

SOROTAN DARAT

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


Nor Chehid Dato' Kamaruddin (410318)

Grafik Oleh
Spr Fatah B Sulaiman

Dicetak
Oleh
MAZIZA SDN. BHD.

RESURGENCE OF HF COMMUNICATIONS



LT KOL MUSHARDIN BIN MOHD SAID

This article is based on Jost A. Spielvogel Seminar Paper presented at the Electronics for National Security Exposition in Singapore, January 1985. The article explores the latest improvement programs for HF Communications.

HF COMMUNICATIONS

The use of HF (High Frequency) systems have been with us since the days of Marconi himself, but over the last 20 years or so, has tended to go into decline as other more glamorous systems such as the satellite have been developed. HF communications have some physical drawbacks as a result of the very nature of HF propagation.

HF can be used for short distance communications up to 45 – 50 km using ground wave or long

distance communications using skywave. Due to the presence of reflecting layers at various heights above the atmosphere, skywave propagation is feasible as well and provides communication at distances of thousands of kilometers. Without examining the exact nature of the reflecting layers it should be pointed out that the layers change their properties with sunspot activity, seasons of the year, time of day and frequency of transmission. Thus HF communications become a management problem which includes the prediction of usable frequencies and the geographical

location of transmitter and receiver. As a result of the changing layers we have to expect variations in signal amplitude and phase, which may create a 'fading' channel. The HF spectrum is very crowded with users giving rise to man-made interferences, whether intentional or not, together with natural noise, both of which can seriously limit communications.

For some time it looked as though satellite communications would replace all alternative long-range transmission media. They have however failed to fulfil these hopes. The capital costs per channel are extremely high and not all users need high data rate communications. Furthermore the unconditioned availability in times of crisis or war is more than likely.

To some extent, the disillusion with space communications, combined with advances in HF system-technology, have led to a resurgence of HF communications. The new awakened interest sparked off a fruitful mutual effect. Successful engineering in the industrial laboratories indicated that the potential of HF could be exploited far more than formerly expected. It is not surprising that here again, the microprocessor played a dominant role. The enhanced performance underlined the natural advantages of HF. As a matter of course the user community grew larger and larger thus providing further motivation for even more engineering efforts.

ADVANTAGES OF HF COMMUNICATIONS

It is now a fact, that HF has regained an indispensable role in present communications. HF communications are used as a viable back-up or alternative system at a multitude of levels. Armed forces, national embassies, press agencies, security and intelligence services, air and sea-traffic authorities, they all started programs to improve their HF communications and to make optimum use of the inherent capabilities (Table 1).

Table 1
Advantages
of HF Radio Communications

Long Range Communications without Relays
High Mobility

Suitability for
Ground-based
Airborne
Shipboard Communication
High Survivability
Low Capital Costs

Paramount is the capability of over-the-horizon communications without relays and with relatively low transmitter power output. The latter point is one of the reasons for the potential high mobility of HF radio stations. For tactical operation manpacks and vehicle installations are mainly in use, whereas for strategic communications shelterized or fixed installations are dominant.

In the following, main consideration will be placed on aspects of strategic communication. Propagation characteristics, moderate output power requirement and today's technology make HF radio exceptionally suitable for ground based, airborne, ground-to-air, shipboard and ship-to-shore communications.

Next we have to consider the high survivability, resulting from numerous reasons. Flexible, alternate service is provided by the exceptionally long range of communication. Over-the-horizon transmission can be achieved without relays, thus avoiding radio sites on foreign territory and reducing the number of sites and thus potential targets of physical or electronic attack. Radio sites are quickly set-up and taken-down and can be operated after set-up without local staff. Finally threats by ECM are more difficult to carry out than in the VHF, UHF range.

Capital costs for setting up long range links are low in comparison to radio relay system, cable installation or satellite channels.

Another element of costs is the manpower needed to operate the system. In the past, special and therefore expensive operator expertise was necessary. As well will see, recent developments have overcome this weak point.

DISADVANTAGES OF HF COMMUNICATIONS

The natural characteristics of HF propagation are not all beneficial. A list of unfavourable aspects in the application of HF are given in Table

2. The main efforts for improvement that have to be made, are to wipe off the stigma of a fine weather media. The permanent and only partially predictable variation of the reflecting layers in the innosphere and the high level of natural and man-made noise decrease reliability of communications.

Table 2
Disadvantages
of HF Radio Communications

Propagation Unreliability
Low Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Limited Transmission Capacity
Sensitivity to EW and EMP

The multipath propagation of signal varies with frequency. This limits the usable bandwidth of a transmission channel to about 3 kHz, a severe restriction for digital data communications.

Prior to bringing HF into military service the unquestionable sensitivity to EW (Electronic Warfare) and EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse) must be examined carefully.

Electronic warfare consists of three areas. ESM (Electronic Support Measure) is based on passive activities such as interception of signals to gain intelligence, traffic analysis and direction finding, the latter a means to locate and to attack Communications Centres. ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) uses active methods and is concerned with deception to create confusion and with jamming. Jamming can vary from dedicated channel jamming to general communications interruption through a nuclear burst outside the atmosphere, the latter disturbing the reflecting layers for hours or days.

ECCM (Electronic Counter Measure) must be effective in preventing ESM and ECM. A package of measures is necessary to meet effectively the various threats. To make these measures effective, again improvement programs have started.

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

Essentially, the running improvement programs can be divided into three categories in equipment performance, quality of transmission and security. It is quite natural that the programs interfere with each other, indicating that the task is no longer

to look for select problem solving but to try a system-approach. With this in mind, it is nevertheless useful to examine program by program for a better understanding.

Equipment Performance

Table 3 shows what recent achievements have been made in upgrading the performance of relevant equipment. Reliability has been enhanced by modular design, solid state technology, low power consumption, built in test facilities for permanent monitoring and controlling of all functional elements. Digitally controlled frequency synthesizers in combination with wide-band or self-tuning components greatly facilitate the establishment of reliable communications links, even when made by poorly trained operators and also to achieve fast frequency change when required. For automated system management, remote-control is necessary. Modern equipment provides easy interfacing to remote-control devices. These can be programmed to control a variety of transmitters, receivers, antennas and ancillaries, even though these may come from different manufacturers.

Table 3
Equipment Performances

Recent Achievements

Improved Reliability
Built-in Test and Control Facilities
Digital Frequency Synthesis
Self-tuning Capability
Interface for Remote-Control

Quality of Transmission

A selection of appropriate techniques and procedures to enhance the quality of HF transmission is given in Table 4. Diversity transmission is a method to transmit and/or receive a wanted signal two or more times. Due to the statistical independence of the propagation paths it is quite likely that the received signals will differ from each other. By signal assessment, signal segments with the greatest likelihood of being correct are selected and sequenced.

Table 4
Quality of Transmission

Improvement Potential by:

Diversity Transmission
Modulation Technique
Coding Technique
Transmission Procedure
Communications Management

Basically four different methods exist: space, frequency, polarisation and time diversity. They may be combined. Space, frequency and polarisation diversity are obviously expensive methods, as basic communications equipment must be duplicated.

Less expense is needed for space diversity, employing one transmitter and two or more receivers at different sites. A message compilation unit evaluates by use of complex algorithms the correct signal. If required the unit can be controlled by a communications processor. This method is for example advisable for ship-to-shore communications.

With time diversity the required equipment can be reduced, but it also leads to a reduction of the effective data rate. The diversity processing can be a modem-integrated function, which brings us to improvements about by newly developed modulation techniques. Whereas former on-off keying achieved a transmission rate of 100–200 baud, multitone frequency shift keying and differential phase shift keying modems have become available, providing rates of up to 3600 baud.

Coding technique may be applied by the modem as well. Basically this technique introduces redundancy into the transmitted data. By this redundancy, error detection, or even error correction, can be achieved. The coding method could be combined with bit or word interleaving. The problem with HF propagation lies in the fact that there is not only characteristic error pattern, as for example with switched lines. HF links exhibit burst error and random as well as periodic errors. Coding schemes have developed to meet the above error patterns. If such patterns appear together, multiple coding schemes must be used to provide high-grade error correction.

The selection of appropriate transmission procedures is a further step to establish reliable HF communications. They must employ however half-duplex and full-duplex transmission, because after transmission of a portion of the message to be transmitted, the receiving station answers back, acknowledging either correct or incorrect receipt.

So far we have seen that diversity transmission, modulation and coding technique and transmission procedure can assist greatly in communicating via HF. This great variety may be confusing, on the other hand in real operations, it might be badly reduced because the specified demands can exclude one another.

The advent of the microprocessor has produced a new category of equipment for improving the quality of transmission. On the basis of fixed hardware, programming can be tailored to the needs of a dedicated operational task. As an example the coding schemes for error correction capabilities are no longer fixed but can be selected by the operator individually for each different transmission link or the software program may even optimize automatically the right combination of coding schemes.

Communications Security

Important information is a target for interception, analysis and deception. This is especially true for communications used in the diplomatic, military and security fields. Unprotected HF links are very vulnerable to these threats as a result of their nature of practically undirected, wide-range propagation. To achieve communications security a four-step procedure is recommended. Firstly a user must be aware of the threats. Secondly the operator must communicate with great discipline and as fast as possible. Thirdly cryptographically secure equipment must be integrated into communications. And finally the operations of such cryptographic equipment must not degrade the security. A lot of emphasis is to be placed on effective and safe key management, which comprises the production, registration, distribution and annihilation after use of the sensitive key material. Newly introduced electronic key management methods are a major improvement.

Table 5 is a collection of suitable means to achieve communications security Spread spectrum transmission is one of the recent catchwords, with

frequency hopping being the most prominent among the various methods. In HF Communication the hopping-rate must be rather low in comparison to hopping in the VHF, UHF range, but yet it is still too high for high-power output transmission. Therefore the use of frequency hopping will be limited for the time being to tactical application where output-power is moderate.

Table 5 — Communications Security

Cryptographic protection For:

Spread spectrum Transmission (Frequency Hopping)

Cryptological Base Key Distribution Voice

Scrambling Techniques

Vocoder with HF Modem

Telegraphy

Synchronous cipher System

FEC/ARQ-Support

Text

Burst Transmission

Some remarks to key distribution have already been made. So we can now concentrate on cryptographic equipment designed for HE communications security. Prior to choice of equipment we have to decide upon the nature of information to be transmitted. For protection of voice transmission two different methods exist. The first is to scramble the signal either in the amplitude, the frequency or the time domain. More sophisticated equipment scrambles, for example, in the frequency and time domain and is therefore called two-dimensional. Scrambling techniques are generally characterized by an analogue output signal which firstly still contains portions of the clear input signal and secondly has the same bandwidth as the original signal. The first fact is an indication that the security achieved by scrambling is limited. The second fact permits, in principal, the transmission of a scrambled signal over HF links. Due to the disturbances in HF propagation special measures must be undertaken however, to ensure reliable communications. They concern primarily the method of synchronisation. The appropriate equipment must be designed without any compromise.

The second way for voice security is to digitize the signal. Especially for HF transmission the output signal bandwidth must not be increased, which limits the methods of digitization to so called vocoder techniques. The output bit-rate of a vocoder is approximately 2,400 bps. In combination with already mentioned HF modems communications can be achieved satisfactorily. The security of a vocoder can be better than that of a scrambler. The drawback however is a price up to five times higher. A user has to find the right balance of technical performance of available equipment, operational requirements and costs.

Secure voice communications are mainly used in the tactical environment whereas in strategic applications the use of written information is preferred. The latter is safer against human misunderstanding can be easily recorded. For tactical purposes high-grade scramblers provide enough cover time and give an excellent cost to performance ratio.

For transmitting written information teleprinters are dominantly used up until now. For secure transmission the teleprinter signal must first be enciphered. But again HF communications ask for some special provisions. At the transmitting and the receiving site both cryptographic equipment must be in synchronisation. If they lose this synchronisation the output signal at the receiver will be totally unintelligible. With high-stable clock-systems inside both equipment, propagation disturbances can be bridged for some time. Information will then be lost for the time of disturbance only. If this is not acceptable additional error correcting equipment must be added.

CONCLUSION

After many years of being neglected, HF communications are enjoying a return to popularity. HF has some advantages over other transmission media. The inherent disadvantages have been reduced greatly by a number of improvement programs. And we can still expect further advances.

But there is a price to be paid. The price is uniqueness and complexity. As a result special tools and methods of engineering must be used.

Advance HF communications is a discipline

which slots in between modern, but nevertheless traditional, communications and advanced electronic data processing. What is needed is a

vast expertise in communications, data processing, cryptography operations and the capability for overall system-design and turn-key implementation.

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Lt Col Mushardin Bin Mohd Said was commissioned into the Regiment of Signals in 1968. While in service, he had attended a telecommunication engineering course in the United Kingdom and he is also a graduate of the Staff College, Halgate, Mindef. Currently he is the CO TC Regt; attached to Defence Planning Directorate, Ministry of Defence.

MILITARY DOCTRINE ... A RUSSIAN VIEW

In 1975, Marshal Grechko, then minister of defence of the Soviet Union, described military doctrine as the result of a complex process of development of national perspectives. It is not produced by isolated elaboration of purely military thought. It is, rather, the product of a national synthesis of broader policy goals. He also noted that Soviet doctrine must answer at least the following questions:

- * What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
- * What will be the nature of that war, and what goals and missions might be assigned to the armed forces engaged in it?
- * What forces are needed to accomplish those missions, and what further combat development may be needed to improve capabilities?
- * What steps will be required to prepare for war?
- * How should the war be fought?

— A A Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* (A Soviet View) p. 272

*Antikel
Kulit Muka*

BANTUAN PERKHIDMATAN PERUBATAN DI MEDAN PERANG & PENGLOLAAN KASUALTI KOMBAT

Oleh

*Jabatanarah Perubatan &
Pengisian Angkatan Tentera*




Bantuan Perkhidmatan Perubatan Medan bertujuan memberi khidmat dalam masa secepat mungkin, rawatan dan jagaan yang diperlukan oleh perajurit yang tercedera atau jatuh sakit di medan peperangan. Bantuan ini meliputi segala perkhidmatan yang bersangkutan dengan pengelolaan kasualti tersebut umpamanya, pengambilan dan pemindahan mereka, penempatan mereka di hospital dan pencegahan penyakit.

Matlamat Bantuan Perkhidmatan Perubatan di medan peperangan ialah mengekalkan kekuatan anggota supaya keupayaan tempur unit-unit tidak terjejas begitu sahaja atas sebab kekurangan anggota yang berupaya. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini satu sistem kemudahan rawatan dan pemindahan kasualti telah diadakan untuk mengelola setiap kasualti supaya mereka dapat dipulihkan seberapa segera untuk bertugas semula.

SUSUNAN KEMUDAHAN PERUBATAN

Kemudahan rawatan boleh dibahagikan kepada 4 peringkat. Setiap peringkat selain dari mempunyai keupayaan yang serupa dengan yang di hadapannya, juga mempunyai keupayaan tambahan.

- * **Barisan Pertama.** Ini termasuk semua elemen perubatan yang bertugas di peringkat unit tempur, termasuk pos rawatan rejimen.
- * **Barisan Kedua.** Ini merentang ke belakang dari pos rawatan rejimen hingga ke hospital wilayah dan adalah tanggungjawab Batalion Perubatan. Jika tidak terdapat pasukan perubatan kor, tugas memindahkan kasualti dari hospital hadapan atau hospital medan ke hospital wilayah terletak di batalion perubatan.

RANGKAIAN PEMINDAHAN KASUALTI
DI MEDAN

* **Barisan Ketiga.** Ini mengandungi semua hospital wilayah di luar kawasan tanggungjawab tektikal Divisyen. Di mana talian perhubungan terlalu panjang, sebuah hospital medan untuk kor mungkin didirikan di pertengahan talian perhubungan tersebut.


* **Barisan Keempat.** Bantuan perubatan di peringkat ini bertumpu kepada hospital pengkalan angkatan tentera di mana terdapat kemudahan-kemudahan perubatan tertentu. Ada kalanya hospital di barisan ketiga dibelakangkan dan kasualti dipindahkan terus kehospital pengkalan.

TAHAP PENGELOLAAN PESAKIT

Rawatan pertolongan cemas dilakukan untuk menyelamatkan nyawa apabila anggota perubatan

tidak dapat diperolehi dengan serta merta. Tiap-tiap perajurit adalah diharapkan mengetahui serta yakin untuk melaksanakan pertolongan cemas. Jika tidak, mangsa pertempuran mungkin tidak akan terus hidup sehingga mendapat rawatan perubatan dari seorang yang terlatih. Langkah-langkah menyelamatkan nyawa diperguna untuk mengembalikan pernafasan, denyut jantung, memberhentikan pendarahan dan menegak renjatan (shock) serta jangkitan. Rawatan pertolongan cemas juga memerlukan pelaksanaan langkah-langkah untuk mencegah keadaan kasualti dari menjadi bertambah buruk. Ini termasuk mengamalkan cara-cara yang betul untuk memindahkan kasualti ke lokasi yang lebih selamat sementara menunggu pemindahan atau rawatan perubatan yang lebih positif.

Pengelolaan oleh pembantu perubatan merupa-



kan penjagaan perubatan yang pertama diterima oleh pesakit atau yang cedera dari seorang yang mempunyai latihan pengkhususan perubatan. Pengelolaan oleh Pembantu Perubatan memerlukan cara-cara pemeriksaan yang cekap, mengambil langkah-langkah rawatan kecemasan dan langkah-langkah menyelamatkan nyawa, pengawasan dan penjagaan yang berterusan untuk memastikan agar saluran pernafasan sentiasa terbuka, bahawa pendarahan telah berhenti selanjutnya renjatan, jangkitan serta kecederaan lanjut dicegah. Ia membabitkan penggunaan bahan-bahan perubatan yang tidak terdapat pada perajurit biasa, serta peraturan pemindahan yang sesuai.

Di tahap rawatan perubatan kecemasan, kemahiran perubatan dan perhitungan yang lebih tinggi dipergunakan. Rawatan perubatan ini disediakan di suasana sekeliling, yang secara perbandingan, lebih selamat; agar terdapat waktu untuk melakukan pemeriksaan yang lebih sempurna dan memulakan rancangan rawatan yang mencukupi. Rawatan ini meliputi penggunaan ubat-ubat antibiotik, bendalir melalui cucuk urat; pengawetan saluran pernafasan pesakit dengan cara pembedahan, jika perlu; dan penggunaan pembalut (pembekat) serta tuap yang lebih teguh. Elemen-elemen kelolaan perubatan yang lengkap ini membolehkan pesakit dipindahkan ke tahap rawatan yang diperlukan mengikut keadaan pesakit dan bentuk kecederaannya. Kepada mereka yang tidak dapat dihantar semula untuk bertugas di barisan hadapan, terpaksa difikirkan cara-cara untuk memindahkan mereka. Tahap rawatan seperti ini adalah ciri-ciri pos rawatan rejimen.

