLP approach is encryption of sensitive information on laptops, removable media such as thumb-drives and backup tapes. As part of a proactive information security strategy, many organisations are consolidating their electronic assets into database management systems (DBMS). Therefore,

database encryption is critical to the data protection strategy because the information is maintained in the database. Hence, DBMS will provide the mechanism for encryption, monitoring and blocking of activities as well as ensuring proper authentication and access controls so that only authorised users have access to specific data.

Over and above encryption, organisations are increasing the use of web content filtering, web site certification and accreditation as well as secure browsers. These preventive security systems are used to implement access controls to classified information, monitor as well as block employees' postings on the SN applications. Besides that, it is also able to restrict the use of chat functions and access to third-party applications. Additionally, these tools can be configured to designate some SN sites as out of bounds. Likewise, the British MoD's main computer network doesn't allow access to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter for security reasons (Mansfield, 2010).

Despite these preventive security systems' ability to restrict access to organisation networks, it is unable to change human attitudes and behaviour. Computer savvy employees are less deterred by such tools simply because they can manoeuvre their way through the system. Another drawback here is that the preventive security systems can be very costly to implement and maintain. Furthermore, whilst cybercriminals may be stopped by the use of such technological defence, the threat coming from the direct actions of insiders are less suitable for the use of software defence. In summary, organisations should put more emphasis and focus in the human factor via security education, training and awareness programs coupled with good comprehensive ISPs.

CONCLUSION

The advent of online SN applications is rapidly exploding from a nascent concept for teen computing to an effective means of communication platform for both individuals and organisations alike. Consequently, it has become the most challenging channel for information leakage amongst employees through the use of SN sites like Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. Nowadays, most

SN sites have typical user-friendly functionalities like status updates, friends' requests, link to other websites or third-party applications as well as photo and video uploads. Carelessness in SN attitude and behaviour while interacting with such functionalities can cause detrimental and damaging impacts on organisations. Additionally, it allows cybercriminals to launch attacks on individuals and organisations through social engineering, spams, phishing and malware.

Meanwhile, irresponsible use of online SN can have serious impacts on the organisation's entire network and information systems. It could lead to loss of productivity, potential lawsuits due to defamation or copyright infringements, damage to an organisation's reputation and loss of customers' trust. Additionally, the phenomenon of information leakage among employees through the use of online SN sites is basically driven by several underlying factors like attitudes, social influence from peers or superiors and self-efficacy coupled with facilitating conditions in terms of resources and technology. Understanding these contributing factors will assist IT security managers to propose cost-effective solutions to deal with information leakage.

Finally, in mitigating information leakage, there are no "silver bullet" solutions to solve users' information access dilemmas. Hence, a multi-layered approach that offers levels of overlapping protection is required. What is needed is a comprehensive cost-effective solution to minimise the risk of data being leaked or compromised. Thus, information security education, training and individual awareness, ISPs as well as DLP technologies combined will provide an intuitive and cost-effective solution for monitoring outbound communications and ensuring that sensitive information stays within the network where it belongs. The insider threat is becoming a pressing concern for many organisations as existing controls have quickly grown obsolete and insufficient. Hence, closing the gap between ISPs and employees' attitudes and behaviour require much more emphasis on communicating policies and training employees on what the policies meant relative to their job functions and tighten areas that were rarely being monitored before.

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Kol Muhammad Ariff Soo was commissioned into the Royal Ordnance Corps on 1st Nov 1985 after graduating with a Bachelor of Science (Hons) in Computation from UMIST, UK as an Armed Forces scholar. In addition to his first degree, he possesses a Master of Science in Software Engineering and a Master of Social Science in Defence Studies, both from UKM. He is also a graduate of Philippine Command and General Staff College and the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College. He has served in various appointments like Staff Officer 2 at Ordnance Directorate, Commanding Officer of 73 BOD, Malacca and Staff Officer 1 at the Second Division Headquarters, Penang. Currently, he is heading the Army Inventory Management Systems (AIMS) Project Team.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE IN LAND BATTLE

By: Brig Jen Dato' M. Zaki Wan Mahmood (R)

–SYNOPSIS–

Utilisations of unmanned aerial vehicles by the military forces in operations have been on the rise. They were initially used for surveillance and reconnaissance. With similar on-board sensors they are also found to be suitable for targeting and damage assessment. Latest development is that these unmanned platforms are being fitted with various types of arsenals, from machine guns to missiles. They are easy to develop, versatile in modification and deployment, cheap to procure and maintain and simple to operate, very suitable for use by army in battle.

INTRODUCTION

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have been in military service since World War 2. Currently UAV are being used by many militaries of the world, especially those of major powers. They are mainly used as airborne platforms to carry sensors for intelligence gathering. Currently they are fitted with weapons. They are more effective, and in some cases, more suitable than piloted aircrafts. Presently the United States and Israel are countries most advanced in UAV development, whilst British Forces do have UAV organisations. Singapore forces are believed to have hundreds of UAV. Many world military leaders believe UAV are world military weapons of the future.

Use of UAV have increased in recent years. Initially during the World War 2 UAV were used to toe targets for anti aircraft firing practices. Later, they were frequently used for intelligence gathering and observing enemy activities. In recent years, especially towards the end of the last century militaries started to use UAV for delivery of bombs and platforms for firing at ground and airborne targets. Lately UAV are beginning to be used by civilians for commercial applications such as for monitoring, supervising, security and property business and development ventures. These uses of UAV by civilians and commercials are logical progressions since they are

simple to deploy and cheap to operate, yet able to deliver similar or better results than piloted platforms.

Uses of UAV for security and surveillance are most suitable, especially if the area involved is dangerous, because of rugged earth surface or because of unpredictable weather, as in some parts of Malaysia. Malaysia, with large areas of jungle and sea, is most appropriate to use UAV for surveillance jobs. In future UAV will be best friends of army formations and units during peace time operations, and more so during war time. This paper looks into the potential of UAV applications by the army.

CONCEPT OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) USAGE

Use of UAV by Military. Many militaries of the world favour the use of UAV, possibly based on the following usage concept:

- More efficient information gathering from combat zone.
- Reduce risk of losing operators or operators being captured.
- Reduce cost of procuring and maintenance.
- Easier and safer than normal aircrafts for dangerous missions.

e. Primary roles: reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.

f. Secondary roles: communications, signals intelligence, detect mines and effect of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

g. Effective support for the following functions:

- 1) Intelligence preparation of the battle field.
- 2) Situation development.
- 3) Battle management.
- 4) Battle damage assessment.
- 5) Rear area security.

Current Military Uses. It is observed that in present day military operations of major powers usage of UAV are most likely to be as follows:

- a. Intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.
- b. Strike at ground targets.
- c. Resupply.
- d. Combat search and rescue.
- e. Refuelling.
- f. Air combat.

Examples of United States Military UAV. In the chart below are some examples of UAV types, characteristics and payloads, in service with the United States forces:

UAV Producing Countries. UAV is so easy to produce, so much so that most universities and colleges have UAV making projects. Some UAV are produced in very small versions and flown as toys by children. According to internet sources there are 51 countries that produce UAV. Some of these countries are mentioned here, with number of models produced as shown. They are: Argentina:9; Australia:25; Brazil:25; Canada:15; China:38; France:12; Germany:19; Greece:11; Iran:14; Israel:39; Singapore: 5; South Africa:5; Spain:12; Turkey:19; Thailand:2; United Arab Emirate:3; United Kingdom:39; and United States of America:96.

Name/Quantity in Service	Weight	Speed/ Endurance	Range/ Height	Load
Global Hawk (large) 20	3,851 kg, (loaded 10,387 kg)	800km/hr, 36 hrs,	25,000km, 20km	SAR, EO/IR, Intelligence for worldwide mil op
Sentinel (medium, stealth)	takeoff weight 3,863kg	464 km/h	10,000km, ceiling 15.24km	EO/IR sensor, radar for IR, strike missions & EW
Reaper (medium) 57	Max payload 1730 kg	480 km/hr	5,000km, 15.3km	Hellfire missiles, 500 lb laser guided bomb
Predator, (medium) 360	512 kg, (loaded: 1,020 kg)	217km/hr, 24 hrs,	1100 km, 7.62 km	Cameras, sensors, two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or others
Scan Eagle (small) (bought by Malaysia)	16 kg (loaded 22kg)	80km/hr, 15 hr	Ceiling 3km	SAR (2 lb), High Res day/night camera & thermal imager
Raven (mini, hand launch) 9000	1.9kg	Endurance 60–90 min,	Op radius 10 km	Colour video, IR & night vision camera

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) OPERATION

UAV Definition. Wikipedia¹ describes UAV as, “unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), known as drone, is a machine which functions either by the remote control of a pilot or autonomously, as a self-directing entity.” US Dept of Def defines UAV as “powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload”.² Autonomous flying is having UAV controlled by flight data preloaded in UAV on-board computer. Diagram in figure 1 below shows an example of how UAV product of Marcus Zephyr is operated.




Figure 1: UAV Operation.

Take Off and Landing. There are two types of UAV, helicopter (rotary wing) and fixed wing types. The helicopter type takes off and lands vertically like an ordinary helicopter. The fixed wing UAV takes off by being launched by hand, catapulted, released from a moving vehicle or takes off from a runway like an ordinary aeroplane. Its landing is by net trapping, using parachute,

or landing on a miniature runway under the control of a pilot on the ground. Flight endurance depends on battery or fuel tank capacity, from 10 minutes to hours. A battery operated UAV may fly for up to 30 minutes. Each flight can be initiated in a short time, without much pre-flight preparation.

Payload. Payload carried by a UAV depends on UAV size. Normal payloads are cameras and sensors. There are military UAV that carry bombs, missiles and machine guns. UAV are equipped with engines, control computer and receivers to receive flight

Instructions. When required it may carry transmitters to transmit data from cameras and sensors down to ground stations.

Information Acquisition. Information from cameras and sensors on board a UAV is obtainable after it has landed. If information is required immediately, the UAV will be fitted with a transmitter to send down digital images of information from the UAV cameras and sensors to a ground processing station, where data will then be processed into visual pictures or videos. With the use of a UAV, information is obtained quickly, accurately and at a low cost, without risking lives.

Safety. Safety assurance is necessary for any UAV flight so that it does not endanger other aircrafts in flights and it does not drop from the air, endangering lives and properties on the ground. UAV flight security measures are as follows:

- UAV flights require prior approval from Department of Civil Aviation.
- Height of UAV flight is controlled
- Ground control is able to take over control from an autonomous flight.
- UAV flight is always being monitored by a qualified pilot.

Security. Military UAV in flight is exposed to enemy offensive actions. The enemy may shoot it down, as done by Israel in April 2013, bringing down an unidentified UAV over its air space.³ The most desired enemy action is to take over control of the UAV flight computer and steer it down as carried out by the Iranians in November 2011, bringing down in Iran one US RQ-170 Sentinel UAV.⁴

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unmanned_aerial_vehicle .

² U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2012

³ Reports The Daily Telegraph on 27 Apr 2013.

⁴ Published by Fox News.com on 5 Dec 2011.

SUITABILITY FOR ARMY

Battle field. UAV is suitable for army battle fields, to assist commanders and staff in the following situations:

- a. Wide area. Battle fields to be observed are normally vast.
- b. Land surface. Land surface is with mountains, hills and jungle.
- c. Continuous surveillance. Surveillance under all conditions, day and night.
- d. Risk from enemy fire. Manned vehicles endanger operators.
- e. Rear security. Rear of own unit or formation needs to be closely watched.

Command and Control Benefit. Information received in real time from UAV will assist commanders to command and control activities in battle fields and to derive sound decisions. The army is ever on the alert and actions need to be decisive and timely.

UAV Suitability. There are combat air missions that cannot be carried out by UAV, such as troop lift and resupply. However there are missions which are most suited for UAV to perform, such as those mentioned above. Given below are some factors why UAV are more suitable than normal aircrafts and helicopters:

- a. Lower initial cost, as well as cost of operation and maintenance.
- b. Ease of transportation and deployment into battle fields.
- c. Short pre flight preparation.
- d. Combat missions without risk to pilot's life.
- e. Quiet and difficult to detect its presence in the air.
- f. Mission possible in high risk situation from enemy and weather.
- g. Able to approach enemy rear and sides for intelligence and destruction.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) IN FOUR PHASES OF LAND WARFARE

Advantages. Primary usage of UAV in the army is likely to be for clear, accurate and real time information gathering, by having varieties of cameras and sensors on board, and have it flying round the clock over a battle field. Highly in demand battle field information is transmitted in real time to ground station.

These UAV are easily transported to any part of a battle field. The smaller ones may be at the front most, facing the enemy. Their ease of deployment, operation and maintenance as well as their low cost to buy and to operate, make them most suitable for army battle field applications. Training of soldiers to operate and maintain is easily done, especially at locally. These UAV are like toys to the soldiers. Some examples of surveillance and communications support, not exhaustive though, the army may use in four phases of land warfare, are briefly mentioned below.

Advance.

- a. Information to prepare plan for main and secondary routes.
- b. Detect enemy locations and possible threat from rear, in front and flanks.
- c. Detect obstacles and likely enemy reserve demolition.
- d. Airborne communications rebroadcast and relay stations.
- e. Signal intelligence gathering stations.

Attack.

- a. Detect enemy defences, reserves, obstacles and activities.
- b. Identification and selection of most likely direction of attack.
- c. Damage assessment of preparatory bombardment.
- d. Identify enemy likely withdrawal routes.
- e. Detect locations and routes of counterattack forces.

Defences.

- a. Detect enemy offensive activities.
- b. Early warning of possible enemy offensive actions.
- c. Detect enemy preparatory movement to mount an attack.
- d. Locate and identify enemy reserve forces.
- e. Direct fire from artillery, mortar, fighter aircrafts and naval ships.

Withdrawal.

- a. Rear and flanking protection.
- b. Demolition and reserve demolition control.
- c. Prevent from being cut off by enemy.
- d. Communications rebroadcast and relay stations.
- e. Carry electronic jammer equipment.

Additional Uses. Other than those uses mentioned above UAV may also be used to perform some offensive tasks, with some modifications to the UAV. These tasks are as follows:

- a. Dropping bombs.
- b. Shooting ground and airborne targets.
- c. Delivery of missiles.
- d. Dropping smoke bombs to form smoke screens.
- e. Dropping markers for airborne operations.