Rawatan pemulihan semula dapat dibezakan dengan yang lain melalui cara penggunaan kemahiran dan pendapat oleh sepasukan pakar perubatan. Perkara ini dibantu oleh anggota perubatan lain; kemampuan makmal, ubat-ubatan; peralatan dan pembekalan yang meluas; bendalir cara cucuk urat; termasuk darah; dan kemampuan wad untuk menampung pesakit yang akan menjalani pemeriksaan lebih rapi atau pengawasan yang lebih sempurna. Untuk mereka yang mesti dipindahkan peraturan terpaksa dibuat sama ada melalui pemindahan udara atau darat. Rawatan pemulihan semula ialah untuk pesakit yang keadaannya memerlukan prosedur diagnostik yang lengkap sebelum pembedahan; persediaan intensif

untuk pembedahan; kehadiran pasukan bedah yang berkelayakan; kemampuan untuk memberi ubat bius umum; bilik pembedahan yang mempunyai peralatan yang cukup dan kemudahan rawatan intensif selepas pembedahan. Objektif rawatan ditahap ini ialah melaksanakan prosedur pembedahan kecemasan yang dengan sendirinya merupakan rawatan pemulihan semula. Sebaliknya jika prosedur ini tidak dilakukan, kemungkinan maut akan menimpa atau kehilangan tangan atau kaki ataupun fungsi-fungsi anggota lain. Tahap ini merupakan ciri-ciri hospital hadapan atau hospital medan.

Rawatan muktamad dipersesuaikan kepada keadaan yang tertentu mengenai pesakit. Ia meliputi segala ikhtiar yang boleh menyembuhkan pesakit. Prosedur tertentu dilaksanakan oleh pakar. Rawatan muktamad yang tidak diganggu oleh keadaan pertempuran dapat dilakukan dengan lebih hati-hati dan dengan persiapan yang lebih meluas. Penyempurnaan rawatan ini menggambarkan kesembuhan penyakit dan pengawatan anggota badan serta fungsi-fungsinya kepada had yang maksima. Untuk kebanyakan pesakit, rawatan muktamad merupakan semua tatacara yang perlu diambil agar dapat kembali bertugas dengan sepenuhnya. Bidang rawatan ini memerlukan kemampuan klinikal yang terdapat di hospital yang lengkap keanggotaan serta peralatan dan terletak di lokasi yang tidak terdedah kepada ancaman musuh. Rawatan seperti ini terdapat di hospital-hospital wilayah dan pengkalan utama.

Bantuan perlindungan perubatan ditahap pengelolaan pesakit yang sembuh, memerlukan panduan untuk pesakit, dari masa yang boleh dikatakan ia telah sembuh hingga ke waktu bilamana ia telah mencapai kekuatan fizikal dan stamina yang seimbang, dengan tugas ia akan dipertanggungjawab. Ini membabitkan pertimbangan klinikal mengenai masa yang sesuai, untuk pesakit dihantar bertugas, agar ia tidak dicabar dengan keadaan yang lebih dari keupayaan tenaganya.

Tahap pengelolaan dan rawatan pesakit di medan peperangan telah dibincang dengan menumpukan perhatian kepada kecederaan kombatan. Falsafah yang dilahirkan juga meliputi pesakit yang mengalami masalah lain daripada kecederaan kombatan. Walau bagaimanapun cara-cara menyediakan rawatan untuk masalah yang

ada hubungan dan penyakit berbeza sedikit. Untuk perkara yang kecil-kecil keseluruhan tahap pengelolaan dan rawatan dapat diadakan di peringkat hadapan lagi. Penyimpangan dari prosedur-prosedur biasa mungkin berlaku disebabkan oleh keadaan yang diluar kawalan sistem bantuan perkhidmatan perubatan.

PEMINDAHAN PESAKIT

Pemindahan pesakit ialah satu pergerakan di mana kasualti pertempuran atau pesakit dipindahkan ke tempat yang mempunyai kemudahan rawatan perubatan. Pemindahan pesakit bermula dari lokasi di mana kecederaan berlaku dan diteruskan ke arah belakang. Jauhnya tertakluk kepada keadaan pesakit dan tempat terletaknya kemudahan perubatan yang mampu memberi rawatan untuk pemulihan. Pemindahan pesakit perlu dilakukan dengan cekap, pantas dan tepat pada waktunya.

Walaupun aliran pemindahan pesakit adalah melalui tempat pertama mendapat rawatan perubatan hingga kepada pusat yang lebih rumit di barisan belakang, mana-mana kemudahan perubatan boleh dibelakangkan apabila keadaan pesakit membenarkan dan keupayaan memindah pesakit ujud. Di dalam medan peperangan, pesakit mungkin dipindahkan oleh orang perseorangan,

pasukan usungan, ambulan atau pesawat udara. Dengan tidak mengira cara-cara yang digunakan, pemindahan pesakit di dalam suasana medan peperangan ialah satu tugas yang rumit dan merbahaya. Ia menjadi lebih rumit lagi dengan masalah yang timbul akibat dari cuaca buruk, bukit bukau, jalan-jalanraya yang tidak dapat didekati, kawasan tanah yang tidak rata, pergerakan pasukan sahabat dan tindakan pihak musuh. Menyelaraskan rancangan pemindahan pesakit dengan mereka yang mengendalikan lalu lintas logistik dan taktik adalah penting untuk gerakan pemindahan yang sempurna.

MASS KASUALTI

Istilah mass kasualti tidak hanya terhad kepada kasualti yang ramai bilangannya. Ia juga bermaksud kejadian kasualti beramai-ramai secara serentak atau dalam masa yang singkat yang mengelolakan jumlah pesakit yang memerlukan rawatan jauh melebihi keupayaan pasokan perubatan memberi rawatan. Kemampuan itu berupa menyediakan rawatan yang khas kepada seseorang ataupun pemindahannya. Dalam ertikata yang lain, terdapat jurang perbezaan yang besar antara jumlah pesakit dan sumber-sumber perubatan yang ada, seperti anggota perubatan, ubat-ubat, peralatan, bekalan, cara-cara pemindahan dan masa.



Pemindahan kasualti melalui udara

Dalam ertikata sebenar mass kasualti boleh dikatakan berlaku apabila seorang pembantu perubatan berhadapan dengan dua kasualti yang sama-sama memerlukan perhatian segera. Ini bermakna salah seorang daripada kasualti ini tidak akan mendapat perhatian buat beberapa ketika. Dengan kasualti yang lebih ramai, perbezaan ini akan berlipat ganda; menyebabkan runtuhnya cara-cara rawatan dan pemindahan yang biasa dilaksanakan. Ini mengasingkan masa kasualti dari keadaan masa yang paling sibuk dengan pesakit; sebabnya di situasi kedua tiap-tiap pesakit dapat diberi rawatan secara individu dan cara pemindahan adalah mengikut yang lazim dibuat. Tidak mengindahkan sama ada masa kasualti berlaku pada waktu biasa atau waktu sibuk, pesakit-pesakit yang sedia ada di pusat rawatan, mestilah dikelolakan mengikut prosedur masa kasualti.

Apabila terdapat jumlah pesakit yang melebihi kemampuan sumber-sumber perubatan, pusat-pusat ini mestilah bersedia mengubah taraf dan bidang rawatan perubatan daripada yang biasa disediakan. Pengantian seperti ini, di masa jurang perbezaan, hendaklah sesuai dengan matlamat utama untuk membekalkan kebaikan yang jauh lebih banyak kepada seberapa ramai yang boleh.

Pengasingan (Triage) kepada mass kasualti merupakan penilaian dan pemberian kategori kepada kasualti untuk tujuan rawatan dan pemindahan. Ini akan memudahkan, serta dengan cara yang bermunafaat penggunaan segala sumber perubatan yang ada. Ia akan memastikan matlamat bekalan pembaikan yang jauh lebih banyak kepada seberapa ramai yang boleh. Pengasingan ini diselesaikan dengan sempurna oleh pegawai perubatan yang paling berkelayakan membuat perhitungan klinikal. Perkara ini dilakukan dengan pantas dan bijaksana. Pegawai Perubatan tersebut menyatakan keadaan kasualti, mengikut gelaran kategori yang menentukan berapa segera rawatan patut diberi, dan kemungkinan baginya untuk terus hidup, berdasarkan kepada masalah klinikalnya. Pengasingan yang pantas memastikan bahawa rawatan yang sedia ada ditujukan, mula-mula sekali, kepada kasualti yang mempunyai peluang yang paling baik untuk terus hidup.

Kategori yang dimaksudkan ialah seperti berikut:

a. **Minima.** Kategori untuk pesakit yang mana

prosedur yang ada mudah sudah mencukupi untuk membolehkan ia kembali semula bertugas dalam bentuk yang sesuai. Rawatan susulan mungkin dikehendaki selepas tahap jurang perbezaan tamat. Lebih kurang 40% dari kasualti, biasanya, berada di dalam kategori ini.

b. **Serta merta.** Kategori untuk pesakit yang berkehendakkan rawatan pemulihan semula yang segera. Kategori ini mendapat keutamaan yang tertinggi untuk rawatan. Pada umumnya, prosedur yang digunakan adalah ringkas dan cermat, jika diukur dari sumber-sumber perubatan yang ada. Lebih kurang 20% dari kasualti berada dalam kategori ini.

c. **Penangguhan.** Kategori untuk pesakit yang mana jika prosedur kecemasan sudah dilakukan dengan kadar sederhana, kemungkinan penyakitnya atau kefanannya bertambah sedikit sahaja dengan melambatkan prosedur muktamad, sehingga prosedur ini boleh dilaksanakan di keadaan yang lebih memuaskan. Lebih kurang 20% kasualti berada di dalam kategori ini.

d. **Pengharapan.** Kategori untuk pesakit yang kecederaannya terlalu berat sehinggakan kemungkinan untuk hidup terlalu tipis, walaupun semua sumber-sumber perubatan ditumpukan kepadanya. Matlamat untuk membekalkan kebaikan yang jauh lebih banyak kepada seberapa ramai yang boleh, dikala ujudnya jurang perbezaan perubatan, menetapkan bahawa anggota perubatan mengelola pesakit dalam kategori ini dengan cara berikut:—

- * Berwaspada terhadap perubatan kepada keadaan pesakit.
- * Memberi rawatan mengikut gejala atau tanda.
- * Membantu dengan kata-kata perangsang.

Ini terpaksa dilakukan sehingga beban kerja perubatan membenarkan ia dirawat. Lebih kurang 20% dari kasualti berada di dalam kategori ini.

Walaupun cara-cara pengelolaan perubatan bertukar dari yang teruk dirawat dahulu kepada membekalkan kebaikan yang jauh lebih banyak kepada seberapa ramai yang boleh, ia tidak bermaksudkan untuk meninggalkan sesiapa sekalipun daripada mendapat rawatan. Sebaliknya mengkategorikan

pesakit dimasa-masa kasualti adalah berdasarkan nilai-nilai klinikal yang layak, agar sesuatu yang positif dapat dilakukan, untuk menyelamatkan nyawa kasualti seberapa ramai yang boleh, mengikut sumber-sumber perubatan yang ada.

Jika musuh menggunakan senjata nuklear atau bahan-bahan kimia ataupun kuman-kuman, ia bukan sahaja menghasilkan kasualti yang sungguh ramai tetapi juga menjejaskan sistem bantuan perkhidmatan perubatan yang sedia ada, serangan nuklear melemahkan kemampuan perubatan (anggota, ubat-ubat, peralatan). Pencemaran dari serangan nuklear, bahan kimia atau kuman-kuman

menambahkan lagi masalah menjalankan kerja. Dalam usaha untuk mengadakan bantuan perkhidmatan perubatan yang mencukupi disuasa serangan nuklear, bahan kimia atau kuman-kuman, rancangan dan koordinasi muktamad adalah dibawah pihak yang berkuasa disemua peringkat pemerintahan. Pihak berkuasa mesti menegaskan tentang latihan pertolongan kecemasan untuk bukan anggota-anggota perubatan. Mereka hendaklah dilatih untuk melaksanakan tugas mencari dan menyelamatkan dan memberi pertolongan kecemasan serta-merta, dan tindakan ulung menghilangkan kecemasan. Latihan memberi pertolongan kecemasan untuk kasualti nuklear mesti menitikberatkan tentang asas-asas menyelamatkan nyawa, dan teknik rawatan dengan ubat dan peralatan yang sedia ada tapi mengubahsuaikan cara penggunaannya. Lanjutan dari pertolongan kecemasan ulung, pengumpulan kasualti oleh bukan anggota perubatan, pengasingan mengikut kategori dan rawatan cemas perubatan yang diberi kasualti-kasualti ini hendaklah dipindahkan ke pusat rawatan yang sesuai untuk menerima dan merawat mereka.

PENGELOLAAN KASUALTI KOMBAT

Kecekapan pegawai dan anggota perubatan di peringkat batalion merupakan satu faktor yang penting di dalam pengelolaan kasualti kombatan. Kecekapan tidak hanya terbatas kepada kebolehan memeriksa dan memberi rawatan tetapi juga meliputi keupayaan melakukan tanggungjawab ini dengan cepat dan tepat. Disamping itu, kerjasama semua pihak juga perlu untuk mengelak berlakunya komplikasi tambahan yang sudah tentu melambatkan proses pemulihan dan baik semula.

Di masa ini, Kor Ubatan dan Gigian sedang merancang satu kursus yang dipanggil Kursus Kelolaan Kasualti Kombatan atau K4 untuk mencapai matlamat-matlamat tersebut. Kursus ini ditumpangkan kepada pegawai-pegawai perubatan di peringkat batalion. Ianya berpandukan kepada "Combat Casualty Care Course" atau C4 anjuran Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

MENYELAMAT NYAWA KASUALTI YANG CEDERA PARAH

Harapan untuk hidup setiap kasualti kombatan bergantung kepada keparahan kecederaan yang dialami dan juga pengelolaan kecederaan itu sendiri terutama di dalam beberapa jam pertama kecederaan diperolehi. Pegawai perubatan rejimen memainkan peranan penting di dalam hal ini kerana beliaulah doktor yang pertama sekali ditemui oleh kasualti pertempuran. Sungguhpun keupayaan beliau memberi rawatan dihadkan oleh peralatan dan kemudahan yang ada, kelolaan atau jagaan yang diberi dengan secara langsung akan menentukan nasib anggota-anggota yang malang ini.

Di dalam modul Menyelamat Nyawa Cedera Parah (MNCP) atau Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) anjuran Academy of Health Sciences, pengajaran ditumpukan kepada tindakan-tindakan secara sistematik bagaimana pegawai perubatan patut mengendali kecederaan yang mengancam nyawa. Di saat-saat kegentingan yang mana masa tidak boleh terbuang, segala tindakan perlu ditumpu ke arah pemulihan. Latihan ini bertujuan membolehkan pegawai perubatan memeriksa, menilai, memberi rawatan serta merta dan merancang pengendalian selanjutnya dengan cepat, tepat dan berkesan.

Melalui syarahan dan latihan amali, penuntut menerima penerangan dan bimbingan cara-cara memeriksa kasualti mengikut aturcara yang ditetapkan. Ini menentukan kepantasan mengenalpasti kecederaan yang mungkin membawa maut jika rawatan tidak diberi serta merta. Disamping itu keadaan kasualti secara menyeluruh boleh dinilai pada masa yang sama. Syarahan juga membincangkan rawatan-rawatan kecemasan serta merta dan rancangan rawatan selanjutnya.

Di dalam bidang perubatan, ada beberapa pembedahan kecemasan yang dengan secara langsung dapat menyelamatkan nyawa atau sekurang-kurangnya menstabilkan keadaan sehingga pemindahan ke hospital dibuat. Malangnya di peringkat siswa, pengajaran hanya berupa teori, untuk membina keyakinan yang begitu diperlukan, satu sesi di makmal haiwan telah diadakan. Penuntut berpeluang melakukan sendiri pembedahan-pembedahan ini ke atas kambing-kambing yang telah dibius.

Dua ujian diadakan diakhir modul ini bagi menilai penerimaan pengajaran teori dan kemahiran praktikal. Mereka yang berjaya diberi sijil. Untuk setiap pegawai perubatan rejimen dalam Tentera Darat Amerika Syarikat, ia adalah satu keperluan.

LATIHAN TRIAGE

Di dalam suasana pertempuran, yang sudah tentunya mendatangkan kasualti yang begitu ramai pegawai perubatan menghadapi cabaran

berat dalam menentukan setiap usaha dan tenaga-nya dapat memberi kebaikan maksima kepada seberapa ramai anggota yang boleh. Diperingkat batalion yang mana keupayaan memberi rawatan adalah terhad kerana bilangan anggota dan jenis peralatan yang ada, keputusan perlu dibuat dalam masa yang singkat bukan sahaja dari segi keutamaan rawatan tetapi juga sama ada pemindahan perlu dilakukan. Jika perlu, apakah keutamaan yang patut diberi serta ke manakah kasualti perlu dibawa.

Syarahan yang diberi menerangkan keupayaan setiap peringkat bantuan perubatan di dalam rangkaian pemindahan kasualti dan jenis-jenis keutamaan yang digunakan. Di dalam latihan praktikal pula, penuntut mempunyai 15 minit untuk mengasingkan 15 kes-kes kasualti mengikut keutamaan rawatan dan pemindahan. Ini diikuti dengan perbincangan.

MEMBAWA USUNGAN KASUALTI

Kepantasan membawa kasualti ke pos rawatan



Mengusung Pesakit Ke Ambulan

ialah satu faktor yang boleh membantu menyelamatkan nyawa atau mengurangkan kecederaan dari menjadi bertambah buruk. Walau bagaimanapun, cara membawanya juga penting kerana jika tidak dilakukan dengan betul dan berhati-hati nescaya akan menambah kemudharatan yang tidak diingini.

Pegawai perubatan rejimen bertanggungjawab melatih pembawa usungan atau 'stretcher bearers' pasukan. Di dalam latihan membawa usungan, penuntut berpeluang membawa usungan cara berempat (four man stretcher carry) melalui beberapa halangan misalnya tembok 6 kaki, kawat-duri rendah, titian sempit, menaiki bukit dan menuruni jurang. Penerangan diberi tentang cara

bahaya, memudahkan pembukaan untuk pemeriksaan dan terutama bagi kecederaan yang mempunyai keretakan atau patah tulang, mengurangkan kesakitan. Sebaliknya balutan yang tidak betul dan kurang kemas akan membawa komplikasi yang sudah tentu melambatkan proses pemulihan dan baik semula.

Pengajaran yang diberi menunjukkan cara-cara mengenakan balutan untuk kecederaan di bahagian kepala, tangan dan kaki. Penggunaan tuap juga diterangkan untuk kecederaan yang melibatkan patah atau retak tulang di bahagian tangan dan kaki. Diakhir pelajaran penuntut berpeluang mempraktikkan segala ajaran sesama sendiri.