PROCUREMENT

Lease. For peace time uses the army may opt for leased UAV services from some local UAV companies. Cost of leased UAV services may be quoted in two different methods, as follows:

- a. **By Project.** To obtain specific current information or picture in a given requirement.

- b. **By Period.** Such as for border surveillance or monitor specific activity for a specified period of time.

Purchase. For uses in four phases of land warfare and for additional and offensive applications the army may have to buy UAV. Those for sale are normally unmanned aerial system (UAS). Each UAS constitutes some three or four UAV, one ground control station, support equipment and some spares. Operators, analyst and maintenance personnel will be trained by the supplier.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) TYPES

Local Products. Locally produced UAV are mostly preferred. Continuous UAV supply, maintenance, training and supply of spares are assured. In situations of emergency and during war time the army is assured of uninterrupted support from the supplier. Mounting of army preferred sensors and modification for armament fittings are always possible with local suppliers, which may be impossible with foreign suppliers. These UAV however, must be proven and suitable for army use. Mentioned here are three possible types and sizes of UAV most likely suitable for army use in battle fields.

Helicopter Type. Small UAV helicopter type, as in figure 2 below, using electric quad-rotor, two UAV units operating under one ground control system, are suitable for an infantry company or similar army sub-units. Each weighs 400 gram may be easily carried into battle field

and quickly deployable. Battery powered, it is quiet, suitable to be used by troops in the forward edge of battle area. With an endurance of up to 20 minutes at a height of 150 meters, able to fly within one kilometre range. With day or night camera on board it is able to record or transmit information to the ground. Its operation is either by autonomous flying or being fully controlled by a pilot through its ground control system.



Figure 2: Helicopter type UAV and its ground control system.

Small Fixed Wing. A small UAV, shown in figure 3 below, weighs about three kilogram, with a payload of 200 grams, can support an infantry battalion or a regiment of combat support unit. It is battery powered, quick and easy to deploy, quiet and is launched by hand and does its landing under the control of a pilot. Its endurance of 40 minutes is able to cover a range of 5 kilometres.



Figure 3: Small fixed wing UAV and its ground control system.

Medium Fixed Wing. Medium size UAV, as shown in figure 4, is about two to three meters long, as well as its width. It is made from composite material, light but strong, able to fly autonomously, as well as able to be reprogrammed in flight. Telemetry data and pictures are transmitted to a ground station in real time. Normally one ground station is able to control up to four UAV simultaneously. Each UAV weighs about 20 kilograms, including three kilograms of load. Its operational range is about 60 kilometres with endurance of four to six hours. Military payload that it is expected to carry may include data link modem, forward looking camera, normal camera, synthetic aperture radar, laser designator, infrared and temperature detection equipment. These medium size UAV systems are suitable for deployment at supporting units of formation headquarters of brigade, division and corps.



Figure 4: Medium fixed wing UAV and its ground control system.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

Apart from the above-mentioned applications of basic UAV in land warfare, it is wise to look at what possible future uses of UAV will be. The US which has more UAV flying than any other nation or combined total of all other nations of the world, is providing more fund for research into 'bigger payloads and operate with greater stealth', reports Time magazine⁵. The report says 'drones are getting more powerful, more accurate and a lot smaller'. Scopes for future developments are likely to be as follows:

- a. Improve stealth: better radar absorbing coating and electronic defence for better chance flying through hostile airspace.
- b. More power: better engine for more speed and load. Next generation Predator or jet-powered Avenger will have speed of 800km/hr.
- c. Better communication link: more bandwidth for robust and secure link to ground controls and to other UAV, will improve awareness for better decision making over battle fields.
- d. Better intelligence: sensors with better images, fast data acquisition and efficient analysis.
- e. Increase destruction: Avenger, latest UAV, carries 900 kg bomb, 4 times of that carried by Reaper.
- f. Greater accuracy: missiles to carry inertial measurement units enable to attack targets at rear. UAVs will use new radar and laser imaging for accuracy.

⁵ Time, January 9, 2012, Stealth Army, pg 25.

FUTURE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)

From basic local UAV mentioned above the army can have initiative with the support of local industry and research centres to proceed into development of future battle field UAV. Malaysian army needs will not be the same as those needed by the US, but the six US future development scopes can be used as guidance by Malaysia. In the meantime organisational changes may need to be put in place in the army. Each level of combat organisation will need UAV units and manpower. Not to be too far left behind by other armies, immediate applications of UAV by the army will be as identified above.

Man power development will have to be high on the priority list. These qualified personnel will lead the army into the future for UAV development. Knowledge advancement can be in the form of formal tertiary education and attachment with local industry in actual development of UAV and its related subjects.

CONCLUSION

UAV has long been used by militaries, other government agencies and commerce and industry of developed nations. Its usage has advanced to fulfil multi military and civilian roles and is expected to further multiply. More militaries, government agencies and commercial sector will be using UAV in the immediate future. They are cheap, easy to deploy, safe and more efficient than normal aircrafts and helicopters. Planning and execution of defence, security and development programmes will be more effective and assured with the use of UAV.

Militaries are really in need of UAV, as alternatives to planes and helicopters, to be used where they are suitable. Using UAV is much cheaper, easy and safer to human being compared to planes and helicopters. For army operations and land battles UAV units may be brought to battle fields and to most forward front lines close to the enemy. Combat situational picture is more assured to be available to the army at all times with the support of UAV.

For army use local UAV are preferred. Local producers will offer better support to the army. Their cost will be much cheaper, meeting user specifications, remained serviceable with local maintenance and troops remain current in their training at local vendor sites.

Operational and technical support from local industry is assured, even in battle fields or during emergency. Modifications for offensive applications can be easily materialised. Effectiveness and product enhancement

are continuously being carried out. With the support of the army these capabilities and knowledge with the local industry can be shared with the army and retain in country, as well as being kept improving and remain relevant.

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5. Time magazine 9 Jan 2012, Stealth Army, pg 25.



Brig Jen Dato' M. Zaki Wan Mahmood (B) was in the Royal Malaysian Signal Regiment for 35 years. He retired in 2000. Now he is a senior principal consultant with System Consultancy Services Sdn Bhd. His last two military assignments was in the Defence Intelligence Staff Division as the head of Electronic Warfare Branch and in the Malaysian Armed Forces Headquarters as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications and Electronics. In those two positions he was responsible for the development, procurement, concepts, doctrines, operations, procedures, training and management of communications, electronics, electronic warfare, information technology and technical support facilities. In the present company he is still involved and current in all those activities, including the unmanned aerial vehicle development.

STRATEGI LAUTAN BIRU KEBANGSAAN TRANSFORMASI TENTERA DARAT DI DALAM PELAKSANAAN HASRAT KERAJAAN

oleh Kapt Mohd Asraf Bin Abd Kabir

-SINOPSIS-

Tentera Darat (TD) telah melakukan anjakan paradigma dalam memastikan organisasi ini bergerak maju seiring dengan kemajuan yang dicapai Negara. Pemodenan aset TD dan program merakyatkan tentera Your Army: 1 Angkatan Tetap Gagah Tetap Setia merupakan antara wacana TD di dalam menyahut seruan kerajaan. Tahun 2011 menyaksikan sekali lagi TD berkolaborasi dengan agensi keselamatan yang lain di dalam menjayakan aspirasi kerajaan hasil cetusan idea Yang Amat Berhormat Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Dato' Seri Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak iaitu Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan atau lebih dikenali dengan National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS). Esei ini menerangkan implikasi dan impak yang diterima oleh TD khususnya sebagai sebuah organisasi yang terlibat secara langsung di dalam menjayakan Misi Nasional ini.