Latihan membawa usungan

mengendalikan mengawal usungan supaya pergerakan yang harmonis berlaku diantara ke empat-empat pembawa. Ini adalah penting lagi mengurangkan kemungkinan berlakunya cedera tambahan.

BALUTAN CEDERA

Membalut cedera bukan sahaja satu perkara yang dilakukan untuk menutup luka dari pandangan mata. Ia juga bertujuan membantu menahan pendekatan, menghindar jangkitan kuman mer-

PENCEGAHAN PENYAKIT

Untuk menentukan kekuatan anggota dapat dikekalkan ditahap dan jangka masa yang maksima, kehilangan tenaga akibat serangan penyakit perlu dikurangkan seberapa yang boleh. Pengalaman Peperangan Dunia Kedua dan Vietnam menunjukkan bilangan anggota yang menjadi kasualti penyakit jauh melebihi jumlah kasualti pertempuran. Yang menyediakan lagi, sebahagian besar penyakit-penyakit ini boleh dielak dengan hanya



*Latihan pencegahan penyakit memberi suntikan
Vaksin*

mengambil beberapa langkah pencegahan yang mudah.

Syarahan mengulangkaji beberapa jenis penyakit yang sering mengancam kesihatan anggota di medan serta cara-cara pencegahan. Lain-lain tajuk syarahan ialah pembersihan air minuman dan cara menguji, kebersihan medan dan kesihatan badan terutama bahagian kaki.

ANCAMAN AJEN NUKLEAR DAN KIMIA

Keperluan untuk menggunakan pakaian pelindung telah menimbulkan masalah kerana penglihatan yang terhad dan pengurangan rasa-tangan. Ini menyebabkan kesulitan untuk pemeriksaan dan melakukan rawatan.

Syarahan menerangkan cara-cara mengenal-pasti tahap kecederaan yang diperolehi dan rawatan sewajarnya. Penuntut berpeluang melakukan pemeriksaan dan menyediakan rancangan rawatan ke atas kes-kes simulasi dengan berpakaian pelindung penuh. Cara-cara membuka pakaian pelindung tanpa menyebarkan pencemaran selanjutnya juga dilakukan. Di antara lain, syarahan juga

menyentuh cara mengguna alat suntikan penawar agen kimia, cara mengenakan topeng pelindung dan alat-alat pengesan.

KESIMPULAN

Setiap anggota adalah penting untuk kejayaan di medan pertempuran. Oleh itu setiap kecederaan atau penyakit yang dialami perlu mendapat perhatian perubatan yang berkesan supaya kemampuan tempur unit-unit yang terlibat tidak akan terjejas begitu sahaja atas sebab kekurangan anggota berupaya. Matlamat Bantuan Perkhidmatan Perubatan di medan peperangan ialah mengekalkan kekuatan anggota.

Kemudahan perubatan medan disusun secara berperingkat mengikut keupayaan memberi rawatan bermula dari barisan perbatasan yang hanya berupaya memberi rawatan berbentuk pertolongan kecemasan dan rawatan asas hingga ke hospital pengkalan yang mempunyai berbagai kemudahan untuk rawatan secukupnya. Ini berarti setiap kasualti perlu dipindahkan ke arah belakang sehingga ke peringkat yang boleh memulihkannya kembali untuk bertugas semula.



Latihan penyesuaian pakaian pelindung Ajen Kimia

Walaupun bagaimanapun sumber tenaga kerja yang ada di unit-unit perubatan dijangka tidak akan dapat menandingi beban kerja akibat bilangan kasualti yang begitu ramai. Oleh itu pengasingan perlu dilakukan mengikut keutamaan rawatan dan pemindahan. Dengan ini bantuan perubatan medan berharap dapat mengekalkan kekuatan anggota dengan menentukan setiap usaha yang dilakukan dapat memberi munafaat kepada seberapa ramai kasualti yang boleh.

Pegawai Perubatan rejimen memainkan peranan terpenting kerana beliau bertanggungjawab mengendalikan kasualti di dalam beberapa jam pertama kecederaan diperolehi. Segala keputusan serta tindakan beliau dan juga anggota-anggota yang dilatih oleh beliau akan dengan secara terus menentukan nasib si malang. Sebagai penasihat

kesihatan pula, beliau bertanggungjawab menentukan kejadian kasualti penyakit dikurangkan ke tahap yang minima.

Kursus Kelolaan Kasualti Kombat yang akan diadakan bertujuan untuk meningkatkan kesediaan pegawai perubatan terutama mereka di peringkat batalion. Ia merupakan satu usaha untuk mendekatkan lagi kepada pencapaian matlamat-matlamat bantuan perubatan medan yang begitu mencabar, iaitu, menyelamatkan nyawa dan anggota serta mengembalikan untuk bertugas semula setiap kasualti secepat mungkin.

Sumbangan:

*Jabatanarah Perubatan & Pergigian
Angkatan Tentera Malaysia*

MY INNER THOUGHTS

BRIG JEN HJ WAN NORDIN BIN HJ WAN MOHAMMED

The author ponders over his standing in Islam and within his own society. Many things, according to him, need a second, or even a third look. Islamic practices, often, have been misunderstood and misinterpreted sadly, perhaps, due to ignorance, or even laziness on the part of the mukmin.

One of the things that is forbidden for me to consume is food, I mean, the non-*halal* food. Yet the question of *halal* or non-*halal* food does not seem to attract much attention. I have always taken care to ensure that I strictly follow Allah's orders in this regard. I do not mind starving "*kerana* Allah" or "for God's sake". I can always ask for and eat bread, fish, eggs, sea-foods, grasshoppers, milk, butter, cheese, vegetables and . . . well, there are so many things that I can eat, anywhere in this world. Why do some people, for example, are still willing to consume meat which may or may not be *halal*? I wonder.

Allah has already pronounced:

"So eat of the lawful and good food which Allah hath provided for you, and thank the bounty of Allah if it is Allah ye serve."

— Verse 114 Surah XVI

Allah's *firman* goes on:

"Allah hath forbidden for you only carrion and blood and swine-flesh and that which hath been immolated in the name of any other than Allah; but he who is driven thereto, neither craving nor transgressing, lo! then Allah is forgiving, merciful."

— Verse 115 Surah XVI

But Allah also warns those who interpret falsely about the "*halal*" or "*non-halal*" status of food:

"And speak not, concerning which your own

tongues qualify (as clean or unclean) the falsehood: "This is lawful, and this is forbidden" so that ye invent a lie against Allah. Lo! Those who invent a lie against Allah will not succeed. A brief enjoyment (will be theirs) and theirs a painful doom."

— Verse 116 and 117 Surah XVI

I also know that if in my body there exists non-*halal* things like pork or non-*halal* chicken, or wine or beer or stout, I am shunned by Allah till I rid myself of them. In that state, I am "forbidden" even to do the mandatory prayers or touch (let alone read) the Quran! It's like being double-faulted!

Worse still, what if I should die in that state of life? But then how do I judge things or an issue from an Islamic viewpoint to guide myself towards purity or to know the standing of such things or issues in Islam?

Suppose, just supposing, that a girl or a woman wearing a "*purdah*" or "*telekong*", which completely covers her body except her face and her two eyes, passes by. I used to hear (pitiful) comments like "*warak*" (pious) or worse still, "*tak perlu*" (unnecessary). All these comments perhaps reflect a lack of understanding of the true Islamic rules and principles. *Ignorance* (*kejahilan*) I know is contrary to Allah's will and the Prophet's (PBUH) teachings.

Again, suppose that I pray without any *head-*

dress, or only wearing my trousers. Or suppose, that I wear gold ornaments² on me, or wear red silk³ clothings to cover me. How do I know the Islamic answers to all these questions?

In my opinion, the key (words) is to know the roles of "hukum" and "nas" in Islamic practices, even when I am an enquirer.

Before applying the two types of rules, I must first learn their true meaning and functions.

I know that everything in Islam has "hukum", that is, Allah's law. *Hukum* is, in fact, law or the punishment, if any, upon a conviction.

For example, the daily prayers, five times a day, are mandatory or "*wajib*". Where a thing or an issue is *wajib* there is no choice and any breach is punishable by Allah.

This is a *positive mandate*. I must do it at all costs. An *omission* is tantamount to a big sin (*dosa*). An example of this category of things is the paying of *zakat* (*fitriah* and *harta*) annually. Another example is the reply to an Islamic greeting by a Muslim.

Then we have the exact opposite of *wajib* called "*haram*" as the *negative mandate*, the doing of which is a very grave breach and therefore heavily punished. I must *avoid* it at all costs. An example of this category of things is the hypocrisy or boastfulness of a Muslim. Another example is theft or adultery.

Next, we have the mid-point between the two called "*harus*" or "*mubah*" meaning that one is free either to do or not to do and in either case, no evil sanction or reward is forthcoming. An example of this category of things is the (halal) food and water that we consumed.

The next two *hukums* are in opposite. They lie in between the two extremes — "*wajib*" and "*haram*" — and sit on either side of the middle term, "*harus*". They are "*makruh*" and "*sunat*".

"*Makruh*" is something which is *not* evil to do, but I am rewarded if it is not done or not followed. Conversely, "*sunat*" is an act which is rewarded if done but no evil is sanctioned if it is not done. Smoking is *makruh*, so is the taking of *petai*! But to visit a sick friend is *sunat*, as is the giving of alms.

To summarize, the five *hukums* that I always bear in mind are:

- Wajib* — must do, punishable otherwise.
- Sunat* — if done, reward. Not punished if

not done.

- Harus* — can do, need not do. Neutral.
- Makruh* — if not done, reward. If done, not punished.
- Haram* — must NOT do, punishable otherwise.

What about the second rule or test — "*nas*" — that I follow?

If someone speaks about a point or an issue in Islam, he must have a "*nas*" to back him up. In legal studies, it is called citing an authority, religiously speaking, of course.

There are only four (4) valid sources of authority, and in a descending order, they are:

- Al-Quran* — the Source Divine, The Syariah, Paramount and Always Prevailing.
- Hadiths* — the Prophet's acts, proclamations and decisions only if reported by authentic sources.
- Qiyas* — analogies from the Quran/Hadiths by humans.
- Ijmak* — consensus of Islamic experts on rules in the Al-Quran and Hadiths.

If a thing is clear from the top, that is, the Al-Quran, there can be no contradiction below. If there is no *nas* from the *Al-Quran*, I move next to the *Hadiths*, and so on down the line.

Alhamdulillah, it is indeed fortunate that this "*hukum*" and "*nas*" problem has been extensively researched and recorded by Islam's four great Imam of unsurpassed scholastic abilities. They were Imam *Maliki*, Imam *Hanafi*, Imam *Shafei* and Imam *Hanbali*.

These four Imams constitute the four main schools of thought in Islam to-day.

To me and those not learned in the philosophies of Islam and Islamic jurisprudence, there seems to be some contradictions between the four great Imams.

For example, *Hanafi's* interpretation believes that a man or a woman (not being *Muhrims* [Muslims who are *not* allowed to be married to each other]) does not loose their ablutions (cleanliness) if they touch each other while doing the *tawwaf* (rounding the *Kaabah*), but *Shafei* is very strict about it. If the two touch each other, they must retake their ablutions.

I have been taught that there are certainly no contradictions. All the four *Imams* (some people

called them Sects, as if they are the same as the various sects in some religions and this is indeed erroneous) are right and may be followed. But I must first study the *rules* or *conditions* that each of them put forward, and if a condition exists or does not exist, certain *hukum* may or may not be made. This is the most essential point often ignored or overlooked by me.

As an illustration of this, we can look back to Allah's prohibition on carrion (*bangkai*) and blood and swine-flesh (pork) in *Verse 15 Surah XVI, supra*.

In the same verse, Allah knowingly and mercifully inserted exceptions to the general rule which forgives any one who had to consume forbidden food involuntarily, or, as a result of a genuine mistake, or as having no choice but to eat them in order to live (as in a life and death emergency). All these exceptions must, nevertheless, have either no "craving" or any wish to "transgress" Allah's decree (as between the wrongdoer and Allah and not between the wrongdoer and another human).

I must, therefore, always be careful not to make a conclusion about things before I analyse them according to Islamic rules (not just moral or ethical rules) on *hukum* and *nas*.

But of course, it is impossible to do so if I do not know anything about *hukum* and *nas* at all (not just the meanings of the two words). If so, I would rather reserve my comments till I have asked those knowledgeable about them or seek the *ilmu* from some reliable sources.

This is because, above all, I know Allah shall punish me if I consciously falter or fail to discover or seek for the truth and as a result I make a wrong choice, perhaps, even deliberately.

May Allah's blessings be upon my good readers. Amin.

..... AND MORE INNER THOUGHTS

Pure acts of worship within the concept of religious rituals are not substitutable or reducible by other acts of life support even though they are also duly recognised as acts of worship (ibadah). So says the writer who also depicts graphically his various "approaches" to piety.

It is not uncommon to hear or see people who like to do easy things, or find an "easier" way to do easy things, in life. Of course, it is not such a bad thing at all to do so, I thought, but what is perplexing or disturbing is that when *conditions* or *pre-conditions* are attached to or concomitantly desired for the things done or to be done, those same conditions or pre-conditions are often forgotten or left unexecuted as though the so-called religiously "legitimate main act" itself is done as a substitute for the conditions and pre-conditions themselves.

I often hear, for example, of people saying that "muslims should not only think of the religious rituals *per se* such as prayers, fasting, zakat and pilgrimage etc as the only acts of *ibadah*, but that *ibadah* should include commerce, earning a livelihood, looking after neighbours etc as well."

Of course, it's correct to say so, but, I think, it is correct only in theory as this saying is mere knowledge, since in practice, people, friends included, performed the second category of the so-called worldly "rituals" yet failed to perform the attendant religious obligations completely or even partially, and called their second category of "rituals" as religious or equally sacramental as the first (actually) religious rituals. These two categories of acts are classed completely differently. Assertions that they are equally substitutable with each other are completely without foundation.

Nevertheless, some people are so happy to do the non-religious "rituals" (for want of a better term), yet refused, or forgot, inadvertently perhaps, to undertake the higher religious obligations. I am sure there are priorities in life. Religious rituals equally are part of the same life. See *Figure 1*.




Figure 1:
Partial Theory - Religion is Only Part of Life

If life is more than just religion (and for those who professedly know their true religious obligations but unfortunately do not practice so) it is indeed wrong to leave aside the practical side of that religious beliefs. See Figure 2. Otherwise, life itself is not complete even if it is a very happy one.




Figure 2:
Partial Theory – Life and Religion Partially Mixed

But if religion is the whole of life itself (as Allah desires) (see Figures 3) then, only when all the non-religious acts are declared by *niat* (by heart – an inward intention) as being based on religion (for Allah or God's sake), as *ibadah*, are they acts of *ibadah*; otherwise, they are mere *de facto* acts, but not acts within the concept of religion. See Figure 4.




Figure 3:
Pure Theory – As Willed by Allah




Figure 4:
Impure Theory – Religion and Life Do Not Mix

The trend is that the secondary part has thus become a primary part and that too at the expense of purely religious rituals upon which the whole thesis started in the first place. If the argument started on a religious basis (that is to say, that commerce, making money, eke out a living, helping others etc are *also* religious in nature, as acts of *ibadah* with a *niat*) then why is it that religious rituals, decreed and commanded by Allah, are not done as *laid down*?

Literally, a building would collapse if its foundation is not catered for earlier in time and to remain there (that is, religious practices must also continue) for as long as the structure shall thereafter stand.

In all honesty, I must admit that, more often than not, I tend to forget the *niat* (as *ibadah*) before I undertake an act (not amounting to a religious ritual) (see Figure 4) yet because *niat* is not visible or tangible for all to see or verify, I can easily convince people that all my acts are acts of *ibadah* in nature! Hence my argument that my daily livelihood activities are also *ibadah* is used as 'proof' of my piety on the same level as my actual religious rituals, namely prayers, fasting and so on. How deceiving, I thought, but which human knows!

Even if the "non-religious" acts (with the *niat*) and the religious rituals are alleged to be on the same level, I do not believe that they carry the same *weight* or *value*. If they do, then I am certain wealthy people and people of high standing (assuming that their *iman* and what they do or do

not do more than what little that I do or do not do for Allah) will be in the queue in front of me nearest to Allah. I think Allah is not going to allow that to happen. *Iman* and *takwa* surely prevail over *wealth* and *status*. I know that Allah says so in the holy Alkorannulkarim.

For example, in the Koran, Allah very frequently uses the salutations "ya ayyu hanna!" and "ya ayyu hallazi!" and I know there is a vast difference between these two phrases.

Thus, "annas" refers to all *mankind* (manusia), that is, Muslims and non-Muslims of all races everywhere. In this regard, Allah, via the Koran, calls on all mankind. But, when the phrase "allazi" is used it calls only on those who are faithful

(*beriman*) and not mankind in general. It follows, therefore, that a Muslim who possesses "*iman*" in the true sense, is included in both calls, but not those who are without "*iman*" and those who are non-Muslims. Of course, I do take heed of both calls and learn from each of the calls like those referred to in the salutations.

Admirably, the Koran is for me but not all its contents are directed or meant for me. Some are for *jins* and *syaitans*.

I seek Allah's indulgence over me so that I may perform my religious obligations first or, at least, at the same time as my other activities (as a subsidiary part of my religious and other duties) — the sum total of my entire existence.

FOOTNOTES:


1. The Arabic idea of *purdah*, as a (fashion of their) national dress has nothing to do with the concept of "*aurat*" in Islam in the same way that wearing a "sari" is not a religious dress for the Hindu followers. Do not blame Islam!
2. Hadith by *Tirmizi* and *Nisai*: "*Abu Musa* reported that the Prophet (PBUH) said: 'Gold and silk have been made *lawful* for the *females* of my followers, and *unlawful* for their *males*'. (This was proved as correct by many authentic sources).
3. (a) Hadith recorded by *Muslim*: *Abdullah bin Armbal* reported: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) found two coloured silk dresses on me and so he said: 'This is of the clothes of the infidels. So don't use them.' An in a narration, I said: 'I shall wash them!' The Prophet (PBUH) said: 'Rather burn them.' (There are other authentic Hadiths on this).
(b) Also hadith reported by *Ibn Majah*, *Ahmad Tirmizi* and *Nisai*: "*Samurah* reported that the Prophet (PBUH) said: 'Put on a white dress because it is most pure and pleasant, and use it as coffin for your dead bodies.'
(c) Again, hadith reported by *Tirmizi* and *Abu Daud*: "A man with two *red* dresses passed by and saluted the Prophet (PBUH) but he did not return it."



Brig Jen Hj Wan Nordin B Hj Wan Mohammed, a graduate of OCS Portsea, an honours graduate in law University of London, and holds a professional degree of Barrister-at-Law, Gray's Inn, London. Currently he is Deputy Chief of Personnel Staff in the Ministry of Defence.

... direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration.

— Clausewitz



LT KOL HUSSEIN BIN HASSAN

INTRODUCTION

Malaysia going armour! Most military leaders will not dispute the need to equip one's army with armour. Those who will, will have to cast their minds back to World War II where those who considered that the Malaysian terrain did not lend itself to tank warfare were proven wrong by the Japanese. It has been said in the previous issue of Sorotan Darat that armour forms the corps of strength of most armies in the world; but is a tank the best weapon against another tank? Or is it the anti-armour weapons? Which ever it may be, is not the concern of this article. The need to go armour has been decided and the nucleus of an armoured force has been introduced. The suitability of the equipment introduced can become a focal point of discussions.

The role of any combat vehicle is to carry a payload. This payload may be a man who is required to use his eyes or some surveillance devices, a weapon system or a section of infantry. The circumstances under which, and the manner in which this payload has to be carried in order to make it tactically valuable to the commander will vary greatly according to its nature and tactical roles. All armoured vehicles will combine in some degree the characteristics of fire-power, mobility and protection. The vehicles' tactical role will determine the relative importance of these three and may become major factors in design. However, any of the following characteristics may become factors in design and dominate the designer's approach, these are; Fire-Power, Protection, Mobility, Surveillance, Communications, Night Fighting Capability, Endurance, Silence,

Reliability, Cost, Maintainability and Operability.

For any vehicle which operates in the direct fire zone, there is bound to be a conflict between essential characteristics. In fact, the priority of characteristics in the battle tank has been the subject of controversy in all tank producing countries for many years. Designers' views differ, but had surprisingly little influence on the design balance of the resulting tanks.

FIREPOWER

General. Needless to say that a weapon system to be mounted on any AFV is the prime consideration and it always will have direct bearing on the design of such vehicles. The weapon's characteristics such as its weight, calibre, muzzle velocity, recoil forces, etc; determines the size, weight, type, automotive power, traction etc, of the vehicle. The interaction of such factors determines the effectiveness of these vehicles.

Roles. Before deciding on the calibre and weapon system, its role must first be defined or determined. The roles of any weapon system may in broad term be as follows:

- * The disablement of armoured vehicles of a weight class at least up to that of the vehicle which mounts the weapon system, and at ranges greater than those at which the enemy vehicle can inflict similar damage.
- * The destruction of unarmoured vehicles.
- * The disablement of men in the open.
- * The destruction of emplacements and other hard pinpoint targets.
- * The neutralization of area targets, including particularly covering fire for infantry in the final stages of an attack.
- * The delivery of a carrier shell — e.g. smoke and illumination.
- * The capability of at least deterring aircraft which directly threatens the vehicle.

Choice of Weapon System. The relative importance of the roles above (armour defeating and HE) is debatable and will vary with circumstances. Technically however the armour-defeating role governs both the selection of a weapon system and the design of the vehicle to mount it. Before a choice can be made, the following must be understood:

a. **Effectiveness.** The effectiveness of an armour defeating weapon, or chance that a single round fired will disable the target based on the following factors:

- * **Reliability.** The chance that a round will function correctly when fired. (It is approaching 100% for conventional gun system but is significantly lower for anti-tank guided weapons).
- * **Accuracy.** The chance that a round will hit.
- * **Lethality.** The chance that a hit will disable.

b. **Target Characteristics.** Despite their size and unwieldiness in everyday terms, armoured vehicles present small and fleeting targets, except at very close range. They are also tough targets, the disablement of which demands great power of attack. From these characteristics result the key features of armour — defeating weapons:

- * High power of attack.
- * Extreme accuracy.
- * High speed of engagement.

c. **The Attack of Armour.** The following mode of attack may be employed:

- * **Kinetic Energy (KE).** The whole of the kinetic energy attack is developed during projection. This is normally delivered in one concentrated strike but, may also take the form of a number of dispersed strikes (with or without boost). In modern practice, a subcalibre projectile (e.g. APDS) is always preferred in calibre over 30mm. It has greater penetration and can be fired from both Smooth Bore or Rifled guns.

d. **Chemical Energy (CE).**

- * **HEAT.** HEAT is by far the most effective means of attacking armour in terms of system weight, logistic weight and cost; but its power of attack is a function of calibre. Its lethality is low unless the attack overmatches the target by at least 33% and its effect is severely degraded when the charge is spun.
- * **HESH.** Because its performance against complete vehicle has always fallen short of expectation and because it is degraded

by anything lying on the armour and defeated entirely by spaced armour, HESH can no longer be regarded as a primary means of attacking armour. However it is likely to feature as a multi-purpose round in direct-fire system since it is highly effective against bunkers, building and light armoured vehicles.

- e. **Versatility of Attack.** From the above there are great attractions in exclusive reliance of HEAT for direct fire systems at the expense of KE attack. However, the exclusion of KE attack could allow an enemy tank of reasonable weight to dominate the battlefield, as from armour designers point of view both HEAT and HESH attack can be defeated.

MOBILITY

Strategic Mobility. In designing or buying armoured vehicles it is necessary to decide upon their roles, where they are likely to be used and how they are going to get there. These factors dictate the means by which the vehicles are transported (air, sea and land) and in turn impose restrictions on the design of vehicle with respect to weight and width.

Battlefield and Vehicle Mobility. Apart from good command, control and communication, a commander's chance of winning encounters depends largely on the mobility of each payload at his disposal, and thus the mobility of his vehicles. Although there is no absolute measures of mobility; requirements, designs and assessments are related to the opposition and the terrain. Among the factors which may hamper, delay or prevent vehicles and payloads arriving at the required place and time are:

- * **Enemy Action.** Enemy action may force vehicles away from their routes or destroy them. This can be overcome in varying degrees by a balance design of Firepower, Protection and Mobility depending on their primary roles. A good gun or armour combination can enhance a combat vehicle's mobility in that it has a better chance of surviving encounters with the enemy.

- * **Bad Going/Obstacles.** Rough ground will slow vehicles down and soft terrain may force them to make diversion. The proportion of terrain that vehicles can cross at fair speed is one measure of their mobility. It must be noted however, good cross-country performance can be achieved only at the expense of other features; requirement and designs should therefore be based on evidence provided by terrain analysis and terrain geometry.

- * **Manoeuvrability.** Within the direct fire zone, vehicle route are dictated by areas where the enemy can bring fire to bear and where the ground provides most cover. The speed at which vehicles can negotiate such terrain reduces the amount of time they are exposed to direct enemy fire. There will no doubt be times when cover is not available. Thus vehicles must have the ability to move quickly and change direction, so that the enemy has the shortest possible time to take accurate aim. Vehicles must be highly manoeuvrable, a characteristic which is hard to define.

- * **Reliability.** Vehicles may break down, or their payloads may be unfit for their tasks on arrival through lack of robustness. Reliability is a feature of the highest operational importance. A serious effort has been made to define the requirement of reliability and establish standards against which vehicles are assessed. However, the problem is that reliability can only be assessed statistically from large samples over long period. This means that valid information will not be available during development, thus teething problems are inevitable.

- * **Vehicle Speed.** Higher vehicle speeds conflict with other requirements. It means larger engines, higher fuel consumption and thus larger engine and fuel space. The space can only be provided by reducing that allotted to the fighting compartment or by building larger vehicles. Thus the need for higher speeds must be balanced against the design as a whole.

- * **Wheels Versus Tracks.** The controversy over tracks versus wheels is long standing. Much of the argument is emotional, based on out-

dated experience and takes little cognisance of improvements which have occurred over the years. If roads are badly damaged by tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles may require engineer assistance to travel on them. As a result many tracked vehicles are fitted with rubber pads and this conflicts with the need for an aggressive track profile for cross country work. The design of tracked vehicles can be significantly influenced by the peacetime requirement to do little or no damage to roads on which civilian traffic travels. This requirement can be detrimental to operational needs in war time. Basically selection of one system or the other depends normally on the role of the vehicles and whether that role requires them to spend more time on roads or travelling across country.

Mobility's Contribution to Protection. Mobility and protection have traditionally been regarded as rival qualities, but one is coming more and more to think that they are in fact complementary. On the one hand protection will enable the vehicle to take a simple and direct route even when under fire, thus perhaps reducing the requirement for automotive performance and thus contributing positively to mobility. Conversely good mobility, especially the capability of maintaining a high average speed over all types of going, results in reduced chance of detection and exposure times, this may contribute directly to protection.

The preceding paragraphs dealt with certain factors for tactical and battlefield mobility of the AFVs. When considered in conjunction with Firepower and Protection, the other major AFV design requirements, it is clear that compromises must result in almost all areas of the design.

PROTECTION

Armoured vehicles are exposed to many threats and need a balanced protective system that will best enhance their chance of survival on the battlefield. The crew, the vehicle and its weapons must be regarded as an entity. In peacetime there is a psychological tendency to decry the value of protection, but the subject springs quickly into fashion in war.

In deciding the level of protection an armoured vehicle requires, users must first visualize the levels of attack anticipated which is normally associated with the role and employment of these vehicles. Levels of attack are normally defined as follows:

- a. **Attack by Non Specialized Weapons.** This includes all conventional direct and indirect fire weapons likely to be encountered on the battlefield other than those designed and deployed to defeat armoured vehicles.
- b. **Attack by Specialized Weapons.** These weapons are designed and deployed to defeat armoured vehicles and may be subdivided into:
 - * Primary anti-armour weapons, designed to defeat vehicles of the main battle tank class. The modes of attack could be KE, CE or KE/CE.
 - * Secondary anti-armour weapons, designed to defeat light armoured vehicles and perhaps some aspects of the main battle tank.

TYPES OF ARMOUR

Extensive research has been conducted and still continues on the use of different types of material for armoured vehicle in order to achieve the required levels of protection whilst saving in weight and/or bulk of the vehicle. Some types of armour plates existing today are:

- * **Alloy Steel.** This is the classic material for vehicles armour and there is wide range of special nickel/chrome alloy steels.
- * **Aluminium.** Aluminium armour is now well established and has proven advantageous over steel for light armoured vehicles. Its use has resulted in significant weight savings as compared with similar vehicles using steel armour, (it is about 1000 lbs lighter than its steel equivalent). However, Aluminium armour is not considered suitable for use on its own for main battle tanks because of the increased bulk. Aluminium armour has either to be about 3 times as thick as steel for equivalent protection, or needs additional plating or some other material to be used in conjunction with it.
- * **Titanium.** Titanium is becoming increasingly important as an armour material. The use of

these alloys for protection against small calibre projectiles permits a saving of 30% in weight over conventional steel armour. The drawbacks to titanium alloy armours are their very high cost (approximately 10 times that of steel).

- * **Other Materials.** There are numerous other materials being experimented. Some of these materials are Silicious Cored Armour, Ceramics, plastics and non-textile synthetics; all of which may be used in compound armour. At this stage the protective advantage of these armour, weight for weight, is very questionable and their production cost as at now is very high.

ARMOUR ARRANGEMENT

Whatever material is used, the armour plates may be arranged in many ways to enhance the level of protection against various modes of attack as discussed earlier. Thus, as has been said earlier the levels and modes of attack anticipated must be known to designers so that the required level of protection can be designed into the vehicles. Brief discription of various types of arrangements are as follows:

- * **Sloping Armour.** The sloping of armour plate is important for two reasons. Firstly, at angles of above about 65 degrees to the normal ricochet is induced. Secondly, it leads to a reduction in weight, as thickness can be reduced for the same level of protection.
- * **Spaced Armour.** Spaced armour usually consists of a thin outer plate at a distance from the main plate. The function of the outer plate is to degrade the performance of KE projectiles by tripping off the protective cap making it less effective or it may change the angle of strike, again making it less effective.
- * **Bar and Grille Armour.** This is a form of spaced armour but with a much lower weight penalty. It comprises an array of high tensile steel bars in a frame attached to the hull of the vehicle. It has a similar function to those of spaced armour, but in general, against modern weapons, bar armour does not offer any significant protection advantages.

- * **Ribbed Armour.** Ribbed armour has appeared on both the Swedish 'S' tank and the Russian BMP. Its purpose and effectiveness are by no means clear. It may accord some additional protection against KE and HESH attack.

- * **Compound Armour.** Compound armour is an arrangement of layers of various materials, normally backed by a steel plate; it may or may not include spacing. For full effect they should be designed against a specific mode of attack; in these terms they can deal with any foreseeable power of attack. A compromise system to protect against both KE and HEAT attack is feasible. This has been done with the British CHOBHAM armour, and with the armour of US XM 1 and FRG Leopard 11 MBTs. It is interesting to note that the development of compound armour are swinging the balance back from the anti-armour weapon to the tank. In a vehicle of the battle tank class, complete frontal protection against any single mode of attack may be expected within the next generation of vehicles.

Probability of Attack. Due to weight and hence mobility it is only possible to provide tanks with armoured protection against specialised anti-tank weapons over a specific frontal arc. The arc over which protection is provided is determined by the probability of attack from a given direction. These probabilities can be obtained from Whittakers Directional Probability Variation (DPV) Tables which was the result of theoretical studies and confirmed by actual data obtained during World War II. The British has chosen a frontal arc of 60 degrees where specialized protection is provided.

The preceding paragraphs only deals with protection against ballistic attack which is off course the prime consideration for any users of armoured vehicle. However from designers point of view, protection against mines, nuclear weapons, chemical & biological weapons, and against fire and flame attack must also be considered.

A well-designed armoured vehicle should have inherent all-round protection against a very high-proportion of the non-specialized weapons it may encounter. The raising of protection above this level will incur a severe penalty in weight and

probably in cost. At best, protection against anti-armour weapons can be provided only on a given aspect of the vehicle. In recent years the balance in anti-armour weapons versus armour has swung steadily in favour of the attack. Development in compound armour can almost certainly redress the balance. The key question thus concern cost — effectiveness rather than technology — is a high level of protection worthwhile?

CONCLUSION

The Armament. In selecting a weapon system for vehicle mounting, there are certain general considerations which must be taken into account:

- a. A gun, whatever its inherent performance will only be as effective as its mounting, sighting and fire control system permits.
- b. Armoured vehicles targets must be disabled or destroyed and not just neutralized, this will often dictate the selection of the class of weapon and the weapons systems design.
- c. In broad term there is a choice between:
 - * A versatile system, in which case the anti-armour capability is likely to be limited to targets of the same weight class as the vehicle mounting the system.
 - * A specialized system — one role, one vehicle — which may allow the lightest vehicle to be capable of destroying the heaviest.
- d. Users must be able to distinguish between armament intended to support the commander in imposing his will on the enemy, and defensive armament intended only to protect the vehicle and its occupants against some local threat.

Mobility. The conflicting needs for strategic, tactical and battlefield mobility have on the design

of AFVs is obvious. Users must at the out set decide where and on what types of ground his armoured force is going to fight. This is especially so in a country like ours, as the terrain is considered difficult but not impossible for tank/armoured warfare. Coupled with other factors terrain condition will to a large extent determine traction, automotive power, size and weight hence mobility of such vehicles. These conflicting needs of mobility when considered in conjunction with Firepower and Protection, clearly indicates that compromises must result in almost all areas.

Protection. The need for protection against non-specialised weapons is beyond dispute and given proper design, the direct and indirect costs of providing this are not high. All proven methods of protection against specialised anti-armour weapons impose a severe penalty in weight and cost and are applicable only to the vehicle's Frontal arc, leaving the other aspects vulnerable to all but low grade attack. Thus the level of frontal protection is a matter of user policy and cost-effectiveness.

Overall Design. Whilst there are numerous other characteristics users may impose on designers, the three discussed in this paper are the major one which will decide its effectiveness for the role it is intended. Obviously compromises must be made as these characteristics often conflicts. These compromises however are made in order to achieve the optimum performance. It is therefore obvious that changes in anyone of these characteristics will result in its performance falling below optimum level. Those responsible for such a decision should always remember; once a design is firm, the possibility of up-armouring, up-gunning and up-rating automotive power is limited and costly whilst the result unsatisfactory.

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Lt Kol Hussein Bin Hassan was commissioned into the Signal Regiment in 1967. He had attended several courses both locally and overseas. Lt Kol Hussein is also a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College Halgate. Presently he commands the Signal Regiment, 2nd Division.

MEMORY

The Army is a small world, but its people have large memories. The longer you stay in it the more you will run into friends wherever you go. It's also equally true that as the years pass you will serve with a growing number of superiors who remember you from the back — when and what kind of soldier you were then.

— Maj Gen A Newman
US Army (Ret)

HUMOUR

“Humour enters life in uniform in countless ways, from legitimate change-of-pace remarks to sour-note, satirical wisecracks, from unit costume parties to individual practical jokes — which can be real booby traps sometimes. One gimmick widely used to enliven military life with a smile is to inject funny stories into lectures and speeches. Senior officers often do this but they, like everybody else, can be caught in a backlash from their own jokes.”

— Maj Gen Aubrey Newman
US Army (Ret)



TUGAS UNIT UNIT GERAK KHAS

BRIG JEN DATO' BORHAN BIN AHMAD

Tentera Darat Malaysia mempunyai dua jenis unit khas di bawah naungannya — *Para Komando* dan *Unit Gerak Khas*. Kebetulan pula kedua-dua jenis unit ini telah diletakkan di bawah kawalan operasi serta pentadbiran *Markas Gerup Gerak Khas*. Unit-unit Komando ini telah ditubuh dan dilatih khas untuk melaksanakan operasi-operasi terhad (limited sustained operations) seperti membuat serangan mengejut (raids), meronda atau menyerang sasaran-sasaran penting di kawasan musuh; oleh kerana unit-unit Komando ini telah ditubuhkan mengikut rupa bentuk *Royal Marine Commandos*, maka ianya juga berkebolehan mengerjakan tugas-tugas terhad di kawasan perairan. Manakala pasukan *Gerak Khas* pula, ianya telah dibentuk khas untuk tugas 'small unit operations' yang biasanya dikendalikan oleh kumpulan-kumpulan ronda yang mengandungi 5 ke 10 orang anggota. Tugas-tugas mereka ini termasuklah tugas jangka panjang (long term), seperti melakukan kekacauan di kawasan belakang musuh (enemy rear areas), mengintip maklumat dan melatih pasukan-pasukan 'guerilla' sama ada di dalam mahupun di luar negeri. Dalam pada itu tentera kita juga mempunyai pasukan *Perahu Khas* atau lebih terkenal dengan nama SBS (setanding

dengan pasukan SEAL atau British Royal Marine SBS). Pasukan ini berupaya mengerjakan tugas-tugas meninjau dan serangan-serangan mengejut melalui laut dan udara. Selain dari tugas-tugas ketenteraan, pasukan *Special Boat Section* (SBS) ini adalah terlatih di dalam tugas-tugas mencegah keganasan (anti-terrorist).