PENDAHULUAN

Malaysia telah menjalani proses transformasi yang panjang dan berliku untuk berada dalam keadaan sekarang. Dalam tempoh lima dekad yang penuh mencabar ini, Negara telah menggapai kejayaan demi kejayaan yang menakjubkan. Hakikatnya ketika banyak pihak sibuk menulis belasungkawa yang berinspirasi imajinatif, Negara kita berjaya mengesima ketidakpercayaan serta kesinisan mereka. Rakyat Malaysia kini boleh berbangga dengan kepimpinan yang mapan serta persekitaran yang kondusif membolehkan Malaysia yang dahulunya sebuah Negara Pertanian berpendapatan rendah yang hanya bergantung kepada hasil getah dan bijih timah kini telah muncul menjadi sebuah Negara Perindustrian berpendapatan sederhana tinggi dengan asas ekonomi yang mantap.

Kejayaan yang digarap ini bukan datang bergolek dalam angan-angan tanpa perancangan mahupun tanpa usaha, sebaliknya ia adalah hasil gigih kepimpinan kerajaan berwawasan dengan sokongan padu rakyat

sejak merdeka. Dalam hal ini, Kita amat terhutang budi kepada kepimpinan Negara dan generasi terdahulu kerana natijahnya kita telah membuat lonjakan di atas tapak yang telah dibina oleh mereka dengan segala jerih payah dan pengorbanan yang begitu besar. Secara sedar ataupun tidak, dua Rancangan Malaya, sepuluh Rancangan Malaysia, tiga Rangka Rancangan Jangka Panjang dan satu Misi Nasional telah dan sedang dilalui sehingga kita tiba di pusingan pada hari ini¹.

Bertitik tolak dari kejayaan itu, Tentera Darat (TD) telah melakukan anjakan paradigma dalam memastikan organisasi ini bergerak maju seiring dengan kemajuan yang dicapai Negara. Pemodenan aset TD dan program merakyatkan tentera *Your Army: 1 Angkatan Tetap Gagah Tetap Setia* merupakan antara wacana TD di dalam menyahut seruan kerajaan. Tahun 2011 menyaksikan sekali lagi TD berkolaborasi dengan agensi keselamatan yang lain di dalam menjayakan aspirasi kerajaan hasil cetusan idea Yang Amat Berhormat Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Dato' Seri Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak iaitu Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan atau lebih dikenali dengan *National Blue Ocean Strategy* (NBOS).

¹ Petikan Ucapan Pembentangan Rancangan Malaysia Ke-10 Oleh Perdana Menteri Malaysia pada 10 Jun 2010.

STRATEGI LAUTAN BIRU (BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY)

Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan atau *National Blue Ocean Strategy* (NBOS) telah diadaptasi dari teori yang dihasilkan oleh dua ilmunan terkenal iaitu W. Chan Kim dan Renée Mauborgne dari Blue Ocean Strategy Institute yang berpangkalan di INSEAD (*Institut européen d'administration des affaires*)². Metafora dari lautan merah dan biru menggambarkan ekologi semasa setiap persekitaran (pasaran) yang wujud. Organisasi di dalam teori ini digambarkan sebagai sebuah syarikat tidak kira sama ada kecil atau besar manakala lautan digambarkan sebagai pasaran produk. Ianya juga membayangkan hal-hal yang berkaitan produk seperti saingan, kos dan sebagainya.


Red Ocean Strategy	Blue Ocean Strategy
Compete in existing market space	Create uncontested market space
Beat the competition	Make the competition irrelevant
Exploit existing demand	Create and capture new demand
Make the value-cost trade-off	Break the value-cost trade-off
Align the whole system of a company's activities with its strategic choice of differentiation or low cost	Align the whole system of a company's activities in pursuit of differentiation and low cost

Gambaran perbezaan Strategi Lautan Merah dan Strategi Lautan Biru

Lautan Merah digambarkan sebagai satu keadaan atau persekitaran yang telah dikenalpasti dan wujud pada waktu ini dimana persekitaran di dalam Lautan Merah telah ditakrifkan melalui peraturan dan limitasi tertentu. Di dalam persekitaran ini, individu atau organisasi tertentu cuba untuk menewaskan lawan masing-masing dengan mengambil bahagian atau keuntungan yang lebih besar dari permintaan produk atau perkhidmatan. Keadaan ini akan menyebabkan prospek pasaran menjadi sesak manakala prospek keuntungan dan pertumbuhan berkurangan. Produk atau perkhidmatan yang ditawarkan menjadi komoditi atau *niche*³. Keadaan ini akan mewujudkan persaingan melalui cara yang kotor seperti kronisme, birokrasi yang menyebabkan keadaan

seperti ini digambarkan seperti di dalam Lautan Merah. Hanya organisasi atau individu tertentu sahaja yang mendapat keuntungan manakala yang selebihnya ditindas.

Lautan Biru pula digambarkan sebagai satu persekitaran yang kontra dan berlawanan dengan Lautan Merah dimana keadaan pasaran yang terbuka, tidak tercemar oleh persaingan dan bersifat kompetitif. Persekitaran di dalam Lautan Biru berkonsepkan penyediaan permintaan dan bukannya perebutan permintaan⁴. Ianya secara tidak langsung mencipta banyak peluang untuk pertumbuhan yang bersifat menguntungkan dan *Fast Growing*. Konsep di dalam Lautan Biru menekankan peluang yang terbuka kepada semua pihak dan konsep persaingan adalah tidak relevan kerana peraturan atau limitasi yang menunggu untuk ditetapkan. Biru laut adalah sebuah analogi untuk menggambarkan Persekitaran atau keadaan yang terbuka dan lebih luas, lebih dalam potensi ruangan pasaran yang belum diterokai serta tidak bersifat keuntungan pada sebelah pihak sahaja. Terdapat beberapa tools untuk menghasilkan output atau produk yang mantap di dalam strategi yang dibangunkan oleh profesor W. Chan Kim dan Renée Mauborgne. Proses-proses yang perlu dilalui untuk menilai keberkesanan sesuatu hasil atau output adalah melalui Nilai Inovasi (*Value Innovation*) iaitu mengejar serentak pembezaan dan kos yang rendah. Proses ini merupakan *analytical tools* yang utama untuk proses analisis seperti Kanvas Strategi (*Strategy Canvas*), Rangka Kerja Empat Tindakan (*Four Framework Path*) dan grid Menghapuskan-Mengurangkan-Meningkatkan-Mewujudkan (*eliminate-reduce-raise-create-grid*)⁵.



GAMBARAN PROSES BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY


² INSEAD, Wikipedia.org (en.wikipedia.org)

³ PDF Blue Ocean Strategy, W.Chan Kim dan Renee Mauborgne, www.blueoceanstrategy.com.

⁴ Part 1: Creating Blue Ocean, Blue Ocean Strategy, W.Chan Kim dan Renee Mauborgne, m/s

⁵ Part 1: Creating Blue Ocean, Blue Ocean Strategy, W.Chan Kim dan Renee Mauborgne, m/s 36.

Bahagian seterusnya menerangkan empat prinsip penggubalan strategi lautan biru iaitu bagaimana untuk mewujudkan ruang pasaran tanpa bertanding dengan membina semula sempadan pasaran, memberi tumpuan kepada gambaran yang lebih besar, penguasaan melebihi permintaan yang sedia ada dan mendapatkan urutan strategik. Keempat-empat prinsip penggubalan ini menggambarkan kitaran proses bagaimana organisasi boleh mencipta lautan biru menerusi perspektif merentasi enam sempadan konvensional (*Six Paths Framework*) iaitu mengurangkan risiko perancangan dengan pengadaptasian empat langkah-langkah penghasilan strategi (*Visual Creation*), mewujudkan permintaan baru dengan membuka tiga peringkat noncustomers serta mencanangkan idea komersial lautan biru yang berdaya maju dengan menjajarkan utiliti yang pernah berlaku sebelum ini yang menawarkan *value* atau nilai yang strategik dan berharga dengan mengatasi halangan sedia ada.



Empat Prinsip Penggubalan Strategi Lautan Biru

PELAKSANAAN STRATEGI LAUTAN BIRU KEBANGSAAN (NBOS)

Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan (NBOS) merangkumi tiga bahagian yang melibatkan Polis DiRaja Malaysia (PDRM) dan TD sebagai peneraju utama di samping penglibatan dari agensi kerajaan yang lain. Pelaksanaan projek NBOS yang pertama (NBOS 1) melibatkan PDRM secara total di mana aktiviti menugaskan semula pegawai PDRM berpangkat ASP ke dalam lapangan dimana tugas hakiki PDRM untuk menjaga keselamatan dalam negeri. Ia juga melibatkan penarikan keluar Pasukan Gerakan Am (PGA) dari pos-pos sempadan terutama secara khusus di kawasan Op WAWASAN dan Op NYAH 1⁶.

⁶ Laman Web Rasmi PDRM, www.rmp.gov.my.

Projek NBOS yang kedua pula telah dibahagikan kepada lima bahagian iaitu Rondaan Bersama ATM dan PDRM di bandar-bandar utama atau *Hotspot* seperti Taiping, Ipoh, Seremban, Port Dickson dan Kota Bharu. Rondaan ini dilaksanakan secara berjalan kaki dan kenderaan, sekatan jalanraya dan pengiring. Rondaan dilaksanakan pada waktu siang sahaja dengan nisbah 2(PDRM):1(ATM) terdiri daripada KPTD dan Polis Rejimen. Aturgerak anggota tersebut akan ditugaskan kepada Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah (IPD) yang berkenaan di bawah kawalan operasi (*Operational Control*) Ketua Polis Daerah (OCPD). Aturgerak rondaan bersama ini juga diselarasakan oleh MK Medan TD dan dibantu oleh Provos Marshal TD serta Jabatanarah KPTD⁷. Rondaan bersama ini turut dijalankan di Lapangan Terbang Utama Malaysia iaitu di Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA).

Keduanya ialah *JUNGLE GREEN* iaitu pengambilalihan tugas operasi di kawasan Op WAWASAN dan Op NYAH I yang melibatkan Op WAWASAN Kelantan, Op WAWASAN Kedah/ Perlis bagi mencegah pencerobohan, penyeludupan dan kemasukan PTI di kawasan Tanggungjawab (KTJ) tersebut⁸. Pelaksanaan tugas operasi ini adalah secara rondaan jalan kaki, rondaan motosikal, serkap hendap dan pos pemerhati.

Penggunaan kemudahan Pusat Latihan ATM bagi pelaksanaan kursus asas polis merupakan projek ketiga yang melibatkan dua buah Pusat Latihan ATM iaitu PUSASDA di Port Dickson dan PULAREK di Tanjung Pengelih. Penggunaan projek ini telah bermula pada 18 Jan 11 hingga 2014. Setiap siri pengambilan akan mengambil masa 6 bulan tempoh latihan.

Projek keempat pula melibatkan kerjasama Jabatan Penjara Malaysia dan Tentera Darat iaitu pembinaan Pusat Pemulihan Pemasarakatan (PPP) di kem tentera. Program ini bertujuan mengurangkan kesesakan di penjara selain melibatkan Orang Yang Diselia (ODS) dalam kerja-kerja kemasyarakatan. Untuk program ini, banduan akan ditempatkan di dalam kem-kem yang dikenali sebagai Confinement Area. ODS yang terlibat akan melaksanakan kerja-kerja senggaraan kem di luar bangunan seperti memotong rumput dan mencuci longkang serta tambahan menternak ikan air tawar dan

⁷ Petikan Akhbar Utusan Malaysia, "Rondaan ATM-PDRM Diperluas", 29 Julai 2011.

⁸ Petikan Akhbar Sinar Harian, "ATM Serah Semula Tugas Op NYAH 1 Kepada PDRM", 1 Januari 2012.

menanam sayuran di Kem Syed Sirajudin sahaja. Keuntungan hasil jualan akan diagihkan kepada kementerian terlibat, Tabung Kebajikan Rejimen (TKR), Akaun Amanah Penjara dan Yayasan Veteran⁹.

Perdana Menteri Malaysia, YAB Dato' Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak pernah menyatakan bahawa ini merupakan sesuatu yang amat unik dan berkemungkinan satu-satunya yang wujud di dunia¹⁰. Menerusi program ini, kerajaan telah memperuntukkan kos pembinaan sebanyak RM 4.5 juta untuk setiap pusat pemulihan bagi menempatkan banduan atau lebih dikenali dengan panggilan Orang Yang Diselia (ODS) yang ditahan kerana melakukan kesalahan-kesalahan ringan.

Bekas tentera untuk menyertai PDRM merupakan projek kelima yang melibatkan bekas tentera yang berkecualan akan dilantik sebagai konstabel polis dengan umur tidak melebihi 40 tahun. Di antara tred yang ditawarkan adalah pemandu, semboyan, AMRA, Mekanik, Tugas Am, Pasukan Gerakan Am (PGA) dan lain-lain penugasan berkaitan. Latihan penyesuaian akan mengambil masa 3 bulan dan diselenggarakan oleh Pusat Latihan Polis Kuala Kubu Bharu, Selangor. Setakat ini, seramai 2,626 orang pesara telah memohon melalui Jabatan Hal Ehwal Veteran (JHEV)¹¹.

Projek NBOS yang ketiga (NBOS 3) telah melibatkan kerjasama di antara Kementerian Pertahanan, Kementerian Luar Bandar dan Wilayah (KKBW), Kementerian Dalam Negeri (KDN) dan Kementerian Sumber Manusia (KSM). NBOS 3 terbahagi kepada dua bahagian iaitu Projek Program Bantuan rumah (PBR) dan program Bekalan Air Luar Bandar (BALB). PBR melibatkan rumah kumpulan sasar yang telah dikenalpasti oleh *Focus Group* dan dikonsolidasi bersama KKLW. Sejumlah 1,160 buah rumah dikategorikan sebagai bina baru dan 652 buah rumah perlu dibaikpulih¹².

Program BALB pula memperuntukkan pengenpastian kawasan-kawasan di 12 daerah di Sarawak yang menggunakan *Gravity Feed System* (GFS). TD berperanan di dalam membantu KKM dan masyarakat setempat melaksanakan kerja dalam konsep gotong-royong.