Pada hakikatnya pasukan *Para Komando* kita telah ditubuh khas untuk melancarkan serangan-serangan di peringkat Seksyen, Terup, Skuader, hinggalah ke peringkat Rejimen. Mereka dilatih untuk menyeludup masuk ke kawasan operasi melalui darat, laut dan udara. Apabila tertubuhnya *Rejimen Gerak Khas* [boleh menandingi pasukan *Special Air Service* (SAS) Inggeris pada dasarnya], maka tugas/peranan pasukan-pasukan *Para Komando* harus ataupun telah diubahsuai kepada *employment against time sensitive and tactical or strategic targets in all types of terrain and weather*. Begitu juga tugas tinjauan jarak jauh yang biasa dilaksanakan dalam tahun-tahun pra-1981 patutlah diambilalih oleh *Rejimen Gerak Khas* yang ditubuhkan khusus untuk tugas-tugas meninjau/mengintip maklumat-maklumat penting serta melakukan *small unit operations/behind the lines missions*.

Jika tidak dikaji dengan teliti dan mendalam adalah sukar bagi seseorang itu memahami perbezaan di antara peranan bagi kedua-dua unit khas ini. Hanya dengan secara mengetahui jenis-jenis latihan serta alat-alat kelengkapan mereka barulah perbezaan ini dapat dipastikan. Namun begitu, hendaklah difahami juga bahawa kedua-dua jenis unit ini telah dapat didikan asas yang sama. Dan berpandu kepada rentak dan corak latihan adalah diduga kedua-duanya boleh diharap menjalankan tugas yang hampir sama dan saling bantu membantu antaranya.

Penugasan

Apakah tugas-tugas yang patut atau harus diberikan kepada unit-unit khas kita di dalam perang yang *berseneriokan* kepada 'LANUN' sebagai musuh? Berbanding dengan doktrin yang digunakan di dalam Tentera Darat kita dewasa ini, LANUN merupakan lebih 'manoeuvre orientated' menggunakan kuasa tembakan yang kuat (co-ordinated firepower) membantu pasukan pengempurnya. Pergerakan '*soviet-styled blitzkrieg attack*' yang mana sentiasa akan mengakibatkan jarak yang berjauhan ini akan memerlukan '*a high degree of command and control*'. Di sini jelas, kelemahan seperti ini adalah terdedah kepada serangan-serangan ke atas sasaran '*behind the front lines*'. Admiral J. C Wylie di dalam bukunya yang berjudul '*Military Strategy*', menyatakan strategi perang mempunyai dua jenis corak — '*sequential*' dan '*cumulative*'. Apabila gerakan demi gerakan dilancarkan secara bantu membantu (dependent of each other) untuk mencapai kemenangan maka strategi yang digunakan itu adalah, *strategy-sequential*. Tetapi, sekiranya sesuatu peranan itu dilancarkan secara berasingan (series of independent individual actions) and kadangkala tidak bersangkut paut dengan '*the grand strategy*', tetapi bertujuan memusnah atau semata-mata mengacau pihak musuh, maka perbuatan ini adalah dinamakan '*cumulative*' dan tidak bersangkut-paut dengan mana-mana strategi. Sungguhpun demikian perbuatan seperti ini akan akhirnya melumpuhkan pihak musuh jika dilaksanakan dengan bertubi-tubi. Misalnya gerakan '*submarine*' menenggelamkan kapa-kapa Jepun di lautan Pasifik dalam Perang Dunia Kedua, sungguhpun tidak bersangkut-paut dengan mana-mana strategi

jangka pendek (short term strategy), namun ianya dapat melumpuhkan pergerakan bala tentera Jepun yang berulang-alik ke pulau-pulau Pasifik di ketika itu. Di sebaliknya '*raid*' yang dilakukan oleh 48 orang anggota SAS ke atas Pulau Pebble pada 14 Mei 82 bertujuan memusnahkan stesyen radar dan kapal terbang jenis Pucara, tidak boleh disifatkan '*cumulative*', kerana gerakan ini adalah berkaitan dengan strategi '*Rear Admiral Woodwork*' iaitu '*To isolate, demoralise and hit at targets which are vital to the very survival of the Task Force*'. Pada keseluruhannya, jika kedua-dua jenis corak ini — strategi '*sequential*' dan '*cumulative*' dapat diarahkan ke atas sasaran-sasaran yang penting, ianya akan mendatangkan hasil yang boleh menentukan nasib peperangan atau mana-mana pertikaian.

Penugasan pasukan-pasukan khas seperti komando, SAS, SBS atau Sandhi Yudha mistilah bertujuan meninggikan lagi '*cumulative effect*' ke atas pasukan lawan. Gerakan-gerakan bertujuan mengacau, memusnah, memesong dan membingungkan pasukan musuh yang sedang mara ke negeri ini akan pasti merendahkan moralnya untuk terus maju. Gerakan-gerakan komando/pasukan khas ini hendaklah dilancarkan dengan seberapa segera ke atas *the enemy's line of communications*. Sasaran-sasaran seperti '*choke points*', dan ketua-ketua (key enemy personnel) hendaklah diletakkan ke dalam senarai keutamaan unit-unit khas ini. Dengan secara menghindar pergerakan dan kebebasannya dan mengacau nadi perhubungan serta pos-pos pemerintah adalah dipercayai pihak LANUN akan tidak dapat membekal pasukan-pasukan pengempurnya. Faktor-faktor ini adalah penting untuk membolehkan serangan balas dilancarkan. Pada kesimpulannya gerakan-gerakan oleh unit-unit khas ini apabila dicampur hasilnya dengan '*active defence*' maka bertambah '*combat power*' tentera kita menentang musuh-musuh seperti LANUN dan kerajaan-kerajaan boniknya.

Rejimen Para Komando, Rejimen Gerak Khas dan pasukan-pasukan lain seperti unit-unit khas jika penugasannya disatukan khusus untuk tugas-tugas '*unconventional*' ianya akan memberi '*Theatre Commander*' kebolehan istimewa untuk mencapai kejayaan. Unit-unit ini jika ditugaskan dengan betul mereka akan dapat menjalankan kerja-kerja secara bersendirian (independent of frontline maneuvering by conventional forces)

dengan berkesan. Antara hasil-hasil terbesar yang boleh dicapai melalui kerja-kerja sulit ini adalah mempengaruhi pihak musuh supaya bertindak yang mana boleh mendatangkan keuntungan kepada pihak kita.

Berdasarkan kepada konsep pertahanan serta berpanduan kepada peralatan, latihan dan kebolehan istimewa pasukan Komando atau Para Komando maka adalah dirasai lebih sesuai baginya ditugaskan ke kawasan-kawasan hadapan dari 'covering force' kita. Menggunakan kumpulan-kumpulan kecil, mereka akan dapat mengacau, menyerang hendap serta melakukan serangan-serangan mengejut ke atas pusat-pusat perhubungan, markas dan sasaran-sasaran penting yang boleh melemahkan pasukan lawan. Unit-unit Komando yang ditugaskan secara ini akan juga dapat mengumpulkan maklumat-maklumat berkenaan dengan pasukan musuh dan keadaan tanah (ground intelligence) yang diperlukan untuk melakukan tindak-balas.

Juga berpanduan kepada kebolehannya, unit-unit Gerak Khas pula haruslah ditugaskan ke atas sasaran-sasaran seperti 'lines of communications, nuclear storage areas, logistic points and key enemy or political personnel'. Sasaran lain seperti paip minyak, lapangan terbang, 'air defence site', depot-depot kelengkapan dan sebagainya haruslah juga dimasukkan ke dalam senarai untuk diberikan kepada unit-unit Gerak Khas. Unit-unit seperti ini haruslah juga diberi tugas melatih pasukan-pasukan 'guerilla' yang perlu ditubuhkan untuk menyempurnakan 'The National Strategy'.

Sepertimana unit Sea Air Land (SEAL) dan SBS dipergunakan pasukan perahu khas boleh digunakan untuk memperhitungkan sasaran-sasaran di pantai, di pelabuhan atau mana-mana juga sasaran-sasaran yang harus diserang melalui dasar laut atau muka perairan. Unit-unit perahu khas ini boleh diseludupkan masuk ke kawasan sasaran melalui perahu-perahu kecil atau diterjunkan melalui pesawat terbang.

Pada kesimpulannya unit-unit khas memang mempunyai potensi untuk ditugaskan di kawasan-kawasan belakang pihak lawan yang jauh dari pengkalan sendiri. Sungguhpun apa yang dilakukan oleh mereka ini tidak akan memusnahkan enemy's main battle forces, namun hasil dari gerakan-gerakan tersebut akan tetap menyumbangkan (contribute towards) ke arah kemenangan kepada

pihak kita tanpa ianya bertentangan serta berlawanan cara habis-habisan. Unit-unit khas ini tidak ditubuh dan dibendung untuk berperang secara 'conventional'. Menyalahguna mereka ini adalah buruk padahnya. Kerana mereka boleh digugur dan diseludup ke kawasan-kawasan yang tidak boleh ditibai oleh unit-unit 'konvensyenal', dengan secara tidak langsung, unit-unit khas ini telah menambahkan kebolehan serta kekuatan tentera kita untuk bertindak ke atas sasaran-sasaran yang tidak boleh dimusnahkan oleh pesawat-pesawat pengebom atau meriam-meriam artileri. Melancarkan gerakan-gerakan di kawasan belakang (behind the lines action) adalah berlainan dari peperangan biasa. Unit-unit khas ini biasanya mengelakkan diri dari bertentangan secara berhadapan dengan musuh kerana mengelakkan kecelakaan atau kerugian besar yang mungkin menimpa keatasnya. Demi mencapai kejayaan dua faktor penting sentiasa diambil perhitungan 'time and surprise'. Sasaran-sasaran penting (critical targets) akan diserang di ketika musuh tidak menyangkainya.

Pandangan Soviet

Adalah diketahui bahawa negara Soviet memang memandang berat kepada peperangan tidak lazim (unconventional warfare). Polisi mereka ke arah ini adalah tegas, iaitu segala persiapan hendaklah dibuat untuk menghadapi peperangan ini sama ada untuk sendiri mahupun untuk menolong negara-negara sahabat. Era senjata nukliar tidak mengubah sikap, konsep dan kecayaannya terhadap peperangan tidak lazim.

Di akhir-akhir ini Soviet Union telah memperhebatkan melatih anggota lintas udaranya (airborne forces) memahirkan konsep 'operations in enemy near areas'. Juga adalah diketahui, kini Soviet Union telah menambah atau mengekalkan kekuatan angkatan lintas udaranya ke lapan Divisyen. Unit-unit ini pula adalah dibantu (supplemented) oleh dua rejimen kombatan helikopter (terletak di Jerman Timor) yang boleh mengangkat beberapa 'motorised rifle air-landing battalions' mendahului pasukan-pasukan pengempur untuk tujuan menawan tempat-tempat penting terutamanya 'bridge-heads areas'. Dalam pada itu Soviet Union juga ada mempunyai Komando Udara (Air Commandos) yang bertaraf

dengan SAS Inggeris. Pasukan ini yang lebih terkenal sebagai 'REIDOVIKI' adalah ditubuh dan dilatih khas untuk misi penyelusupan jarak jauh serta melakukan serangan-serangan kilat ke atas sasaran-sasaran dibelakang pasukan lawan. Di dalam angkatan 'Motorised Division'nya pula, mereka mempunyai satu kompeni komando yang bergelar 'VYSOTNIKI'. Kompeni ini adalah 'the elite of the airborne troops'. VYSOTNIKI telah dilatih untuk diseludup secara terjun bebas (HALO dan HAHO) dan ditugaskan mengintip serta melakukan kerja-kerja sabotaj. Sementara itu adalah diketahui unit-unit khas dari negara-negara persekutuan WARSAW yang bersedia memperkukuhkan kekuatan unit-unit khas Soviet Union (in organic form) yang dari beberapa Divisyen pasukan Lintas Udara dan juga Rejimen-Rejimen Lintas Udara Khas telah diletakkan di tempat-tempat strategik di Jerman Timur dan di Czechoslovakia.

Adalah difahamkan bahawa kesemua pasukan-pasukan khas Soviet Union dan dari negara-negara

persekutuan WARSAW ini telah dilatih dan disediakan khusus untuk bertindak semata-mata bertujuan melumpuh atau melemahkan kekuatan pihak lawan, dan tidak sekali-kali untuk 'to fight decisive battles'. Selain dari tujuan melumpuhkan kekuatan pihak lawan melalui unit-unit VYSOTNIKI dan REIDOVIKI ini seperti ini, Soviet Union berharap akan dapat mencetuskan porak peranda (chaos and disorganisation) serta keadaan yang amat mengejut ke atas pihak yang ditentang.

Jelaslah, dari apa yang difahamkan, setakat ini Soviet Union selain dari mempunyai 'tactical forces' yang begitu besar, mereka juga mempunyai rancangan mengguna unit-unit khasnya untuk melakukan serangan-serangan membantu di belakang pihak lawan. Berdasarkan dari kekuatan unit-unit khas mereka dan juga dari apa yang dilihat di negara-negara WARSAW dan NATO, ini merupakan bukti yang sah bahawa unit-unit khas ini memanglah tidak boleh diketepikan demi memperkukuhkan sesuatu angkatan tentera dan negara itu.

RUJUKAN:

Robin, Moore — *The Green Berets*

JC Wylie, Admiral — *Military Strategy*

Dobson, Christopher)

Miller, John) — *The Falklands Conflict*


Pyul, Ronald)

Geraghty, Tony — *The SAS*



Brigedler Jeneral Dato' Borhan Bin Ahmad telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor RAMD pada 13 Dis 1959. Beliau telah bersukarela berkhidmat dalam Pasukan Gerak Khas sejak 13 Sep 1960. Beliau telah menghadiri Kursus Maktab Turus di Wellington, India pada 12 Jan 1970. Beliau merupakan Pegawai Memerintah 1 Rejimen Gerak Khas Malaysia (sekarang 21 Para Komando) yang ulung. Kini menyandang jawatan Panglima Gerup Gerak Khas.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE STUDY OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT



ABDUL RAZAK ABDULLAH BAGINDA

In his article the author discusses at length about 'crisis management as an important process in the avoidance of war and how to manage conflict;' although his article "basically examines the validity of using cuban crisis as a model of managing crisis," to us as leaders, such profoundly expressed thoughts based on proven events can be of significant value especially when managing crisis.

INTRODUCTION

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 brought the world to the brink of a nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. The thirteen days of the crisis was seen as the hottest point of the cold war. As a result of the successful management of the crisis, policy-makers of the two superpowers, despite rhetorical proclivities, have moved towards negotiations rather than confrontation.

Crisis Management is an important process in the avoidance of war and to manage conflict. With the numerous crises in the world today, one is

hopeful that such conflicts would not escalate to the point where the superpowers would draw their nuclear sword. As the study of crisis management emerged after the Cuban crisis, I will focus primarily on the latter. This article will basically examine the validity of using the Cuban crisis as a model of managing international crisis.

DEFINITION

The successful management of the missile crisis gave impetus in the academic study of managing international crisis. The US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, after the crisis stated that,

"there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management"¹. The term crisis management has been used rather vaguely, denoting a variety of meanings and emphases. Some see it as simply the peaceful resolution of crisis, whereas others see it solely as an exercise in winning. However, crisis management can best be defined as suggested by Phil Williams:

"Crisis Management is concerned on the one hand, with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other, with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a state are secured and protected".²

He went on to say that this will lead to vigorous actions, carrying substantial risks. Therefore, a vital task of crisis managers is to toy around with these risks, keeping them as low and controllable as possible, and at the same time, to ensure that coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective as possible in gaining concessions from the opponent. Crisis management can be said to have been an off-spring from the term 'Brinkmanship', in which it was first popularized by John Foster Dulles.

As crisis management grew as a result of the peaceful resolution of the October crisis, students of the subject tend to take the crisis as a model of managing international crisis. However, how far is it valid to do so, given the fact that the crisis was the first and the last time the two superpowers confronted each other militarily? Compared with other international crises, the Cuban missile crisis was found to have certain special conditions, which eventually led to its successful management. The Cuban missile crisis fits in nicely into the 'two-person game', with the factors involved clearly defined. The crisis has been likened to a diplomatic chess game, resulting in a final victory. However, most crises tended to be 'N-person games' instead of a 'two-person games' model. In the current Lebanese crisis, for example, there are many actors involved — the Israelis, the Syrians, the PLO, the Druze, the Phalangist-led Lebanese government, plus until recently, the multinational force, comprising of the Americans, the British, the French and the Italians. The issues involved are unclear and complicated to the extent that the multinational forces are themselves ambivalent as

to their tasks and this has resulted, inter alia, with internal and domestic dissension. The Lebanese crisis tended to represent the 'real' world than the Cuban missile crisis.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE CRISIS

The crisis began when President Kennedy learned on the sixteenth of October, that the Soviet Union had placed missiles on the island of Cuba. At the outset, the crisis occurred to the advantage of the United States. The obvious advantage was the geographical factor, where Cuba lies only ninety miles away from the American coastline. The United States has a military base on the island itself, in Guantanamo Bay, hence giving them a further advantage. In other crises, in the middle east for instance, the location tended to lie nearer to the Soviet Union than the United States.

The second advantage was over the question of nuclear superiority. At the end of 1962, the United States had approximately 1,050 strategic nuclear vehicles (294 ICBMs, 144 SLBMs, & 600 long-range bombers) compared with the Soviet's 340 vehicles (75 ICBMs, 75 SLBMs and 190 long-range bombers).⁴ It was clear then that the US was the superior power with strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. Also in terms of naval power, the Americans far outclassed the Soviets. During the early 1960s, the Soviet navy was still in its infant stage vis-a-vis the American navy.

In fact, it could be argued that one of the possible reason for Khrushchev to deploy the missiles, the first time outside the Soviet Union, was to overcome this American superiority rather quickly. By deploying intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union would be able to strike American homeland at a relatively shorter time, thereby counter-balance US superiority in ICBMs. This could greatly threaten the US, especially when their early-warning systems are mostly placed on the north of the country. Following from this, one could argue cogently, that the missiles in Cuba were a vital concern to American national security then the Soviet Union. In as far as the Kennedy administration was concerned, it was imperative that the Soviets remove the missiles.

This US military superiority also meant that the Soviets were almost invariably bargaining and

negotiating from a position of weakness. Therefore, Moscow was cautious and restrained in their behaviour. This greatly contributed to the Soviets' decision to remove the missiles from Cuba. Zbigniew Brzezinski, suggested that in 1962, acute awareness of the inadequacies of the Soviet nuclear posture not only made Khrushchev withdraw the missiles, but also rendered possible counter-moves elsewhere out of the question.⁵

International crises occurring in the 1970s and 1980s, had a different international milieu as compared to the early 1960s. By this time the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear parity with the United States, with superiority in some delivery systems. The Soviet navy, a vehicle for coercive diplomacy, has grown (attributed mainly to the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov) and its submarine fleet is already the largest in the world today. The Soviet navy now patrols around the globe, deployed increasingly to 'show the flag'. As a result of the achievement of parity, Moscow now has a wide range of options opened, and hence this new confidence has led it to play an increasing role in the world, particularly in the developing countries. In the 1970s, witnessed Soviet involvement in the middle east, Southern Africa, and in Asia. Therefore, it is often claimed that Soviet risk-taking propensity has been given a substantial boost, while the United States — mainly as the result of the Vietnam debacle — on the other hand it is seen to have undergone a retreat in the international arena. During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, for instance, the issue of human rights was declared as an important determinant in the formulation of US foreign policy.

Another factor in the international environment was over the question of Cuba itself. Cuba was located in the American traditional sphere of influence and she had always been dominated by the United States, for the early 1900, the American government passed the Monroe Doctrine, which basically gave the rights for the American government to intervene in ensuring a stable government in Cuba. On the other hand, Soviet commitment in the early 1960s to Cuba was still underfined, for they established diplomatic relations only a year before the missile crisis. If we compare this factor in the missile crises with another crisis, for instance in the middle east, then a marked difference would emerge. The middle

east is somewhat a grey area when it comes to sphere of influences. Not only are the two super-powers involved in the numerous middle east crises, other western powers have also been involved.

DOMESTIC FACTORS

Apart from the international environment, there was the question of the domestic scene. The congressional elections were only three weeks away when the missiles were discovered in Cuba. Cuba had previously embarrassed the Kennedy administration, when president Kennedy ratified the abortive CIA-backed invasion of Cuba in April. He had suffered a loss in prestige as a result, and some believed that another such embarrassment could well cost the president's position. Also, Cuba had dominated the newspapers throughout the first few years of the triumph of the Cuban revolution. There were anti-Castro elements in America, and when Castro proclaimed Cuba a socialist state, many in America were shocked to find that their neighbour (only 90 km away from Florida) is now turning 'red'.

Therefore, Cuba had become a major political issue, and this led the president to have been pressured to have done something, in order to regain public support. This he certainly did, for his ratings dramatically shot up after he had announced the quarantine of Cuba. If we take the Arab-Israeli October 1973 war as a comparison, the domestic scene was quite different. The crisis occurred in the midst of the disclosures of the Watergate scandal. It was during a complicated domestic environment. When the Soviet Union threatened to intervene unilaterally in the middle east, a small group led by Kissinger recommended the president to issue a worldwide alert of US military forces. Nixon had not participated in this group, but accepted its recommendations. Instead of regaining support as Kennedy did about a decade ago, the alert of US military forces around the world proved to be a controversy within America. Many accused Nixon of diverting attention away from the prevailing scandal.

One final factor we have to consider in the Cuban crisis, was the question of the Cuba itself. The crisis had nothing to do with Cuban domestic politics, although Khrushchev argued that the

missiles would act as a deterrent against possible US attack on Cuba. Castro was not consulted throughout the crisis, and in fact this greatly annoyed him, specially when the decision to remove the missiles was made without his knowledge. This led to a temporary strain in relations between the two communist states. The Cubans did not even have the physical control of the missiles, as well as other concomitant sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union. This lack of Cuban involvement in the crisis meant that both the Soviets and the Americans could negotiate among themselves, and hence making negotiations relatively easy as compared with the participation of other parties. Taking the Lebanese conflict as an example, the actors involved, although allies of the superpowers, have acted independently, sometimes to the extent of embarrassing their patrons. Syria, for instance, had supported both politically as well as militarily the Palestinian rebels in attacking and destroying the Arafat-led PLO and ousting them out of Lebanon. The Soviet leaders tried to restrain Syria, but failed. Israel, on the other hand, had acted on its own accord in invading South Lebanon. Third parties and allies tended to act more independently than the case of the missile crisis.

The various advantages and special conditions prevailing during the Cuban missile crisis naturally contributed to its successful management. The Executive Committee was set up by the Kennedy administration, in order to act as a coherent body, directing and managing the crisis. The committee consisted of the president himself, his brother, personal advisers, and elite bureaucrats. The American local superiority meant that it could be initiated at a low level while threatening, with high credibility, an ascending sequence of steps short of nuclear threshold. According to G. Allison, "all that was required was for the United States to bring to bear its strategic and local superiority in a way that demonstrated American determination to see the missiles removed, while at the same time, allowing Moscow time and room to retreat without humiliation".⁶ And the best way to achieve this was the naval blockade of the island.

The actual reason which led to Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles are debatable, but the withdrawal had conditions attached to it — United States would guarantee that she will not invade

Cuba and later Khrushchev, decided that a mutual withdrawal of US missiles in Turkey was necessary. The latter condition was possible because the missiles based in Turkey were not indispensable to United States security. In fact, the Americans were already contemplating to remove them. The first condition was easily met as the United States had no strong desire to invade the island. Therefore, the crisis ended with the removal of the missiles from Cuba. Although throughout the post-missiles crisis era, Cuba and the two superpowers have been involved in various disputes, the issue of offensive missiles in Cuba never emerged again. However, most international crises never end in such a neat way. Crises tend to prolong with no end in sight, for example the Kampuchean problem is now in its sixth year and there is no indication that the crisis will end, but if anything it will get worse.

LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS AND CONCLUSION

However, despite all the somewhat 'artificial' conditions present during the missile crisis, there are lessons that can be learnt from it. Perhaps the most obvious was over the question of communications. Communications between the main parties concerned are imperative in managing a crisis. Throughout the crisis, both Kennedy and Khrushchev communicated with each other directly, hence giving them quick and effective way in solving the crisis. Its importance was realised by the two superpowers and as a result the 'hot-line' was set up, connecting Moscow and Washington. The 'hot-line' has been used frequently in subsequent conflicts, for example during the Arab-Israeli October war.

A second lesson and perhaps the most important is that neither side must leave the opponent with no alternative in resolving a crisis. In the nuclear age, there must never be a demand for total victory or unconditional surrender. During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy gave Khrushchev a way out and in actuality the latter could proclaim that the whole affair was successful when the US guaranteed not to invade Cuba. Concomitantly, conditions attached must be 'reasonable' and possible for the other party to carry out.

When dealing with the opponent's traditional

sphere of influence, the parties must act cautiously and respect the opponent's security concerns. When Soviet forces entered neighbouring Afghanistan, the United States did not react with a military threat not intervention, except for condemnation and later a grain embargo.⁷

Another lesson must be the constant civilian control of events. During the missile crisis, there was, apart from the quarantine, suggestions of a surgical air strike. Such a drastic move could have been disastrous, and the conflict could have escalated to a dangerous point. Even when the quarantine was imposed the navy wanted to do it their way, but was restrained by the civilians.

There are other important lessons, for example the need for domestic support, the importance of accurate information and the imperative accurate mutual assesment of interests. Therefore, in conclusion, the missile crisis consisted of too many special conditions that it rendered itself difficult and dangerous to be a model for a general theory of crisis management. In today's crises, factors are complicated and issues ambiguous, and actors numerous. The successful management of any crisis, I believe, still boils down to cautious and prudent leadership, as was clearly exemplified during the Cuban missile crisis.

NOTES


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- 5) P. Williams, op. cit., p. 157
- 6) G.T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971) p. 57
- 7) The US Congress also refused to ratify the SALT II agreement as a result of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan



Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda holds a B.A (Hons) degree in Political Science from London and an MA degree in War Studies from King's College, University of London. A guest lecturer for both the Staff and Defence Colleges, he is currently a lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences, Universiti Pertanian Malaysia.

PARACHUTE OPERATION

• • • • *an overview*



LT KOL AHMAD RODI BIN ZAKARIA

INTRODUCTION

With the evolution of the parachute, traditional warfare acquired another dimension whereby the enemy should not only be outflanked, but enveloped from the air with extraordinary speed. Such names as *The Red Devil*, *Les Paras* and *The Screaming Eagles*, are all associated with parachute forces.

The development of Parachute Forces was in response to a realisation that the invention of the aircraft had made possible a third flank using a third vertical dimension, whereby aircraft could fly over the enemy lines, thus envelope vertically the third flanks, the enemy's rear areas which are difficult to defend. In this respect, therefore, parachute operations offered the possibility of injecting the type of mobility required in the tactical sense of the future fast and fluid battles.

SCOPE

Parachute Operations in itself is a vast subject in terms of its preparation, planning, principles of employment, limitations and command and control of such operations. Hence, this article will briefly cover the Planning, Organisation, Roles and Tasks, Characteristics, Limitations and Command and Control aspects of such operations.

PLANNING OF PARACHUTE OPERATIONS

Planning of Parachute Operations constitute the following phases:

- * **The Ground Plan.** Having been given a certain tasks, objectives have to be selected which enable the task to be carried out. Detailed intelligence planning is essential for the collections, dissemination, by means of maps and air photographs, of topographical and engineer intelligence and information about enemy strength and disposition.
- * **The Landing Plan.** This includes the sequence, time and places of arrival of the airborne formation. The troops and equipment needed to carry out the tasks must be fitted in the aircraft available. If adequate number of aircrafts are not available, the ground plan may have to be modified for consideration.
- * **The Air Movement Plan.**
 - (1) During the drop, and for the period the airborne forces is to be supplied by air, a degree of air superiority will be required over the Drop Zones (DZs). The aircraft streams must also be protected, and the anti-flak plans will requires special attention. The plan must include details regarding this respect.
 - (2) The Air Movement plan will include tables showing the troops and equipment carried in each aircraft together with aircraft RVs, flight routing and the dropping formation.
- * **The Mounting Plan.** These covers all arrangements for the development of troops and equipment to airfield till emplaning. Such arrangements may include the setting up of

Transit Camps, provision of parachute platforms and other special stores. Air supply must also be included in the plan.

ORGANISATION OF A PARACHUTE FORCE

In most armies, the Airborne Division is the basic tactical formation of the airborne assault; assault being its primary role. Due to financial constraints experienced by some poor nations and also because it has been found that Brigade Group have produced the desired results, more and more armies have adopted the independent Brigade Group as the Basic Tactical formation of the airborne assaults.

The Organisation of an Airborne Division or Brigade is basically the same as that of an Infantry Brigade. The only different is that an airborne Brigade will be employed with the most powerful anti-armour weapons which can be carried into the airborne assault. Also the Field Battery/Regiments of an Airborne Brigade are usually equipped with the lighter guns such as the 75 mm pack howitzer instead of the normal conventional artillery pieces. In addition to that, in an Airborne Brigade an additional company known as the Pathfinder company, extra communication facilities and additional field surgical teams will be included.

ROLES AND TASK OF PARATROOPS

General

Due to inherent flexibility of airborne forces they are capable of performing a variety of tasks. In brief, these can be discussed under two main headings as follows:

- * Roles in which airborne troops have tasks independent of immediate ground operations. These may be strategic in nature or involving special tasks.
- * Roles in which a link-up with ground forces is visualised. These are classified as tactical roles.

Strategic Role. This will be the capture of an airhead, deep in enemy territory, to serve as a base for future operations, or to seize and hold an isolated area against limited operation for use as a ground, air or sea base for attacks on enemy's rear and his lines of communications. Another

strategic role is the capture of a strategically important area at the outbreak of a war.

Tactical Roles. Close cooperation with the main ground force remains the most precise use of airborne troops. Tactical tasks within this role may be:

- * The capture of ground vital to the enemy which is not otherwise readily accessible to normal ground troops.
- * The seizure of dominating ground or defiles, on the lines of advance.
- * To divert or block the approach of enemy reserve to the main battle and to protect the flanks of main assault.
- * To capture air fields, either as advance bases for our tactical aircraft or to deny them to the enemy.
- * To delay and cut off the enemy's retreat.
- * Attack to destroy enemy maintenance, signal communications and headquarters.
- * To reinforce ground troops in action.

CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS

The characteristics and limitations are:

- * **The Strategic Mobility and Surprises.** The training and equipment make them particularly suitable for movement at short notice from a base into action, from one theatre to another. This strategic mobility is further supplemented by tactical air mobility. Within the range of transport aircraft capable of dropping parachutists and other equipment, airborne forces have a wide choice of objectives. Natural and artificial obstacles are no barriers to them. If planned with adequate secrecy, the time and place of landing and the route of flight can be concealed until the last moment. Tactical surprise can often be gained by the airborne assault; but once surprise is lost, the maintenance of rate of build-up by air or overland, must be rapid enough to deal with the enemy's concentration of troops and heavy weapons against the landings.
- * **Effect On Morale.** The threat of vertical envelopment, the sudden appearance overhead of an airborne formation in mass or the news in the night or airborne landings in the

rear of a defensive system have a serious effect on the morale of enemy's troops particularly their commanders. The very threat of an airborne force in being may be enough to lock up large enemy reserves.

- * **Dependent On Air Superiority.** Transport aircraft flying at low altitudes and speeds, particularly at the time of drop, are vulnerable to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft defences. A degree of air superiority, is therefore, essential, which differs in degree depending on a number of factors including the scale of the operations and the length of time for which the airborne troops must depend on the air supply.
- * **Weather.** In poor visibility, DZs may not be accurately located. Cloud base must be above dropping height for personnel, heavy drops and supply drop missions. Wind speed should be preferably less than 25 knots, as above 25 knots heavy landing casualties must be expected.
- * **Limitation When Landed.** Airborne troops are particularly vulnerable immediately after landing and that they have organised themselves into their units and sub-units. A Parachute Bde can drop in under 15 mins from the aircraft, but a well trained Parachute Battalion should be able to reorganise in 10 mins by day and 60 mins by night. The Drop Zone (DZ) should be as close as possible to the objective and should be immune to enemy fire during this period.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PARACHUTE OPERATIONS

Airborne forces are expensive to train, equip and maintain. As such, the control of airborne forces are often kept centralised and in most cases will remain under direct command of the supreme commander in any theatre. The mounting of an airborne operation will be a joint responsibility of Army/Air Command Headquarters.

At the working level, the detailed planning will be done by the Airborne Force Commander and the Air Force Commander, who commands the air transport force allotted for the operation. The overall command of an airborne operation from take off to the landing is vested in the highest Air

Force Commander concerned, usually the commander of the Air Command, in whose area the operation takes place. He will coordinate the efforts of all components taking part.

CONCLUSION

The history of parachute operations has been too short and too inconclusive for any reasonable predictions for the future. With the growth and development of helicopter forces in countries such as Russia, US, Britain, France and Israel, air mobility has been reorganised to be far more

effective than ever before. This will be far more important in the future, when wide mechanisation of ground forces has led to high battle field, spreads. However, the development of new square parachutes and techniques such as High Attitude Low Opening (HALO) and standoffs have changed parachute forces to gear itself for highly specialised roles and tasks particularly for small scale infiltrations and exfiltration with long range capability. The effectiveness of such operation will of course be determined by detailed and thorough planning of commanders concerned.



Lt. Kolonel Ahmad Rodi Bin Zakaria was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment on his graduation from the RMA Sandhurst, United Kingdom in 1969. After attending the Airborne and Regiment Para Commando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD) in Indonesia, he volunteered to join the then Special Service Regiment in February 1971. He attended the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College in 1981. Currently he is attached to HQ Special Service Group.

SELF-CONFIDENCE

A commander who lacks self-confidence in his own abilities will never inspire the trust and respect of his subordinates. Nobody can be expected to follow a leader he does not trust unless he is motivated by fear or curiosity – both very temporary expedients. To develop that special trust, a commander must win the loyalty of his subordinates.

— Col Ian R. Cartwright
British Army
Army Review 1981

THE SOVIET VIETNAMESE RELATIONS & THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

KOL CHE MD NOR BIN MAT ARSHAD

Appearing in this edition of Sorotan Darat are the final parts of the original article written by the author. Parts 3 and 4 highlight some of the most significant events of the Soviet Vietnamese Relations and their effect on PRC.

PART III

IMPLICATIONS

Retrospectively, the USSR's success in concretising the relationship with SRV so that the latter became an ally was achieved primarily as a consequence of cautious and serious commitment. But it could hardly be claimed that the success was the outcome of any general long-term planning on the part of the USSR. Rather, it was a case of a number of factors coinciding and interacting together of which the following were significant: first, the complete withdrawal of the US from Indochina at the end of the Second Indochina War; second, the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations culminating in the termination of Chinese aid to SRV; third, failure of the non-communist industrialised nations especially the US to provide adequate economic aid; and finally, the USSR's declaration issued immediately after

the end of the war to help in large scale reconstruction of Vietnam.¹ But most important of all of course, was the USSR's willingness to help SRV realise its ambition in Indochina, irrespective of any eventuality, recognising that this would serve as an initial phase in the long-term aim of containing China.


In Indochina, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia meant that these three states were brought together under Hanoi's leadership and had since become a close ally of USSR. The signing of the Cambodia-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in February 1979, and the Lao-Cambodian Treaty for Cultural and Economic Cooperation a month later, signified the completion of a network of interlocking agreements that bound the three states together in the form of a confederation, thus making sure the realisation of Vietnamese ambition in Indochina.² Except for the threat posed by the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge forces fighting a guerilla war in



Mikhail Gorbachev

Cambodia, SRV's position in Indochina seemed secured. But, in order to ensure its security against PRC in the north, and to sustain the sponsored regime in Cambodia, SRV was obliged to maintain a force of 1.2 million men making it the strongest military power viz-a-viz all military forces of ASEAN states put together, in the region.³ Without Soviet help SRV could hardly maintain this

huge military machine, while simultaneously attempting to reconstruct its economy. SRV's dependence on USSR was obvious, given the fact that since 1980, the latter had to provide economic and military aid worth \$3 million per day. Evidently the Soviet must have found that such a state of dependency was necessary for this would be conducive to its policy of extracting concession from SRV. There was no arm factories in Vietnam so that all military hardware had to be imported from outside, chiefly the USSR.⁴ Without this, SRV would be helpless against the PRC. The Soviet appeared interested in investing in light industries only, but the rule was such that the products from these industries must be exported to the USSR only as loan payment. By contrast, the Soviet refused to invest in the creation of heavy industries, keeping the SRV dependent on the USSR for heavy machinery which was essential for SRV's reconstruction programme. So long as the threat from China does not subside, and until such time that SRV is able to feed itself, SRV has no alternative but to tolerate this exploitative nature of Soviet aid policy. In any case, in return for all this aid, SRV had to accede to the USSR's demand for use of base facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, the Soviets arguing that SRV's security could best be guaranteed through the physical presence of Soviet troops on Vietnamese soil. Since then, Soviet vessels have been seen



Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.

bunkering at Cam Rahn Bay and Soviet aircraft have been using the Danang air base.⁵ It was previously argued that the independent-minded Vietnamese would never allow the Soviet to construct permanent bases in Vietnam, but on the contrary, evidence suggests that since PRC's invasion of Vietnam, the Soviets have established electronic surveillance facilities, refueling installations, and maintenance workshops at Cam Rahn Bay and Danang. Such being the case, the USSR thus has achieved its goal of establishing base facilities in South China Sea, thus solving the logistic problems that had in the past plagued its Pacific Fleet of 755 ships including 100 submarines, 30 cruisers and 10 destroyers.⁶ In terms of competition with the US, the Soviet presence in Vietnam seemed to have matched the US presence in the Philippines. It was not surprising therefore that since 1979, violation of Filipino airspace by Soviet TU 95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft had become a regular affair. In short the USSR now had the capacity to back its political aspirations in the region even beyond Indochina.