OUTCOME STRATEGI LAUTAN BIRU KEBANGSAAN KEPADA TENTERA DARAT

Semua pelan projek NBOS yang dilaksanakan ini telah diasimilasikan dengan pelan pembangunan hala tuju Kerajaan iaitu Program Transformasi Kerajaan (GTP) dengan berprinsipkan 1 Malaysia, Rakyat didahulukan, Pencapaian diutamakan¹³. Program Transformasi Kerajaan ini telah digembleng melalui perincian objektif, keberhasilan dan set tindakan permulaan dalam bidang yang dikenalpasti sebagai Bidang Keberhasilan Utama Negara (NKRA) dan Bidang Keberhasilan Utama Kementerian (MKRA).

MEREALISASIKAN BIDANG KEBERHASILAN UTAMA NEGARA NKRA NEGARA

NKRA merupakan gabungan keutamaan jangka masa pendek untuk menangani keperluan rakyat. Enam NKRA telah diputuskan oleh Kabinet iaitu mengurangkan jenayah (Kementerian Dalam Negeri), membanteras rasuah (Bahagian Undang-Undang, Jabatan Perdana Menteri), mempertingkatkan pencapaian pendidikan (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia), mempertingkatkan taraf kehidupan isirumah berpendapatan rendah (Kementerian Pembangunan Wanita, Keluarga dan Masyarakat), mempertingkatkan infrastruktur asas luar bandar (Kementerian Luar Bandar dan Wilayah) dan memperbaiki pengangkutan awam bandar (Kementerian Pengangkutan)¹⁴. TD dengan erti kata lain telah menjenamakan ATM ke peringkat yang lebih tinggi dengan sumbangan dan bantuan yang dihulurkan sejajar dengan konsep yang diterapkan iaitu *Your Army: 1 Angkatan Tetap Gagah Tetap Setia*.

⁹ Artikel "Program Pemulihan Pemasarakatan", 29 Mac 11, www.army.gov.my.

¹⁰ Petikan Ucapan Perdana Menteri Malaysia Pada Anugerah Inovasi Perdana Menteri 2010, PICC Putrajaya, 31 Mei 2011.

¹¹ Artikel "Kerajaan Beri Dua Kelonggaran Untuk Tarik Bekas Tentera Sertai Polis", 18 April 2011, pnr.penerangan.gov.my.


¹² Petikan Artikel "RM 3.9 Juta Untuk Teruskan PBR Di Luar Bandar Serian", 19 Februari 2012, Sarawak.gov.my.

¹³ Petikan Artikel TKRA-1, www.scrib.com, M/S 1.

¹⁴ Petikan Artikel "Enam Bidang Keberhasilan Utama Negara", 27 Julai 2009, pnr.penerangan.gov.my.

**Infrastruktur
Luar Bandar**

783.1

 km jalan raya
telah dibina

36, 273

 isi rumah mendapat
bekalan air bersih

27,266

 isi rumah mendapat
bekalan elektrik

16,962

 rumah dibina dan
dibaik pulih

**Mengubah
kehidupan
2 juta rakyat**
(di kawasan luar bandar)

Laporan GTP 2010: Infrastruktur Luar Bandar Hasil Program NBOS 3

MENGURANGKAN KOS PERBELANJAAN NEGARA

PDRM dan TD telah mengambil pendekatan yang unik di dalam merealisasikan NKRA dimana penerapan pendekatan *Blue Ocean Strategy* di dalam program yang dijalankan diantara dua Kementerian iaitu Kementerian Pertahanan dan Kementerian Dalam Negeri dijangka dapat memastikan objektif di dalam NKRA tercapai¹⁵. Pendekatan *Blue Ocean Strategy* yang menerapkan pemikiran di luar kebiasaan ini digunakan dengan sebaiknya oleh TD khususnya dengan menampilkan beberapa pendekatan yang telah menunjukkan impak yang dapat dilihat iaitu melalui kerjasama strategik PDRM - ATM yang telah berjaya menunjukkan penurunan insiden jenayah dari 203,930 (2009) kepada 176,459 (2010) iaitu

13.9% berbanding sasaran 5% NKRA. Selain itu, kerjasama antara kedua agensi ini juga telah berjaya menjimatkan kos secara ketara iaitu sebanyak RM449 juta bagi pembinaan pusat latihan, emolumen, logistik, makan dan penyelenggaraan untuk tempoh lima tahun berbanding perkongsian sumber latihan secara strategik yang hanya melibatkan perbelanjaan sebanyak RM58 juta sahaja¹⁶.

PENGOPTIMUMAN PENGGUNAAN SUMBER TENAGA KERJA DAN MATERIAL

Melalui kerjasama yang terjalin erat di antara Kementerian ini telah dapat membantu dalam mengoptimumkan penggunaan sumber masing-masing dan dapat memastikan ia digunakan secara efisien dan berkesan serta menjimatkan perbelanjaan melalui

¹⁵ Petikan Artikel "Agensi Kerajaan Perlu Terap Strategi Lautan Biru Capai Objektif NKRA" 26 Mac 2011, Portal 1malaysia.com.my.

¹⁶ Petikan Artikel "Penerima AIPM 2010-Kerjasama Strategik PDRM dan ATM", 6 Ogos 11, www.mampu.gov.my.

tenaga kerja, prasarana dan kemudahan yang ada secara konsep gunasama. Ianya juga mengaplikasikan cara-cara yang kreatif dan inovatif dengan kos yang minimum menjadi pemangkin di dalam penjimatan penggunaan dari segi tenaga kerja dan material. Projek ini adalah selaras dengan Program Transformasi Kerajaan (GTP) yang bertujuan mengoptimumkan penggunaan sumber bagi mencapai impak lebih tinggi dalam melaksanakan program pembangunan kerajaan.

Kolaborasi di antara tiga kementerian ini telah menjalin simpulan atau bonding yang unik dari segi integrasi dan pemuafakatan kerana kerjasama seperti ini tidak pernah wujud dalam mana-mana organisasi mahupun kerajaan di dunia ini. Perdana Menteri menyatakan bahawa kerjasama di antara Kementerian Pertahanan, Kementerian Dalam Negeri dan Kementerian Pertanian & Industri Asas Tani merupakan satu kerjasama yang unik kerana kerana kepakaran dan penggunaan aset gunasama yang dimiliki mampu menjana *outcome* yang baik dan menguntungkan negara seperti yang dicanang melalui pendekatan *Blue Ocean Strategy*¹⁷.

KERJASAMA DUA HALA ANTARA KEMENTERIAN

Hasil daripada kombinasi idea tersebut membolehkan kedua-dua Kementerian ini merangkul Anugerah Inovasi Perdana Menteri 2010 pada 31 Mei 2011¹⁸. Ini membuktikan kolaborasi di antara kementerian telah mencerna *outcome* yang baik dan berkesan di dalam mengaplikasikan dasar-dasar kerajaan.

Di samping itu juga, program ini telah memecah tembok bekerja dalam silo masing-masing antara agensi kerajaan dimana kerjasama sebagai satu pasukan diterapkan bagi mencapai satu tujuan. Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Dato Seri Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak menyatakan “Sebelum ini Kementerian Dalam Negeri dan Kementerian Pertahanan terutamanya polis, tentera dan jabatan penjara dilihat menjaga kubu masing-masing dengan secara cemburu”. Setiap agensi yang terlibat mempunyai kepakaran yang tersendiri. Kerjasama dan semangat berpasukan adalah penting bagi mengoptimumkan sumber tenaga, kepakaran dan kewangan untuk menjayakan pelan transformasi.