PRC appeared to have lost its influence completely in Indochina. By occupying Cambodia, SRV had removed the foothold that PRC hoped to use to influence the activities of the pro-Peking

insurgent movements in Southeast Asia. Laos, who in the past had been adopting a neutral posture in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute, turned completely pro-Vietnamese, following PRC's invasion of Vietnam, to the degree that in March 1979, PRC had to withdraw its 600 road construction workers, while its embassy staff had to be reduced to 12, placing PRC's mission in Laos on equal diplomatic status with that of the US.⁷ PRC's reaction to this loss of influence was to apply pressure through maintenance of tension to the north of Vietnam's and Laotian borders, and to increase support to the anti-Vietnamese resistant movements in Laos and Cambodia, hoping that the three states would loosen their ties with the USSR. PRC's policy was however counter-productive as it only solidified the three states together so as to form an anti-China bloc to the benefit of the USSR. Indeed, the USSR, through SRV had removed PRC's influence in Indochina, but Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, on the other hand had been detrimental to the objective of Soviet overall policy towards the region. First, ASEAN countries had regarded the Soviet action in supporting the invasion as violating their limits upon Soviet involvement in the region. In their view, Moscow had attempted to gain illegitimate entry into the



The Five ASEAN Heads of Government affixed their signatures to the "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia."

region in disregard to ASEAN desire to remove the basis for great power intervention of this kind. Hence their hope of establishing ZOPFAN had been undermined. Second, ASEAN had lost the buffer that in the past had shielded their front-line state Thailand, and should Vietnam decided to expand westwards they would have to come to Thailand's aid. ASEAN thus demanded SRV's withdrawal from Cambodia, while simultaneously continuing their recognition of the ousted Khmer Rouge regime, on the grounds that the Vietnamese Heng Samrin's government had been unconstitutionally installed by the Vietnamese.

Soviet fleet operating from Cam Rahn Bay were to gain access to the Indian Ocean to interdict the US military moves, Japanese shipping and PRC's future blue sea navy now under modernisation, prior approval of ASEAN states for use of their waterways must be obtained.

In an effort to obtain the ASEAN countries' approval, the USSR had attempted to communicate its concern for regional stability. Through the Thai and Malaysian Prime Ministers who visited Moscow in March and September 1979 respectively, ASEAN leaders were assured that SRV had no aggressive intention against Thailand.⁹ This



Khmer Rouge: Well-disciplined

For the USSR, the need to mollify ASEAN countries to induce them to accept SRV, as the dominant power in Indochina had become more urgent. ASEAN's acceptance of the Vietnamese sponsored regime in Cambodia could promote international acceptance of Vietnam's position, enabling the country's leaders to seek aid from other sources.⁸ At the same time, the USSR had found that regional animosity must be overcome if Soviet influence was to extend beyond Indochina so that Chinese and even American influence could be pushed out of the region. Furthermore, if the

assurance was however short-lived, as following the Non Mark Moon's incident in June 1980, when Vietnamese troops had made a limited incursion into Thailand, ASEAN leaders had begun to suspect that the USSR had collaborated with SRV in the hope of making some gains out of Vietnamese aggression. If the USSR had earlier thought that ASEAN initial search for assurance meant acceptance of Soviet role in the region, then the incident must have been a set-back to the USSR. In addition, it was also an embarrassment, for it reflected the USSR's inability to restrain the

Vietnamese despite the former's leverage on the latter. Coupled with the problems faced by the ASEAN states as a consequence of the influx of refugees, (the USSR had been implicated as having helped the Vietnamese to create a situation which compelled greater outflow of refugees, because these refugees were of Chinese origin from Cambodia and Vietnam, by locking the distribution of supplies and medical aids from other countries), ASEAN solidified their stand together branding the Soviet-Vietnamese combination a threat to peace and stability in the region. The dilemma for the USSR now was that the two aspects of its policy towards Southeast Asia had come into conflict. Alliance with Vietnam had made the USSR



Deng-Xiaoping

less acceptable to the ASEAN states, and had endangered the overall policy towards these countries. Without Vietnam, however, the USSR would have no other foothold in the region which could be used against China and no basis to claim any legitimate interest in Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN views, the USSR had lost accountability. But the USSR's unwillingness to sacrifice its alliance with SRV, in favour of its overall policy, had forced the former to orchestrate policies from behind the three Indochinese states so that ASEAN would continue to have dialogues with the SRV to solve the Cambodian issue.

The strained relations that developed between ASEAN on one side, and the Soviet-Vietnamese combination on the other, provided the

opportunity for PRC to exploit the fear of the danger posed by the Soviet-Vietnamese combination to the security of all states in Southeast Asia. PRC reiterated its earlier pledge that it would come to Thailand's and ASEAN defence should SRV with Soviet support extend its aggression beyond Indochina. Lacking any substantive military capability, to communicate to the Vietnamese in the language that they understood, the ASEAN states would be compelled to rely upon Chinese and American diplomatic or military support to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Thus Thailand's alignment with PRC, as the price of which the former had granted the latter the right to use their territory as a conduit of PRC's military supplies to the Khmer Rouge force in Cambodia. Considering that Thailand had a long traditional rivalry with Vietnam for control of Cambodia and Laos, and had historically been aligned at times with China for precisely the same reason, SRV's leaders must now think of a possibility of PRC opening a second front should they contemplate moving beyond Indochina.¹⁰ SRV's action then, intentionally or otherwise had reactivated the traditional Thai-Chinese link, so as to invite PRC into involvement in Thailand's security. Similarly whether or not through PRC's influence, since PRC had long advocated continued US presence in the region, the US reactivated the Manila Pact Agreement of 1954, by pledging to come to Thailand's defence in the event of any further aggression from Vietnam.¹¹ While there were doubts about American credibility after the fall of Saigon, the major airlifts of military hardware to Thailand after the Non Mark Moon incident seemed to reflect the US determination to honour its commitment to its ally. The USSR had to be concerned with this renewed American interest, as the response from the new Reagan administration, was hard to predict especially with regard to this administration's attempt to impress its toughness in dealing with the USSR in international affairs.

Although ASEAN and PRC seemed to have adopted similar postures over the Cambodian issue, both the USSR and SRV were cognizant of the fact that there were different perceptions among the ASEAN states concerning the source of regional threat, and hence the possibility of splitting the organisation on security matters. As



The apparition of Ho!

this difference centred on whether China or Vietnam was a threat, the USSR attempted to convince ASEAN that SRV had no aggressive intention beyond Indochina. According to the USSR, ASEAN should be grateful to Vietnam for creating a strong buffer on mainland Southeast Asia to protect them from expansionist PRC.¹² Malaysia and Indonesia, who had bitter experience of Peking-inspired insurgency, overseas Chinese problem and Chinese supported coup of 1965, considered China a great threat. Thus they came up with the Kuantan formula in March 1980 that recognised SRV's security interest in Cambodia, provided that SRV was free from dependence or influence by either the USSR or the PRC.¹³ Thailand, who perceived that Vietnam was a threat, rejected the formula while Singapore not wanting to be identified with China because of its concern over its Malay neighbours, advocated the formation of a military alliance made up of the US, Japan and ASEAN to oppose the Soviet-Vietnamese combination. SRV of course rejected this formula as this could mean its divorce from the USSR. The split was however short-lived, as following the Non Mark Moon incident, all ASEAN states rallied behind Thailand on all

matters pursuant to Cambodian problem. PRC must have been delighted over this outcome, as this ensured Thailand's (and hence ASEAN) alignment with China. Subsequently ASEAN and PRC's policy seemed to merge, as both continued to advocate the Vietnamese withdrawal as a precondition for political settlement to the Cambodian problem. For that matter, the formation of the coalition government in Cambodia under Sihanouk and its subsequent legitimisation as a result of its acceptance in the UN General Assembly in late 1982, would not have been possible without PRC's backing.¹⁴ SRV on the contrary rejected any proposal if it involved its withdrawal from Cambodia, and maintained that its position in Cambodia would be irreversible.

SRV's refusal to reach a compromise with ASEAN, its failure to defeat the Khmer Rouge insurgents, and to achieve economic recovery must have frustrated the Soviets. The longer the war in Cambodia continued to drag on, the more dependent the SRV would be on Soviet aids, and hence a continuous drain on the Soviet economy.¹⁵ This prompted the USSR to deal directly with Cambodia and Laos rather than going through SRV; on economic matters initially, but later it

developed into an attempt by the USSR to exploit the local grievances against the Vietnamese domination. In February 1980, the USSR even offered to conclude a separate bilateral treaty with Cambodia.¹⁶ In the Cambodian case, perhaps the USSR must have seen the advantage of weaning it away from the SRV, since Cambodia could provide the port of Kompong Som as an alternative to Cam Rahn Bay in the event that SRV disallowed Soviet use of Cam Rahn Bay. Soviet attempts to separate the two Vietnamese dependencies from Vietnam intensified in September 1981, when Brezhnev had separate meetings with all the three Indochinese leaders in the Crimea.¹⁷ Vietnamese suspicion of Soviet

USSR returned to the old line of going along with SRV on matters pertaining to problems in Indochina especially over the Cambodian issue.

It appears therefore that so long as the Cambodian issue is not solved, Soviet influence in Southeast Asia seems to be confined to within Indochina only. This is far from achieving its objective of preventing China's influence in the region. On the contrary, the Soviet-Vietnam combination's policy over the Cambodian problem, not only had increased PRC's involvement in Thailand's security, and a convergence of policy with the ASEAN states, but also had invited the US to show a renewed interest towards the region. Some strains in the Soviet-Vietnamese



Civilians on the run: Thailand boarder will have to look after another 100,000

intentions resurfaced, and in December 1981, pro-Soviet sympathisers including Cambodia's Premier Pen Sovan were removed from power. This led to a strained relations between the USSR and the SRV. But fearing the loss of an ally the

relations seemed to surface, but for the time being the Soviet had to tolerate the Vietnamese posture in the interest of the gains that the Soviet had made so far.

FOOTNOTES

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16. Leszek Buszynski, "The Soviet Union In Southeast Asia: Motives, Limits And Opportunities" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 1982, p. 285.
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TO UNDERSTAND THE WORLD —

Man must rise above the Earth — to the top of the atmosphere and beyond — for only thus will he fully understand the world in which he lives.

— Socrates

PART IV

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

To reiterate, the USSR obviously is faced with a dilemma in its attempt to prevent Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. This is because the two aspects of its policy have come into conflict. Through Vietnam, the USSR has now gained influence in Indochina thus partly ensuring the achievement of the above objective. Further, alliance with Vietnam gives the USSR the bases on the shores of South China Sea, that not only could serve the purpose of containing China, but also serve its global objective in terms of competition with the US. But as a result of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, alliance with Vietnam has made the USSR less acceptable to the ASEAN states, thus endangering the USSR's overall policy towards the region. Without Vietnam, however, the USSR would have no foothold that it could use to contain China, and perhaps no basis to claim any legitimate interest in the region.

It is most unlikely that the USSR would want to sacrifice the gains that it has made so far. Having recognised that it is the regional animosity arising from Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (with its backing) that has become the obstacle to further influence in the region, the Soviet must be expected to concentrate their efforts in removing this regional animosity through finding a solution to the Cambodian problem, in a manner that could lead to ASEAN acceptance of Vietnam's position in Cambodia as a fait accompli. Using force, such as launching incursion in the manner of another Non Mark Moon incident, but on a larger scale, in order to achieve this end, perhaps is most unlikely as this not only would throw Thailand into a deeper Chinese embrace, but also might invite the US into greater involvement in the region. In addition, such action could also alarm Japan, especially if the Japanese were to judge that such action could threaten their economic life line. ASEAN states are not just major markets of Japanese goods but also main suppliers of raw materials for Japanese industries. An ASEAN-Japan-US-China entente formed to oppose the USSR is not something the Soviets would want. Thus the Soviet policy would be to support the initiative of the Indochinese states in their dealing

with ASEAN, while simultaneously continuing to give economic and military aids to SRV to eliminate the continuing and embarrassing existence of the Khmer Rouge and settle the Cambodian problem. It may take time, but its purpose is two-fold: in that the Soviet-Vietnamese relations would last because of SRV's continued dependence on Soviet aid, while the removal of the source of animosity between ASEAN and the USSR would enhance the USSR's influence on ASEAN in future. In the meantime, the USSR could count on the influence of Indonesia and Malaysia who have always considered China a threat to the region, to work on Thailand in particular, so that the latter would reorientate its China policy. In fact trends towards this direction are already shaping, as influential Thai leaders have, since early 1982, begun to express concern over Thailand's involvement in a proxy war of the superpowers.¹ It is probably part of the Soviet calculation too, that success in Cambodia will not immediately alter the nature of Vietnam's conflict with China, and to that extent the USSR will still be required as an ally which will retain its strategic facilities in Indochina, however tenuously. Soviet policy would at least be compensated for an impaired relationship with Vietnam by the eventual elimination of a source of regional hostility as the Cambodian problem fades into history. In this sense, the relationship with Vietnam continues to present opportunities for the USSR in the region.² Thailand (and hence ASEAN) would have to come to terms with Vietnam, and for fear of possible Vietnamese actions if Thailand continue to maintain links with China, Thailand might decide to sever these links and seek accommodation with Vietnam. Noted for the policy of 'bending with the wind', Thailand might even invite the USSR to act as moderator in the Thai-Vietnamese relations.

Although the solution to the Cambodian issue would present opportunities for the USSR in the region, several inherent characteristics among ASEAN members could restrict Soviet influence in the part of Southeast Asia. First, Thailand is tied to the US by the Manila Pact Agreement of 1954, and the US military and economic aid has always been substantial especially after the Non Mark Moon incident of June 1980. The Philippines has the US military bases legitimised under the

Mutual Security Treaty of August 1951, and for that matter the Filipinos have always placed alliance with the US at the centre of their foreign policy.³ Malaysia and Singapore are bound to Britain, Australia and New Zealand under the Five Power Defence Arrangement. Moreover, these two countries still harbour suspicions of the USSR, because of the USSR's involvement in the Indonesia's confrontation policy against them in 1962-1965. Similarly Indonesia looks to the USSR with suspicion because of the USSR's past involvement in PKI activities, and the aborted coup of 1965. Soviet attempts to reestablish link with the Indonesian armed forces through promises of renewed supply of spare parts, was rebuffed by the Indonesian government in 1976. Moreover, the Soviet regional aims have always conflicted with Indonesia's desire to insulate Southeast Asia from the great power penetration.⁴ Second, ideologically ASEAN states are staunchly anti-communist because of their experience with communist insurgencies in the past. The predominantly Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia have continuously condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and called it a threat of Islam. Third, ASEAN proposal for the establishment of ZOPFAN in 1971, that came barely two years after Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System proposal, reflected their objection to Soviet presence. The Soviet efforts to link the two proposals calling them as identical to each other have so far failed to get ASEAN acceptance. Fourth, economically, the USSR has not much to offer in terms of development model, as these states have made so much progress using the capitalist system. Although Soviet trade has in the past expanded, Soviet reluctance to convert rubles into hard currency, and the poor qualities of Soviet manufactured goods seem to limit trading activities in the region. Moreover, in the foreseeable future, it is hard to imagine that the Soviet would be able to challenge the Japanese predominance in this field. Finally, the activities of Soviet diplomats seem to have antagonised the ASEAN governments as seen from the strings of expulsion of Soviet diplomats from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore at the beginning of 1982.⁵ These characteristics in ASEAN would continue to prevail for some time to come. Opportunities do indeed exist, but the same opportunities are

open to other powers as well.

Another avenue by which the Soviet Union could gain influence in ASEAN states perhaps, is the threat to support the insurgent movements in ASEAN states, so as to coerce the latter into accepting the Vietnamese position in Cambodia. It is important to remember that PRC during its courtship of ASEAN, pledged that it would stop supporting the pro-Peking insurgent movements. In Thailand, PRC encouraged the Communist Part of Thailand (CPT) to cooperate with the Thai government to fight the Soviet-Vietnamese combination.⁶ Vietnam also made similar pledge in the course of its courtship of ASEAN, but was even further by expelling the CPT from its sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The situation confused the CPT, causing its members to lose faith in the organisation, to the extent that between 1 October 1979 to 30 September 1981, a total of 2,256 of its members surrendered to the Thai authorities.⁷ Thailand indeed had benefitted from the conflict in Indochina since its domestic security had been enhanced. The USSR, on the other hand considered that this improved security situation, which was achieved at the expense of the conflict in Indochina, would only encourage the Thais to harden their attitude towards the Vietnamese position in Cambodia. Thus, coupled with the frustration as a result of failure to reach a compromise between ASEAN and Vietnam over the Cambodian issue, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Kapitsa, in April 1983 resorted to threat by warning ASEAN states that the "USSR would support Vietnam to supply arms to the insurgent movements in the ASEAN states, if ASEAN did not stop supporting the Khmer Rouge Forces in Cambodia".⁸ The appearance of a pro-Soviet communist organisation called the 'Green Star Movement' in Northeast Thailand in July 1983, showed that the USSR and Vietnam would implement the threat.⁹ The USSR and Vietnam have the capacity to support this movement, and should the Cambodian conflict prove prolonged, the USSR and Vietnam might perhaps use their insurgent movement to create incident that could threaten Thailand's security, thus forcing Thailand (and hence ASEAN) to seek accommodation with Vietnam. Subsequently perhaps, this instrument might continue to be used by the USSR to achieve other policy objectives as well.

With respect to Indochina the longevity of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance which the Soviet have to cling to, to ensure continued influence, could also be open to question. First, this alliance was established because Vietnam needed the support of a superpower in its quarrel with PRC, and in its desire to dominate Indochina. In this respect the USSR would be indispensable as long as the China threat persists. Second, Vietnam needed economic aid to help its reconstruction programme, and alliance with the USSR is important, insofar as Vietnam 'is unable to diversify its sources of aid from elsewhere. Finally, the Vietnamese as a race are historically characterised for their 'independence mentality'. This independence mentality (Doc Lap) which simply means 'depending on no one and trusting on no one', has its genesis as a consequence of Vietnamese experience of repeated attempts by China to sinicise the Vietnamese since 500 BC.¹⁰ Vietnam's policy of vacillation in the Sino-Soviet dispute between 1954 to 1975, and Vietnam's attempts to diversify sources of economic aids from 1975 to 1978, all could be regarded as efforts by the Vietnamese leaders to avoid dependent on one only. Vietnam would also not forget the USSR's sacrifice of Vietnamese interest at Geneva in 1954, and again in 1972 when the USSR failed to react to the US mining of Haiphong harbour, for fear of jeopardising Soviet interest elsewhere. Of late, the Non Mark Moon incident clearly demonstrated that Vietnam could act independently so long as it served the Vietnamese interest. Bearing in mind the above factors, the future of Soviet-Vietnamese relations could be in jeopardy. A solution to the Cambodian issue, that could lead to correct relations established between ASEAN and Vietnam, could in turn mean that economic aid from other sources such as Japan and the US could be obtained by Vietnam. Of course the threat to its domination of Indochina would remain. But logic and history had shown that after each confrontation, Vietnam has always made peace with China.¹¹ It might take a long time to get over the anti-Chinese feeling as a result of the border war of 1979, but recognising the geographical and political reality, SRV's long-run interest and security needs, might dictate an accommodation with its bigger neighbour. If PRC could accept a neutral Burma and a neutral Laos in

1962, there is every possibility that it would also accept a Vietnamese dominated Indochina provided it is not aligned to the USSR. Viewed from this angle, reconciliation between PRC and Vietnam is possible in the near future. But once the China threat is removed, 'independence mentality' might dictate Vietnam's disengagement from the USSR. Thus the possibility of the Vietnamese implementing the same policy that Sadat did in dealing with the USSR.

Based on the above, Soviet-Vietnamese relations therefore presents both the opportunities and limits to Soviet policy towards the region. If the Cambodian issue is not solved, and the China threat remains, Soviet influence tends to be confined to Indochina only. If the Cambodian issue is solved, opportunities do exist for the USSR to extend influence to the rest of Southeast Asia, particularly with respect to its aim of preventing China's influence, as trends are developing within ASEAN towards keeping a distance from PRC. But the same opportunities are also open to other powers such as the US and Japan who have since established strong links in the region. Perhaps the greatest danger to Soviet policy in the region is when the China threat to Vietnam is removed. Vietnam would find no requirement of being dependent on any power to guarantee its security, and if aid from other sources are obtainable, especially following the solution to the Cambodian issue, Vietnamese 'independence mentality' could work to the detriment of the longevity of the alliance.

CONCLUSION

The loss of Indonesia in 1965, almost eliminated the USSR's hope of obtaining a foothold in South-east Asia to serve the purpose of preventing China's influence in the region, and also of obtaining a base from which to project its presence in terms of competition with the US. But following the intensification of air war in Vietnam by US in 1965, which forced the Vietnamese to change their strategy, and the Nixon policy of Vietnamisation of the war that signalled the US impending withdrawal, Moscow saw that a good opportunity to gain a few foothold had suddenly emerged. Capitalising on the Vietnamese change of strategy that required sophisticated military hard-

ware which the Chinese not provide, the USSR began pouring military aids into North Vietnam. Up to 1975, USSR's aid however fulfilled the strictly limited function of neutralising PRC's assistance, the latter giving about twice as much as the former. After 1975, the situation began to change, and the Soviet leadership evidently realised the opportunity, not just to obtain a foothold, but also to fulfil the vacuum in Indochina left by the withdrawal of the US.

In the years from 1975 to 1978, after overcoming the problems created by the Vietnamese attempts to continue pursuing their policy of vacillation in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the USSR gained Vietnam as an ally. Again this was not the outcome of systematic long-term planning, but rather as a result of a combination of several factors: first, the complete withdrawal of the US from Indochina at the end of the Second Indochina War; second, the deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relations culminating the termination of Chinese aid to Vietnam; third, the failure of the non-communist industrialised nations such as Japan to provide adequate economic aid; fourth, the USSR's declaration issued immediately after the war, that it was prepared to help on a large scale in the reconstruction of Vietnam. But the most important factor that threw Vietnam deeper into the Soviet embrace, and consequently the USSR's ability to use the base facilities in Vietnam, was the threat posed by China, and the latter's attempts to prevent the creation of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina that was aligned to the USSR.

Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia with Soviet support, though it eliminated Chinese influence in Indochina, also had consequences that have since persisted, and proved detrimental to the Soviet desire to prevent China's influence in the region as a whole. Soviet relations with ASEAN worsened, and coupled with the USSR's inability to prevent Vietnam from acting independently on the Cambodian issue, particularly after the Non Mark incident, ASEAN and particularly Thailand found alignment with PRC the only means to counter the Soviet-Vietnamese combination. In addition, the Non Mark Moon incident also re-involved the USA. So long as the Cambodian issue is not solved, the USSR's influence would continue to be confined to within Indochina only.

This situation has led to a stalemate and confronts the USSR with a dilemma. On the one hand, the relationship with Vietnam gives the USSR a strong foothold in the region, and base facilities for its large Pacific fleet which the Soviets are unwilling to sacrifice in view of their competition with US. On the other, the relationship besides being a heavy economic burden, has confined the USSR's influence to Indochina only. This dilemma has resulted in a degree of immobility of the USSR's policy towards the region, and hence undermined the objective of preventing China's influence in this region. Further, the US renewed involvement has also complicated Soviet attempts to deal with the non-communist states in Southeast Asia.

Unwilling to sacrifice the gains that it has made so far, the USSR is obliged to continued its present two-part policy even though one part is in conflict with the other. The USSR's hope is that the Cambodian issue would fade into history, forcing ASEAN to come to terms with Vietnam and accepting the latter's position as a fait accompli. If the trends within ASEAN continue to proceed in the direction of keeping a distance from China, opportunities for Soviet influence do exist. But equally the same opportunities are also open to other powers as well. Moreover, because of ASEAN states 'anti-communist posture and distrust of Soviet activities, the USSR would still face difficulties in trying to gain influence in that part of Southeast Asia.

But even if the Cambodian issue is solved, the Vietnamese 'independence mentality' could perhaps work to the detriment of the USSR. With the help of ASEAN, Vietnam could now be able to obtain aid from elsewhere particularly from Japan and the US. If Vietnam demonstrates that it does not intend to expand beyond Indochina, the US has every reason to cultivate Vietnam into other 'Yugoslavia'. The manner by which the USSR is administering aid could perhaps cause resentment on the part of Vietnam. Past records had shown that the Vietnamese have always made peace with the Chinese after each confrontation. Past records have also shown that China would accept neutral states along its border if this ensured its security. If Vietnam could satisfy that it would remove the Soviet bases upon China's cessation of hostility, then Vietnam might find no

cause to continue to become an ally of the USSR. The Vietnamese 'independence mentality' would work so as to cause Vietnam to disengage from the USSR. Losing Vietnam not only could mean losing Indochina as its sphere of influence, but also could place the USSR in a position that it would have no basis to claim any legitimate interest in Southeast

Asia. Perhaps only a "neither-peace-nor-war" situation is good for the USSR's interest. Such a situation not only could ensure longevity of its relations with Vietnam, but also its continued influence in the region, though confined to Indochina only.

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3. *ibid.*, p. 282.
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7. *ibid.*, 557. According, The New Straits Times of Kuala Lumpur on 27 July and 29 July 1983, reported that the strength of CPT had been reduced from 12,000 to 3,000 by mid-1983. In addition 500 members of CPM had also expressed their intention to surrender.
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


An ex-putra of the RMC, Kol Che Md Nor Bin Mat Arshad was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment in 1963. Kol Che Md Nor who holds a Master Degree in International Relations & Strategic Studies from the University of Lancaster, had held several senior appointments (including being the CO of 19 RAMD) before assuming his present position as the Head of the Strategic Planning Staff, Joint Services Division, Ministry of Defence.

BATTLE WOUNDS

Death and battle wounds are plain and clear dangers to soldiers in Vietnam, or anywhere else the cold war blows hot. Not so clear, but quite as real, are insidious threat to military careers from booby traps hidden in bottles, skirts, black markets, and other quicksands of foreign service.

— Maj Gen Aubrey Newman
US Army (Ret)
"The Human Element In Leadership"



... berkomunikasi adalah satu kemahiran yang perlu dituntut dan dipraktikkan demi untuk mencapai sukses dalam satu-satu bidang tertentu itu.

KEMAHIRAN BERKOMUNIKASI

MEJ YUSOFF KHAN B RAHIM KHAN

Penciptaan dan penyebaran DOKTRIN khas bagi utilisasi dalam Tentera Darat kita kini sedang mencapai satu tahap yang diharapkan semenjak konsep mengadakan Doktrin sendiri telah dilaksanakan pada Tahun 1980. Doktrin yang jua merupakan suatu pengetahuan dasar mengenai pelbagai konsep peperangan tidaklah boleh disarankan tanpa adanya satu media kuat bagi penyarannya. Apa yang saya maksudkan di sini ialah media BAHASA. Penguasaan Bahasa

tidaklah boleh dianggap sebagai satu proses automatik — yakni jika seseorang itu terdiri dari satu suku kaum, maka secara automatik beliau boleh menguasai Bahasa kaum tersebut!

Jika kita sempat mengkaji sebuah dua buku hasil ilham Chomsky dan Bloomfield, Ilmu Bahasa bukanlah boleh tercapai begitu sahaja, malah ianya perlu dicari-periksa dan dikaji secara mendalam. Pakar-pakar ilmu Bahasa Tanahair Dr. Prof Asmah Hj Omar dan penulis terkemuka Puan Adibah

Amin sering memperingatkan bahawa Bahasa yang dipertuturkan itu perlu dikaji-selidik hari demi hari supaya ianya digunakan mengikut ciri-ciri penggunaan yang betul.

Di dalam Angkatan Tentera kita, kini penggunaan Bahasa Malaysia sedang dipergiatkan di segala bidang pengajian. Di Sekolah Latihan Tentera Darat (LATEDA) dan di Pusat Latihan Tentera Darat (PULADA) kursus-kursus latihan diselenggarakan dalam Bahasa Malaysia; malah di Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera jua penggunaan Bahasa Malaysia sedang diusahakan. Pelbagai pamflet ilmu ketenteraan telah dan sedang diterjemahkan dari Bahasa Inggeris ke Bahasa Malaysia.

Penyiaran Doktrin melalui medium Bahasa Malaysia sangatlah penting kerana kian hari kian ramai pegawai dan perajurit kita menanam minat membaca buku-buku serta majallah-majallah yang mengandungi artikel-artikel ketenteraan.

PERANAN KOMUNIKASI DALAM PERDAGANGAN

Konsep Komunikasi yang saya utarakan selanjutnya adalah komunikasi melalui media bahasa, — sama ada lisan atau yang bertulis. Memang tiada boleh dinafikan betapa pentingnya media ini di segala bidang pembangunan di dunia hari ini.

Anika bentuk dan jenis peralatan komunikasi termasuk komputer-komputer dan peralatan setelit akan terkubur begitu sahaja sekiranya media 'bahasa' ini diketepikan. Tanpa perhubungan melalui media ini jua saya rasa dunia akan terhenti dari segala aktiviti dan mengalami detik-detik zaman purbakala.

Peranan komunikasi melalui penggunaan satu-satu BAHASA itu amatlah penting di bidang perdagangan di dunia ini. Perantaraan Bahasa inilah menjadi akar-tunjang yang meneguhkan perdagangan di sesebuah negara itu; waima, ianya secara otomatik memainkan peranan selanjutnya meningkat ekonomi negara tersebut. Tidaklah mencukupi sekiranya seseorang itu berhajat hanya mengumpulkan sijil-sijil atau diploma-diploma tanpa menyediakan dirinya supaya boleh menulis dan bertutur dengan cekap dalam satu, dua atau lebih BAHASA tertentu. Sering kelihatan bahawa pengurus-pengurus mahupun eksekutif-eksekutif yang berjaya hari ini sangat fasih dalam sekurang-

kurangnya DUA bahasa; malah syarikat-syarikat di sektor awam atau pun jabatan-jabatan Kerajaan hanya melayani mereka-mereka (pemohon-pemohon pekerjaan) yang fasih dalam bidang bahasa-bahasa yang ditetapkan.

Dari segi kemajuan penggunaan BAHASA dalam bidang perdagangan kini pelbagai kursus khas bahasa dianjurkan di beberapa institusi pengajian tinggi di dunia. Di Singapura misalnya kursus ESP (English for Special Purposes) diadakan. Bidang ini termasuk *English For Oil Purpose*; *English For Commercial Purpose*; atau *English For Military Purpose* dan lain-lain lagi. Kursus khas bahasa Inggeris ini mempunyai modul-modul tertentu yang memberi perhatian khas kepada istilah dan konsep-konsep mengenai satu-satu kegunaan (purpose) tersebut. Dengan terasasnya pengetahuan sedemikian ini di kalangan pegawai-pegawai satu-satu syarikat itu, sudah tentu bidang perdagangan yang diselenggarakan oleh Syarikat/sektor tersebut itu akan menjadi maju.

PSIKOLOGI PERDAGANGAN

Pengetahuan atau kebolehan bertutur dalam satu-satu BAHASA yang didapati dari bangku sekolah atau dari keturunan (lidah-rasmi ibunda) hanyalah boleh menjadi pengasas; — tetapi, yang penting adalah mencapai satu kepakaran atau prestasi yang tinggi dalam satu-satu Bahasa itu. Kefasihan bertutur adalah kritarium utama bagi pemilihan eksekutif-eksekutif muda dalam satu-satu syarikat itu. Pertuturan yang disusun rapi dan penuh dengan kata-kata lemah-lembut serta berdiplomasi adalah seperti 'magnet' untuk menarik pelanggan-pelanggan. Pegawai-pegawai mahupun pemimpin-pemimpin yang berbudi-bahasa halus lagi fasih dalam pertuturan biasanya disegani dan disayangi oleh orang-orang bawahannya. Fenomena inilah yang boleh meninggikan taraf satu-satu syarikat atau sektor perdagangan dan pada asasnya inilah yang dilaung-laungkan sebagai *psikologi perdagangan* oleh pakar-pakar ekonomi atau sains-sosial. Pergaulan (interaction) melalui media perhubungan (bahasa) di antara pegawai-pegawai/kakitangan tuan-punya syarikat/perniagaan/industri dan pelanggan-pelanggannya menjadi ciri-ciri utama kejayaan yang dicapai oleh sektor tersebut. Kini sudah pasti kejayaan tersebut wujudnya dari interaksi tadi dan mereka sudah

tentu menggunakan perantaraan BAHASA yang indah lagi tersusun itu.

Jika kita menjelajah di negara-negara di dunia kini; kita dapati setiap negara sedang pesat memimplimentasikan bahasanya sendiri dalam segala bidang pengajian dan perdagangan, sementara itu mempelajari segala BAHASA utama dunia. Matlamat negara-negara ini adalah supaya dapat menghubungi di antara negara yang kemudiannya akan terjalinlah persahabatan serta wujudlah perjanjian perdagangan dua-hala.

Di negara kita kini sudah pun ada syarikat-syarikat usahama dari negara-negara Jepun, Korea, Amerika Syarikat dan Eropah. Sudah tentu 'perhubungan' sedang dan akan memainkan peranan istimewa terutama apakala mengadakan mesyuarat atau mengikat perjanjian. Memang tiada sekali-kali boleh dinafikan wujudnya peranan komunikasi yang amat penting di sektor perdagangan.

KUNCI PERKEMBANGAN

Penggunaan BAHASA dalam perdagangan sehari-sehari telah disalahfaham oleh sebahagian dari kita. Ada di antara kita yang menafikan bahawa BAHASA atau *perantaraan Komunikasi* ini bukanlah satu faktor yang penting, — ia hanyalah satu media interaksi sahaja; dengan bergantung kepada falsafah sedemikian maka mereka mengabaikan segala aspek-aspek mempelajari atau mengajar ataupun menyokong pembelajaran BAHASA. Betapakah salahnya mereka yang berpendapat sedemikian! Sayang sekali! padahal faktor inilah menjadi KUNCI perkembangan perdagangan atau perniagaan. Dari interaksi pertama atau dari temubual awallah mulanya satu-satu perusahaan itu; dan, apakah yang memulakannya jika tidak penggunaan BAHASA?.

Memenang sudah wujud *media komunikasi* di kalangan rakyat dunia dewasa ini; tetapi apa yang saya pertikaikan di sini ialah mempelajari secara lebih mendalam lagi bahasa-bahasa yang utama di dunia ini; dan lebih dari itu, belajar apa yang dimaksudkan seperti Bahasa-ekonomi; Bahasa-

dagangan; Bahasa-sains; Bahasa-komputer dan lain-lain lagi. Sebenarnya, kesemuanya ini adalah BAHASA — apa yang ditambah-tokok ialah istilah-istilah khas — *special-to-subject* sahaja. Kini kursus-kursus BAHASA khas diadakan untuk pegawai-pegawai Kerajaan atau esekutif-eksekutif muda dalam pelbagai bidang perdagangan. Inilah di antara langkah-langkah yang sepatutnya diambil oleh pihak-pihak tertentu demi meninggikan lagi prestasi pegawai-pegawai yang diamanatkan dengan tanggungjawab memajukan perdagangan bagi negara atau satu-satu sektor tertentu.

SINTEKS & SIMANTIK

Istilah-istilah khas bagi satu-satu matapelajaran bidang pekerjaan/profesyen bukanlah boleh dicipta dengan sewenang-wenangnya oleh satu pihak sahaja. Pengajian teliti dan perhubungan (*liaison*) yang kerap terpaksa diadakan pihak-pihak terlibat sebelum satu-satu ISTILAH itu diterima atau disahkan. Wakil-wakil dari profesyen atau bidang pekerjaan tertentu mestilah dihubungi dan beberapa perbincangan mestilah diadakan mengenai SINTEKS dan SIMANTIK yang melibatkan profesyen tersebut. Misalnya, jika satu modul BAHASA TENTERA hendak disediakan; wakil dari TENTERA mestilah dipelawa dalam hal-hal tersebut; begitulah pula dengan ILMU KEDOKTORAN (PERUBATAN) misalnya — pakar-pakar perubatan mestilah dihubungi tentang segala istilah tersebut.

Hasil dari kajian-kajian inilah yang akan merupakan MEDIA-KOMUNIKASI yang mutlak khas untuk bidang-bidang tertentu. Tidaklah akan berbangkit perbalahan istilah dan sebagainya apakala ilmu disalurkan melalui media seperti ini. Inilah apa yang saya maksudkan dengan 'SPECIAL TO SUBJECT language; Peranan komunikasi melalui penggunaan BAHASA tidak boleh dipisahkan dari perdagangan; malah, ianyalah yang menjadi KUNCI bagi kemajuan atau kemakmurannya.

Penulis artikel ini adalah juga Editor Sorot Darat