PELAKSANAAN KONSEP HANRUH

Perlaksanaan projek ini juga membantu di dalam melaksanakan Pertahanan Menyeluruh (HANRUH). HANRUH dapat didefinisikan sebagai satu bentuk pertahanan yang melibatkan secara menyeluruh dan bersepadu agensi-agensi kerajaan, sektor swasta, badan-badan bukan kerajaan serta rakyat jelata dalam mempertahankan kedaulatan dan keutuhan negara. Oleh yang demikian konsep HANRUH ini tidak terbatas mengenai isu pertahanan atau unsur ketenteraan tetapi sebagai elemen yang menerapkan konsep keselamatan negara secara lebih luas dan *universal*¹⁹.

Untuk mewujudkan kondisi ini, ciri-ciri berikut perlu diberi penekanan dan dipupuk di kalangan setiap lapisan masyarakat seperti mengamalkan sikap penyayang, toleransi, mengamalkan sikap permuafakatan, berkongsi matlamat dan wawasan yang sama, mengamalkan nilai-nilai murni dan menghormati perbezaan agama.

Perlaksanaan komponen ini perlu selari dengan komponen-komponen HANRUH yang lain. Oleh yang demikian, perlaksanaan komponen ini perlu dipupuk dari awal untuk melahirkan persefahaman dan toleransi dalam kepelbagaian nilai dan budaya lain. Komponen ini memainkan peranan penting dalam menjamin perpaduan dan integrasi nasional agar tetap utuh dan tidak terancam. Setiap individu dan agensi-agensi seharusnya memahami bahawa setiap apa yang diperkatakan di atas adalah demi keutuhan Negara tanpa mengira kepentingan individu, perbezaan sosio budaya, ideologi dan kelompok-kelompok tertentu²⁰.

¹⁷ Petikan Ucapan YAB Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak Sempena Anugerah Inovasi Perdana Menteri (AIPM) 2010, 31 Mei 2011.

¹⁸ Petikan Artikel “Penerima AIPM 2010-Kerjasama Strategik PDRM dan ATM”, 6 Ogos 11, www.mampu.gov.my.

¹⁹ Petikan Artikel “HANRUH”, Portal Rasmi Majlis Keselamatan Negara, www.mkn.gov.my.

²⁰ Petikan Artikel “HANRUH”, Portal Rasmi Majlis Keselamatan Negara, www.mkn.gov.my.

Situasi Menang-Menang (*Win-Win Situation*)

KONTINJEN	JENAYAH INDEKS				JENAYAH JALANAN			
	JAN 2010 - SEPT. 2010	JAN 2011 - SEPT. 2011	+ / -	%	JAN 2009 - SEPT. 2009	JAN 2011 - SEPT. 2011	+ / -	%
KUALA LUMPUR	21,277	18,869	-2,408	-11.3	8,389	4,940	-3,449	-41.1
SELANGOR	36,914	33,814	-3,100	-8.4	8,284	5,062	-3,222	-38.9
JOHOR	16,145	15,635	-510	-3.2	4,133	2,275	-1,858	-45.0
PULAU PINANG	9,755	7,354	-2,401	-24.6	1,891	823	-1,068	-56.5
KEDAH	8,816	8,330	-486	-5.5	1,140	824	-316	-27.7
KELANTAN	5,408	4,596	-812	-15.0	451	316	-135	-29.9
MELAKA	4,014	3,600	-414	-10.3	395	365	-30	-7.6
NEGERI SEMBILAN	4,948	4,660	-288	-5.8	1,061	890	-171	-16.1
PAHANG	4,658	4,577	-81	-1.7	423	223	-200	-47.3
PERAK	8,343	7,387	-956	-11.5	1,591	1,084	-507	-31.9
TERENGGANU	3,118	2,771	-347	-11.1	204	188	-16	-7.8
SABAH	2,775	2,127	-648	-23.4	681	158	-523	-76.8
SARAWAK	5,500	4,774	-726	-13.2	939	395	-544	-57.9
PERLIS	684	882	198	28.9	14	48	34	242.9
MALAYSIA	132,355	119,376	-12,979	-9.8	29,596	17,591	-12,005	-40.6
4 KONTINJEN HOT SPOT	84,091	75,672	-8,419	-10.0	22,697	13,100	-9,597	-42.3

Statistik Jenayah Yang Menunjukkan Penurunan Selepas NBOS 1 Dilaksanakan²¹

Berdasarkan rasional ini adalah penting bagi setiap individu dan agensi diberi kesedaran berkenaan peranan dan tanggungjawab masing-masing dalam memastikan keutuhan serta kedaulatan negara terjamin dan berada dalam keadaan aman. Di dalam mengaplikasikan konsep HANRUH, pendekatan *Blue Ocean Strategy* dilihat sebagai salah satu tool yang dapat menjayakan program ini. Situasi menang-menang (*win-win situation*) di antara agensi-agensi kementerian yang terlibat membantu di dalam merealisasikan dasar Keberhasilan Utama Negara (NKRA). Selain dari itu, Pengasingan banduan jenayah ringan dan banduan tegar dapat dilakukan dan proses integrasi banduan jenayah ringan supaya tidak terjebak dengan banduan tegar mampu dilaksanakan dengan berkesan.

MEREALISASIKAN YOUR ARMY: 1 ANGKATAN, TETAP GAGAH TETAP SETIA

Panglima Tentera Darat Ke-24, Jeneral Datuk Haji Zulkifli bin Haji Zainal Abidin di dalam Perintah Ulungnya menegaskan demi mengekalkan relevansi dan keunggulan TD, beberapa aspek perlu diambil kira bagi mengekalkan kelangsungan tersebut iaitu melalui aspek Anjakan Paradigma yang menjelaskan pengukuhan pemikiran luar kotak beserta dengan kematangan akal budi ketenteraan yang menjadi faktor utama bagi

menyahut cabaran suasana semasa dan akan datang yang rawan dan mudahubah. Justeru penerapan teori dan konsep Strategi Lautan Biru dan *Big Think Strategy* perlu disesuaikan serta dijadikan panduan kepada transformasi TD yang inklusif²².

Bertitik tolak daripada itu, TD memandang ke hadapan dengan menjadikan Strategi Lautan Biru sebagai Tool bagi menggerakkan aspirasi Kerajaan. Perkara ini telah menjadikan TD sebagai sebuah organisasi teras dalam ATM sebagai major player Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan dengan Kementerian yang lain. Ianya sekaligus telah mengangkat martabat TD di mata masyarakat sebagai sebuah organisasi yang prihatin dan berdedikasi dengan keperluan semasa.

PENUTUP

Transformasi yang dilaksanakan ini pasti berdepan dengan sedikit halangan untuk dilaksanakan. Idea yang dianggap pelik atau tidak masuk akal, masyarakat pasti mempersoalkan keberkesanan program ini tetapi dengan penyampaian yang disertakan dengan data dan fakta yang tepat serta meyakinkan, masyarakat akan mendapat pemahaman yang sewajarnya. Jika disulusuri secara rambang, idea yang dicetuskan ini seakan-akan satu wawasan yang tidak relevan dan merugikan semata-mata kerana ia mencampuradukkan penugasan serta tanggungjawab pasukan beruniform terhadap tugas-tugas komuniti seperti ini. Situasi ini diadun juga bersama stigma masyarakat yang negatif terhadap usaha murni kerajaan tetapi sekiranya diperhalusi, program ini sebenarnya memberi impak yang lebih besar kepada negara amnya dan TD khususnya kerana Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan juga menyentuh perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan aspek sosial dan *lifestyle* seperti pembentukan dan keperibadian bangsa, moral dan etika, kebudayaan kebangsaan, pembangunan sumber manusia dan lain-lain.

Strategi Lautan Biru Kebangsaan bukanlah pendekatan yang sekadar untuk dilauung-laungkan dan dibangga-banggakan tetapi ianya lebih merupakan rangka kerja tindakan *framework of action* bagi setiap individu dan agensi di negara ini untuk berani berfikir di luar kotak serta mengambil pendekatan yang luar biasa dan unik bagi memastikan Malaysia menjadi negara yang dihuni masyarakat yang mempunyai mentaliti kelas satu serta benar-benar maju dan makmur. Dalam konteks ini,

²¹ Statistik Jenayah Berakhir Sept 2011, Laman Web PDRM, www.rmp.gov.my.

²² Petikan Perintah Ulung Panglima Tentera Darat Ke-24, 16 Jun 2011, army.mod.gov.my.

pendekatan yang diambil oleh Kementerian-kementerian dan TD amnya telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa transformasi yang dilaksanakan adalah sejajar dengan hasrat kerajaan. Ianya juga telah berjaya menaksirkan

bahawa perancangan yang pragmatik dan inovatif mampu mencerna *outcome* yang produktif dan dinamik dalam membentuk sebuah angkatan yang kredibel dan responsif dengan arus pembangunan semasa.

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9. Portal Rasmi MAMPU www.mampu.gov.my.
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Kapt Mohd Asraf bin Abd Kahar memasuki tentera pada 24 Apr 2001 dan telah ditauliahkan dalam Kor Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja pada 28 Sep 2005. Beliau merupakan Pegawai Tauliah Jangka Pendek (Tugas Am). Kini beliau telah diberi kepercayaan untuk menjawat jawatan PS 3 Operasi Bantuan (C) di MK TD Cawangan OPLAT.

NOTA UNTUK PENULIS

- * Had Panjang Artikel. Disyorkan panjang artikel diantara 3,000 hingga 6,000 patah perkataan dan menggunakan font Arial, saiz 12. Artikel tersebut hendaklah bertaip dengan baris dua jarak yang menggunakan kertas A4. Dua salinan berbentuk *soft copy* atau CD di sertakan.
- * Sinopsis. Setiap artikel sekurang-kurangnya mempunyai sinopsis ringkas tidak melebihi 100 patah perkataan yang mengandungi pendapat-pendapat utama dalam artikel dan kepentingannya sebagai tambahan kepada pengetahuan sedia ada atau analisis yang disertakan sebelum artikel dikemukakan.
- * Kandungan Utama. Format penulisan berbentuk penulisan akademik atau tugas turus. Sila rujuk mana-mana keluaran US Army Military Review atau British Army Review sebagai panduan. Pembahagian utama kandungan mestilah ditandakan dan tajuk kecil di mana yang bersesuaian. Tajuk kecil, tajuk buku, dan perkataan dari bahasa asing hendaklah digariskan. Tarikh dituliskan sedemikian: 21 Mac 1980; Khamis, 20 Januari 1992. Nombor 1 hingga sepuluh dieja dan angka yang lebih tinggi dengan nombor.
- * Nota Kaki dan Rujukan. Nota kaki boleh ditulis dengan ringkas dan bilangannya dihadkan. Ia ditulis di atas kertas berasingan, disusun mengikut abjad dan ditaip dengan dua jarak seperti di Para 6.
- * Butir-butir Peribadi Penulis. Perkara ini dihadkan kepada aspek-aspek seperti kelayakan dan/atau pengalaman yang dapat menyokong kebenaran dan keaslian artikel. Butir-butir ini ditulis dalam satu perenggan ringkas sepanjang tiga atau empat baris yang tidak melebihi 100 patah perkataan. Gambar berukuran pasport juga dilekatkan bersama.
- * Tajuk dan Nama Jurnal. Tajuk dan nama jurnal, tempat dan tahun dicetak hendaklah disertakan. Bentuk keseluruhannya seperti contoh-contoh di bawah:

Cady, John F. *South Asia: Its Historical Development*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1964.

Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 5, November 1963, p.64.

New Straits Times; 16 Jun 1960.

- * Jadual dan Gambarajah. Digunakan secara terhad di tempat yang sepatutnya diletakkan. Jadual dan gambarajah mestilah jelas dan dicetak dua kali ganda lebih besar daripada saiz sebenarnya.
- * Gambar. Penulis juga dikehendaki menyertakan gambar-gambar yang ada kaitan dengan artikel yang ditulis. Gambar yang disertakan mestilah gambar asal bagi membolehkan gambar dicetak dengan jelas.

**PERINGATAN: SEMUA ARTIKEL YANG DIMAJUKAN KEPADA
SIDANG REDAKSI MESTILAH PENULISAN SENDIRI DAN
BUKAN BAHAN PLAGIAT.**

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

- * Length of Contribution. The suggested essay is within 3,000 to 6,000 words and uses the font Arial. The article should be in double spacing and using A4 paper.
- * Synopsis. A short paragraph of not more than 100 words indicating the major arguments of the article and its significance as an addition to existing knowledge or analysis should precede the text.
- * Main Text. The format of the text should conform to the norms of academic writing or that of the Service Paper. Please refer to the issues of the US Army Military Review or The British Army Review for guidance. Broad division in the text: should be indicated, and sub-headings supplied where appropriate. Sub-heading, book titles and foreign works should be underlined. Date should be given as: 21 March; 1 April 1980; Thursday, 20 January 1992. Numbers up to ten should be spelt out and higher numbers normally are given as figures.
- * Footnotes and References. Footnotes should be kept as short and as few as possible. They should be submitted on a separate sheet, numbered consecutively throughout and double-spaced as paragraph 6.
- * Particulars of the Author. This should be confined to those aspects of the author's qualification and / or experience, which help to support the authenticity and originality of the contribution. They should be contained in a short paragraph of three or four lines (maximum 100 words). A passport size photograph of the author should also be submitted.
- * Title and Name of Journal. The title, name, place of publication of the journal should be given. The overall form is as shown in the example below:

Cady, John F. *South Asia: Its Historical Development*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1964.

Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 5, November 1963, p.64.

New Straits Times; 16 Jun 1960.

- * Tables and Diagram. These should be used in moderation and each of them is used in separate sheets of paper. The proposed position in the text should be clearly indicated. Diagram should be approximately twice the size of the original block.
- * Photograph. Writers are also to insert photographs which are related to the essay. An original photograph is welcome so as to produce a quality printing.

REMINDER: ALL ARTICLES SUBMITTED TO THIS JOURNAL MUST BE THE ORIGINAL WORK OF THE WRITERS CONCERNED AND NOT PLAGIARISED FROM OTHER SOURCES.





